Većina libertarijanaca se, u neko vreme, suočila sa problemom javne imovine, ili kako tržište može najbolje da zaštiti i rasporedi dobra koja su „u zajedničkom vlasništvu“, kao što su ribe u moru, putevi, radio-talasi i tako dalje. Jedna stara ekonomska parabola lepo sažima ovaj problem – hajde da je ukratko pregledamo pre nego što se ozbiljno pozabavimo rešavanjem problema javne imovine.
Problem je dobro opisan parabolom koja se zove problem zajedničkih resursa (POTC), a koja glasi otprilike ovako: grupa farmera koji poseduju ovce poseduje zemlju u krugu oko zajedničke oblasti. Svaki od njih pojedinačno ima koristi od toga što pušta svoje ovce da pasu na zajedničkoj zemlji, jer to oslobađa deo njihove sopstvene poljoprivredne zemlje za druge namene. Međutim, ako svi puste svoje ovce da pasu na zajedničkoj zemlji, svi će stradati, jer će zemlja biti potpuno iscrpljena, pa će na kraju završiti posmatrajući kako njihove ovce izgladnjuju, jer je njihova sopstvena zemlja prebačena na druge namene. U mnogim krugovima, ovo se smatra neoborivim coup de grace za apsolutno pravo privatnog vlasništva – i za slobodno tržište uopšte – u meri u kojoj to „dokazuje“ da lični interes, kada se racionalno sledi, može rezultirati ekonomskom katastrofom. Zbog POTC-a, tvrdi se, prava vlasništva pojedinca moraju biti ograničena radi „većeg dobra“. Dakle, moraju se uspostaviti regulacija i državno vlasništvo kako bi se kontrolisali preterivanja individualnog interesa radi dugoročne stabilnosti, bla bla bla.
There is one significant difficulty with the POTC, however, which is that it fails to prove that government regulation or public ownership is necessary, or that turning the POTC over to the State solves the problem in any way. In fact, it is easy to prove that even if the POTC is a real dilemma, the worst possible way of solving it is to create government regulations or public ownership.
PROBLEM #1: JAVNO VLASNIŠTVO
The simplest rebuttal to the POTC, of course, is to point out that the problem faced by the farmers is not an excess of private property, but a deficiency. If we imagine the farms surrounding the commons to be doughnut-shaped, then clearly the POTC is best solved by simply extending the ownership of the farms to the very center, like pizza slices (yes, these metaphors are making me hungry as well!). If private property is thus extended to include the commons, farmers no longer face the problem of everyone wanting to exploit un-owned resources. Everyone can then use their extra land to feed their sheep, and everyone is content. (Alternatively, a woman can come along, buy up the commons and start charging grazing fees. To ensure the longevity of her resource, she will naturally take care to avoid overgrazing.)
However, let us accept that under some circumstances the POTC is real, and cannot be overcome through the extension of private property rights. What solutions can then be brought to bear on the problem?
Solutions to social problems always fall into one of two categories: voluntary or coercive. Voluntary solutions to the POTC abound throughout history – the most notable being the kinds of social arrangements made by fishermen. When a number of fishing communities dot a lake, villagers develop complex and effective measures to ensure that the lake is not over-fished. Any display of wealth is frowned upon, since it is clear that wealth can only come from over-fishing. Communal leaders meet to figure out how much each village can catch – and it is very hard to hide your catch in a small village. Furthermore, the problem of not knowing exactly how much fish is being taken by others – as well as natural annual variations in fish stocks – lead to significant underestimation of allowable catches, which ensures that sustainability is always achieved. Left-leaning economists might be baffled by the POTC, but there is scant recorded historical evidence of illiterates in fishing villages regularly starving to death due to over-fishing (unless their village leaders were left-leaning economists perhaps).
The POTC is yet another manifestation of that old bugbear: the blind insistence that man is a being whose sole motivation is immediate financial considerations. (Economists who believe this and who also have children are most baffling in this regard!) “Ahhh,” says the miserly farmer of this ‘instant gratification’ fairy tale, “I will graze my sheep by night and callously denude the commons, so I can grow a dozen extra turnips!” But what good will his extra turnips do him if no one in the village will talk to him, or when no one will help him build a barn, or when he gets sick and needs people to care for his sheep? No, even miserly farmers are far better obeying the rules and forgetting about their extra turnips – since they will lose far more than they gain by circumventing social norms. Communities have weapons of ostracism and contempt that far outweigh immediate economic calculations.
(Has this changed in the Internet age? Surely we are far less constrained by social norms than we used to be! Not at all – now, with tools ranging from credit reports, web searches and easy access to prior employers, conformity to basic decency is more important than ever.)
PROBLEM #2: DRŽAVA KAO ‘ZAJEDNIČKO DRUŠTVENO IGO’
Međutim, pretpostavimo da nijedan od gore navedenih protivargumenta protiv POTC-a ne opstaje, i da u određenim okolnostima jednostavno ne postoji način da se prava svojine prošire na resurse koji se ne mogu posedovati, niti da se vrši društvena kontrola nad njima – šta onda? Da li takav trnovit i složen problem prepuštamo na milost Države da ga reši?
One of the most interesting aspects of using the State to solve the POTC is that the State itself is subject to the problem of the commons.
Since the State is an entity wherein property is owned in “common,” the problem of selfish exploitation leading to general destruction applies as surely to State “property” as it does to the common land ringed by greedy and short-sighted farmers. Just as farmers can destroy the commons while pursuing their individual self-interest, so can politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists and other assorted State toadies and courtiers destroy the economy as a whole in pursuit of their own selfish economic and political goals.
The POTC argues that, due to “common ownership,” long-term prosperity is sacrificed for the sake of short-term advantage. Because no one defends and maintains property that can be utilized by all, that property is pillaged into oblivion. And – the State is supposed to solve this problem? How?
To je baš tako država funkcioniše!
Pogledajmo neke primere kako država pljačka budućnost u ime pohlepe u sadašnjosti:
- deficitno finansiranje;
- inflatorna monetarna ekspanzija;
- državne obveznice, koje će buduće generacije morati da isplate;
- trošenje novca prikupljenog putem socijalnog osiguranja, za koji će buduće generacije morati da plate;
- ofanzivno „odbrambeno” trošenje, za koje će budući građani plaćati kroz povećan rizik od domaćih napada;
- ogromni obrazovni neuspesi, koji imaju izuzetno štetne efekte na buduću produktivnost i sreću;
- the granting of special powers, rights and benefits to lobbyists such as unions, public sector employees and large corporations, which results in higher prices and deficits (the cost to the US economy for union laws alone is calculated at $50 trillion dollars over the past 50 years);
- the failure to adequately maintain public infrastructure such as roads, schools, bridges, the water supply and so on, which passes enormous liabilities onto the next generation;
- massive spending on the war on drugs, which increases crime in the future;
- the pollution of public lands and other fixed assets, which saves money in the short run while ruining value in the long run;
- …i Bog zna koliko još!
From the above examples, it is easy to see that the POTC applies to the State to a far greater degree than any other social agency or individual. If we recall our group of greedy farmers, we can easily see that they have a strong incentive to avoid or solve the POTC, since it is they themselves who will suffer from the despoiling of un-owned lands. However, in the case of the State, those who prey upon and despoil the public purse will never themselves face the direct consequences of their pillaging. Thus their incentive to prevent, solve or even alleviate the problem is virtually nonexistent.
Štaviše, čak i ako poljoprivrednici na kraju unište neovlašćene zemlje, oni barem mogu da se udruže i dobrovoljno rade na pronalaženju boljeg rešenja u budućnosti. Međutim, kada vlada preuzme problem, kontrola skoro u potpunosti prelazi iz privatne sfere u javnu sferu sprovođenja zakona, korupcije i politike. Jednom kada se čvrsto ukorenite u domenu države, ne samo da se problem javne vlasništva čini neizmerno gorem, već se on nikada ne može rešiti, jer je sada pljačka javnog novca zaštićena svom naoružanom silom državne vojske.
Posledice isparavaju, konkurencija je eliminisana, a lud bacanje svega za sebe jednostavno eskalira sve dok se javni novčanik ne isprazni do kraja i država ne kolapsira. (Ovo se dogodilo u Sovjetskom Savezu; tokom 1980-ih, kada je postalo jasno da komunizam nije održiv, ljudi iz Kremlja su jednostavno pljačkali državnu blagajnu sve dok država nije bankrotirala.)
Thus the idea of turning to the State to solve the POTC is akin to the old medical joke about the operation being a complete success, with the minor exception that the patient died. If the POTC is a significant issue in the private sector, then turning it over to the government makes it staggeringly worse – turning it from a mildly challenging problem of economics into a suicidal expansion of State power and violence. If the problem of the commons is not a significant issue, then surely we do not need the State to solve it at all.
Either way, there is no compelling evidence or argument to be made for the value, morality or efficacy of turning problems of public ownership over to the armed might of the State. Both logically and ethically, it is the equivalent of treating a mild headache with a guillotine.
Ako je država zla, korumpirana i destruktivna rešenja za probleme društvene organizacije, koje alternative može ponuditi anarhizam?