Discussion on whether to pay for security

A subscriber sent me the text of their article with a suggestion to refine and publish it. This seemed like a bad idea to me, as I find AI-generated creations uncomfortable to read, and editing them is not enjoyable at all. So I simply posted the article on Teletype so that those interested could read it, and I will reflect on the topic addressed in it.

Briefly, the article explains why someone in need of security should not buy this security, but should ensure it for themselves. As justifications, fairly standard protectionist arguments are provided, stating that the division of labor is not always a benefit because the provider of necessary services will inevitably want to dominate the market, which in the case of security services will inevitably place the consumer of these services under the complete control of the provider.

Firstly, it seems to me not entirely correct to suggest that the reader act on the assumption as if there are currently no enforcers claiming a monopoly, but rather a free market, and one only needs to try not to spoil the current blissful ancap. In fact, we already have a situation of forced collection of arbitrary sums from everyone the state can reach under fraudulent pretexts, including the argument that the state supposedly provides protection. In other words, the article essentially suggests to people who have already fallen into the crocodile’s teeth to be more careful and not walk around Africa.

Secondly, the same arguments used against the division of labor in the sphere of security can be transferred unchanged to other spheres. Wouldn’t a food supplier want to be a monopoly supplier, with complete power over your death by starvation? Let’s engage in subsistence farming to avoid this terrible danger.

In fact, in the case of state security, we have not an excessive, but an insufficient division of labor. The state tends to involve itself in any aspect of security that occurs to a bureaucrat drafting new regulations. Meanwhile, it is precisely the practice of turning to various narrow specialists for every specific issue that counteracts the potential forced merger of these specialists into a single center for providing everything. As soon as the state gets a market competitor in any sphere, the state’s position in it becomes more shaky. Of course, many initially prefer the option already paid for by taxes and therefore requiring no additional expense, rather than paying a private provider for a higher-quality solution. However, private solutions still gradually carve out their way, first in the premium segment, and then in the mass market.

Therefore, I will instead formulate the opposite call: pay for security. Buy all goods and services that are sold to you cheaper and/or of higher quality than if you were to tinker with it yourself. And only if the market choice does not satisfy you, does it make sense to combine efforts with partners and produce the missing product yourself.

Svetov

There is something humiliating about reacting to an information agenda set by other people whose influence far outweighs their usefulness, so this post appears somewhat late, after everyone who wanted to has already spoken out. The formal reason for this text was a question from a subscriber who introduced himself as Tidvik’s dad:

Please share your opinion on Svetov’s latest text about abandoning idealism and merciful rule. Is this a departure from libertarian ideals and a transition into cynical realpolitik? Or is it simply disillusionment and an admission of the opposition’s impotence? And what does Hoppe have to do with it?

On March 5, Mikhail Svetov posted the text Farewell to Idealism (on the mercy of power), which he characterized as “my best text since the state is anarchy” (I also did not want to react to that video, and I also managed to hide behind answering a subscriber’s question).

In the video “The state is anarchy,” Svetov attacks the idea of natural rights and explains its emergence by stating that people had only just killed God and were fascinated by materialism. In the new article, Svetov, on the contrary, repents for having been an idealist (though he says “we” instead of speaking for himself, and his former party colleague goes hard on this topic).

Actually, I rather admire it when a person states: “previously I said this or that, such and such facts forced me to change my position, now I believe this or that.” All Svetov lacks is to add, “because of my mistake, I caused harm to such and such people, I apologize, and I am ready to compensate somehow, if possible.” However, even Navalny never managed to reach such heights of self-awareness. But even this is already better than the classic mid-air flip-flopping, where a change in discourse goes uncommented, and reminders of former views are met with bewilderment, in the spirit of “Did I say that? I can’t believe it. Next question.”

As usual, Svetov introduces strange definitions of terms. If he previously defined anarchy as a state of war of all against all (meaning that since 2019, he can no longer call himself an ancap), he has now defined power as the ability to induce desired behavior from people. Thus, power belongs to a good advertiser whose product is bought, to a good orator whose agenda catches on with the masses, to a rapist dragging a victim into the bushes, and to an official issuing a demolition order for a house. And, of course, to a tyrant deciding what to smear on his political opponent’s underwear. Such a definition does not allow a libertarian to distinguish which power is worth striving for and which is not, but now Mikhail can confidently assert that “there is no scenario in which principles can rely on anything other than power.” Of course it would be, if we expand the definition of power so disgracefully that it includes absolutely any influence.

Svetov’s post was quite warmly received by the Center for Republican Research. It was dedicated two whole reviews from different authors — Daria Kormanovskaya and Andrey Bystrov. Mikhail was congratulated on his position approaching the republican one, recommended literature, and noted minor flaws — in short, they effectively welcomed him into their ranks.

It is also said that his post was warmly received by official Russian propaganda, but fortunately, I am not obliged to familiarize myself with it, so I am completely unaware of the details.

Among Svetov’s sharp critics, I would mention Michael Naki, who emphasized the most important thing lacking in Mikhail’s activities: for quite a long time now, they have been far from any practical application. Mikhail Svetov’s last practical project was the late Moscow club Novaya Iskrennost. But since emigrating, he has focused entirely on maintaining his information resource, which, nowadays, amounts to nothing; bloggers have become as common as dirt, and the activity itself has significantly devalued, unless, of course, a blogger directs their earnings toward something practical, such as Michael Naki organizing fundraisers for the AFU. So it turns out that in this Farewell to Idealism, Svetov simply stated that you, supposedly, are doing everything wrong, but did not outline new landmarks for his potential supporters. It is not surprising that quite many readers concluded: Svetov is suggesting you throw up your hands and surrender to the mercy of the authorities, claiming they are more merciful than how you write about them.

I think Svetov doesn’t engage in practical activities simply because he is bad at it. All the public organizations he belonged to were dismantled by him. His offline business was opened flagrantly late and, quite predictably, was killed by the merciful authorities. So he devotes himself to those pursuits he still feels an affinity for: following the news, commenting on it, and occasionally reflecting on the vanity of existence. Maybe just let the old man rest in retirement instead of demanding action?

And finally, some positivity so as not to resemble Mikhail Svetov. If you want action, in conditions where the merciful authorities are diligently weeding out any public organizations, then the action must be partisan. If you believe it is more important to weaken Putin—your path leads to Rospartizan. If you believe it is more important to empower yourself and gain that very strength without which there is no right—your path leads to agorism. Implementing various agoristic practices is exactly what I am doing.

Albedo Stellar wallet

This review was done for a donation from @ignatyashin (bought 1.4 EURMTL of my ANCAPCHAN tokens)

All of Montellibero’s tokenomics operate on the Stellar blockchain. A number of third-party tools plus proprietary developments are used for operations with it. There are several different blockchain explorers, online transaction builders, and a couple of services for a purely Montelliberian feature—BSN (Blockchain Social Network), but users of the tokenomics primarily interact with wallets.

Historically, the first wallet we started using was Lobstr. Its advantages are: a) the ability to link a so-called federation address to the public key, which is convenient due to its human-readability; b) a contact list; c) convenient order book display for trading on the decentralized exchange integrated into the blockchain; d) the ability to top up via fiat. Disadvantages are: a) it supports only one account; b) it charges a fee for swaps.

Next, the community turned its attention to the open-source Solar wallet. It could handle multiple accounts and didn’t mess with the user’s money, but trading from it was not very convenient, and soon the developers stopped supporting it. Now, our people have forked it, and a wallet called Sunce has been created on its basis. It can already work with multi-signature and is equipped with a contact list, but trading from it remains just as inconvenient.

The main wallet for Montellibero remains a custom-developed Telegram bot, @MyMTLWalletBot. Pros: it supports multiple accounts, multi-signature, swaps, an address book, and some other specific Montelliberian features. Cons: you never know at what moment Durov will decide to completely ban the use of any blockchains in Telegram other than TON.

And now, another wallet, Albedo, has been presented to me for review. Let’s see what interesting things it can offer.

This is an open-source wallet which, judging by its GitHub account, has been slowly developed by five developers for five years. Moreover, the team clearly has some connection to the stellar.expert blockchain explorer. The wallet is written in JavaScript, which implies its use via a web interface. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible to embed it into your own website, for example, as a large golden “donate” button that would immediately generate a payment transaction and prompt to sign it. However, I didn’t have enough brains to build such a button for myself—well, to each their own. Usually, there was always some kind of kind subscriber who helped implement one useful tool or another in WordPress.

If we set aside the idea of integrating the wallet functionality for now and open the wallet’s own website, the first thing offered, of course, is to create a new account.

Scrolling past the routine blah-blah

Next, we are prompted to protect the account with a password (which will be used to locally encrypt our keys), after which we can either create a new account, log into a previously created one, or import one created elsewhere.

If you create an account, a pair of public and private keys is generated, but the wallet is completely empty, so for the blockchain, this account does not yet exist.

You can click on the phrase “public network” and select “test network.” A sandbox will open for playing around. There, you will have 10,000 test Lumens (XLM, the native token of the Stellar blockchain), the ability to open trustlines to some test tokens from a given list, exchange them for each other, and so on. The alternative—while staying in the public network—is to find a few Lumens somewhere and send them to your new account, for which the “Receive” button is used.

I simply imported my main account into the new wallet right away and gained access to all my tokens. It’s convenient that the wallet also imports custom token icons. For example, Lobstr doesn’t see the icon for my ANCAPCHAN token, which is somewhat disappointing, but here everything is fine.

In the account properties, you can set your name, fill out the address book, and connect additional accounts to the wallet if needed.

By playing with the buttons at the bottom, you can discover that the wallet also allows for fairly advanced operations that are not needed very often. When swapping, an allowable slippage percentage is set. When sending, you can perform an immediate send with conversion or send tokens for which the recipient does not have a trustline, so they will receive a notification and either accept the tokens or refuse them. An interesting option: you can immediately generate a link to receive a specific amount of specific tokens; this is convenient if, for example, you are pouring a beer for a customer and then present the bill this way. Our Montelliberian wallets cannot do this—a useful feature. If you already have a Stellar account, you can scan the code and see that you will be prompted to send me 10 EURMTL.

Most likely, some functionality was not considered by me; for instance, I didn’t find out about the multi-signature. However, the mere ability to issue fixed invoices already makes the wallet worthy of attention.

The wallet can also be installed on a phone as a web app. Open the site albedo.link in Chrome, click the three dots in the right corner, and in the menu that opens, select “Add to Home screen.” That’s it—you have a shortcut through which this web wallet will open immediately.

The author of the review request also asks to provide a channel for user support if anything remains unclear while working with the wallet. Perhaps I will use this channel to figure out how to organize the “stellarization” of my website.

Stop fighting with Russia, it is time to fight with Ukraine

To mark the third anniversary of the start of the SMO, I want to reflect on whether it is ultimately beneficial for libertarians for the hostilities between Ukrainian and Russian troops to end immediately, even on terms that are quite unfavorable for the Ukrainian state. From the phrasing used, the reader can already guess that I will be arguing that this is indeed beneficial for libertarians.

Ukraine has always had an abysmal state (confirmed by several Maidans) and a civil society that is developed relative to the RF (confirmed by those same Maidans, as well as the fact that the front is held largely through the efforts of volunteers—both among those fighting and those providing supplies). Civil society has neither piety nor illusions regarding the state. And over these years, Ukrainian civil society has learned to fight very well. But right now it is terribly preoccupied: fighting another state, Russia, in a situational alliance with a treacherous but slightly less dangerous enemy—the state of Ukraine.

What happens if no one on the Ukrainian side concludes peace with Putin? The flow of resources for conducting military operations in favor of the Ukrainian side will weaken, and the tension of the conflict will gradually fade on its own as the warring parties exhaust themselves. When both armies are completely bled dry, peace will happen eventually, and there will not be much benefit in this peace for Ukraine’s civil society, even if the terms for the Ukrainian state are better than those currently offered.

What happens if a ceasefire with the Russian side is reached and turns out to be relatively stable? A huge number of very angry and highly skilled military representatives of Ukrainian civil society will return from the Russian front to within drone-flight distance of Ukrainian officials. How soon will these gluttonous grabbers (I mean the officials, of course, not the veterans) begin to die en masse, playing with grenades or some other stupid way? How soon will the current Ukrainian president join the ranks of the clumsy idiots who ignore safety protocols? Does he really want that? Therefore, Zelensky will do everything possible to delay the moment of concluding peace. He should not be helped in this. One can even support the pressure on him to finally conclude any deal with Putin. One can even support Mikhail Svetov: I do not know his true motivations, his public argumentation is poor, but he pushes for peace—and good for him.

Just as Milei’s victory in Argentina gave libertarians arguments in favor of political methods of shrinking the state, a potential military coup in Ukraine after concluding an agreement with Putin will give libertarians arguments in favor of armed methods of shrinking the state, and my bloodthirsty heart rejoices in anticipation.

A request to readers. If anyone knows of a specific Ukrainian unit conducting its own crowdfunding for modern, high-efficiency tools of warfare applicable also for combat operations against its own state—please provide links to their materials. I want to read, form an opinion, and donate.

How does libertarianism propose to solve the problem of blackmail?

Suppose one company threatens another with sanctions if they do not enter into a contract, and the sanctions could be genuinely serious and severely damage that company’s budget; how do you see the solution to such hypothetical problems?

Matvey

Let’s introduce different terms depending on what kind of sanctions are envisioned, because the reaction to the threat will heavily depend on this.

Let’s define robbery as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of physical violence, extortion as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of economic sanctions, and blackmail as the demand for a predatory deal under threat of disclosing information that the target of the threat would prefer to keep hidden.

The reaction to robbery depends on the balance of power, the determination to resist, and an assessment of the situation regarding the possibility of receiving outside help. For instance, under current conditions, it often turns out to be cheaper to comply with the robbery demands of a state, although sometimes one can try to negotiate a way out, provided, of course, that state officials respect at least some principles—for example, those considered official laws of that state, or any others. (For example, in Montenegro, an attempt to negotiate a way out is the most obvious response to any attempt at state robbery.) Cases of forceful resistance to the state are also possible, and if such cases are frequent, political scientists say something like “state X is a failed state.”

Robbery demands from private individuals are far more likely to encounter forceful opposition, as such opposition is much more likely to be supported by bystanders, and in some relatively sane state jurisdictions, even by representatives of that very state, especially if the robber acts completely recklessly.

Extortion is perceived by many economic agents as lawlessness and a direct invitation to bypass the sanctions. If the bypass proves successful—that is, if the losses of the party applying the sanctions are almost higher than the losses of the party bypassing them—then the sanctions will be quickly lifted, perhaps even with apologies. However, if the author of the economic sanctions is the state, its officials may, in turn, consider the evasion of sanctions as lawlessness and move from extortion to robbery. Fortunately, the state is not a single organism, but a multitude of actors with their own interests, and bypassing sanctions usually implies that certain officials are interested in making it work.

Finally, in a blackmail situation, the target must solve a difficult dilemma: agree to let all interested parties find out something about them that they would prefer to hide (which is usually something unsightly), or enter into a predatory deal, usually without guarantees that the blackmail will end there. We often encounter such stories in detective novels, and it is easy to see that a wide variety of outcomes are possible. The most boring stories are those where the blackmailer honestly fulfills their part of the deal, and the target of the blackmail, accordingly, escapes with a mild scare. A note to potential blackmailers: act exactly this way. A note to potential targets of blackmail: do not abuse deals with your conscience; in the long run, honesty and openness pay off more.

Please review this video by Alexander Tatarkov

The request is accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00003084 ₿

It’s been a while since I listened to this author. He is still as wordy as ever and still doesn’t provide timecodes, but it seems I’ve become slightly more tolerant of this genre, so I resubscribed to Alexander’s channel. Sometime in my free time, I’ll listen to what he’s managed to say over the last three years. If you are subscribed to him and can recommend any specific episodes, drop the links in the comments, preferably with a brief introduction.

Essentially, for two hours, Alexander spends his time explaining a single thesis: that Putin’s regime looks like a clumsy cosplay of Hitler’s. Examples cited include the style of propaganda, Freikorps, concepts of Lebensraum and Lebensborn, ressentiment, and the fight against sects, same-sex relationships, and migrants.

There is no particular moral here, just a simple observation that this is another confirmation of the heuristic that farce tends to repeat tragedy.

In general, I like collections of historical anecdotes, but Tatarkov’s thoughts specifically always have a lot of room; there’s no point in listening slower than at 1.5x speed.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 2.3. Waging War

Another section of the book on libertarian theory of war has been completed—specifically, on the conduct of war. Surprisingly, it is once again almost entirely dedicated to the final stages of preparation for war and the actual beginning of combat operations. This is because these are the moments when actions can still be planned in advance. After that, either the plans will work, or everything will go wrong, you will get bogged down in a stupid war of attrition, and the next section—on how to get out of the war—will become relevant.

Freedom of association

A long question came in from Georgy Nemov:

I was discussing private jurisdictions with a friend, and when we got to the freedom to leave an association, he threw out the argument that this is impossible because, in such a case, the police wouldn’t even be able to detain a suspect until the circumstances were clarified.

I replied that the freedom to leave stems from the NAP, and therefore the jurisdiction agreement could certainly stipulate conditions under which a suspect of aggressive violence may be detained. And that there is no contradiction in this.

But his answer made me think. He said that in such a case, communities would use suspicions as a pretext for the forced retention of members. And that the freedom to leave either exists or it doesn’t.

How do you think this can be combated? Or will it be necessary to outsource the execution of punishments and searches to various bounty hunters?

Well, let’s figure this out.

Jurisdiction is “legal authority.” If a person is within someone’s jurisdiction, it means that the norms established by whoever exercises that jurisdiction apply to them. These norms concern both the measure of responsibility they must bear for their actions and the measure of protection they can count on while being in that jurisdiction.

Let’s imagine a world in which jurisdiction can be changed within the framework of explicit voluntary agreements. Let’s also imagine the worst-case scenario, in which the norms of different jurisdictions diverge significantly.

Anna, who is in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company, interacts with Boris, who is also in the jurisdiction of the Ancap company. Within the regulatory field of Ancap, Boris’s actions toward Anna are qualified as a violation of her rights, and Anna calls Ancap employees to handle the matter. While the employees are on their way, Boris contacts the Bandits company and agrees to switch to their jurisdiction, and notifies the Ancap company that he is terminating his contract with them.

Anna explains to the arriving Ancap employees that she suffered damages as a result of Boris’s actions, and she demands compensation from Boris. Boris claims that there were no damages, and in general, he is already in the jurisdiction of the Bandits. The Ancaps contact the Bandits, and the latter explain that in their jurisdiction, Boris’s actions, even if Anna is not lying, are not considered an offense, but if anyone outside should apply any sanctions against their client, they will certainly consider that an offense and will pursue it harshly.

The Ancaps conduct a quick investigation and are convinced that Anna’s testimony is quite credible. Now they face a dilemma. They can pay Anna the compensation for damages themselves and then forward the bill to the Bandits. Or they can shrug their shoulders and state that their competence ends here since Boris is not in their jurisdiction, so there will be no compensation. In this case, Anna contacts the Bandits, switches to their jurisdiction, and demands that they deal with Boris. Now the Bandits have to stand by their words, because even if Boris manages to slip out of their jurisdiction, they just promised that the violation of their client’s (Anna’s) rights by an outsider (Boris) must be harshly pursued by them, the Bandits.

Scenarios can be varied this way or that by changing the relative power and degree of ruthlessness of the jurisdiction providers — and different pictures will result. It is known that historically on Earth, jurisdiction providers with forced entry based primarily on place of residence became dominant. To erode this dominance and move toward extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions, an increase in the decentralization of money, easing of migration, and an increase in the armament of individuals are required. In other words, a movement toward the sovereign individual, who agrees on norms with equals, rather than receiving them from above.

We are working on this.

Forgive me that the answer turned out to be on a broader topic than the one indicated in the question.

Fight! Fight! Fight!

Trump released Ulbricht. During his first term, he refused to do so, speaking along the lines that both your Bitcoin is a scam and Ulbricht is your criminal, and generally to just leave him alone, he has more important things to do.

What has changed in 8 years? Has the Libertarian Party become more influential and managed to pressure Trump more than before his first term? Of course not. Compare the results of the LP presidential candidate in 2016 and 2024. It is exactly the opposite. Around the world, the influence of political parties has decreased and the influence of memes has grown. Of course, organizational structures matter a great deal, but today they do not require century-old roots; startups are in charge. Milei was not made president by the Libertarian Party, but by the meme of the chainsaw man. Trump is not the leader of the Republican Party, but Donald the Wall Builder, Donald the Swamp Drainer, Donald the Peacemaker, Donald the Immortal, and Donald the Fascist, of course, as well.

A man who creates a 15 billion dollar capitalization for his personal memecoin in a few days can no longer leave Ulbricht in prison.

In the book on libertarian war theory, which I have been writing with great effort for God knows how long, I pay great attention to conceptual subjects (especially collective ones), referred to for brevity as spirits. Spirits express the emerging community between people, describing the motives that unite them—in short, they are used as a crutch to reduce the complex motivations of each group member to simple models. Not “Vasya wanted a thrill, Petya was showing off to Masha, Kolya planned to loot, Oleg joined for the company,” but “they were seized by the spirit of freedom.”

Memes rule. He who skillfully uses memes feels the zeitgeist. Force the right memes, attach those upon whom much depends to them; let the memes support them, while they, in turn, find themselves dependent on the memes.

Ancaps are not obligated to fuck children. But supporting a joke about it is their sacred duty. Ancaps are not obligated to fight for their freedom right this second. But the thought of being able not only to run for freedom, hide for freedom, and lie for freedom, but also to fight for it, should fill them with trepidation. This means that the spirit of freedom has taken root, and its demands are growing. Someday it will demand fighting. First, you buy Trump’s memecoin, and then you discover that the call “Fight! Fight! Fight!” is not an empty sound.