Recently, I published a post in Bitarch’s column stating that current trends in technological development are easily extrapolated into the near future, and based on them, we see that the capabilities of private individuals to carry out indiscriminate mass killings continue to grow and could well reach the level of a global threat. From this, the author concludes that to eliminate this threat, not only the institution of the state must be rejected, but also any other factors that potentially place people in a desperate position where there is no particular difference for them whether to die alone or to take all of humanity with them.
Bitarch then expanded on the topic on his VKontakte page, responding to a number of objections. The response boiled down to the idea that the threat is closer than one might assume and that, in general, we need to be more responsible. Unfortunately, this rhetoric added few substantial arguments—how is such a call for responsibility different from Greta Thunberg’s appeals? She also threatens global consequences if we do not all wake up right now.
After that, Bitarch released a third article, and this time proposed a more specific case for consideration. Imagine a dangerous asshole (Harvey Weinstein is used in the example) or an organization (let’s say, for example, ELF) who are given a severe punishment, and instead of accepting it humbly, they demand immediate pardon under the threat of releasing some unpleasant virus according to the dead hand principle. The virus would not kill humanity, but as we see from current events, it is capable of seriously damaging the economy.
Will the emergence of such threats lead to state power beginning to bend? Yes, of course. We have a great experimental state, Israel, which over time moved from the doctrine of “we do not negotiate with terrorists” to the doctrine of “we exchange one of our prisoners for a thousand of yours.” Thus, in states where there is a possibility of holding leaders politically accountable, they will bend to the demands of terrorists; and when the threats of terrorists acquire a global character, whether or not to negotiate with terrorists will cease to be the choice of a specific dictator, and even Putin, in such a scenario, would have to bargain. “I, for instance, agree to make certain concessions to the terrorists, but you, dear Western partners, should lift sanctions on me for such compliance, because as you know, terrorism is so unpredictable.”
Under ancap, this problem is simplified. The terrorist loses a subject for negotiations. Yes, he may be ready to indiscriminately exterminate several million people if his conditions are not met. But what conditions? To whom will he address them? There is no state. He could address, for example, the management of some corporation. Let’s say the same “elves” demand that the management of an oil company stop oil production, otherwise, there will be a coronavirus. After this, the board of directors resigns, and the subject of negotiations disappears again. Of course, this will not prevent the elves from launching an epidemic, but the goal of the terrorist act was slightly different.
Of course, means of protection against such threats will also be improved. For example, total transaction transparency could allow for the rapid location of a terrorist network and the neutralization of the dead hand threat. Or it might be possible to change the terrorist’s motivation. Or even local time-stopping. The debate over whose fantastic assumption will be realized first is quite fruitless. Bitarch claims that defense technologies develop significantly slower than attack technologies. Nevertheless, for some reason, the general level of violence is steadily declining, and if state-initiated violence is excluded from the statistics, it becomes practically negligible.
Therefore, it is not that I disregard the threat being discussed. I simply believe it is not very relevant to ancap, and as for postulating the necessity of outgrowing states, I have other sufficient arguments.
