анонимный вопрос
Here, I really want to start with an extended quote from a source I constantly refer to—our Political Science-chan, Ekaterina Schulmann:
As for the actual state of affairs, generally speaking, the Russian person is a spontaneous libertarian, but does not know it and would never call themselves such. In reality, they are very inclined toward libertarian values, namely: they do not trust the state, state institutions, or law enforcement agencies. In general, they trust no one except personal acquaintances. They tend to rely only on themselves and their closest relatives. Accordingly, they would like it if no one messed with them, if they were left in peace and not told how to live. In other words, these libertarian values are very strong in Russian people.
Ekaterina Schulmann
At the same time, the opposite view is entirely justified: Russia is a country of ingrained social-democratic values, and the ideal state for the majority of Russians is the Scandinavian countries, with low levels of inequality, comfortable prisons, officials on bicycles, and broad public discussion of all issues—in short, a proper Soviet government as it should be, according to the project documentation. The high taxes and strict regulations attached to this model are perceived as a fully justified price for this paternalistic paradise.
And finally, it would be strange not to mention the viewpoint that the Russian person is a sucker and a doormat, burdened by Stockholm syndrome and learned helplessness. Their motto is “initiative is punishable”, and not “punishable by being ordered to implement the initiative”, as in the ideal Confucian China, but literally punishable by a blow to the head so that they don’t stick their neck out. They harbor no illusions about the benevolence of state power, but justify the actions of officials by believing that they themselves would behave the same way in their place.
The first category—these are our natural allies. They might not provide active support because they are busy with their own peaceful anarcho-capitalist affairs, but at the very least, at the right moment, they will look away and not snitch on people for their peaceful anarcho-capitalist affairs.
The second category—these are our natural allies. They understand the importance of jointly solving local problems, the ability to negotiate, and the desire to unite around common interests, rather than simply on the principle of “us versus them.”
The third category—these are our natural allies. Gradually, it dawns on them that an official is not some inexorable force, omnipotent and omniscient. An official is a ridiculous idiot who doesn’t dare take a step without instructions, yet treats orders according to the principles of “wait to execute—they’ll cancel it” and “if you can shift the responsibility—shift it.” Finally, these people realize that an official immediately loses all their superior arrogance when facing a crowd one-on-one. And then officials can be peacefully pelted with snowballs, as in Volokolamsk, or subjected to “garbage lustrations,” as in Ukraine, but if things get really heated, it can even lead to defenestrations, which our Slavic brothers in the Czech Republic loved to use.

Of course, sometimes with allies like these, you don’t even need enemies. Of course, such allies are too easily lured by communist slogans, and then they will go beat up the liberalists and the bourgeois. Therefore, as unpleasant as it may be, it is necessary to perform the important work of creating the correct image of the enemy in these people’s heads. This is precisely why Mikhail Svetov, with his propaganda of hatred toward the nomenklatura, is also doing important work; I couldn’t do it, I find it much more pleasant to tell various optimistic tales about how we can organize ourselves.