Mobilization is about mobility. Mobilize!

So, Putin announced mobilization. Not enough military recruitment offices were burned down in Russia for him to give up on this idea. Before that, not enough Rosgvardiya officers were killed during protests for Putin to give up on the idea of going for who-knows-which term of the presidency. And so on. This is a classic tragedy of the commons, where each protest activist bears personal costs, while the hypothetical result is achievable only collectively, and the contribution of a specific activist is always relatively small and can easily be replaced by the contribution of some other activist. For collective protest to be successful in such a situation, many crutches and fortunately aligned factors are required: political culture, charismatic leaders, a split among elites, and so on.

Of course, everyone understands this. FBK investigations plus lobbying for personal sanctions, as well as smart voting, are measures aimed at splitting the elites. Organizing rallies, training observers, and participating in elections are measures aimed at forming a political culture. Promoting opposition information channels is a measure aimed at the emergence of charismatic leaders. Navalny, Yashin, and Roizman demonstrated by their example that they not only call on others to bear costs but are ready to bear them themselves. The leaders of the Russian opposition have acted and continue to act generally quite competently.

As a countermeasure, the regime acted with maximum audacity, which was aptly described at the time by the formula “Yes, we’ve gone totally off the rails, so what?” The regime made it clear that in response to any criticism, it would destroy the source of that criticism, and this naturally led to a situation where now everything is banned in Russia. And if not long ago the regime’s propagandists were saying, “if you don’t like it, get out,” now even the option of leaving is becoming less accessible and increasingly subject to criminal charges.

Well then. If previously burning down recruitment offices seemed like a perfectly adequate measure that did not entail unnecessary casualties, now it is clearly insufficient. As correctly noted online, if you beat up a recruitment officer, you’ll get a lighter sentence than for draft evasion—provided, of course, that you don’t shout extremist slogans while doing it. But this, of course, is only relevant for those who are already in the first line for mobilization.

If I previously recommended the tactic of “committing a terror act and immediately fleeing abroad,” now everything has changed; there are traffic jams at the borders, plane tickets are sold out, and there is a high probability you’ll have to hide within the country, which is much harder. Therefore, active actions will need to be planned much more carefully to avoid being caught, and you certainly must not waste yourself on suicidal actions that have purely symbolic significance with negligible destructive effect. I’m talking about rallies, pickets, and similar non-working crap.

As for us in Montellibero, we are still ready to welcome those who managed to evacuate from the sinking ship and help them settle in. Even if your husband has been mobilized, that is no reason for you to remain a hostage of the regime, waiting for him in Russia—it is much more pleasant when a husband knows that you are safe. You won’t be lost here.

*Find out where the recruitment office employees live, and don’t let them reach the main road*

Not only with a gun, but also with a kind word

My voice is currently forming a funny polyphony with the voice of the Bitarch: he continues to develop the theme that the only justified reason for violence should be self-defense at the immediate moment of the act, while I am rooting for guerrilla warfare, and specifically, I tossed out the idea of intensifying it during election periods, when the enemy’s forces are distracted by this boring show.

And since we are talking about elections, I would like to rely on the opinion of a key Russian opposition political strategist, Leonid Volkov. Who, if not him, should understand how relevant all this guerrilla activity is at the current moment?

So, let’s read his recent interview with Novaya Gazeta, which was recently shut down in the RF. What theses does he convey regarding the issue of interest:

Guerrilla warfare against the Russian regime is cool, right, and patriotic; and if no Stauffenberg is found near the Führer, then it is possible and necessary to hit the regime at least at those levels where it cannot reliably protect potential targets of attack.
Donating to the AFU is like bailing out the ocean with spoons; big predators operate at this level, so let the states dispose of their weapon stockpiles; for private individuals, it only makes sense to plug occasional holes in this area.
Creating organizations for conducting guerrilla warfare in the RF is either stupidity or provocation; one must absolutely not act this way.
Why doesn’t Volkov try to organize guerrilla actions? Because he doesn’t know how, and doesn’t even have a clue how to go about such things. He advocates for the division of labor, where everyone realizes their comparative advantages, just as economic theory suggests to us.

So, the maestro is ready to support the guerrillas informationally, but abstains from more direct participation. In this regard, first I want to speculate on how it actually makes sense to act in order to inflict regular damage on the regime in the rear while maintaining an acceptable level of security.

There are, of course, old known mechanisms like the assassination market, which are designed flawlessly in terms of security, but have a significant drawback: for some reason, they never worked in real life. Why? Primarily because ideas do not exist without carriers. It is not enough to provide a mechanism; you also need to attract people who would start using it.

Therefore, when choosing between security and effectiveness, one always has to sacrifice security in some way. Hence custodial crypto wallets, Telegram instead of encrypted mail, and the creation of firms instead of a total realm of freelancing.

Therefore, as a decent compromise, I want to recommend the article Entry Point. Creating a Cell from the Telegram channel Black Journal — slightly leftist, but that has little effect on the quality of the practical material.

The recent AFU offensive seems to have become a turning point in the Ukrainian military campaign, and while previously I was inclined to recommend the operational scheme “lone wolf commits sabotage – immediately leaves the country,” now optimists can afford schemes like “created a cell – we work in different directions – those who are exposed leave the country, the others continue the work.” A political future may largely lie within such cells of grassroots self-organization, because all the old mechanisms of political participation, such as parties, have long been bankrupt.

The goal of sabotage and terror attacks is not so much the immediate weakening of the enemy, but rather to sow and strengthen defeatist sentiments among the ranks of poorly motivated supporters and hostages of the regime. Essentially: look what the current leadership has brought the country to: its army is being beaten to a pulp at the front, Ukrainian saboteurs roam the rear like they are at home, orders are sabotaged, budgets are plundered; grab a piece of the country for yourself at the end, however much you can, the inevitable collapse will write everything off anyway.

Accordingly, if you absolutely cannot imagine how you would organize any destructive activity, but you know how to whine talentedly, then rejoice: your hour has come! It is precisely talented whining that the country needs most right now. If you don’t sow defeatist sentiments, then who will, other than you? Well, Strelkov is trying too, of course, but you should be able to do no worse. Rebrand yourselves as victims of television propaganda and start spreading gloom: the whole West is against us, everyone is deceiving Putin, everything is lost, the front is collapsing, what the hell is this Donbass for, it’s nothing but problems, and all those refugees — and so on and so forth, depending on who your interlocutor is.

You can do it.

Optimal tactics for the Russian opposition during the upcoming elections

Elections are coming soon in Russia. Last time, voting at polling stations lasted for three whole days, and I hope this practice continues now. The FBK, as usual, is calling for smart voting, and of course, the Russian opposition (those who haven’t left yet) should publicly support this initiative. Be sure to post on social media that it is now more important than ever to act within the legal framework, support democratic institutions, and so on and so forth. And even go and vote for someone; it might prove useful.

The most important thing for the Russian opposition in the coming voting days is that a vast number of polling stations are open across the country, and at each one, there is one or even two cops on duty. This, in turn, means a sharp increase in the police response time to various truly important political actions, such as burning down certain government institutions—like the already familiar military recruitment offices—or even something more tasty. It would be a sin not to take advantage of this!

Remember: the only thing that justifies a Russian oppositionist remaining in Russia right now is participation in sabotage, diversions, and terrorist attacks. Your sitting in prison weakens the regime far less, and participating in some pickets actually strengthens it, because you will inevitably pay the regime a hefty fine afterwards. So, for those of you remaining behind enemy lines, it is far more useful to promote some theory of small deeds, write that the special operation is “not that straightforward,” and generally behave in a moderately unacceptable manner—while steadily unscrewing the nuts from the rails.

Well, the time has come for terror too

In the post What to do with Russia from July 1, I wrote:

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotage against war-sustaining infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological nuances; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will end up demotivated, rather than receiving, on the contrary, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is practically an inevitable stage in the gradual escalation of efforts to dismantle the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with it in advance, acquire the necessary competencies in a timely manner, and identify a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely in a while; they have not yet fully crystallized.

After that, I had somewhat forgotten the topic, but just the other day, deep in the enemy’s rear, somewhere near Moscow, Fascism-chan was blown up as a result of a terrorist attack. Exactly who blew her up does not matter, just as it does not matter which of the socialist-revolutionaries in the early 20th century collaborated with the Okhrana. Much more important is exactly who was blown up. Perhaps I should still reflect on the optimal choice of targets for individual terror.

Judging by the hype caused by this attack, the target was chosen very successfully. It was demonstrated that the war is not happening somewhere far away, but can knock on the door of any “sofa-front” fighter at any moment, even a very glamorous one. Perhaps future terrorists should designate such a category of rear rats as “charming cannibals” as a priority target. For example, someone like Girkin and the like; I am not very well-versed in them. The category of “loathsome cannibals”—like a conditional Margarita Simonyan—are second-tier targets. The category of “useful idiots,” like a conditional Yuneman, is the third tier.

Compiling lists is also useful. For instance, a liquidation list, provided with links to the figures’ creative works and justifications as to why the elimination of a particular figure will contribute to demotivation in the pro-war camp and a drain of people from it. Plus, criteria for exiting the list: leaving the Russian Federation, public condemnation of the war, or transferring a significant sum to pro-Ukrainian funds (specifically those dealing with troop supply, not humanitarian aid). The benefit of the list is obvious. Someone on it discovers one fine day that two figures have already died in two weeks, there are ninety figures in total, and if the trend continues, they have a year and a half to live at best, so isn’t it time to run and repent?

And, of course, it would be especially effective to carry out attacks in locations where farewell rites for the bodies of previous victims of terrorist attacks are taking place. The goal is to ensure that not only the people on the lists, but their entire circle of acquaintances, begin to live in the mode of a special operation being conducted right around them.

It would be very useful to focus the terror primarily on Muscovites: it is beneficial to increase the rift between Moscow and the surrounding territories. Let the provincials, on one hand, gloat, and on the other, be wary of drawing fire upon themselves and prefer to distance themselves from the capital and its absurd war.

P.S. Why do I write only about attacks targeting propagandists, those collecting donations for the SVO, and the like? Because the destruction of military personnel during a war, even in the deep rear, is not a terrorist attack, but sabotage. Military personnel are legitimate targets. Propagandists are illegitimate.

P.P.S. And what about the NAP and all that? That’s just how it is. Not armies, but states fight. Combatants are merely the most obvious targets, who are also usually within the reach of the combatants of the second warring party. Non-combatants of a warring state who support the war are exactly the same targets of war. Moreover, non-combatants who do not support the war can also be quite justifiably destroyed by the second warring party if they failed to escape the jurisdiction of their state abroad or into captivity. It is simply that it is most useful to show maximum humanity toward them, but that is a question of tactics, not of law.

How will the problem of a “federal fleet” be solved under minarchism and even more so under full ancap?

This problem is clearly visible in the US Civil War, where the Southerners had a larger army, a more powerful economy, and more money, but they lacked one thing: naval supremacy.

In other words, the essence of the problem is simple: maintaining ships is hellishly expensive, more so than any other weaponry, and there are great doubts that a single firm could maintain a nuclear aircraft carrier. If it were maintained by several firms, there is a high chance it would turn into a “federal” aircraft carrier.

Without a fleet, self-defense is impossible. With a fleet, controlling counter-revolution is impossible.

How is it proposed to deal with such a problem?

P.S. This is, of course, referring to minarchism or ancap in a specific country.

Anonymous question

In many ways, this question resembles the problem of cities being buried under layers of horse manure as the population grew in the late 19th century. In other words, the problem belongs to one technological era, while the circumstances for which a solution is being sought already belong to another.

Proto-ancap existed in Iceland for three hundred years and then surrendered to the state. Proto-minarchism existed in the USA, conventionally speaking, until that very Civil War—meaning less than a hundred years—and was then crushed with great bloodshed by the federal center. So, of course, the problem of power centralization itself is not imagined, but at its core lies a pronounced positive effect of scale when increasing armament. If this effect disappears, the problem of power centralization also disappears.

Today, naval supremacy is a thing of questionable effectiveness. Let’s say there is some mega-bandit who has robbed his subjects of such an astronomical sum that he can afford a mega-fleet superior in strength to all other fleets. What is the profit from this? The ability to ensure an effective naval blockade of any chosen coastal territory? The ability to control the sky over any territory within the reach of carrier-based aviation? And how do these capabilities convert into money? For the mega-bandit as some unified entity—almost not at all. These expenses will never pay off, and naval muscles serve the bandit almost exclusively as decoration.

On the other hand, the mega-bandit is a conceptual entity; in fact, decisions are made by specific people, and for them, what matters is not what income the mega-bandit receives, but what income they personally receive—by reducing the overall efficiency of the mega-bandit. Again, if instead of increasing one’s own efficiency, one reduces the efficiency of others, then this is also a quite effective strategy for remaining the coolest, even at the cost of reducing one’s capabilities in absolute terms; and the mega-bandit can indeed act quite rationally based on this extremely “smart” strategy of “you die today, and I tomorrow.”

How could a conditional ancap community prevent such moronic attacks from these atavistic predators? First, as the episode with the cruiser Moskva showed us, anti-ship missiles are quite effective against a fleet at a significantly lower price. Second, the elimination of individual regime functionaries is usually even cheaper than the destruction of thousand-ton tubs. Third, the idea of the nation-state is becoming less popular, and with it, the popularity of patriotism falls, which is expressed, in particular, in the unwillingness to serve in the army. As a result, today even countries with huge military budgets have serious manpower shortages. It is already difficult to man a fleet, and when the situation develops to the point where the first significant territorial ancap communities appear on Earth, the situation will become even more depressing for etatists.

Yes, horses will not give way to cars overnight, but cities will no longer be buried under manure; the trend has changed. Conflicts will become increasingly market-justified, which means minimum costs for maximum efficiency. Not the time for aircraft carriers.

What to Do with Russia

From what can be gathered from the news, the situation with Russia is roughly as follows. External political actors want it to suffer a military defeat, but not an overly crushing one, and they certainly want a single statehood to be preserved on the territory of the RF. This is understandable; the status quo always has the advantage of not having to worry about interacting with new entities.

I do not rule out that, given such a touching coincidence of interests, Western politicians may indeed succeed in preventing Russia from collapsing. If, of course, the residents of Russia themselves do not resist this terrible scenario in which Moscow’s power, however criminal it may be, remains legitimate in the eyes of other political sovereigns, which means a carte blanche for any internal repression and squeezing every last drop out of the citizens.

It is clear that a scenario in which the entire population simply leaves Russia is extremely unlikely, and the departure of even ten percent doesn’t really change the overall situation, as the examples of Venezuela or, for instance, Ukraine show us. The state continues to stumble along despite general hopelessness and degradation.

Those remaining in the RF now have to actively work themselves to ensure the country loses the war as quickly as possible. It is difficult to say which specific sabotages are currently being carried out by locals and which by Ukrainian saboteurs, but one hopes that the local share is quite large.

I primarily draw information about what is happening on this strange front and what sentiments are gradually forming in this environment from the Telegram channel Anarchy+. The channel is occupied with attempts to theoretically conceptualize what is happening; reflections on the most appropriate tactics are constantly presented, and while peaceful protest was discussed there before, the channel is now rapidly radicalizing.

I would like some more serious involvement of my own in the process of the RF’s collapse, but it is hard to understand where I would fit in. Sabotage is a maximally secretive and decentralized process, and for me, the most obvious role is providing communication and coverage of what has happened. So, for example, I could receive reports of certain actions unilaterally and promote them on my platform, so that the actions would gain publicity, but this would not help in reaching the organizers.

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotaging war-support infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological points; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will are demotivated, rather than receiving, conversely, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is an almost inevitable stage in the gradual increase of efforts to bring down the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with this in advance, acquire the necessary competencies ahead of time, and look over a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely after some time; they are not yet fully formed.

A provocative question

It has been a while since I wrote anything about the war. The bleakest of predictions has come true; the war has become protracted. The warring parties will not exhaust the resilience of their economies anytime soon. The Russian side—due to skillful tactical actions on the economic front. The Ukrainian side—because financing Ukraine is not yet particularly burdensome for its allies.

On the other hand, the global economy has obviously begun to crack, undermined by the war in addition to the preceding COVID madness. This leads to the thought: are all these economic sanctions really so necessary to destroy the RF? Actually, no, but that is a boring topic, let’s not dwell on it; I want to ask about something else.

Ukraine asks for more and more weapons, yet receives them in quantities obviously insufficient for a quick victory. In this regard, I am purely humanly curious how Ukrainians would react to a certain dilemma. The greedy capitalists say: the reserves of our charity are exhausted. You want to keep fighting—fine, you will have your weapons. We will sell them to you. In exchange, we want your Ukrainian land. As our capitalist private property. And so that you—we know you, you damn socialists—do not nationalize it immediately after victory, we demand extraterritoriality for the land we buy. We will establish our private military bases there, so that you don’t dream of stretching your greedy hands toward us later. Sell us Odessa; we will organize a free city there. Without mines in the waters, securely protected from the Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian fleets. And without taxes, of course. And with the free circulation of our capitalist currencies, whichever are convenient for us. And without your officials, naturally—our managers are more efficient.

Do you think a conditional Zelensky would agree to such an insolent proposal? Would he give one seaside city into the ownership of a consortium including a conditional Lockheed Martin and other esteemed gentlemen? In exchange for the products of these very Lockheeds and Martins. And a conditional Zelensky voter—how would he react? Would he say, “Oh, to hell with Odessa-mama, give me F-35s”? Or would he scream angrily that he will not yield an inch of native land to anyone, and that after the ammunition runs out, he will fight with stones and sticks?

*Who wants muskets? Real muskets from white people!*

Reparations

It is quite funny that the RF is still fully attempting to go on the offensive, still holds a substantial advantage in the air, and continues to throw new goals of the war into the information space—while on social media, discussions are already in full swing about how Russia will pay reparations to Ukraine, whether one should push for them, and whether those who were initially against the war should have to pay them.

I’ll throw in my two cents as well. It seems to me that the absence of reparations is primarily in the interests of Ukrainian libertarians, but also Russian ones. Meanwhile, statists on both sides should heartily approve of reparations.

The thing is, reparations are money that a state pays to a state. But the state always collects this money from its subjects. How did the rise of the Moscow Principality begin? It began when the Moscow Prince Ivan received the privilege from the Horde Khan to pay reparations on behalf of all Russian principalities. In the process of collection, much stuck to his hands, and Moscow grew strong. When a conditional Leonid Volkov begins collecting reparations for Ukraine, Moscow will also only grow stronger from this, because what on earth is federalization and the transfer of powers to regions when you need to squeeze money out of people and pay the Ukrainian president?

But let’s assume that the international anti-corruption fund, led by the valiant Ivan Zhdanov, manages to find and lobby for the seizure of such a quantity of property from major Russian corrupt officials that it will be enough to pay reparations, and no extraordinary taxes will need to be levied from other Russian citizens. What will the kind Ukrainian president do upon receiving reparations from the kind Russian president? He will begin, on behalf of the state, to commission various works to restore what was destroyed during the war, strengthen the Ukrainian state army, police, customs, tax authorities, provide additional funding to the national bank, and so on. In short, he will strengthen the social state. Is this a good thing? “Of course, it is,” the government officials who will distribute all this money will answer the Ukrainian libertarians, as well as their relatives who, by a happy coincidence, receive government contracts.

Naturally, any caring person has many moral grounds to help Ukrainians in the war, in life in emigration, and in the restoration of the ruined economy after returning home. But for this, they do not need state coercion; it is more likely to get in the way. For instance, states block the bank cards of RF citizens (making it harder to donate), create a mass of restrictions for emigrants, which complicates their settlement in a new place and hinders providing them with help, and at the stage of post-war assistance, they will surely surround private initiative with a bunch of hurdles. Therefore, partisan activity against all states proves to be in demand: against the state of Ukraine, which prevents some refugees from leaving it freely; against the state of the RF, to sabotage military conscription, the work of state institutions, disrupt military supplies, and demotivate private individuals from supporting the war; against other states that hinder emigrants from finding employment, settling in, and conducting monetary transactions. But all of this is not reparations—do not whitewash this cringe-worthy word.

P.S. I forgot to add one more important point. The best outcome of this war is the complete destruction of the Russian state. But in that case, there will certainly be no reparations: the subject from whom they can be taken will vanish. And this is another very important reason why Ukrainian libertarians should dream not of reparations, but of a far more pleasant outcome.

Of course, the absence of reparations does not cancel the possibility of prosecuting private individuals and bringing claims against them for specific damages.

*Where do reparations come from? Allah gives!*

Reflections in connection with the special operation

I am not, of course, talking about what is happening in Ukraine—a war is happening there. I am talking about the special operation carried out by Ekaterina Schulmann for evacuation to Germany “for an internship.”

For a long time, Ekaterina Mikhailovna categorically denied the possibility of her own emigration, because she is a political scientist, a specialist in the Russian legislative process, and leaving would mean leaving the field of research. Of course, these are rather laughable excuses, because she herself has repeatedly stated that she always relies solely on open sources rather than some murky insiders; access to open sources from Berlin is no worse than from Moscow. We have a classic cover story so that the enemy suspects nothing until it is too late.

Now she claims that the internship is not indefinite, it is only for a year, and then either the shah will die, or the donkey will, or as a result of the internship, a new interesting research task will come up, for example, in Latin America—but make no mistake, return to Russia is inevitable, so there is no need to repress the relatives remaining in Russia, dear officers of the authorities.

I strongly urge those who find it difficult to decide to leave to adopt the experience of Ekaterina Schulmann. The main thing: if emigration scares you so much, do not call it emigration. As Schulmann has repeatedly stated, people are not leaving for nowhere now. You can relocate to another country while continuing to maintain communication with those remaining in Russia no less closely than before departure. You can continue to work for Russia remotely. You can choose not to sell off your property, but simply mothball your home or rent it out. You can leave powers of attorney with reliable people, allowing them to carry out any transactions on your behalf if necessary. And most importantly—you can immediately outline an approximate timeframe or conditions for return. That’s it; you are simply going for a change of scenery, not throwing yourself into a whirlpool of uncertainty. Admit it, that sounds much less frightening.

Nevertheless, please do not be overly reckless. Study the experience of the pampered Muscovites who rushed out of the country like they were scalded, only to discover with surprise that while it is, of course, pleasant and peaceful abroad, it’s actually damn hard to break through. Many skills diligently acquired in Russia turn out to be useless, employers are not lining up to hire you, and then there are all those annoying domestic trifles, like an unfamiliar cuisine or an insufficiently rich cultural life.

Far from the familiar business and linguistic environment, far from familiar daily life and old friends, it can be difficult. You will have to prove to a multitude of people, who didn’t know you until now, that you are needed enough for them to pay you. You may have to engage in completely unskilled labor, at least for some time. You may be visited by thoughts that you are using yourself completely irrationally, since in Russia your labor was far more effective than here, in a new place. Yes, it may be so. But there, your labor benefited primarily those who are killing people in Ukraine. Therefore, your departure is a heroic act. It is your feasible contribution to the defeat of the Putin regime. It is not the only possible path, but it is a completely worthy one.

Instead, you can go to prison in Russia. The regime will feed you, and the recruit will get less food. You can engage in propaganda and sabotage. The regime will feed an army of investigators, whom you will provide with work, and the monetary allowance of Russian contractors will be more modest. You can earn money in Russia and donate to the Ukrainian army or other organizations waging war against Russia. All of these are also worthy choices.

Actually, there are only two unworthy choices. This is retreating into internal emigration, when you live in the RF as if nothing had happened, shutting yourself off from external irritants. And this is supporting the Russian regime. In the first case, you are a legitimate target for economic sanctions. In the second, you are also a legitimate target for security actions.

Perhaps I will expand slightly on the last point. Libertarians, after all, advocate for the protection of private property. But if it occurs to you to mark your private property with the same symbols used to mark Russian military equipment—you are marking yourself as a target for guerrilla warfare. Moreover, an easy, poorly guarded target. You are a combatant, a member of an organization that initiated violence against a wide range of people, and your property is now encumbered by demands for reparations. Be glad if they only slash your tires.

Routinization of the nightmare

The war in Ukraine has entered a protracted stage and is beginning to slowly slip from the current agenda. The most unpleasant outcome this could lead to is:

The front stabilizes, the sides dig in, and losses decrease;
The Russian economy slowly degrades under sanctions, but the political structure proves resilient enough, and the state does not collapse;
The Ukrainian economy slowly degrades under shelling, and effectively only those fighting and those servicing the war remain in the country; the majority of those left either scatter far from the front line or leave the country, and once gone, gradually get used to their new place of residence;
Russians, who failed to flee the RF in the early stages of the war, gradually lose the ability to do so: they are welcome nowhere, they run out of money for tickets, and international flights will cease to exist. Wittingly or unwittingly, they tighten their belts and begin to survive;
By the way, regarding the replenishment of the RF army with cannon fodder, there is no need to worry in this scenario: it is enough to give the conscript’s family army rations and immediately deprive them of them as soon as the conscript deserts or surrenders. Son in the army—parents are fed. Many would be willing to accept such a deal.
And this continues for years.

To some extent, this scenario could be hindered by the opening of new hotspots of tension around the RF: the remnants of Russian troops will begin to be pushed out of Transnistria and the Caucasus; the RF will try to act on all fronts and will ultimately break down relatively quickly. However, one should not rely solely on the help of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia. It is better to continue pushing the RF toward a rapid military defeat and political collapse, primarily through the efforts of Russians.

Initially, I proposed exclusively “herbivore” measures, such as burning down military recruitment offices. This creates chaos in the troop mobilization system, entails no collateral casualties, looks effective, and has an inspiring effect on any supporter of freedom. Now, however, I see that in many places they have gone further: there are reports of sabotage on the railways. Again, without human casualties. Relay cabinets, which as I understand it, serve for cargo dispatching, are being destroyed. That is, the throughput capacity of the road is sharply reduced, but trains do not derail. A mass of other sabotage proposals of varying degrees of ingenuity is circulating online, but for the most part, it boils down to provoking failures in the troop supply system.

What interests us much more is the collapse of the country. And here, it is very difficult for me to think of any political activity in the RF that would allow a libertarian to keep their “white coat” on. Propose simplifying business operations and lowering taxes? Advocate for simplifying the circulation of civilian weapons? Call for a complete transition to a highly professional contract army? Are you serious? Now? In Russia? Honestly, now, on the contrary, it would make sense to support the communists in everything. Give them full nationalization of industry! Price controls! Export restrictions on goods outside their production region! Replace Nabiullina with Glazyev! IT specialists to the machine shops! What else do they want? Let them have it. Otherwise, they will just blame capitalism again for bringing the country to its knees. No, let it collapse under Glazyev.

So, honest to God, I cannot think of a more worthy goal for Russian libertarians today than to leave the RF as quickly as possible and leave the country to be torn apart by leftists. As Ayn Rand enjoined. ~~As Navalny suggested to libertarians~~. Square your shoulders.

Ancap-chan

I answer questions on ancap, libertarianism, economics, politics, ethics, law and occasionally on abstract topics.

Тег: War