People who consider Konrad Lorenz’s conclusions regarding the nature of violence and his concerns about the risks it entails to be unfounded often refer to or use arguments from a piece titled “The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique“. To avoid any misconceptions about the phenomenon of violence, let us examine what is wrong with this critique.
At the very beginning, an argument is made that Lorenz defines aggression as a combat instinct implemented toward members of one’s own species and is genetically innate, inherited from biological ancestors. However, according to the critics, this definition strips the term aggression of its meaning. In general, when discussing aggression and violence, the question of what we actually mean by “aggression” and “violence” almost always arises. In this context, it is reasonable to reduce these terms specifically to innate tendencies toward intraspecific violence in the form of inflicting physical harm (or the threat of inflicting it), as this is the object of study. Everything else, for example, the fact that aggression is subjectively defined differently by different people (for some, even an impolite greeting would be aggression), we do not take into account.
Based on the critique, such an understanding of aggression does not correlate with activities manifested not directly, but through social institutions developed by humans. Firstly, all institutions that apply coercive measures always work through coercive agents. You might say that if a person becomes a politician, they can sit in an office and issue inhumane orders, thereby committing acts of violence without actually performing any corresponding physical activity. However, these orders are worthless without the coercive agents who execute them directly; therefore, one must look specifically at them and their propensity for violence. Secondly, other social aspects, such as wealth, status, and skills (which were mentioned in the critique), do not provide such an opportunity on their own without methods of directly inflicting physical harm on a person, for example, using the same security forces. We cannot speak of violence where there has been no such direct impact. Of course, a person may attempt to harm another person through indirect influence via a chain of many instances; however, this chain will sooner or later encounter the need to apply a coercive measure. For example, some might say that a monopolist in the market can turn people into slaves using purely economic methods and even drive them to starve to death by unilaterally setting the cost of labor and products. However, to be a monopolist, one must have coercive agents (one’s own, or an agreement with the agents of an existing monopoly, such as the state) ready to destroy all competitors in the market through direct violence, especially those who refuse to make concessions and negotiate peacefully.
After this, Lorenz is criticized for mixing the behavioral models of quite different animal species and humans, arguing that the justification of a common origin of species is insufficient for this. However, it should not be forgotten that the unbreakable basis of the behavioral model of any living creature is always the biological processes occurring in its organism. It would be foolish to believe, for example, that by mere desire, due to some social factors or with the help of some supernatural forces, a highly developed primate, including a human, could ignore the action of hormones and receptors of the nervous system. And biological processes, in turn, are determined by genetics. Of course, one should not forget the gene-environment link—certain genes are activated in a certain environment. But this fact only confirms our correctness, if we consider two factors: humans share a large part of the genome with animals due to the same common origin, and Lorenz observed the same behavioral mechanisms regarding the manifestation of violent behavior in very different animal species. According to the critique, it is wrong to extrapolate observations of animals to humans, even if these observations coincide for a very wide range of species. Of course, I agree that Lorenz’s works may lack observations of specifically human behavior; however, based on the two factors described above (common genetic heritage and the observation of identical behavioral patterns in different species), it can be boldly presumed that his conclusions regarding the nature of violence are very likely true for humans as well. And referring to the social sciences, psychology, etc., which was also mentioned in the critique, makes no sense, as we are considering the biological and genetic component, which is more fundamental—these sciences cannot contradict biology or make changes to it. In the end, if someone still continues to deny these conclusions, it would be better to criticize them with observations of human behavior, corresponding systematization, and comparison with Lorenz’s conclusions, rather than simply pointing to the incorrectness of the fact of extrapolation.
The critique also addresses Lorenz’s instinctive-hydraulic model. It explains the phenomenon of instinctive reactions triggering in the absence of a specific stimulus by the accumulation over time of a certain specific potential, which lowers the threshold necessary to trigger the reaction; this also explains spontaneous acts of aggression. This model is criticized due to the lack of neurophysiological evidence for its correctness. However, firstly, it has not been refuted, and secondly, Lorenz himself acknowledged the limitations of this model and the fact that it possesses a number of flaws; that is, in fact, he did not propose it as an absolutely correct and final solution.
Next, the influence of intraspecific aggression on the survival of species is criticized, especially in the case of humans. Statistics are provided as an example, showing that wars between different groups of people (including modern wars starting from the 19th century) have had a very insignificant effect on the survival of humanity. I will not argue that this conclusion is correct at the moment. However, here, Lorenz’s fears regarding the threat of violence to the survival of humanity should be linked to scientific and technical progress. After all, humans have become the most heavily armed species on the planet; they have already faced nuclear threats more than once, and every day the threats become more serious, as dangerous means become increasingly accessible for acquisition and reproduction by small groups of people and even individual individuals. In fact, the destructive potential of small groups and individual individuals is increasing every day. For example, viruses are a very accessible means of mass destruction, although other things could be devised. It is hard to argue with Lorenz’s fears here!
Another point in the critique caught my attention because it only confirms Lorenz’s theory rather than refuting it. But first, we need to remember something. As we know, Lorenz’s observations show that species with strong innate weaponry do not use it in intraspecific clashes. This primarily concerns hedgehogs, porcupines, venomous snakes, and insects; Lorenz also mentioned wolves, which do not bite their fellows in vulnerable places such as the belly or neck, and ravens, which in fights do not even try to peck out each other’s eyes with their very sharp beaks. The emergence of such mechanisms during evolution is quite logical; otherwise, representatives of these species would simply exterminate each other. As for poorly armed species, this mechanism manifests to a lesser extent, since either their representatives are unable to inflict serious harm on their fellows, or the latter can escape from the attack—meaning violence does not threaten them as much. For example, when Lorenz put two turtle doves—seemingly peaceful birds of the pigeon family—in one cage, the dislike of one bird for the other led to it severely maiming and almost killing the other during Lorenz’s absence. All because there was nowhere to run in this case.
In the case of humans, this mechanism also does not manifest very strongly, as their natural weaponry is quite weak. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that humans have inherited this mechanism to a certain extent; moreover, we can confirm this with observations regarding war, which the critique itself refers to, again, to prove the insignificance of the influence of violence on the survival of humanity. In many armies, more than half of the soldiers who were supposed to shoot simply could not pull the trigger. There is also mention of a refusal by one of the US army brigades to obey orders during the Vietnam War. Cases such as the mass killing in My Lai are a great exception and an abnormality for modern wars. In general, most soldiers considered the Vietnam War meaningless, and throughout its duration, a typical soldier spent only a few hours in combat. Also, a social study conducted by the information and education department of the US Department of Defense shows that during World War II, most soldiers actually tried to pretend they were busy with something rather than actually engaging in military affairs.
Based on this, it can be concluded that humans possess Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism. Although it is expressed in a weaker form than in heavily armed species, it nonetheless provides the prerequisites for solving the problem of violence, which concerned Lorenz so deeply and, in principle, is a cause for concern for any sane person. And, by the way, in the material we are considering, an attempt to criticize this specific theory is not even undertaken.
