Читатели знают, что в последнее время я больше обычного интересуюсь таким феноменом, как война. Это неизбежно сместило и акцент моего восприятия недавнего громкого убийства в США. Что в нём странного?
То, что в США считают политических оппонентов легитимными военными целями? Это рутина. В США богатейшая традиция политических убийств, где целями выступали кто угодно, от низовых активистов до президентов. То, что мишенью стал человек, принципиально стремящийся к деэскалации конфликта? Это как раз и делает его приоритетной целью, поскольку ястребы обеих сторон конфликта выигрывают от его смерти, даже если и не причастны к ней. То, что он был убит единственным выстрелом в горло с двухсот метров? Ну, это средняя дистанция, и он представлял собой удобную неподвижную мишень. Нет. Самое удивительное во всей этой истории в том, что стрелок выбрал себе позицию на открытой крыше.
Понимаете, на дворе стоит 2025 год. Человек планирует совершить убийство во время охраняемого собрания и обустраивает свою стрелковую позицию так, что она прекрасно видна сверху. Это сопоставимо по тупости с атакой плотными колоннами пехоты в начале 20 века. Тогда колонна была бы уничтожена пулемётным огнём. Сейчас стрелка уничтожит или хотя бы выявит дрон. Рассчитывать, что у охраны многотысячного собрания не будет дрона – это примерно как рассчитывать, что у защитников полевых укреплений в начале 20 века не будет пулемёта.
В качестве средства наблюдения дрон может позволить себе примерно каждый. А в США всего год назад было покушение на кандидата в президенты, где стрелок точно так же занимал позицию на открытой крыше. И после этого службы охраны массовых собраний не внесли в свои протоколы безопасности хотя бы обязательный мониторинг с воздуха? Непугаными идиотами их назвать уже нельзя, потому что пуганые. Но вот необучаемыми – это будет, пожалуй, более чем уместно.
Думаю, тут есть какая-то симметрия мышления. Нам угрожает потенциальное нападение со стволом, значит, расставляем охрану со стволами. В таком случае дроны охраны мы увидим в воздухе на подобных ивентах не ранее, чем состоится первое покушение с дрона.
I looked at the poll results regarding the reasons why my readers are staying in Russia.
What pleases me most is that the smallest category is currently under a direct travel ban. For the vast majority, the path of retreat is at least not under fire.
I am equally pleased by the agorists who managed to find an excuse to avoid mobilization. I hope it is a good, high-quality excuse.
Those who are already packing their bags have surely studied the issue well and know where to go. There is plenty of material on emigration; while waiting for a foreign passport and other papers, one can study it inside and out.
Partisans, I am proud of you. You already have over a year of combat experience, and you certainly have no need for my advice. From time to time, something in Russia mysteriously burns or explodes, certain unpleasant individuals run into trouble, including fatal outcomes, secret information doesn’t stay within the narrow circle of authorized holders for long, the morale of the troops is low, state-sponsored patriots are eating each other, and so on. If any of you had a hand in any of this, or in something not covered by my imagination—I don’t want to know anything about it until the war ends or your evacuation is complete.
Now a few words of consolation for the lazy and those bound by insurmountable domestic difficulties. It is very unlikely that the rate of producing corpses and cripples on the front among Russians will exceed three hundred thousand people per year. Thus, even if the mobilization potential of the RF is only thirty million, the state will consume only one percent of those liable for military service per year. So, out of the hundred or so who answered that they intend to remain in the RF, only one or two people will die or be crippled in the war in a year. This is a good chance for survival, enough to keep from shaking with fear. I would shake with disgust, but that is a matter of habit. Nevertheless, I recommend buying bitcoins at every opportunity: if the rate skyrockets, perhaps you will reconsider your ambitions and finally head abroad.
Of course, the main reason not to go anywhere is the fear of the unknown. How to legalize oneself, how to live, how much will have to be spent, how to get money, how long one will have to live in such a suspended state—this worries many even more than they want to show.
I’ll try to share my experience.
It is believed that it is easiest for remote IT workers to emigrate. This is true. I am still sincerely surprised why even one IT worker remained in the RF. These gluttonous creatures have driven apartment rental prices into the sky and still dare to grumble that the level of service abroad is somehow worse than in Moscow. Even if another hundred thousand of them crowd into tiny Montenegro and prices double again from current levels—even then they will be able to live in comfort, denying themselves very little, while all other immigrants will have to pack their bags and migrate to Africa, or wherever else is relatively cheap.
Without IT skills, I was lucky enough to find a remote job requiring only basic computer literacy. ChatGPT cannot replace me, but a well-designed dispatch program could; however, it is easier to pay me 700 euros a month than an entire team of developers for such a program, so I don’t have to worry about my employment. Nevertheless, there isn’t much work of this sort, and without it, I would have to work offline and with my hands, which, however, is not a great tragedy. If you are not an IT worker, it is better to orient yourself toward such an outcome from the start.
To make ends meet, many immigrants rent apartments as a group of friends. This is very sensible. Concerns about privacy and domestic frictions take a back seat compared to the savings achieved. In the RF, I never lived with any one person for more than six months—tensions built up, and we gradually drifted apart. Here I have already broken that record: I have no time for petty whims, you know. Those who have experience living in a dormitory already have a head start.
There is another obvious pattern. On one hand, the further away, the more obstacles await new immigrants. This includes a higher cost of living and the increasing complexity of legalization in a new country. On the other hand, the further away, the fewer resources the average new immigrant has: Russia is getting poorer, it is becoming harder to sell property there for a good price before leaving, and so on. Therefore, the fact that the flow of refugees from the RF does not dwindle is only because the Russian state makes staying in the RF unbearable at a rate even higher than the rate of citizens’ impoverishment. Conclusion: if you leave now, it will be easier for you than if you leave in six months. Second conclusion: at some point, it will become almost impossible to leave the RF, even if you want to very badly.
In 2021, I went to Montenegro simply because an interesting project came up—let’s, they said, build a libertarian community here and create a kind of European New Hampshire (in American New Hampshire, as I recently heard, a former member of the LPR is sitting in the state congress). And the weakness of COVID restrictions also played a part (remember, there was this COVID, under whose pretext all states competed in who could ruin their subjects’ lives in the most absurd way). I rented the cheapest studio for 120 euros a month and received a residence permit just two months after arriving—actually two weeks later than established by government regulations, about which I even had the audacity to grumble. Now this same studio is rented to someone else for 200. After applying for a residence permit extension in June, I received the new document only in November, and I still haven’t been able to open a bank account for the company I acquired—I am literally not being given the opportunity to pay taxes, damn it. Those who arrive right now simply cannot physically apply for a residence permit—the queue starts at nine in the evening the night before; few can endure such a thing.
If I were deciding right now which country to flee to from Russia with my background and current job, I would probably settle on Kyrgyzstan, because Montenegro is already too lavish and too much of a headache. Kyrgyzstan also has mountains, also a sea (of possibilities), also plenty of Russian speakers, also meat cuisine, also people friendly to immigrants, also an unstable government—but at the same time, life is cheaper, and it seems slightly easier with the bureaucratic red tape.
And if I decided to go specifically to Montenegro right now—since there is no Montelibero in Kyrgyzstan—I would no longer count on any residence permit, but would simply do visa-runs every month—to Albania in the summer, to Serbia in the winter. Or maybe I’d just forget about it and live as an illegal. As long as you don’t try to cross the border, no one cares about the legality of your residence status. And when you try, and they pick on you—the maximum risk is a fine and a six-month ban on entry.
Forgive the awkwardly long and rambling post; I just wanted to vent. I simply believe it is important to support my readers, wherever they are stuck right now, and whatever status they hold. Even if you didn’t escape and ended up at the front—well, shoot something off of yourself, something not too vital for life, but necessary to fight. There is always a way out.
I watched Andor. Very interesting, unexpectedly mature for this franchise, and quite timely.
Naturally, while examining Emperor Palpatine’s regime, I couldn’t help but think of another dictator starting with P, from our own galaxy. Of course, there are many differences between them. The Empire has no external enemies; it simply has temporarily uncontrollable outskirts, periodically rebellious provinces, and so on. In short, it’s not the RF, but rather something like medieval China. On the other hand, the RF has no parliamentary opposition. In the Empire, the rebel movement is funded by local aristocracy and consists primarily of individual entrepreneurs. In the RF, the core of the protest is also made up of freelancers and other remote workers, and it is funded by crowdfunding. Big business in both cases has completely merged with the state. In general, there are many interesting parallels.
Now I would like to see what the series tells us about the methods of the rebel movement.
A great deal of attention is paid to conspiracy. To the point that operatives can easily be sacrificed, and even eliminated by their own, if there is a threat of exposing key coordinating figures. It’s not like that in the RF, because the protest can be coordinated from abroad, even without hiding, while remaining sufficiently safe, whereas no state borders can protect one from the Empire.
The idea of funding rebels through the expropriation of imperial property is not new and is deeply rooted, among other things, in the Russian Empire. Against this backdrop, the Russian opposition’s emphasis on exposing the corruption schemes of the imperial elite looks completely counterproductive.
The theme of tits “militant wing vs. moderate wing” is not sufficiently explored. Although the rebels seemingly have sympathizers in the Senate, nowhere from a high podium does one hear: “See, this is what your local excesses lead to; why escalate? Let’s not push desperate people toward extremist actions, since the war ended long ago—isn’t it time to loosen the screws?” Instead, the parliamentary opposition is guided by an agenda that does not correlate with the militant actions, which weakens its rhetorical power. And soon, as is well known, the Senate will be completely dissolved.
I was very pleased by the character who, in the pauses between preparing for a combat operation, wrote a book about ancap Resistance manifesto. I truly felt a kindred spirit. Unfortunately, there are no social networks or even Telegram channels in the Empire to promote such manifestos, which heavily centralizes any organizational activity.
The series captures a pattern noted by James Scott: it is precisely the peoples oppressed by the empire that manifest their ethnicity and various unique cultures, while people digested by the empire become unified and lose the traits of any ethnicity. At the same time, in essence, ethnicity can easily be created from scratch based on any traditions extracted from dusty closets—or stylized as such. Alex Rozov writes about the same in the Meganesian cycle, and any community opposing an empire, even libertarians, for example, can reproduce the same if they wish to strengthen their identity. For instance, we are not just some arrived Russes, but already quite proper Monteliberians.
The reader might find my selection of series features for review strange. But I shouldn’t just rave about its artistic merits. They exist, and if it weren’t for them, there would be no point in digging deeper.
The Russian hinterland is well portrayed in the series…
Elections are coming soon in Russia. Last time, voting at polling stations lasted for three whole days, and I hope this practice continues now. The FBK, as usual, is calling for smart voting, and of course, the Russian opposition (those who haven’t left yet) should publicly support this initiative. Be sure to post on social media that it is now more important than ever to act within the legal framework, support democratic institutions, and so on and so forth. And even go and vote for someone; it might prove useful.
The most important thing for the Russian opposition in the coming voting days is that a vast number of polling stations are open across the country, and at each one, there is one or even two cops on duty. This, in turn, means a sharp increase in the police response time to various truly important political actions, such as burning down certain government institutions—like the already familiar military recruitment offices—or even something more tasty. It would be a sin not to take advantage of this!
Remember: the only thing that justifies a Russian oppositionist remaining in Russia right now is participation in sabotage, diversions, and terrorist attacks. Your sitting in prison weakens the regime far less, and participating in some pickets actually strengthens it, because you will inevitably pay the regime a hefty fine afterwards. So, for those of you remaining behind enemy lines, it is far more useful to promote some theory of small deeds, write that the special operation is “not that straightforward,” and generally behave in a moderately unacceptable manner—while steadily unscrewing the nuts from the rails.
Tomorrow, January 31, we take to the streets again. After January 23, we see a fairly clear tactic from the regime: to make coordination as difficult as possible and to knock out all organizers, as well as those who theoretically could be organizers, even if they aren’t currently exposed but were noticed in something similar in the past. In the locations where the protests are held, communication will be jammed, public transport movement will be restricted, sidewalks and roads will be blocked, and establishments will be closed.
Navalny’s headquarters continues to insist that the upcoming action be peaceful. That is, it is suggested not to kick the security forces in the stomach, even if their visors fog up.
How is it proposed to behave within the restrictions imposed on us by the enemy, and those imposed on us by our own command?
This is not the final decisive battle, but simply one of the episodes of a very long confrontation to come.
But tomorrow we must perform more vividly than a week ago.
Most likely, slightly more people will come out, but that is not of particular importance.
We need to demonstrate determination, but at the same time sustain minimal losses.
Therefore, the main emphasis is placed precisely on safety.
Anonymity. Unobtrusive clothing that hides identifying features; definitely wear masks, no badges or other accessories that make identification easier.
Come in groups. If you don’t have your own company, try to attach yourself to someone. You must not remain alone and unsupervised.
Do not stand in squares; move continuously as a dense mass, do not let yourselves be surrounded or split; if the cops try to break into the ranks—link arms.
During detention attempts, grab those being detained, surround the resulting scuffle, and demand that the cops leave without their prize.
Film only the cops on camera. Under no circumstances film your own. Demand that journalists only film wide shots, and only from behind. No interviews—tell them to fuck off. And use profanity specifically, so there is no temptation to broadcast it. The best thing you can do with a pro-government channel journalist is to secretly push them toward the cops and immediately vanish into the crowd.
Do not bring posters. Unless that poster is on plywood, and the plywood is on a sturdy stake. You never know, it might come in handy.
Regarding weapons. Use them only to prevent detention, and only when it is not being recorded by cameras. Stream and gel sprays are good. Aerosols are bad (your own people may suffer).
Banners are needed only for orientation, to understand where the head and tail of the column are. The banner-bearer should not walk on the edge—they are a primary target for detention. If the banner-bearer is detained anyway, take the flag from them, if they don’t think to throw it far into the crowd themselves. Let someone else carry the flag. It is stupid to take the flag with you into the police van.
Chants—keep them to a minimum; it is better to loudly greet friendly motorists who are honking. Chants can also be used to notify the rear ranks of important details of the situation. “Putin is a dick!” is a bad chant. “Cops on the right!” is a good one.
When the end point of the march is reached, you must immediately and very quickly disperse in different directions, but not individually, but in several columns, according to the number of possible directions of movement at the finish point. This is the most dangerous stage of the action; it would be a pity to complete the entire route only to end up in a police van at the very end.
If the cops are waiting at the finish point, do not go there at all—it is better to turn off beforehand and go far to the side, and only end the action at a safe distance from the enemy.
All these recommendations are for the regions. The two capitals have their own specifics, huge experience with such actions, plus a completely different scale; they will figure it out themselves.
As for banal things, like how to behave in the police department, I’ll leave that to the lawyers. First of all, try not to end up there.
Yes, this is all preparation for a past war. If tomorrow we are met not with batons but with water cannons, gas, and rubber bullets, little of these recommendations will be useful. If the situation proves to be that abnormal, you should simply get as far away from the action site as possible, because it will mean that next time you will need to bring completely different equipment.
It is better to repost this text from anonymous accounts.
I’m not calling for this yet, although I really want to, of course
Why did the pig pick up a hammer and what was it trying to get from our host? What should be done with those who violate the principle of non-aggression? Is revenge permissible if it is non-violent? What question should one ask when seeking compensation for damages?
I present to you a fresh video on individual tactics for defusing aggressive violence. The script was written with a hammer to the temple, but everything turned out fine. Enjoy the viewing.
On the evening of September 18, near Krasnoyarsk, a group of about ten public activists relaxing at a libertarian-conservative camp Krest Kappelya was attacked by a similar number of rioters wearing balaclavas and armed with clubs. The camp participants were seriously beaten, and their phones, some belongings, and tents were seized and destroyed, and their passports were burned. The attackers did not hide the political nature of the assault.
One of those attacked managed to escape, take cover at an empty summer house, and contact the police. As far as I can tell, it is about a three-hour drive from the Emelyanovo district center to the camp site; therefore, the police made excuses until the last moment, unwilling to venture into the wilderness at night, and only deployed after the attack gained publicity. By the time the police arrived, the camp site was already empty, and by morning, details of the attack and photos of the beaten activists began to appear. They made their own way to the nearest settlement and from there were evacuated to Krasnoyarsk.
Information regarding exactly where the camp would take place was not readily available in open sources. On the camp’s VK public page, it was suggested to contact the organizers personally for additional information. Thus, potential attackers would have had to either organize surveillance or have prior data on the camp’s location.
I am posting all these details for the following understanding:
Your political activism can lead to an attack by paramilitaries.
In such an attack, it will be difficult for you to encounter an opponent who is fully prepared for combat. In this case, the attack happened in the dark on people sitting by a campfire with a guitar—an almost ideal setup for the attackers. Even if you happen to have a weapon with you, using it would be problematic, and after the attack, you will almost certainly lose it.
Meetings in deserted places are not conspiracy. If they set a goal to find you, they will find you, but you, conversely, will face problems when trying to escape from a deserted place.
What organizational conclusions can be drawn from this:
Small events for ten to fifteen people are better held in the city or, for example, at guarded recreation centers.
If you gather several dozen people, you can afford a tent camp, but then it is important to organize security yourselves. Sober and armed. Preferably with security credentials.
Local political paramilitaries, like the police, are tied to a specific territory. If you want a quiet, secluded vacation, go outside your region, and if you have federal notoriety, go abroad. Navalny was attacked when he flew from Moscow to vacation somewhere near Anapa, I believe. But if you have only caught the eye of the “E-center” in Krasnoyarsk, a trip to Tomsk will rid you of its attention.
VK is a terrible place for planning any kind of events. Total conspiracy is impossible, but increasing the cost of operational-search activities is within your power.
And generally, the idea of a camp is quite attractive…
Since I wasn’t far off the mark with the first part of my advice, and events unfolded quite closely to the proposed scenario (instead of arresting the entire headquarters — only the deportation of the president-elect; instead of diaspora activity — a nationwide strike), I will venture to suggest a tactic for ending the confrontation.
The essence of the tactic: no one allows any doubt that the president-elect is indeed Tikhanovskaya, and she continues to act precisely in this capacity. And what does the legitimate president-elect do? Of course, she schedules her inauguration.
There is no need to wait long. The inauguration is scheduled for the nearest Sunday, at the largest open venue in Minsk. Foreign leaders are officially invited to it. The Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians will certainly agree, and another dozen leaders will announce that they are sending their representatives. Then begins a bombardment of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with notifications that the president of, say, Croatia gratefully accepts the invitation of the Belarusian side, arrives for the inauguration at such-and-such a time, and requests that a meeting be organized.
In the same way, the inauguration organizing committee with a straight face issues instructions to heads of agencies: organize traffic closures, provide security, set up a stage, seating for invited guests — and so on. If an official sends a refusal, an announcement of their removal from office follows, and a request is sent to the deputy.
In short, the winning side simply begins to give orders, and representatives of the losing side are faced with a choice: either they play by the new rules, or they personally drop out of the process, and tomorrow new faces occupy their offices. Orders are also given to the OMON squads — they are given a week’s leave; after all, they have just worked very hard.
Additionally, the defense side appeals to the investigative authorities with a proposal to close the cases of Tikhanovsky and Babarika in connection with newly discovered circumstances. The circumstances, in the form of a crowd of thousands speaking actively under the windows at that time, speak for themselves.
I will not elaborate on further details; I think the line of thought is more or less clear. Fake it until you make it.
After the first two acts of the play, only the final one remains to be played: we shall overcome
I’ll say right away that in this instance, I most want to play the Shulman: curl up in a hole and scream from there that I am not an expert, go to the experts. But let me just stipulate that I am not insisting on being right in this matter, and am merely expressing a modest opinion.
I am proceeding from a simple comparison of the tactics of the Ukrainian Maidan and the Armenian revolution. The Armenian tactic ensured victory at the cost of less bitterness between the parties, as a result of which the conflict quickly quieted down, and reforms are now proceeding without as many problems.
So, Tikhanovskaya’s headquarters should formulate the simplest possible decentralized tactic of wearing down the security forces through peaceful urban guerrilla warfare, with coordinated street closures in geographically dispersed districts, strong moral pressure on election commission employees—so that they publish materials showing falsifications—and strong moral pressure on the relatives of security personnel to force their helmet-wearing kin into unobtrusive sabotage, and so on.
After this tactic is announced, there is a high probability that the headquarters will be crushed and its leadership imprisoned in its entirety. But a decentralized tactic will allow things to proceed without a headquarters thereafter.
The diaspora worked well in Armenia. Belarusians have one too; it should be utilized. This means pressure on foreign leaders so that they do not recognize Lukashenko’s victory, but rather recognize Tikhanovskaya’s victory.
Unlike in Venezuela, high-ranking Belarusian security officials do not seem to be as heavily involved in business, but are simple government employees, so it will be easier to win them over to the side of the legitimate lady president.
The left symbol has been played, now the central one enters the fray
