Libertarian Theory of War. 3. Application of the Theory of War.
3.3.1. State versus Individual
A war by the state against an individual, initiated by the state, is the most common war scenario in the modern world; therefore, such wars are quite difficult to classify clearly, and even among libertarians, fierce disputes can arise regarding specific examples of such wars. These disputes are primarily conducted on the theme of whether the state’s attack on the person was just, but “justice” is often understood as whether the attack was beneficial to the party arguing.
This ambiguity is due to the fact that the state has usurped a monopoly on the forceful restoration of justice; therefore, its attack on a person may be linked either to the state’s intent to forcibly seize certain resources from the person or simply to cause them harm, up to and including lethal force, or to its intent to help another person restore justice, either at that person’s request or without it.
The state commits aggression against individuals constantly, on a routine basis. Most often, this aggression takes the form of demands, the non-compliance with which is interpreted by the state as an escalation of conflict, and at some stage of this escalation, the violence applied by the state may take a lethal form. An outsider can usually only more or less confidently assess the unusualness of the initial demand. Such unusualness may prompt people to wonder whether the possibility of such a demand is provided for by internal state regulations. If it is not, this may become a reason to consider the initial demand unjust. Nevertheless, the spirit of etatism can flare up at any moment in any person, and they may consider any demand of any state employee toward any individual to be just. The etatist’s explanation will boil down to the following: the state knows best. First, fulfill the demand of one state representative, and then file a complaint with another state representative if you believe that the demand was inappropriate.
Now, taking into account all the above considerations, let us consider scenarios where you are not the object of attack and where you are.
3.3.1.1. The object of attack is not you
In the vast majority of cases, you will receive information about such an attack in the form of news, if the attack was loud, and in the form of statistical generalizations, if the specific attack did not attract the attention of media personalities. For example, you learn that a representative of one of the countless state security structures killed someone on the street. Or that representatives of security structures killed so many people in a year. Any such news can become an information trigger for mass protests against the state. Potentially, such protests could escalate into an armed uprising against the current political regime. A libertarian, theoretically opposing the state as such, may in practice find themselves in such an uprising either on the side of the rebels or on the side of the defenders of the regime. However, it is far more likely that there will be no uprising, and they will limit themselves either to a rhetorical denunciation of the state’s actions in a specific episode or to a rhetorical defense. Or rather, not even a denunciation of the state’s actions, but a denunciation of the actions of network commentators advocating the opposite point of view.
In short, for a state war against an individual to result in mass retaliatory military actions by individuals against the state, a very long series of abuses of state power will be required. Moreover, as long as rhetorical battles in the information space in response to state actions are not suppressed by the state, a transition to military actions by society against the state is extremely unlikely. It is only when freedom of speech is destroyed in a state, and even simple grumbling becomes dangerous, that the neuroticization of society may lead to a spontaneous uprising over a more or less random occasion. An uprising becomes even less likely in a situation where freedom of peaceful demonstrations exists. The permission of peaceful rallies combined with sufficiently strict suppression of violent actions and public bargaining with representatives of the protesters is a very well-developed state technology for pacifying a hostile society.
What should a libertarian do who sees a benefit for themselves and their ideology in the state’s military actions against an individual? First, provide rhetorical support for this specific state policy. Second—and this is very important—emphasize the correctness of the observance of established procedures. That all required warnings were given. That bystanders were not put in danger. That the use of lethal force was a last resort, and non-lethal means were tried before that. That there were public explanations from government representatives, and in the case of excesses, specific changes in procedures were proposed to eliminate these excesses. If any of this list did not happen, then the libertarian should accompany their approval with constructive criticism on how it could have been done better, and a warning that this is not empty grumbling, and if measures are not taken, there will be no approval next time.
If, however, the libertarian sees no benefit in the state’s military actions against an individual, it is desirable for them not only to indicate their disagreement but also to launch a campaign of harassment against both the executors and all those who give the executors exactly such an order of action against citizens in conflict situations. Another important narrative is to emphasize cases where private armed structures or even individuals handled such situations more carefully. In doing so, it is useful not to deny the importance of the function that the state so clumsily attempts to perform, but merely to point out its fundamental incompetence in such delicate matters, which only a free competitive market is capable of resolving correctly.
3.3.1.2. The object of attack is you
In a situation where a certain state agent threatens you with lethal force for disobedience, you are unlikely to have the opportunity to exercise yourself in public rhetoric. Most likely, your primary concern will be avoiding immediate danger, and here much depends on local customs. In some societies (usually so-called failed states), the optimal move will be to distract attention and shoot preemptively; in others (usually called states under the rule of law), to surrender calmly, reminding them of your full readiness to cooperate and your intention to defend your rights in the legal field. In many societies with legal pluralism, it is unlikely that it will be possible to follow a single algorithm for such cases, since different security structures may have different working traditions. In the same state, some security officers will be guided by concern for your safety, and their demands will boil down to you not exposing yourself to unnecessary threats, others will want to find a pretext to extort money from you, and a third group will count on a professional reward if they thoroughly intimidate or even kill you.
3.3.1.3. Strengthening Subjectivity
One way or another, you have certain interests regarding the conflicts of the state with individuals, which the state tends to escalate up to war. Alone, you have practically no chance of influencing the state’s position on this issue, because the state, in principle, does not know how to see the position of loners. In order for a particular wish to be noticed at all by state representatives, it must come from a group. Only an organization, in the eyes of the state, has the right to declare its interests in terms of changing state policy. An organization for the state is not yet a political subject with whom one can negotiate, but it is already a legal instrument of influence on state policy. Therefore, creating an organization looks like an obvious step for scattered loners wishing to escalate their conflict with the state. Moving to this level has its pros and cons, which we will discuss in the next section.
3.3.2. State versus Group
A group is not yet an organization. It is merely a list of people who have fallen into it according to some criterion. And when it comes to a state attack on a group, it may well happen that the list was compiled not by its members at all.
3.3.2.1. The composition of the group is determined by the state
Usually, a state war against a group whose composition it determines itself takes the form of mass repressions, ethnic, class, or religious cleansings, depending on the parameter by which the lists are formed. As a rule, such a group is in no way organized internally, therefore, in essence, it is simply a war of the state against many individuals. For a libertarian, however, such a war is ethically far more unambiguous, because this is a clear case of imposing collective responsibility, and justifying such a thing without betraying libertarian principles is quite difficult.
Thus, if the libertarian is not himself included in the list of the repressed group, and this inclusion does not threaten him (for example, he is in the jurisdiction of another state), he can limit himself to rhetorical support for the oppressed minority, or he can provide its representatives with help in fleeing beyond the borders of the repressive state, help the repressed unite into a paramilitary organization, and even join this war if his spirits dictate such a step. If the libertarian himself finds himself on the lists for repression, it is usually optimal for him to flee as quickly as possible to another jurisdiction or hide all traces of his belonging to the repressed group—if, of course, his spirits do not oppose this and do not urge him to retaliatory military actions.
A bit separate is such a group as those “committing non-violent but criminalized acts.” For example, tax evaders, drug dealers, pimps, and so on. Regarding certain categories of acts, there is pluralism among libertarians, and some may even consider such acts worthy of a war being waged against those who commit them. At the time of writing this book, so-called pedophiles most often fell into this category, although it would be more accurate to call them molesters of minors.
As a rule, however, the state’s war against violators of state laws takes the character of a low-intensity conflict in which state representatives, while ready to kill, have instructions not to escalate violence too much, since in the case of law violations, non-lethal punishments are usually provided for in advance in the state. Nevertheless, state officials are sometimes prone to campaignism, and then the flywheel of repressions can begin to operate far less selectively, which, in fact, gives grounds to consider such campaigns as mass repressions. Moreover, during such campaigns, the state often considers it appropriate to draw peaceful citizens into the war, for when the people participate in pogroms on a mass scale, the pogroms acquire legitimacy.
History knows cases where systemic state repressions against a group singled out by the state itself led to members of this group indeed beginning to feel a kinship with each other, uniting into organizations and acquiring political subjectivity, including creating their own nations. Similar processes are possible today, and libertarians can fully participate in them.
3.3.2.2. The composition of the group is determined by itself
When the state attacks an organization, it usually calls it something like an anti-terrorist operation, although, if the military potential of the group is low, it is more likely that everything will boil down simply to a campaign of mass arrests.
If you are not part of the attacked group, you can calmly analyze how anti-libertarian its activity was, and if you have grounds to believe that it was, then concentrate your attention on ensuring that the state does not step outside the boundaries of the designated goals of the operation and does not begin to repress everyone who happens to be in the way. Well, if you are sure that the group did not commit gross violations of libertarian principles, then you retain the right to help the repressed group by any means available to you, from rhetorical support to joining the war on the side of the group.
Of course, it is much more interesting if the state starts a war against an organized group in which you are a member.
Usually, the state requires some propaganda preparation for an attack: it must decide exactly what sins to accuse you of, and preferably not entirely without evidence. Your primary task is to present the state as an inhuman monster, trampling both the rights of citizens and its own laws for the selfish goals of individual greedy politicians. In other words, the main components of the state’s military potential that the attacked organization should try to undermine are the readiness to use military force and the tolerance of bystanders toward the state’s use of military force.
In conditions where the overwhelming majority is possessed by the spirits of etatism, armed struggle against the state, even in response to direct state violence, can make the resisting group pariahs in the eyes of public opinion, therefore it is considered appropriate to use comprehensive tactics. The group directly responsible for combat operations is made as compact and encrypted as possible, while the influence group, engaged in non-violent resistance, on the contrary, should cover as wide a layer of society as possible. Between these groups there usually exists a vast grey zone, which is the wider the less cohesive the groups directing state violence and those directly executing it appear in their violent actions.
Thus, your group resisting the state, as already indicated, identifies a concrete group within the amorphous object “state” against which it will fight. After this, the combat group begins combat operations against those included in the enemy group, and the influence group accompanies this with the production of narratives. Everything will be used here: leaking versions that state agents are fighting among themselves, stories about the atrocities of state services, demands to the world community to stop the violence unleashed by the state, and, of course, the complete dehumanization of enemies. Naturally, all this means a huge risk of stepping outside the bounds of libertarian principles, as they will often conflict with utilitarian considerations. Alas, the risk is inevitable, but principles take priority over raw utilitarianism, since the war is fought primarily on a spiritual level, and your victory must be a triumph of specifically the libertarian spirit, and not just one armed group over another.
How should your war differ from the usual left-wing riots or, conversely, some right-wing anti-migrant pogroms? First and foremost, by respect for private property, as opposed to state property. Very good PR can be done via crowdfunding for compensation payments to those private individuals who suffered both from the actions of the state and from the actions of the protesters—the latter is especially important.
How should your war be similar to the usual left-wing riots? First and foremost, by the insistent demand for local autonomy and self-government, starting with the transfer of order-maintenance functions as close to the ground as possible—for those fighting the state, their own armed forces, which will be legitimate in the eyes of the world community, will be very useful.
The key point is that if the state itself attacks your group first, it certainly has the factor of surprise, but it has given you an invaluable gift, for now resistance to it will be much easier to legitimize. Do not miss this chance, and then the probability of victory will increase sharply. In the end, you should obtain at least substantial steps toward the decentralization of state power, and at most—a zone of complete self-government.
3.3.3. Civil War
In this section, I depart from the clear tripartite structure of “individual-group-state” and consider a certain intermediate phenomenon. Strictly speaking, its analogues could have been identified at the level of the individual and at the level of groups, they simply do not have such great significance for illustrating the general theory of war. For example, we could consider a situation of serious personality splitting and war between sub-personalities for control over one’s body. Or, say, we could investigate the peculiarities of war within a group for power over it. But instead, let us limit ourselves to the consideration of the phenomenon of civil war, that is, the war of different groups within the state for power over it.
Let us note immediately that many historical wars considered civil are actually separatist, that is, wars of parts of the state for separation from the whole and the formation of their own statehood. Such wars are more conveniently described as interstate, and we will not touch upon them in this section. However, wars that began as civil can ultimately boil down to separatist ones if it turns out that the supporters of the warring factions have diverged in space, and at least one of them agrees to power over a part, no longer claiming power over the whole.
A civil war has an important feature: it strives to become total, for if the recognition of the authority of one side were even slightly acceptable to the other, it would rather try to reach a compromise than ignite a war. So it will not be possible to sit on the sidelines; some concerned type will inevitably appear on your doorstep with the question: are you for these or for those? For these? Then buy emergency loan bonds. For those? Then here is a bullet between the eyes. For no one? Do you want a bullet? No? Then buy emergency loan bonds.
So, a civil war occurs in your state. In material terms, it is about which exact group will obtain power, and the libertarian position here is quite obvious: plague on both your houses. In spiritual terms, it is about which exact spirits will triumph, and here for the libertarian everything is not so unambiguous, for at least one side, and often several, may be inspired by the spirits of freedom, simply understanding it each in their own way.
Thus, if a libertarian is not ready to support one of the sides, a reasonable way out for them will be to leave the theater of military operations as quickly as possible, which for a civil war means emigration. If one of the sides appears to them to be fighting for civil liberties, then the most reasonable thing for them will be to move to where support for that side is maximal. There, the concerned types sending bullets will be encountered less often, and those who sell bonds will distribute them among a larger number of buyers, which eases the individual burden.
The consistent implementation of such a tactic by citizens will lead to a reliable spatial demarcation of the sides, and this will provide a chance to transform a civil war into a separatist one, in which a peace treaty is at least theoretically possible once the sides recognize each other’s authority over the territories they control. And even if, in the case of spatial demarcation, one side fights until its total victory, the losing side at least has a chance for organized mass emigration, which means physical survival and even, heaven forbid, a possibility of revenge.
3.3.4. State versus State
Now all that remains for us is to apply the libertarian theory of war to the phenomenon that is most commonly associated in the ordinary mind with the very concept of war, namely, the war of a state against another state.
3.3.4.1. How to tell if a war between states is taking place?
To begin with, it should be noted that, according to state sources, such a phenomenon has practically ceased to exist in the world at the time of writing this book. States do not wage war with states because they have concocted such regulations for themselves that complying with them has become simply politically impossible. For a war to be considered a war, it must be declared, after first being publicly discussed in a legislative body and passing a corresponding legislative act; thereafter, it must be conducted in compliance with a multitude of international conventions, strictly separating enemy combatants from non-combatants, refraining from many militarily effective actions, avoiding the annexation of territory, avoiding looting, and so on and so forth.
Therefore, officially, states do not wage wars, but carry out various “special operations.” But if a war is supposed to end with a peace treaty, a special operation has no formal bilateral mechanism for conclusion. Furthermore, the very fact that a special operation is being conducted may be classified and not acknowledged by official state representatives. In short, even when de facto we can speak of an interstate war, it will largely be masked as a war of a state against some organized group or even as an inter-group war, and accordingly, will partially fall under the analytical toolkit from sections 3.2.2. and 3.3.2.
For simplicity, one can consider a conflict in which a regular army participates on both sides as a sufficiently pure example of an interstate war, while the actions of other armed formations—police, intelligence services, various kinds of militias—are optional.
3.3.4.2. Interests of the state
Another feature of interstate war is that the state is more of a spiritual entity than a physical one. On a physical level, the state consists of people working for the state and material state property, and on a spiritual level, it is a system of coercing people to maintain the system of coercion itself. In essence, the very existence of the state already represents a low-intensity war against the taxable class. Therefore, when a state enters into a war with another state, it is now fighting on two fronts, and the internal front by default remains more important for state functionaries. Moreover, the existence of an external front usually serves as a justification for intensifying combat operations on the internal front. Simply put, a warring state has incentives to increase oppression toward its own subjects.
This can lead to paradoxical scenarios where it is beneficial for both warring states to fight for a long time, but in a relaxed manner, almost for show, straining themselves on the external front just enough to justify tightening the screws.
3.3.4.3. Interests of private individuals
Taking all the above into account, a private individual caught in the gears of an interstate war is forced to solve a complex optimization problem. Purely rationally, the most beneficial outcomes for them are immediate flight far from the war (though this often means the loss of property and connections in the old place) or the quickest possible conclusion of the war (however, calls for immediate peace are usually the first things to be criminalized, and therefore advocating for this position will lead to harsh sanctions for the advocate). The least beneficial outcome is a war of attrition, in which both states suffer enormous economic losses, which is merely a derivative of the economic losses suffered by their subjects.
As a result, for a subject of any of the warring states who is unable to escape painlessly, it should be most beneficial to immediately side with the stronger of the states so that it can achieve the fastest and most bloodless victory possible. Since the stronger state usually ends up being the aggressor, for the subjects of the country subjected to aggression, in general, the most beneficial course of action would be to surrender en masse immediately.
However, wars do not start out of nowhere. They are preceded by a long history of conflict escalation, during which state propaganda diligently dehumanizes the image of the potential enemy. And when it comes to war, the behavior of soldiers in the aggressor’s army turns out to be so far from gentlemanly toward the civilian population of the attacked state that it forces the latter to quickly reconsider its priorities and prefer all the hardships of a protracted war over immediate surrender.
It turns out that the probability of the rapid surrender of the subjects of the attacked state is higher the less propaganda processing the population and especially the armies of both sides have been subjected to. A state that attacks an unsuspecting neighbor without cause is capable of achieving a quick and convincing victory, as resistance will be short and weak. But such a quick victory whets the appetite of the attackers, and after some time, a powerful demand for a repetition of the celebration arises in the aggressor state. Sooner or later, neighbors will begin to seriously prepare to repel an invasion, and the next small victorious war will nonetheless become a war of attrition.
3.3.4.4. Recommendations for libertarians
If things have reached the point of interstate war, there are no longer any good recommendations for libertarians: it is too late, you should have tried to prevent this. However, it is still possible to derive some benefit from your actions.
First, you can flee the war to some relatively peaceful state with relatively peaceful neighbors. But if a large number of libertarians have a compelling reason to leave their country, this reason can be used to settle nearby and form a community in which the spirit of freedom is strong. Living in a community whose spirit is close to yours contributes to a sense of well-being, which allows not only to smooth over the stress of flight but, in some cases, even to achieve prosperity that was unavailable before the move.
Second, one can look for opportunities to relatively safely acquire military competencies or even direct combat experience (in peacetime such training may be suppressed by the state, while in wartime it may even be welcomed if presented correctly). The point is not to fight for one or another of the warring states. You can, of course, protect people close to you from an external state or bring them freedom from an internal state, or even combine these goals. But still, the point of direct participation in an interstate war is to acquire one’s own military agency. To learn how to fight, to gain comrades-in-arms, to build many informal connections. All this will be useful to you when the time comes to fight the state for freedom, for a war for freedom, as we have already discussed earlier, is a moral duty of a libertarian.
Third, if the war drags on, it will over time expose many inefficient mechanisms of state administration, and as general war fatigue grows, even officials will begin to increasingly turn a blind eye to the fact that people are building their own non-state coordination schemes. A war of attrition forces the state to gradually begin neglecting its most harmful functions: education, social security, the maintenance of centralized communal infrastructure. People acquire practical skills for solving these tasks without support from above, and sometimes even experience in opposing zealous state functionaries who try to curb attempts at self-governance. After the war ends, governments in such societies almost always carry out sharp deregulation, and the period of postwar recovery can turn into what historians later call an economic miracle. It is important for libertarians to take the maximum from this time, but first, they will need to survive until then.
3.2. A group attacks