Тег: War

Working through the news hook of the invasion anniversary

Since everyone is remembering how it was today, I will also go through some old materials. What I wrote about the war is easiest to find via the tag #war. Rereading it now, I realize that, in general, I expressed the key wish for the Russian people in the very first post on the day the invasion began: to scatter across the world, ridding themselves of their statehood. Now, a year later, I am glad to realize that a huge number of former Russian subjects are implementing this program, and I very much hope that they will live in peace and prosperity. Of course, I do not consider myself a Russian nationalist, and therefore I did not limit myself to anti-Russian posts, but also scribbled an anti-Ukrainian one, where, in essence, I wished for representatives of the brotherly people the same thing: the opportunity to freely move far away from the war, where they could build their peaceful lives far from interstate disputes. And this is despite the fact that, overall, I view the activity of the Ukrainian state in destroying the RF rather positively.

For those who wished to stay in the RF and become heroes, a recommendation was also provided, and I am glad that quite many followed it (or thought in a similar direction) — I am talking about burning down military enlistment offices. For expats, the most important tasks were identified as defeatist chatter and helping everyone fleeing the war. I can state that here too, in general, it was a total hit.

As for the positive agenda for international politics laid out by me, alas, it penetrates minds with terrible friction. What can one do — for the average bureaucrat, it is somehow too radical. Nevertheless, I note with satisfaction that the topic of the dismemberment of the RF is gradually ceasing to be marginal. Everyone is simply waiting for it to happen somehow on its own. And I am waiting too, for that matter. After all, territorial collapse goes much easier when the breaking-off scraps of the empire quickly receive international recognition, and for that, you shouldn’t come to me.

A month after the start of the invasion, it became clear that this was for the very long haul, which was the subject of my most pessimistic post, about the routinization of horror and about how not a single useful niche for activity remained for libertarian politics in the RF, and that both libertarian parties should get out of there in full force — it is a moral duty. Alas, only one party out of two left in full force; the other left hostages for the regime.

In April, the theme of future reparations began to play out on social media, and here, unexpectedly for myself, I took the same position as Mikhail Svetov, although within the framework of completely different argumentation. In short, reparations are an evil primarily for Ukrainians.

On July 1, I indicated that a transition from diversions to individual terror would soon be quite likely. At the end of August, the first fairly loud terrorist attack occurred, about which I did not fail to reflect. Perhaps, this was a collection of my most controversial reflections in connection with the war.

Before the elections, I published a rather beautiful idea, which, however, as far as I know, no one utilized. Then mobilization happened, and after putting out a couple more posts, I lost interest in further reflections on the war. Everything has been said, all conclusions have been drawn, sides have been chosen, there is no one left to persuade. Which village was captured today by Russian troops has finally become less important than the fact that the Montenegrin government nationalized the Kamenari-Lepetane ferry crossing.

It’s time, high time for aliens to invade or a machine uprising to occur, so that we can all with a clear conscience retrain from military analysts into xenopsychologists and artificial intelligence experts.

A sad picture of the state’s offensive against private business, which occupies me far more than the war somewhere in the east

How strongly the resistance to committing murder affects a person

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In 2011, US Air Force psychologists conducted a mental health screening of 600 combat drone operators. As it turned out, 42% of UAV operators reported moderate or severe stress, and 20% reported emotional exhaustion or burnout. A later study showed that drone operators suffered from the same levels of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol abuse, and suicidal ideation as conventional combat crews. Many will immediately ask—why is this happening?

As far back as the 20th century, many military experts concluded that 98% of people experience strong internal resistance to committing murder, and only up to 2% of individuals with psychopathic predispositions do not. In analyzing the issue of modern warfare involving combat drones, it is important for us to pay attention to what these experts said about the factors influencing the ability to kill and the factors leading to psychological trauma on the battlefield. The conclusions drawn and listed in the works of Dave Grossman will be especially helpful to us in this regard.

Firstly, this example with combat drone operators confirms the conclusion that killing is the most traumatic experience for a human being. As Grossman writes, the contradiction between the necessity to kill and the inability to do so due to internal resistance traumatizes a soldier’s psyche more than any other difficulties of combat operations. And those soldiers who were still able to kill most often suffer for the rest of their lives after the war because of what they committed.

A drone operator does not experience cold, hunger, lack of sleep, physical injuries, the loss of comrades, the risk of dying at any moment, and many other things that an ordinary soldier faces in battle. The only thing that unites them is the necessity to kill. This, therefore, only proves the long-established conclusion that killing is absolutely unnatural for humans and is the most traumatic experience of all possible ones.

Secondly, although military experts of the past concluded that distancing allows one to bypass the resistance to killing, they apparently underestimated how strongly it is expressed in humans. Even for a UAV operator, who may be located on the other side of the planet from the combat operations, this resistance does not completely disappear. The mere awareness of committing a murder is enough to cause psychological trauma.

An analogy can be drawn with the trench warfare of the First World War, in which hand grenades proved to be psychologically effective weapons. A soldier simply threw a grenade toward the enemy trenches, and it was not necessary for him to directly observe the enemy for this or what his actions led to. However, if he did see the result of his actions, or even just heard it, for example in the form of the screams of enemy soldiers, it could already traumatize his psyche.

All of this shows us that as long as a human is fundamentally capable of realizing the fact of committing a murder, no means will make it an easy act for them. By the way, this also aligns with the assumption of the Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM) model. Although this mechanism is directly activated only when a person can observe the suffering of their victim, due to the process of conditioning (the formation of conditioned reflex reactions), its functioning from childhood develops the ability to experience a rejection reaction even at the mere thought of committing violence.

As we can see, one cannot underestimate how unnatural the act of killing is for a human being. Every mentally healthy individual possesses a violence inhibitor, the function of which cannot simply be bypassed or suppressed. Even if certain means and methods enable some people to commit murder, it still does not end well for them. Only a tiny percentage of psychopathic personalities are truly capable of easily committing murder.

On literate and illiterate actions

After my previous post, I was criticized for inconsistency: on one hand, I claim that the leaders of the Russian opposition acted quite competently, and on the other, I write that the regime’s response was to ban everything in Russia, and that all roads lead to the disposal of the population.

Here I will simply briefly note that when the RF troops attacked Ukraine, the Ukrainian troops also acted quite competently, which did not prevent them from losing a large territory. The actions of the opposition could have been successful if they hadn’t been constantly lagging. But they couldn’t help lagging: you cannot immediately incite people to burn down administrative buildings and engage in individual terror while people, for the most part, believe in legal methods of struggle. Thus, the few extremists from the time when the regime was slightly more herbivorous turned out to be premature, and their impulse went to waste. Now all they have left is to say, “we warned you.”

Similarly, this is all that remains to be said by those who desperately called all their friends and relatives to leave the country, and now they would be glad to leave, but there are traffic jams at all borders, and departure may be banned entirely any moment now.

We do not know what reserves of strength the regime has. Perhaps it will fall like the Soviet one after Afghanistan or the Russian one after the First World War. Or perhaps it will survive, like the Iranian one after the war with Iraq. It is only in our power to nudge it toward collapse through our action or inaction—and, if possible, avoid getting a retaliation from the regime for it. You can flee the country. You can burn down a recruitment office. You can beat up a recruitment officer. You can end up at the front and destroy your tank or commander there, and then successfully surrender into captivity. Or, if you prefer a positive agenda, you can help an immigrant, hide a deserter, persuade a friend not to go to the recruitment office… Ah, yes, that’s some kind of negativity again. Either way, all of these will be competent actions, strategically bringing you closer to the bright goal of the fall of the Russian dictatorship, even if the tactical effect seems negligible.

And what actions would be incompetent? For example, mocking those who have just this moment opened their eyes and demonstrating to them the shimmering whiteness of your own coat. Thoughtlessly approving and trying to justify every single action of regimes hostile to Russia—many of their actions are no less cannibalistic. Paying the regime fines issued to you for participating in peaceful street protests. Wishing the Russian army victory.

The Russian anti-war invasion of Georgia

Mobilization is about mobility. Mobilize!

So, Putin announced mobilization. Not enough military recruitment offices were burned down in Russia for him to give up on this idea. Before that, not enough Rosgvardiya officers were killed during protests for Putin to give up on the idea of going for who-knows-which term of the presidency. And so on. This is a classic tragedy of the commons, where each protest activist bears personal costs, while the hypothetical result is achievable only collectively, and the contribution of a specific activist is always relatively small and can easily be replaced by the contribution of some other activist. For collective protest to be successful in such a situation, many crutches and fortunately aligned factors are required: political culture, charismatic leaders, a split among elites, and so on.

Of course, everyone understands this. FBK investigations plus lobbying for personal sanctions, as well as smart voting, are measures aimed at splitting the elites. Organizing rallies, training observers, and participating in elections are measures aimed at forming a political culture. Promoting opposition information channels is a measure aimed at the emergence of charismatic leaders. Navalny, Yashin, and Roizman demonstrated by their example that they not only call on others to bear costs but are ready to bear them themselves. The leaders of the Russian opposition have acted and continue to act generally quite competently.

As a countermeasure, the regime acted with maximum audacity, which was aptly described at the time by the formula “Yes, we’ve gone totally off the rails, so what?” The regime made it clear that in response to any criticism, it would destroy the source of that criticism, and this naturally led to a situation where now everything is banned in Russia. And if not long ago the regime’s propagandists were saying, “if you don’t like it, get out,” now even the option of leaving is becoming less accessible and increasingly subject to criminal charges.

Well then. If previously burning down recruitment offices seemed like a perfectly adequate measure that did not entail unnecessary casualties, now it is clearly insufficient. As correctly noted online, if you beat up a recruitment officer, you’ll get a lighter sentence than for draft evasion—provided, of course, that you don’t shout extremist slogans while doing it. But this, of course, is only relevant for those who are already in the first line for mobilization.

If I previously recommended the tactic of “committing a terror act and immediately fleeing abroad,” now everything has changed; there are traffic jams at the borders, plane tickets are sold out, and there is a high probability you’ll have to hide within the country, which is much harder. Therefore, active actions will need to be planned much more carefully to avoid being caught, and you certainly must not waste yourself on suicidal actions that have purely symbolic significance with negligible destructive effect. I’m talking about rallies, pickets, and similar non-working crap.

As for us in Montellibero, we are still ready to welcome those who managed to evacuate from the sinking ship and help them settle in. Even if your husband has been mobilized, that is no reason for you to remain a hostage of the regime, waiting for him in Russia—it is much more pleasant when a husband knows that you are safe. You won’t be lost here.

Find out where the recruitment office employees live, and don’t let them reach the main road

Not only with a gun, but also with a kind word

My voice is currently forming a funny polyphony with the voice of the Bitarch: he continues to develop the theme that the only justified reason for violence should be self-defense at the immediate moment of the act, while I am rooting for guerrilla warfare, and specifically, I tossed out the idea of intensifying it during election periods, when the enemy’s forces are distracted by this boring show.

And since we are talking about elections, I would like to rely on the opinion of a key Russian opposition political strategist, Leonid Volkov. Who, if not him, should understand how relevant all this guerrilla activity is at the current moment?

So, let’s read his recent interview with Novaya Gazeta, which was recently shut down in the RF. What theses does he convey regarding the issue of interest:

  1. Guerrilla warfare against the Russian regime is cool, right, and patriotic; and if no Stauffenberg is found near the Führer, then it is possible and necessary to hit the regime at least at those levels where it cannot reliably protect potential targets of attack.
  2. Donating to the AFU is like bailing out the ocean with spoons; big predators operate at this level, so let the states dispose of their weapon stockpiles; for private individuals, it only makes sense to plug occasional holes in this area.
  3. Creating organizations for conducting guerrilla warfare in the RF is either stupidity or provocation; one must absolutely not act this way.
  4. Why doesn’t Volkov try to organize guerrilla actions? Because he doesn’t know how, and doesn’t even have a clue how to go about such things. He advocates for the division of labor, where everyone realizes their comparative advantages, just as economic theory suggests to us.

So, the maestro is ready to support the guerrillas informationally, but abstains from more direct participation. In this regard, first I want to speculate on how it actually makes sense to act in order to inflict regular damage on the regime in the rear while maintaining an acceptable level of security.

There are, of course, old known mechanisms like the assassination market, which are designed flawlessly in terms of security, but have a significant drawback: for some reason, they never worked in real life. Why? Primarily because ideas do not exist without carriers. It is not enough to provide a mechanism; you also need to attract people who would start using it.

Therefore, when choosing between security and effectiveness, one always has to sacrifice security in some way. Hence custodial crypto wallets, Telegram instead of encrypted mail, and the creation of firms instead of a total realm of freelancing.

Therefore, as a decent compromise, I want to recommend the article Entry Point. Creating a Cell from the Telegram channel Black Journal — slightly leftist, but that has little effect on the quality of the practical material.

The recent AFU offensive seems to have become a turning point in the Ukrainian military campaign, and while previously I was inclined to recommend the operational scheme “lone wolf commits sabotage – immediately leaves the country,” now optimists can afford schemes like “created a cell – we work in different directions – those who are exposed leave the country, the others continue the work.” A political future may largely lie within such cells of grassroots self-organization, because all the old mechanisms of political participation, such as parties, have long been bankrupt.

The goal of sabotage and terror attacks is not so much the immediate weakening of the enemy, but rather to sow and strengthen defeatist sentiments among the ranks of poorly motivated supporters and hostages of the regime. Essentially: look what the current leadership has brought the country to: its army is being beaten to a pulp at the front, Ukrainian saboteurs roam the rear like they are at home, orders are sabotaged, budgets are plundered; grab a piece of the country for yourself at the end, however much you can, the inevitable collapse will write everything off anyway.

Accordingly, if you absolutely cannot imagine how you would organize any destructive activity, but you know how to whine talentedly, then rejoice: your hour has come! It is precisely talented whining that the country needs most right now. If you don’t sow defeatist sentiments, then who will, other than you? Well, Strelkov is trying too, of course, but you should be able to do no worse. Rebrand yourselves as victims of television propaganda and start spreading gloom: the whole West is against us, everyone is deceiving Putin, everything is lost, the front is collapsing, what the hell is this Donbass for, it’s nothing but problems, and all those refugees — and so on and so forth, depending on who your interlocutor is.

You can do it.

Outdo this whiner!

Optimal tactics for the Russian opposition during the upcoming elections

Elections are coming soon in Russia. Last time, voting at polling stations lasted for three whole days, and I hope this practice continues now. The FBK, as usual, is calling for smart voting, and of course, the Russian opposition (those who haven’t left yet) should publicly support this initiative. Be sure to post on social media that it is now more important than ever to act within the legal framework, support democratic institutions, and so on and so forth. And even go and vote for someone; it might prove useful.

The most important thing for the Russian opposition in the coming voting days is that a vast number of polling stations are open across the country, and at each one, there is one or even two cops on duty. This, in turn, means a sharp increase in the police response time to various truly important political actions, such as burning down certain government institutions—like the already familiar military recruitment offices—or even something more tasty. It would be a sin not to take advantage of this!

Remember: the only thing that justifies a Russian oppositionist remaining in Russia right now is participation in sabotage, diversions, and terrorist attacks. Your sitting in prison weakens the regime far less, and participating in some pickets actually strengthens it, because you will inevitably pay the regime a hefty fine afterwards. So, for those of you remaining behind enemy lines, it is far more useful to promote some theory of small deeds, write that the special operation is “not that straightforward,” and generally behave in a moderately unacceptable manner—while steadily unscrewing the nuts from the rails.

Firstly, it’s beautiful…

Well, the time has come for terror too

In the post What to do with Russia from July 1, I wrote:

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotage against war-sustaining infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological nuances; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will end up demotivated, rather than receiving, on the contrary, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is practically an inevitable stage in the gradual escalation of efforts to dismantle the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with it in advance, acquire the necessary competencies in a timely manner, and identify a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely in a while; they have not yet fully crystallized.

After that, I had somewhat forgotten the topic, but just the other day, deep in the enemy’s rear, somewhere near Moscow, Fascism-chan was blown up as a result of a terrorist attack. Exactly who blew her up does not matter, just as it does not matter which of the socialist-revolutionaries in the early 20th century collaborated with the Okhrana. Much more important is exactly who was blown up. Perhaps I should still reflect on the optimal choice of targets for individual terror.

Judging by the hype caused by this attack, the target was chosen very successfully. It was demonstrated that the war is not happening somewhere far away, but can knock on the door of any “sofa-front” fighter at any moment, even a very glamorous one. Perhaps future terrorists should designate such a category of rear rats as “charming cannibals” as a priority target. For example, someone like Girkin and the like; I am not very well-versed in them. The category of “loathsome cannibals”—like a conditional Margarita Simonyan—are second-tier targets. The category of “useful idiots,” like a conditional Yuneman, is the third tier.

Compiling lists is also useful. For instance, a liquidation list, provided with links to the figures’ creative works and justifications as to why the elimination of a particular figure will contribute to demotivation in the pro-war camp and a drain of people from it. Plus, criteria for exiting the list: leaving the Russian Federation, public condemnation of the war, or transferring a significant sum to pro-Ukrainian funds (specifically those dealing with troop supply, not humanitarian aid). The benefit of the list is obvious. Someone on it discovers one fine day that two figures have already died in two weeks, there are ninety figures in total, and if the trend continues, they have a year and a half to live at best, so isn’t it time to run and repent?

And, of course, it would be especially effective to carry out attacks in locations where farewell rites for the bodies of previous victims of terrorist attacks are taking place. The goal is to ensure that not only the people on the lists, but their entire circle of acquaintances, begin to live in the mode of a special operation being conducted right around them.

It would be very useful to focus the terror primarily on Muscovites: it is beneficial to increase the rift between Moscow and the surrounding territories. Let the provincials, on one hand, gloat, and on the other, be wary of drawing fire upon themselves and prefer to distance themselves from the capital and its absurd war.

P.S. Why do I write only about attacks targeting propagandists, those collecting donations for the SVO, and the like? Because the destruction of military personnel during a war, even in the deep rear, is not a terrorist attack, but sabotage. Military personnel are legitimate targets. Propagandists are illegitimate.

P.P.S. And what about the NAP and all that? That’s just how it is. Not armies, but states fight. Combatants are merely the most obvious targets, who are also usually within the reach of the combatants of the second warring party. Non-combatants of a warring state who support the war are exactly the same targets of war. Moreover, non-combatants who do not support the war can also be quite justifiably destroyed by the second warring party if they failed to escape the jurisdiction of their state abroad or into captivity. It is simply that it is most useful to show maximum humanity toward them, but that is a question of tactics, not of law.

How will the problem of a “federal fleet” be solved under minarchism and even more so under full ancap?

This problem is clearly visible in the US Civil War, where the Southerners had a larger army, a more powerful economy, and more money, but they lacked one thing: naval supremacy.

In other words, the essence of the problem is simple: maintaining ships is hellishly expensive, more so than any other weaponry, and there are great doubts that a single firm could maintain a nuclear aircraft carrier. If it were maintained by several firms, there is a high chance it would turn into a “federal” aircraft carrier.

Without a fleet, self-defense is impossible. With a fleet, controlling counter-revolution is impossible.

How is it proposed to deal with such a problem?

P.S. This is, of course, referring to minarchism or ancap in a specific country.

Anonymous question

In many ways, this question resembles the problem of cities being buried under layers of horse manure as the population grew in the late 19th century. In other words, the problem belongs to one technological era, while the circumstances for which a solution is being sought already belong to another.

Proto-ancap existed in Iceland for three hundred years and then surrendered to the state. Proto-minarchism existed in the USA, conventionally speaking, until that very Civil War—meaning less than a hundred years—and was then crushed with great bloodshed by the federal center. So, of course, the problem of power centralization itself is not imagined, but at its core lies a pronounced positive effect of scale when increasing armament. If this effect disappears, the problem of power centralization also disappears.

Today, naval supremacy is a thing of questionable effectiveness. Let’s say there is some mega-bandit who has robbed his subjects of such an astronomical sum that he can afford a mega-fleet superior in strength to all other fleets. What is the profit from this? The ability to ensure an effective naval blockade of any chosen coastal territory? The ability to control the sky over any territory within the reach of carrier-based aviation? And how do these capabilities convert into money? For the mega-bandit as some unified entity—almost not at all. These expenses will never pay off, and naval muscles serve the bandit almost exclusively as decoration.

On the other hand, the mega-bandit is a conceptual entity; in fact, decisions are made by specific people, and for them, what matters is not what income the mega-bandit receives, but what income they personally receive—by reducing the overall efficiency of the mega-bandit. Again, if instead of increasing one’s own efficiency, one reduces the efficiency of others, then this is also a quite effective strategy for remaining the coolest, even at the cost of reducing one’s capabilities in absolute terms; and the mega-bandit can indeed act quite rationally based on this extremely “smart” strategy of “you die today, and I tomorrow.”

How could a conditional ancap community prevent such moronic attacks from these atavistic predators? First, as the episode with the cruiser Moskva showed us, anti-ship missiles are quite effective against a fleet at a significantly lower price. Second, the elimination of individual regime functionaries is usually even cheaper than the destruction of thousand-ton tubs. Third, the idea of the nation-state is becoming less popular, and with it, the popularity of patriotism falls, which is expressed, in particular, in the unwillingness to serve in the army. As a result, today even countries with huge military budgets have serious manpower shortages. It is already difficult to man a fleet, and when the situation develops to the point where the first significant territorial ancap communities appear on Earth, the situation will become even more depressing for etatists.

Yes, horses will not give way to cars overnight, but cities will no longer be buried under manure; the trend has changed. Conflicts will become increasingly market-justified, which means minimum costs for maximum efficiency. Not the time for aircraft carriers.

What to Do with Russia

From what can be gathered from the news, the situation with Russia is roughly as follows. External political actors want it to suffer a military defeat, but not an overly crushing one, and they certainly want a single statehood to be preserved on the territory of the RF. This is understandable; the status quo always has the advantage of not having to worry about interacting with new entities.

I do not rule out that, given such a touching coincidence of interests, Western politicians may indeed succeed in preventing Russia from collapsing. If, of course, the residents of Russia themselves do not resist this terrible scenario in which Moscow’s power, however criminal it may be, remains legitimate in the eyes of other political sovereigns, which means a carte blanche for any internal repression and squeezing every last drop out of the citizens.

It is clear that a scenario in which the entire population simply leaves Russia is extremely unlikely, and the departure of even ten percent doesn’t really change the overall situation, as the examples of Venezuela or, for instance, Ukraine show us. The state continues to stumble along despite general hopelessness and degradation.

Those remaining in the RF now have to actively work themselves to ensure the country loses the war as quickly as possible. It is difficult to say which specific sabotages are currently being carried out by locals and which by Ukrainian saboteurs, but one hopes that the local share is quite large.

I primarily draw information about what is happening on this strange front and what sentiments are gradually forming in this environment from the Telegram channel Anarchy+. The channel is occupied with attempts to theoretically conceptualize what is happening; reflections on the most appropriate tactics are constantly presented, and while peaceful protest was discussed there before, the channel is now rapidly radicalizing.

I would like some more serious involvement of my own in the process of the RF’s collapse, but it is hard to understand where I would fit in. Sabotage is a maximally secretive and decentralized process, and for me, the most obvious role is providing communication and coverage of what has happened. So, for example, I could receive reports of certain actions unilaterally and promote them on my platform, so that the actions would gain publicity, but this would not help in reaching the organizers.

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotaging war-support infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological points; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will are demotivated, rather than receiving, conversely, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is an almost inevitable stage in the gradual increase of efforts to bring down the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with this in advance, acquire the necessary competencies ahead of time, and look over a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely after some time; they are not yet fully formed.

A provocative question

It has been a while since I wrote anything about the war. The bleakest of predictions has come true; the war has become protracted. The warring parties will not exhaust the resilience of their economies anytime soon. The Russian side—due to skillful tactical actions on the economic front. The Ukrainian side—because financing Ukraine is not yet particularly burdensome for its allies.

On the other hand, the global economy has obviously begun to crack, undermined by the war in addition to the preceding COVID madness. This leads to the thought: are all these economic sanctions really so necessary to destroy the RF? Actually, no, but that is a boring topic, let’s not dwell on it; I want to ask about something else.

Ukraine asks for more and more weapons, yet receives them in quantities obviously insufficient for a quick victory. In this regard, I am purely humanly curious how Ukrainians would react to a certain dilemma. The greedy capitalists say: the reserves of our charity are exhausted. You want to keep fighting—fine, you will have your weapons. We will sell them to you. In exchange, we want your Ukrainian land. As our capitalist private property. And so that you—we know you, you damn socialists—do not nationalize it immediately after victory, we demand extraterritoriality for the land we buy. We will establish our private military bases there, so that you don’t dream of stretching your greedy hands toward us later. Sell us Odessa; we will organize a free city there. Without mines in the waters, securely protected from the Russian, Turkish, and Ukrainian fleets. And without taxes, of course. And with the free circulation of our capitalist currencies, whichever are convenient for us. And without your officials, naturally—our managers are more efficient.

Do you think a conditional Zelensky would agree to such an insolent proposal? Would he give one seaside city into the ownership of a consortium including a conditional Lockheed Martin and other esteemed gentlemen? In exchange for the products of these very Lockheeds and Martins. And a conditional Zelensky voter—how would he react? Would he say, “Oh, to hell with Odessa-mama, give me F-35s”? Or would he scream angrily that he will not yield an inch of native land to anyone, and that after the ammunition runs out, he will fight with stones and sticks?

Who wants muskets? Real muskets from white people!