Тег: Russia

Telegram as an indicator

Sperry UNIVAC

Итак, российские власти наконец-то решились заблокировать святое – Telegram, на котором стоит не только большая часть русскоязычного комьюнити, но на него также завязаны и практически все процессы в самой стране – от пересылки депутатами мемов друг другу во время заседания, до координации действий подразделений на фронте. Естественно, это вызвало пожар, подобный Чикагскому и все наперебой (и слева и справа) умоляют товарища Сталина РКН отменить это дикое решение.

Однако, важно здесь немного иное. Блокировка Telegram – лишь следствие, а не причина. И нет, дело вовсе не в цензуре ради цензуры — например, российская цифровая инфраструктура совершенно не готова к массовому использованию населением «национального мессенджера» по причине банального отсутствия серверов, которые, кстати, Москва безуспешно пыталась арендовать в странах Центральной Азии и Китае.

Причина лежит в другой плоскости: Российская Федерация находится на пороге кризиса, причем кризиса открытого, и он, очевидно, должен открыто проявить себя в текущем году. Экономические санкции, силовое давление на инфраструктуру экспорта, отсутствие устойчивых союзнических отношений (что также связано с экономикой) уже прямо демонстрируют своё влияние на функционирование государства. Российские же экономические отчеты показывают нехватку бюджетных средств, урезание экспортных доходов, растущую инфляцию и все прочие издержки «мобилизационной трансформации».

До определенной поры Москва умело маскировала нарастающий ком проблем в глазах населения. Полагаю, что скором времени подобная политика уже не будет оправдывать себя в полной мере – и потому требуется превентивная, ещё более жесткая зачистка информационного пространства. Никаких даже условно «независимых» (не секрет, что фактически все российские каналы более 100 тыс. читателей финансируются и де-факто принадлежат тому или иному ведомству и подконтрольны чиновникам куда в большей степени, чем могло бы казаться) информационных ресурсов и средств коммуникации, доступных широким массам, существовать не должно.

Секретом Полишенеля является и то, что инициатором закручивания всех гаек являются чекисты (просто по принципу – торчит гайка? крутим!), даже если это не только не оправдано логически, но и катастрофично экономически и социально. КГБ – сама по себе организация не из приятных, но когда КГБ радостно бежит в сторону КСИР – это заставляет задуматься о том, что же их так подгоняет.

И, на мой субъективный взгляд, в действительности населению РФ нужно больше размышлять именно над этой непростой темой, а не сокрушаться и сетовать на следствия в виде ужесточающейся цензуры. Правильные вопросы находятся в области первопричин этой цензуры, а не её природы – и ответы на них куда более злободневны и оттого чудовищно неприятны для многих.

RKN is rolling out a fresh update for Telegram

As a right-libertarian and legal individualist, can I support the Russian Volunteer Corps?

Max Stirner

From the proposed positions, it is strange in general to ask questions about whether one can do something. Of course, one can; the only question is the extent of responsibility.

If we are talking about sanctions from the Russian state, then solving the problem comes down to finding sufficiently safe ways of transferring money, publishing propaganda, delivering equipment, and so on.

However, I believe the question is more about whether other right-libertarians and right-individualists, upon learning of such activity, would feel obligated to obstruct you.

The RDK is a semi-autonomous armed formation within the AFU: in some ways it obeys the central command, it depends on it significantly for supplies, and it seems to be quite autonomous in matters of recruiting and the informational coverage of its activities. But there are other units within the AFU that independently conduct recruiting and crowdfunding. How is the RDK so different that the German Stirner asks about the permissibility of helping specifically the RDK, and not some Azov?

Azov was mentioned for a reason. Both this brigade and the Russian Volunteer Corps face numerous accusations that Nazis serve there. Economic theory tells us that values are subjective. Any person has every right to prefer one nation over all others; this in itself does not provide grounds to condemn them. Do the guys from Azov and RDK exterminate representatives of all other nations for the sake of the greatness of the nation they prefer over all others? No, they exterminate people according to a different criterion, and this criterion is no different from the one guided by other military formations within the AFU.

The only remaining difference between the RDK (and a couple of other smaller units) and other parts is that they physically, on foot, crossed the internationally recognized Russian-Ukrainian border to fight the Russian army on Russian territory. And what, does this make them aggressors? No, they are still participants in a defensive war. Just like the drone operators striking refineries deep in the Russian rear.

Ah, yes, they also have Russian passports, or at least they did at the start of the war. And what, does this somehow change their legal status? No, not even under Russian laws. They still remain AFU servicemen, toward whom all sorts of rights and restrictions associated with the laws and customs of war apply—laws which the RF pledged to observe (but does not). But even if there were a law in the RF according to which any RF citizen who joined the ranks of foreign armed forces was subject to execution without trial, what significance would this have for a legal individualist?

However, I assume that the reader with the nickname Max Stirner is a Russian citizen. Therefore, his question can be reformulated more sharply: does libertarian morality justify war against one’s own state? Actually, libertarian morality justifies war against any state. Even against states led by libertarians, such as Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele, or Hans-Adam II. Fighting against one’s own is even more meaningful, because that is where your main grievances lie, it is that state that causes you direct harm, whereas all others are just some predators roaming nearby, who, of course, should also have no place on earth. However, a successful war requires allies. Most of us do not have them. The RDK does. Let us be happy for them.

On literate and illiterate actions

After my previous post, I was criticized for inconsistency: on one hand, I claim that the leaders of the Russian opposition acted quite competently, and on the other, I write that the regime’s response was to ban everything in Russia, and that all roads lead to the disposal of the population.

Here I will simply briefly note that when the RF troops attacked Ukraine, the Ukrainian troops also acted quite competently, which did not prevent them from losing a large territory. The actions of the opposition could have been successful if they hadn’t been constantly lagging. But they couldn’t help lagging: you cannot immediately incite people to burn down administrative buildings and engage in individual terror while people, for the most part, believe in legal methods of struggle. Thus, the few extremists from the time when the regime was slightly more herbivorous turned out to be premature, and their impulse went to waste. Now all they have left is to say, “we warned you.”

Similarly, this is all that remains to be said by those who desperately called all their friends and relatives to leave the country, and now they would be glad to leave, but there are traffic jams at all borders, and departure may be banned entirely any moment now.

We do not know what reserves of strength the regime has. Perhaps it will fall like the Soviet one after Afghanistan or the Russian one after the First World War. Or perhaps it will survive, like the Iranian one after the war with Iraq. It is only in our power to nudge it toward collapse through our action or inaction—and, if possible, avoid getting a retaliation from the regime for it. You can flee the country. You can burn down a recruitment office. You can beat up a recruitment officer. You can end up at the front and destroy your tank or commander there, and then successfully surrender into captivity. Or, if you prefer a positive agenda, you can help an immigrant, hide a deserter, persuade a friend not to go to the recruitment office… Ah, yes, that’s some kind of negativity again. Either way, all of these will be competent actions, strategically bringing you closer to the bright goal of the fall of the Russian dictatorship, even if the tactical effect seems negligible.

And what actions would be incompetent? For example, mocking those who have just this moment opened their eyes and demonstrating to them the shimmering whiteness of your own coat. Thoughtlessly approving and trying to justify every single action of regimes hostile to Russia—many of their actions are no less cannibalistic. Paying the regime fines issued to you for participating in peaceful street protests. Wishing the Russian army victory.

The Russian anti-war invasion of Georgia

Mobilization is about mobility. Mobilize!

So, Putin announced mobilization. Not enough military recruitment offices were burned down in Russia for him to give up on this idea. Before that, not enough Rosgvardiya officers were killed during protests for Putin to give up on the idea of going for who-knows-which term of the presidency. And so on. This is a classic tragedy of the commons, where each protest activist bears personal costs, while the hypothetical result is achievable only collectively, and the contribution of a specific activist is always relatively small and can easily be replaced by the contribution of some other activist. For collective protest to be successful in such a situation, many crutches and fortunately aligned factors are required: political culture, charismatic leaders, a split among elites, and so on.

Of course, everyone understands this. FBK investigations plus lobbying for personal sanctions, as well as smart voting, are measures aimed at splitting the elites. Organizing rallies, training observers, and participating in elections are measures aimed at forming a political culture. Promoting opposition information channels is a measure aimed at the emergence of charismatic leaders. Navalny, Yashin, and Roizman demonstrated by their example that they not only call on others to bear costs but are ready to bear them themselves. The leaders of the Russian opposition have acted and continue to act generally quite competently.

As a countermeasure, the regime acted with maximum audacity, which was aptly described at the time by the formula “Yes, we’ve gone totally off the rails, so what?” The regime made it clear that in response to any criticism, it would destroy the source of that criticism, and this naturally led to a situation where now everything is banned in Russia. And if not long ago the regime’s propagandists were saying, “if you don’t like it, get out,” now even the option of leaving is becoming less accessible and increasingly subject to criminal charges.

Well then. If previously burning down recruitment offices seemed like a perfectly adequate measure that did not entail unnecessary casualties, now it is clearly insufficient. As correctly noted online, if you beat up a recruitment officer, you’ll get a lighter sentence than for draft evasion—provided, of course, that you don’t shout extremist slogans while doing it. But this, of course, is only relevant for those who are already in the first line for mobilization.

If I previously recommended the tactic of “committing a terror act and immediately fleeing abroad,” now everything has changed; there are traffic jams at the borders, plane tickets are sold out, and there is a high probability you’ll have to hide within the country, which is much harder. Therefore, active actions will need to be planned much more carefully to avoid being caught, and you certainly must not waste yourself on suicidal actions that have purely symbolic significance with negligible destructive effect. I’m talking about rallies, pickets, and similar non-working crap.

As for us in Montellibero, we are still ready to welcome those who managed to evacuate from the sinking ship and help them settle in. Even if your husband has been mobilized, that is no reason for you to remain a hostage of the regime, waiting for him in Russia—it is much more pleasant when a husband knows that you are safe. You won’t be lost here.

Find out where the recruitment office employees live, and don’t let them reach the main road

Reparations

It is quite funny that the RF is still fully attempting to go on the offensive, still holds a substantial advantage in the air, and continues to throw new goals of the war into the information space—while on social media, discussions are already in full swing about how Russia will pay reparations to Ukraine, whether one should push for them, and whether those who were initially against the war should have to pay them.

I’ll throw in my two cents as well. It seems to me that the absence of reparations is primarily in the interests of Ukrainian libertarians, but also Russian ones. Meanwhile, statists on both sides should heartily approve of reparations.

The thing is, reparations are money that a state pays to a state. But the state always collects this money from its subjects. How did the rise of the Moscow Principality begin? It began when the Moscow Prince Ivan received the privilege from the Horde Khan to pay reparations on behalf of all Russian principalities. In the process of collection, much stuck to his hands, and Moscow grew strong. When a conditional Leonid Volkov begins collecting reparations for Ukraine, Moscow will also only grow stronger from this, because what on earth is federalization and the transfer of powers to regions when you need to squeeze money out of people and pay the Ukrainian president?

But let’s assume that the international anti-corruption fund, led by the valiant Ivan Zhdanov, manages to find and lobby for the seizure of such a quantity of property from major Russian corrupt officials that it will be enough to pay reparations, and no extraordinary taxes will need to be levied from other Russian citizens. What will the kind Ukrainian president do upon receiving reparations from the kind Russian president? He will begin, on behalf of the state, to commission various works to restore what was destroyed during the war, strengthen the Ukrainian state army, police, customs, tax authorities, provide additional funding to the national bank, and so on. In short, he will strengthen the social state. Is this a good thing? “Of course, it is,” the government officials who will distribute all this money will answer the Ukrainian libertarians, as well as their relatives who, by a happy coincidence, receive government contracts.

Naturally, any caring person has many moral grounds to help Ukrainians in the war, in life in emigration, and in the restoration of the ruined economy after returning home. But for this, they do not need state coercion; it is more likely to get in the way. For instance, states block the bank cards of RF citizens (making it harder to donate), create a mass of restrictions for emigrants, which complicates their settlement in a new place and hinders providing them with help, and at the stage of post-war assistance, they will surely surround private initiative with a bunch of hurdles. Therefore, partisan activity against all states proves to be in demand: against the state of Ukraine, which prevents some refugees from leaving it freely; against the state of the RF, to sabotage military conscription, the work of state institutions, disrupt military supplies, and demotivate private individuals from supporting the war; against other states that hinder emigrants from finding employment, settling in, and conducting monetary transactions. But all of this is not reparations—do not whitewash this cringe-worthy word.

P.S. I forgot to add one more important point. The best outcome of this war is the complete destruction of the Russian state. But in that case, there will certainly be no reparations: the subject from whom they can be taken will vanish. And this is another very important reason why Ukrainian libertarians should dream not of reparations, but of a far more pleasant outcome.

Of course, the absence of reparations does not cancel the possibility of prosecuting private individuals and bringing claims against them for specific damages.

Where do reparations come from? Allah gives!

A Positive Agenda for International Politics

Let’s talk about something good.

The international community has managed to cause the Russian economy great pain in a very short time. In principle, this is quite enough to bury the current regime in the RF, should it decide to keep playing out an already lost war. But this will a) take a long time, b) bring enormous losses to all states and private companies that joined the sanctions against the RF, c) in no way help a fundamental solution to the problem of aggression by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear one (the PRC can wait until the governments that so joyfully implemented sanctions against the RF are swept away by an opposition promising a return to normalcy—and immediately after that move to restore its own territorial integrity across the strait).

How to solve the problem faster, cheaper, and more reliably? Simply use not only the stick, but also the carrot. You are already trying to apply this method by offering Russian pilots rewards for flying military aircraft abroad, but, agree, this is small-scale; act on a larger scale. Declare that your sanctions are only against the RF. If any territorial entity declares its separation from the RF, states that it does not support the RF’s invasion of Ukraine, and joins the sanctions against the RF, promise to immediately recognize the sovereignty of this new state, admit it to the UN, recognize its nuclear status if nuclear warheads are located on its territory—and, since this state is not the RF, no sanctions will apply to it.

For decades, the leadership of the RF has told its population that the collective West dreams of dismembering Mother Russia. So, bring this nightmare to life! Let Vladimir, the gatherer of Russian lands, go down in history as the one who left Russia as a principality the size of the Moscow region. It would be elegant. It would be instructive. It would put the PRC in its place.

A compact state, whose activity mostly consists of ensuring the operation of infrastructure and legal frameworks, is something that even libertarians agree to tolerate with some distaste. Yes, it is an outdated interface, but perhaps it is worth preserving temporarily for reasons of backward compatibility until the last statists die out naturally. However, vast empires are a dark past that belonged in the dustbin of history a hundred years ago, and there is simply no reason to preserve the RF (or the PRC) within its existing borders. If even the Ukrainian crisis does not push these empires toward collapse, it is frightening to imagine how great a crisis these empires will cause next time.

QR codes

I have now distanced myself quite a bit from the current Russian agenda, which is why I hardly ever speak on this topic. However, the Global civil war between supporters of the unlimited expansion of the state and supporters of its limitation affects even little Montenegro, so it is worth dedicating at least one post to this.

Statists use a specific vulnerability of economic theory to political pressure—externalities—to attack personal freedom. Anyone can become a carrier of a virus and infect others, meaning that by their very presence, they potentially represent a significant negative externality for those around them. And while attempts to restrict human freedom under the pretext that people breathe and emit terrible carbon dioxide, which will soon boil the Earth, meet with serious misunderstanding, it turned out to be noticeably easier to frighten people with a deadly and immediate danger, rather than one decades away.

In Montenegro, society is holding its defense quite steadfastly. It is helped by serious disagreements between the president and the prime minister, which prevent truly unpopular decisions from being made. But it is hindered by pressure from the European Union, on which loans and the flow of tourists bringing money into the country depend. Therefore, the state advances very cautiously and immediately takes a step back upon encountering serious resistance. This provides the EU with the necessary image: that we tried, but these obscurantists started blocking roads, and we had to find a compromise. For example, in the autumn there was an attempt to gradually make entry to large supermarkets available only by certificate, but after a couple of weeks, all restrictions were cancelled. Closer to winter, they promised to require certificates for entry to Christmas markets, but a couple of weeks later, they conversely announced relaxations: practically all restrictions are lifted during the Christmas holidays, celebrate to your heart’s content. Naturally, society has to fight for every relaxation through street actions.

In Russia, everything is much worse. Society was almost completely paved over last winter; no one is surprised by imprisonments for single-person pickets, social media posts, and other arbitrariness, about which most of my readers have a much more direct understanding, so I will not dwell on it. However, it seems that the attempt, at the end of the second year of the war for public health, to introduce a permit system for movement has nonetheless encountered fairly widespread grassroots resistance.

The Libertarian Party of Russia (the one of the two that the state seemingly hasn’t completely crushed) has announced the launch of a public campaign against QR-codification. I have read the list of proposals, and they look reasonably sound. As is usual in the RF, the level of support for an initiative is determined primarily by the number of signatures on change.org, so the first thing to do is go there and sign, and then figure out how else the campaign can be helped.

And, of course, we welcome everyone who cannot bear this entire frontline atmosphere to cozy, damp, and rainy Montenegro. At least the borders are still open.

The Stylistics of Protest

I heard an interesting thought from Ekaterina Schulmann last night—that the difference in the style of protests in the US and Russia is not related to some special “slave mentality” of Russians, but simply to what is customary. Russia, in her words, is more similar to Scandinavia in this sense: in both places, people protest modestly, expressing a gloomy silent reproach, without all your outbursts of anger, shouting, and arson. If you go out to protest against injustice, you are a decent person, and decent people do not scream on the street, and they do not beat people.

Similarly, rallies in Russia are not intended for listening to whoever is rambling on stage. The speakers talk for YouTube, meaning for those who didn’t come to the rally, but want to feel the atmosphere and leave a like. But the people came to socialize with one another and to be happy that many like-minded people share their position. They certainly understand that, formally, they have formulated demands, and that pressure must be put on the authority to make them fulfill these demands, but they will not go storm the Kremlin, because decent people do not do things that way. They would rather sign a resolution.

This is precisely why Russian agorism takes on some characteristics of AUE. Agorism is not so much about the state dying of starvation, but about a moral choice. By avoiding interaction with the state and especially avoiding payments to it, a person simply feels morally cleaner.

That is exactly why any calls to chip in to help people pay their finesy are so infuriating to me. How can you consciously call upon people to get dirty by making payments to the state, and moreover, voluntarily act as the state’s tax agents? You go out to the street to express your reproach to the state, you unfurl a banner, you get detained, you get a summons to court, the court imposes a fine. Well, express your reproach once more and refuse to pay right there in court. Let them replace it with arrest or carry a wardrobe out of your house. They will wreck your house at any moment anyway, as soon as they want to, especially if you choose the tactic of open confrontation with the regime.

Russian libertarians are now pushing the hashtag and holding single-person pickets against the extrajudicial killings committed by Russian security forces. I support this hype. But when in a week they start collecting donations for the fines of detained activists, I will be spitting in their direction. Just warning you in advance.

I will not condemn liberals who value the institution of the state itself, as something that brings law and order, for paying their fines. For them, this is an element of law and order. They will legally challenge this fine in court, hoping to fix a bad state. These are their rituals for maintaining purity, and this can be respected, although one can still hope for their enlightenment.

Police Russia of the Present, new season

Yesterday, the state carried out another act of violence against its citizens, raiding Navalny’s headquarters, as well as the homes and apartments of his staff, former staff, relatives of staff, and people who simply happened to be caught in the crossfire.

In general, political life in the country has become very lively. If I were watching this in a series, it would be clear that things are heading toward a climax and then a resolution. And, of course, I would find the series very strange if, after showing events like yesterday’s, I were then told that this had finally broken the spirit of resistance, the leaders had dispersed, the volunteers had returned to their everyday peaceful activities, and the tyrant ruled peacefully until his death, passing the throne to his growing son and leaving his loyal henchman Ramzan as regent. Instead, I would expect that in 2021, highly competitive elections for the State Duma would take place, preceded by a fierce struggle over the admission of non-systemic single-mandate candidates, and as a result, the parliament would acquire a rather diverse look, and with it, a certain agency; then there would be clashes over the repeal of the article in the election law banning Navalny from running for president, it would not be possible to repeal it, and quite unexpectedly for themselves in 2024, with Navalny’s support and to the outrage of the libertarians, Roizman would be elected. Now that would be a plot! Everyone would be eagerly awaiting the new season, which would certainly not be inferior to the previous one in terms of dramatic tension.

And although no one writes scripts for Russia, nevertheless, without satiety and the resolution of major internal problems, there will be no dull police stability here, no matter how much you raid Navalny’s headquarters or declare Open Russia an undesirable organization. Not the century, not the people, not the trends.

Smart Voting showed people that they are not just many, but very many. This means that it is possible to step out of the shadows. So now is the time for the visual capture of space. There is no need for extremist slogans, for it is enough to simply state a position rather than explain it; for explanations, there are internet resources protected from pressure. For example, Professor Solovey suggested mass-producing and selling cheap silicone bracelets with a simple inscription “help political prisoners,” and directing the proceeds toward that very help. Firstly, this benefits the prisoners, and secondly, such a thing is not shameful to wear, but it is shameful to demand its removal, as it is proof that a person personally donated a couple of hundred rubles to help those whom the state persecutes for their political views. Moreover, there is nothing extremist in the inscription. There is no need to try to invent a single symbol of protest—why do we need an alphabet of one symbol? After all, we live in a consumer society, which means there will be competition and a wide choice.

Of course, there will be street protests—how could there not be—but these are one-off promotional protest actions; however, for the “fronde” to become fashionable, people must also wear these conditional neck scarves a la fronde.

Thus, I envision the outlines of the next political season roughly as follows:

  • A continuation of the trend toward the normalization of protest, the everyday demonstration of one’s moods to everyone around in the form of wearable symbols. Protest becomes, if not prestigious, then at least mass-approved.
  • Close attention to the numerous ghouls and few decent people newly elected through Smart Voting. Public support for any correct gestures on the part of the elected, even if they were previously in the “ghoul” category: training implies positive reinforcement.
  • The departure abroad of a number of well-known opposition figures and the formation of permanent teams among them for the information support of “rocking the boat.” This is required by banal tactical considerations. The host of a popular YouTube channel must always be online, not sitting uselessly in a detention center. The studio must work, not be endlessly restored after raids by security forces. The coordination of the network must happen continuously. And so on. There is no longer any need to fear that this will negatively affect the image of the protesters: the myth about the State Department has gone stale. No one cares that something like Meduza is based in Riga, so why shouldn’t Navalny.Live, MBX.Media, and SVTV establish themselves there? One cannot be a generalist in an age of division of labor; street politics and media propaganda must be separated. The street politician should remain a guest on a stream, not a regular host of a show.
  • Media shaming of deanonymized security personnel is bearing its first fruits—rank-and-file employees are starting to resign, superiors are starting to apologize, and orders for the violent suppression of street actions occasionally begin to be executed without enthusiasm.
  • Ukraine demonstrates significant economic growth against the backdrop of Russian stagnation. Russian citizens begin to want things to be like in Ukraine.
  • The long-awaited global economic crisis hits. The regime takes a step that is correct from the point of view of self-preservation, opening the rainy-day fund and lowering taxes—but this looks like concessions to the demands of the opposition and only continues to weaken the regime.

As they say, remember this tweet.

The government always tends to do its manicure with an angle grinder

And if you had a choice: to fight the state in the RF or in another country, what would you choose?

Andrey

I think I am cosmopolitan enough not to fixate on the RF: any state is unpleasant in any of its active manifestations. As I have already written, it seems to me that building an ancap society in a country where there is already quite little state and already exists a tradition of respect for private property and entrepreneurial initiative is significantly easier than where none of this exists. Building an ancap society as an immigrant is a more natural pursuit: for immigrants, it is natural to view the state as something incomprehensible and hostile, something to be avoided as much as possible. So, of course, I would like to move to some relatively free country and act there.

As a counterexample to such an approach, people usually cite modern Western feminists who fight for trivialities—in the opinion of many—while being completely unperturbed by the violation of women’s rights in, say, Arab countries. Yes, I would also prefer to dismantle Russia rather than Turkmenistan, and Georgia rather than Russia. An ancap society might grow from the ruins of a conditional Venezuela, but it would have to grow out of such shit that going there at that time would require one to be either a martyr or a god-given entrepreneur. Quite different is a carefully dismantled state in an already decent society. No aesthetics of the “wild nineties” for you; everything is free and with dignity.

In Russia now, among the protesters, the reverence for the law takes on a completely religious character. Yes, we know the laws are shit, but for the sake of saving our souls, we will follow them to the last letter; and if the authorities themselves violate their own laws, we will sue them in their own court, lose in three instances, and win in the ECHR. I admire the optimism and consistency of these guys. I myself am too impatient to mow the lawn of democracy for two hundred years only to end up with a social-democratic society, and then wonder what to do with such a deeply rooted state. Reverence for the law can be both good and bad. Better to have reverence for property rights and intolerance towards violations of such rights, even if it means violating current laws.

For me, the indicator of the success of civil society is not the size of rallies, not the number of opposition deputies in parliaments, and not the regular change of heads of state—but a reduction of the state budget by at least ten percent a year while people’s wealth grows at even more significant rates. In this regard, Georgia seems quite promising to me: the sprouts of freedom have taken root well here, the state is quite weak, and there is not much interference in earning money under the table.

Tomorrow I am gradually heading toward Russia, but I will definitely return here, and quite possibly for a long time.