Today I was in Bangkok, at the Temple of the Emerald Buddha. There is nothing to do there: the Buddha is small, photography is forbidden, talking is forbidden; you can only stand and think about the meaning of all existence. That is what I did. I have never been into meditation, so I don’t know how similar this was to it, but at some point, I suddenly grasped the entire beautiful and amazing picture of spontaneous orders—how the simplest rules followed by people give rise to the most complex and exquisitely coordinated mechanisms of human interaction.

The state was there too, and it also appeared in the form of something very similar to spontaneous orders. After all, it also grows out of people following fairly simple and uniform rules, but it forms the most complex and sophisticated mechanisms of robbery and deception. There were no total clichés in this revelation, such as identifying society and the state as yin and yang, eternally struggling and interpenetrating; rather, the state became increasingly indistinguishable from society.

Anyway, then I left the temple, shook myself off a bit, and began to reflect in the usual European way.

Zolotoryov defines spontaneous orders as the stable result of people observing simple rules, which is formed unintentionally and is useful for the members of society. The word “useful” in this definition smells of voluntarism, and it would be better to do without it. The state is also formed from people observing simple rules, and for some time now, the result of their observance has also become quite stable. What are these rules?

Early states were formed by following the rule “take your neighbor as an accomplice and rob the stranger.” Such states, as Zolotoryov correctly notes, usually disappeared without a trace shortly after the death of the founder, and people returned to the familiar stateless society.

Then, having established themselves where people had nowhere to flee, states mutated—that is, basically, the rule that formed them began to change. Now it became this: “there is a special breed of shepherds; they have the right to eat the sheep, but in exchange, they are destined to protect them from wolves.” To be more precise, that is how I phrased the ideological justification for the new type of state, but the rule became something like: “if you feel you have the strength to lead the herd, become the shepherd, and it is yours.”

This is an extremely stable construction that still works perfectly in paternalistic societies, and especially vividly in Thailand, where the authority of the royal power is very great, criticism of the king is unthinkable, and yet, regarding each king, people proudly tell not of what lands he annexed or how many captives participated in his triumph, but how many temples, universities, and bridges he built.

But liberal ideas ripened in European society, and the state mutated again—that is, the rule whose observance forms the new type of state changed once more. Now it sounds roughly like this: “if you can convince a sucker that you know how things should be done, then lead them.”

So here it is. The consistent observance of this rule should lead to a state that is exclusively herbivorous and, generally, harmless, because if you don’t convince the sucker that you know how things should be done, you will have to leave them alone. And if the sucker is convinced by someone else, then they are that person’s cash cow. In other words, such a rule should produce panarchy, which has been mentioned several times on this channel.

It’s just that from the time of the French Revolution until roughly the Cuban Revolution, a strange intermediate version of the rule worked: “if you have convinced enough suckers that you know how things should be done, then take them as accomplices and rob everyone as best you can.” Obviously, the resulting state turns out to be very unstable: suckers make poor accomplices, and they lose faith quite quickly—while they have to be paid an enormous amount for their complicity in the robbery. This gave rise to the total debt crisis of modern democracies, constant popular unrest over trifles that would have been completely unnoticed by the subjects of a shepherd-type state, and other symptoms of malaise.

Well, the next mutation of the state-forming idea after panarchy should logically be (okay, not logically, but in my revelation, it is exactly so) a formulation like this: “don’t treat people like suckers, and you will be able to sell them more.” And that, kids, is ancap.

Om!