Автор: Анкап-тян

Durov

Due to Durov’s arrest, an active discussion continues online.

For us libertarians, the position is simple: states, by their very nature, exercise aggressive violence and therefore have no right to exist. (Private individuals who provide any conceivable services that the state provides or has ever provided, but do so on a voluntary basis, do have a right to exist)

The world, however, does not consist solely of libertarians. There are numerous representatives of ideologies claiming the right of collectives to violate any conceivable rights of individuals for the sake of the benefit of these or those collectives, including such abstract collectives as, for example, “future humanity.” With them, it is sometimes possible to have meaningful discussions on the topic of “exactly how will this specific violation of individual rights help achieve your wonderful collectivist goal, and isn’t it ridiculous for you to throw so many resources at tasks with such a tiny cost-efficiency ratio, when here are far more effective solutions to your own problem with a much lower need to violate individual rights.” As soon as the interlocutor begins to angrily reject such economic analysis, the conversation can be wound up, essentially saying: come back when you’ve grown wiser; until then, there is nothing to talk about.

Finally, there are the realists. They condescendingly explain that values are called such because they have a price. That anyone can be bought. That Durov has already repeatedly made compromises with quite repulsive political regimes. And if these regimes, through threats to the creators of Telegram, easily turn it into a weapon on the side of evil, then it is foolish to demand that less repulsive political regimes not use threats against the creators of Telegram to turn it into a weapon on the side of good (or, if you prefer, the lesser evil). This position was expressed very clearly and consistently by Michael Naki in his video.

He essentially claims that, firstly, even if Durov was indeed arrested and will be accused, in violation of any legal norms, of all the nonsense that is causing so much noise online, it is justified if the result is his active assistance to the anti-Putin coalition in the war on Ukraine’s side. And secondly—that the arrest looks like a staging, and it is far more likely that Durov himself asked for the protection of the West and effectively promised assistance in the war in exchange for protection from pressure by dictatorial regimes, primarily the Putin regime.

As for what this could lead to, Michael himself concludes quite soberly: that later, so he says, Telegram will start to be used against Trump. And he immediately answers this consideration: won’t there be downsides, then? In other words, what can be applied for extraordinary reasons will easily be applied for any reason. War is a continuation of politics, and if Telegram can be brought under control in a total war, why not bring it under control tomorrow to influence the election process—why hesitate, since Trump, in Michael’s opinion, is a fascist and is just as deserving of having a total war declared against him. And the day after tomorrow, the Chinese experience is adopted—and what’s the big deal, since an honest person has nothing to hide. There are so many terrible things in the world worthy of having a total war declared against them: drug trafficking, trafficking… the state, right, Michael? Oh, what, the state isn’t on this list? Strange, strange.

Realists perfectly understand that their position is logically vulnerable because it is inconsistent. They don’t care, because logical constructs are an ideal construction, not a real one. Some momentary desires are declared by them as the highest value, others as meaningless whims; some methods are adopted, while others are only sweetly dreamed of—and the only criterion for justifying such an approach turns out to be the result. It’s fine if the result is declared in advance, but that’s not necessarily the case, as the target can be drawn around the point where the bullet hit.

What can be opposed to the realists? Only a change in reality. We have lived too long in a world of centralized systems, and therefore we are easily captivated by heroes, seeking hope now in Durov, now in Musk. But real hope is brought by another type of hero—the anonymous Satoshi. One who opens a new technology and makes it public property. We have relied on centralized systems for too long because it is fast, cheap, and convenient. And also, they can be broken quickly, cheaply, and conveniently. It is time to realize that we are not rich enough to buy cheap things.

A small centralized system competing on a free market with a million similar systems—why not. But when it comes to the global exchange of values or opinions—let’s forget about centralization. Bitcoin and its extensions—as protocols for transferring value. Nostr or something along those lines—as a protocol for transmitting statements. Some entity that has not yet gained widespread use—as a protocol for legal transactions (this function of the Leviathan must also be replaced by something decentralized). In the new world, there will be fewer heroes, and therefore—fewer possible points of failure. A hell of a lot of responsibility will not hang on one specific person. And therefore, there will be no point in arresting Durov.

But for now—let’s create hype around our hero and demand his release. Why? A strange question. Let’s be realists; it’s so fashionable. States as a means of forced unification of people must be destroyed. What will contribute more to the death of this institution—if Durov is kept in detention until he agrees to the conditions imposed on him—or if, as a result of a pressure campaign, the French state is seriously discredited and forced to release its prisoner? Of course, the latter. But even if pressure does not help the goals of liberation—that is no reason not to press. It is much more pleasant to observe a morally degraded state than a proud and triumphant one.

Law and legality in the transition to ancap

Another question about the subject was asked in the comments, and I don’t really want to answer from purely theoretical positions, because for a little over three years now, I’ve had the opportunity to try to implement something. So, I want to reflect on the problems of law and legislation in the ancap community using Montelibero as an example.

I will outline the conceptual framework I am using. Law is the order for resolving conflicts accepted within the community. Statute is a legal norm that the community considers permissible to impose by force. Court is a procedure for resolving conflicts by a third party not involved in the conflict. Jurisdiction is the venue, that is, the circle of conflicts that the community customarily resolves through a specific court.

Montelibero, like any other ancap community in the era of state dominance, cannot claim full jurisdiction over its members. Yes, any issue can be resolved within Montelibero’s jurisdiction—but only if the state is unaware of it. Otherwise, the state may impose its own requirements on what the parties to the conflict are obliged to do.

The Montelibero community is small. It does not provide the opportunity for full market competition between many diverse courts. However, this is no reason to bow before the state. After all, we have implemented tokenomics and now have our own very cheap and efficient financial system. On a single blockchain, without competition between them (we tried adding others, but they didn’t take hold). Although, privately, nothing prevents the exchange of any values: whether commodities, fiat, or various types of crypto. The same applies to courts: by mutual agreement, disputes can be resolved by a coin toss, mediation by a pre-agreed authority, or a duel—but if there is no agreement, one must rely on some unified default judicial mechanism.

Every jurisdiction is subject to a strong positive scale effect: the more conflicts it resolves, the more potential conflicts will specify this particular jurisdiction in advance. This is understandable: people save mental effort and will not keep many different legal mechanisms in mind without particular need, eventually leaning toward a single option, even if it is not the most optimal for a specific case. There are also negative scale effects: even the most efficient judge is unlikely to be able to significantly increase their productivity and will more likely raise the price as demand increases. Therefore, to scale this type of service, it is convenient to use a franchising mechanism: judges may differ, but they will use a single procedure and uniform legal norms.

Where would these come from? The Schelling point here is the procedures adopted in the hosting jurisdiction, that is, in the Montenegrin courts. Why? At least because that is where those dissatisfied with a Montelibero court decision will theoretically turn. But since the local legislation is full of various statist rubbish, it must, of course, be discarded and replaced with our own home-grown concepts. There are few basic principles in libertarianism, but specific legal norms that do not contradict them can vary. And here, precedents will become the Schelling points. It will be easier for each subsequent court to apply a previously used norm than to invent a new one for every new case. Moreover, it will be easier for all members of the Montelibero community to proceed from established legal practice, as predictability in affairs is the foundation for trust.

But, as is known, it is not enough to understand if the laws are good; one must ask if they are enforced.

While judicial practice is limited, one must rely mainly on the conscientiousness of the parties and the informal authority of the judge. The potential ability to turn to the state for enforcement of court decisions is relevant only for the largest cases, where the amount at stake justifies the accompanying costs. In the smallest cases, the losing party will pay without question because the amount is trivial. The problem lies in medium-sized cases, where invoking state enforcement is still too expensive and disgraceful, but the losing party is reluctant to pay.

The most civilized way to achieve the enforcement of court decisions is the widespread use of collateral. I envision a gradual evolution here from one-time deposits to secure a specific claim, to permanent deposits confirming a willingness to comply with the decisions of a specific jurisdiction.

Initially, it might work roughly like this. A community member wishes to enter into a legal relationship with another member. For example, rent a car or an apartment, borrow money, or enter into an employment contract. In addition to the direct contract between the counterparties, they also notify the court and transfer collateral amounts to a court-controlled account, the size of which depends on the amount of liability imposed by the concluded contract. Then, from this collateral, a penalty can be recovered—for example, from an employee for damaging equipment, or from an employer for an industrial injury caused by their fault.

But gradually, as the court builds its own reputation, deposits will become permanent: you recognize the jurisdiction of the MTL court and place a certain deposit on its controlled account—a sort of “price of honor,” in ancient Irish terms. Now anyone can be sure that within the limits of the price of honor, you can be trusted unconditionally. Want to increase your reputation—simply increase the deposit. Leaving the country, or, say, the last court decision caused your distrust—decrease the deposit. Leaving the jurisdiction—withdraw the deposit entirely (with some lag to ensure you have no debts from old contracts).

Moreover, based on this solution, an institute of suretyship could develop, where a guarantor increases trust in the person they vouch for by risking their own judicial deposit.

It would be great if increasing the price of honor contributed to respect within the community, but such an attitude will not form on its own—first, a tradition of involving people with a high price of honor in responsible legal relationships must be grown, for example, as witnesses to large transactions or plaintiffs in socially important cases. Also, a mechanism for increasing another’s price of honor through the payment of judicial deposits into another’s account could certainly appear—if a person’s personal integrity far exceeds their financial capabilities. The result would be something like a Hoppean natural aristocracy.

And, of course, this entire mechanism will work much worse if it turns out that there are a large number of community members who completely ignore it, yet enter into legal relationships with each other in the same way. They may be too poor to freeze money for the sake of reputation. They may not trust a specific court. And finally, they may not trust the mechanism itself.

The poverty factor is handled to a certain extent through suretyship mechanisms. The factor of distrust in a specific court—through competing courts. The factor of distrust in the mechanism—simply a matter of habit. Trust is built; one just must not try to impose it.

Internal conflicts of volunteer organizations

Not long ago, I published a long post Internal Dynamics of Libertarian Communities. Among other things, it mentions the danger of “beastly seriousness” over trifles:

Subconsciously realizing the certain comicality of their position, the disputant, in a polemical frenzy, begins to accuse opponents of violating even the most basic value principles.

And just recently, I received a direct message:

I believe that the current Secretary has exceeded their authority. The Council is unable to resolve this crisis on its own, as some Council members support the Secretary’s actions, while others remain indifferent to what is happening. This is not an isolated case that is being questioned, but this particular case is already egregious.

What is this egregious case? It turns out a Telegram chat admin enabled slow mode in the chat. Why slow mode is needed in a chat of two dozen people, I have no idea, but this case perfectly illustrates how easily, in a purely voluntary organization, people take offense at the slightest manifestation of disrespect from those endowed with certain technical powers.

And here is another case, a public one—and also indignation directed at the secretary: one of the MTL-court judges removed the court secretary from handling a case because the secretary, in the judge’s view, handled correspondence with the parties incorrectly and also for some reason was present in the chat where the judges were discussing the case. And the secretary, instead of stepping down, stayed put; instead, the judge was removed.

This pattern repeats constantly. What is required for it to emerge?

  1. An organization consisting of volunteers
  2. The presence of a sole administrative position within it
  3. The administrator having technical capabilities to restrict the rights of other organization participants.

That’s it. Sooner or later, a situation will arise where the administrator begins to interpret their functions broadly and applies their technical capabilities in a way that restricts the rights of other organization participants, and some participants will view this action as an abuse of power.

If the organization had paid employees, the administration’s actions would be perceived more calmly (any whim for your money). If there were a whole board instead of one administrator, one could appeal to one member to roll back the actions of another (also a very rich class of conflicts, though far less acute). Finally, if the administrator lacked technical capabilities that could be abused, it would be much harder for them.

Let’s leave point 1 alone, because conflicts in hierarchical commercial organizations can be discussed by Bitarch and Voluntarist.

Point 2 is much easier to overcome. If the group is small and consists of formally equal participants, then everyone should be made an admin (if some participants have a sort of probation period, admin rights can be granted after its successful completion)—this serves as a visible confirmation of mutual trust within the organization. Alternatively, one could do without admins entirely.

As for point 3, it depends too much on the chosen communication tools. In Montelibero, Telegram is used almost exclusively for this. In it, the only way to disable technical administration capabilities for a group is to create it using a service account, add participants, and then remove the creator from the group. In principle, this is also a solution for a small, tight-knit group that wishes to communicate strictly on business and does not want to lose internal cohesion over someone’s wounded pride.

Of course, administrators are useful. But that is exactly the line of reasoning that etatists use to explain the utility of the state. No, the utility comes not from administrators, but from a tradition of respecting colleagues. Applied to working groups, this means self-restraint regarding off-topic posts and communication style. If such a tradition is established, an administrator is not needed. If it is not established, it cannot be implemented by the strength of one administrator alone. In any case, the goodwill of the other participants is required.

Network State — it’s over!

So, it has happened. The final, and key, chapter of The Network State has been translated. In it, Balaji explains in detail:

  • What a network state is (this is Montellibero, which received diplomatic recognition from El Salvador);
  • What happens if you remove one of the parts from the definition of a network state (in most cases it will break, but if you remove the point about the need for a dictatorship of the network state’s founder, it will be even better—roughly speaking, Bitcoin instead of Ethereum);
  • That digitalization is penetrating everything and it is impossible to fight, and a network state is precisely a way to lead the process, instead of fighting directly against the digital gulag of centralized nation-states;
  • That the startup community, if it aspires to develop, needs a high level of internal trust, and pleasant bonuses would be visible demonstrations of solidarity (for example, the MTL-fest) and the absence of public flame wars;
  • That tokenomics is cool (but Balaji focuses on the community’s internal currency, although having one’s own unit of account is a secondary matter; the principle of public recording of monetary and social obligations is far more important);
  • That it is extremely important to scrounge the first diplomatic recognition from anyone, even from Nauru, and then it will be easier;
  • And he throws in various technological ideas for connecting offline with online, through which you can feel that the person thinks based on a paradigm of abundance of capital goods—let’s be happy for him.

If anyone hasn’t picked up the book yet, now is the time. I don’t see much point in making an audiobook out of it—there are too many external links, many of which are quite interesting to browse. For the same reason, it’s unlikely that the text will be produced in epub format—such a book should be read while online, and preferably in a browser anyway. The author promises to update the book periodically. If anyone follows the updates, please send me links to new pieces of text, and I will update the translation.

And for now—thank you all for the long wait, the channel is now officially coming out of vacation. I’ll need to scour through to see if any interesting questions from readers have accumulated, write a new article for Hedgehog, and it’s about time to finish the translations of Mac and Molinyu, for goodness’ sake.

P.S. Readers quickly generated a pdf. It’s not without flaws—internal footnotes have become external links—but overall it’s perfectly suitable for reading.

Internal dynamics of libertarian communities

This will be a long-form text in three parts. It was written by request of Soz, for a donation of 50 EURMTL. The work took nearly a full month. For ordinary questions with attached donations, this is indecently long, but I recall that back when Bitarch didn’t yet publish on my channel himself but commissioned me to write long-reads, the pace was comparable. Unfortunately, I struggle to keep large concepts in my head, so as the volume of the task increases, the working time increases in a clearly non-linear proportion: a couple of days for a Telegram-format post, a month for a long-read, a year and a half for an 84-page book…

The task from the client was formulated not very clearly, but it amounted to creating and presenting a conciliatory narrative for the Montelibero community, which is currently experiencing internal friction due to differences in approaches to achieving the movement’s goals.

It seemed appropriate to me to expand the topic slightly, but not so much that the final recipes would be inapplicable to the specific community.

Part 1. Why don’t libertarians like contracts?

There is an opinion that libertarians adore contracts and almost pray to them. This is not true. Libertarians, for the most part, have a fairly ordinary system of values, and therefore they do not like contracts. What they love, like all normal people, is an atmosphere of openness and mutual trust. Anyone who claims otherwise most likely loved it once too, but their trust was betrayed.

What is trust? It is the conviction that the counterparty will sincerely defend your interests, and if they conflict with his own, he will still try to take yours into account as much as possible, and if necessary, occasionally compromise his own. Openness, on the other hand, means that the counterparties provide full and reliable information about their interests and other facts related to the subject of interaction. How could one not love this?

This is precisely why libertarians prefer to gather in communities. In a circle of people sharing common values, trust is usually higher, and if these values are libertarian, then—especially in business matters—mutual trust may, to an outsider, even border on naivety.

A contract, however, is a product of mutual distrust. Please state exactly what you will demand from me and what you are ready to give me in return, and what tools we have to compel each other to comply with what is written. And further clarify the meaning of the terms, so that it doesn’t emerge in court that you meant something completely different from what you hinted to me…

It’s not that libertarians completely neglect contracts when making deals among themselves, but usually it is just a brief summary of a chat conversation, purely so as not to forget: I borrow so much, for such a term, at such a rate, payments in equal monthly installments on the first of the month. The higher the trust, the more nuances are left out.

Trust in deals and the ability to rely on people to defend your interests is a huge treasure, as it reduces transaction costs to a negligible minimum, and thus ensures maximum market efficiency. But this treasure, unfortunately, is very fragile.

Trust can be destroyed by a fraudster. This is a very banal risk, and it is partially mitigated by simple tenure in the community. The longer a fraudster is forced to maintain an impeccable reputation to gain trust, the larger the deal he needs to scam the counterparty and ultimately still end up in profit.

But trust can also be destroyed by a pedant. Someone who, in a libertarian community, will demand as detailed a contract as possible, and then start insisting that it be followed to the letter—is a repulsive counterparty. He literally positions himself as an outsider, saying that you are all suspicious types ready to scam anyone at the first opportunity. Therefore, here are ten pages of fine print in tooth-grinding legal jargon, now let’s go get it notarized, and here we have a state court specified, and here is the penalty for delay, and so on and so forth.

Therefore, libertarian communities tend to reject both fraudsters and nitpickers, striving to preserve the innocent simplicity of trust-based relationships. But consistent rejection also requires conscious and unpleasant effort. A fraudster can be charming, and if he hasn’t personally scammed you, there is a temptation to continue being friendly with him. A pedant can be a strong professional, and this provides an incentive to tolerate him despite all the discomfort of communication.

Therefore, in real libertarian communities, complete ostracism is rare. Usually, a community member who causes repulsion is simply pushed to the periphery. There, he can either reshape his behavior and over time return closer to the core, or remain in the vague status of a partial outcast, or leave the community of his own volition. So, libertarian communities are quite resilient to problems with individual people, and these do not have a noticeable impact on the atmosphere of trust. However, another phenomenon is far more dangerous. A split.

Part 2. Why don’t libertarians like corporations?

There is an opinion that the world of victorious libertarianism is a war of corporations. Having read the first part, it is easy to conclude that this is also not true. But it is not that simple.

Communities whose members share libertarian values are capable of having a very high level of internal trust. However, libertarian communities usually have not only values but also goals. Their members do not like the outside world, where freedom is quite poor, and they strive to somehow combine the efforts of community members to influence the outside world and make it freer. This noble aspiration, alas, is capable of leading to rather sad results.

In order to turn a community into a movement—that is, to prompt community members to achieve a certain goal—this goal must be either quickly and verifiably achievable, even at the cost of serious effort (for example, a movement to abolish some repressive law), or easily broken down into stages that obviously bring one closer to the final goal (for example, a movement for EU accession, for which there is a checklist of requirements).

However, it may turn out that the goal looks tempting but suffers from a lack of specificity in implementation (for example, making Montenegro a free country). In this case, several movements may arise around the goal, differing in their ideas of exactly how this goal is achieved. For example, part of the community decides to focus on political transformations in Montenegro, and another part on building an economy independent of the state. And another part declares that it does not wish to adhere to the proposed goal and is satisfied simply living in accordance with its values (that is, remaining just a community).

The situation is exacerbated if certain activities of the movement appear from the outside not only as not bringing it closer to the declared goal, but as completely contradicting it. For example, if the goal is a free society, then any regulations of communications and business relations can easily be declared as contradicting the final goal, even if they perform an important tactical task of lowering the heat of conflict in a dispute or improving coordination in a working group.

Add to this the natural isolation of participants of one movement from participants of another movement—and soon we will inevitably see that the level of trust between several movements within one community has decreased, despite the continuing unity of basic values.

This isolation is further strengthened if a movement is formalized into a corporation. What was simply the coordination of people united by a goal has become management procedures, delegation of authority, setting tasks for working groups, accounting and control—in short, the methods familiar to all of us for making an activity more efficient.

Against the backdrop of such complication of the primary community, those who try to return to the happy past, criticizing the present, are perceived as gloomy retrogrades denying any movement toward the goal.

Thus, a relatively homogeneous community cannot move in a coordinated way toward any complex goal. But with the appearance of structures for achieving complex goals, it, firstly, still cannot move anywhere entirely in a coordinated manner, and secondly, it also loses the atmosphere of trust. What is to be done?

Part 3. How can libertarians maintain a balance of trust and efficiency?

It is quite easy to determine from the outside how great the internal unity of aspirations is in a community. If they argue about fundamental questions, then there is no unity. It is simply a discussion platform, a community united by the value of discussion as such, not its subject. If, however, disputes are over trifles, it means that agreement on basic things was reached long ago; it isn’t even discussed. This does not, however, make disputes over minor details less ridiculous and potentially less destructive.

The devil begins with the foam on the lips of an angel who has entered the fight for a holy right cause. The best path to a community split is animal seriousness in trifles (recall the pedant from the first part). Subconsciously understanding the certain comicality of their position, the disputant in a polemical frenzy begins to accuse opponents of violating basic value principles. Thereby making it clear that they perceive opponents as strangers who somehow ended up in the community.

Therefore, the first rule for a libertarian community that does not want splits is: everyone here is a libertarian. That is, they agree among themselves regarding the basic principles of their ideology.

The second rule develops the first: do not demand ideological purity from others. One can call oneself not just a libertarian, but an agorist. One can gather a bunch of agorists around oneself. But claiming to other libertarians that, for instance, you are not agorists and therefore are latent etatists is a bad idea.

The third rule generalizes the second: excessive detailing is harmful. The more detailed some description, some contract, some charter, or some rules are worked out, the more likely it is that reality will not fit the description, rules will be violated, and the charter will be interpreted based on immediate benefit. A good document is brief, evocative, and strives to capture precisely the spirit of what one wanted to express.

The fourth rule develops the third: an alliance is better than a merger. If a certain group can exist autonomously—let it exist. If it faces a task that it cannot handle on its own, let it enter into an alliance with other groups. If, instead of solving the task, the groups start merging into a single organization to solve the task, all the momentum will be spent on arranging the merger process.

The fifth rule is an antithesis to the fourth: do not judge what is better for others. If, for example, some groups have already merged into something that seems unnaturally large, there is no need to panic and declare war on them. Either they are fine with it, or they will eventually split up on their own. It is better to contact individual members of that group, applying the fourth rule.

One could continue to fantasize, but five rules are already a lot, see the third rule. Therefore, I will limit myself to what has been stated, and in conclusion, I will briefly summarize all three parts of the text.

  1. Trust is what libertarians unite for in communities. Trust must not be destroyed, otherwise the community loses its meaning.
  2. Organization is what without which a community will not move toward a goal. But organization devours trust, and thus destroys the community.
  3. A balance between trust and efficiency is possible, but it is not achieved automatically. One can formulate several rules, the observance of which will help maintain the balance.

Do not be your own enemies; we already have enough enemies from the outside.

From Theory to Practice: Social Support Cases in the Montellibero Ancap Community

This is my second article from the first issue of Yozh magazine, which is distributed via a paid subscription model. The issue was dedicated to the libertarian view on social support.

I am writing this post in a libertarian club, sipping a suspended beer. Recently, I needed money, and I sold my promissory notes on the exchange. Several times, people helped me move my things to a new apartment for free. In the early stages of Montelibero’s existence, I received an unconditional basic income. And at the very dawn of the project, when I first arrived in Montenegro, I received a generous relocation allowance from one of the community’s ideologues—he appreciated that I was convincing people to participate in the movement by personal example. Finally, through one of the project participants, I managed to find stable remote work with a decent income that allows me to live and even save a little, without being an IT specialist.

These were only the cases of social support where I was the recipient. I can recall a few others. An acquaintance of mine received a loan from a private charitable foundation to develop her private kindergarten, and I am helping another person obtain investments to open her own jewelry workshop. And when one idiot borrowed a huge amount of money and was in no hurry to pay it back, he was helped to tokenize his debt, and now all his obligations are available for public viewing on the blockchain. Less patient creditors sell his promissory notes at a deep discount. And when someone buys enough of these debt obligations, it becomes market-justified for them to visit the debtor and very gently ask him to reconsider his priorities regarding spending on personal needs in order to buy back his notes at face value as quickly as possible.

The Montelibero ancap community is young. Therefore, major social support here usually boils down to loans or taking an equity stake in a business. Minor support takes the form of in-kind services or one-time gifts. We haven’t yet reached the point of thinking about what to replace (or if it’s necessary to replace) state pension payments for our participants. For now, it is far more relevant for us to help each other find ways to earn a living.

Our task as a libertarian community is to acquire enough resources to transform the world around us to our liking, and at the same time, not allow the state to seize these resources. Additionally, it is very important to us that other communities borrow and replicate our experience, and that those who know about us but are not part of the community view us favorably.

Therefore, it is required, on the one hand, to be proud and self-sufficient, not begging for money from the state or obscure external NGOs, and on the other hand, not to acquire the image of caricatured ancaps who can help only for money.

As a result, we created a quite original internal tokenomics on the blockchain, where tokens are issued to denote any public obligations, which can then be traded freely. On the one hand, this allows for the easy attraction of the community’s free resources for private needs. On the other hand, for the state, especially one as archaic as Montenegro’s, all these blockchains are a dark forest. Quite serious value is stored in the tokenomics, but it is difficult for an outside observer to analyze, despite the full transparency of the blockchain.

In tokenomics, it is easy for a person to confirm their business reputation: they show a link to their contracts, and then to the transactions on the blockchain made according to those contracts. In tokenomics, it is easy to provide some low-liquidity property as collateral to obtain a loan denominated in high-liquidity euro-stablecoins. In tokenomics, finally, one can simply collect micro-donations. For example, when the path to the club began to be overgrown with blackberries, one of the activists organized a community cleanup. A dozen people showed up and worked with pruning shears for a couple of hours, while many others sent donations for this good cause to the activist’s wallet. Then she divided the collected money equally among the participants. Thus, literally in passing, public goods are created under ancap.

One cannot mention all the cases, but the general principle is this: ideological kinship creates trust, tokenomics tools consolidate it, and an entrepreneurial spirit allows it to be used to solve social tasks.

How stateless social support works

This is my article from the first issue of Yozh magazine, which is distributed via a paid subscription model. The issue was dedicated to the libertarian view on social support.

1. Why is it needed?

Although the free market promotes general enrichment, commerce alone will not make everyone wealthy. Some will be unable or fail to save enough to cover suddenly arising urgent needs. Some people’s needs may exceed their credit limit, so the possibility of a loan will not solve the problem.

Such people have a request for the mercy of those around them.

2. Can they count on it?

In a society of strangers, people show mercy more willingly the wealthier they are, the more secure their position seems to them, and the more undeserved the plight of the petitioner seems to them.

In close-knit communities, additional factors play an important role: the gratitude of the community, a further increase in its cohesion, and the fact that an example of mercy will encourage mercy from other members of the community.

3. Who can count on mercy?

3.1. First and foremost — their own. That is, family members, friends, and participants of a close-knit community.

3.2. Those who are merciful themselves. Helping them is also an opportunity to express one’s gratitude. This also includes everyone who is considered worthy of gratitude for other reasons. Usually, these are positive externalities associated with their activities. Thus, artists, service workers valued by those around them, etc., can confidently count on charity.

3.3. Those who know how to express gratitude. This is a currency that anyone at all is able to find.

3.4. And finally, those who tried to take care of themselves rather than living for the day. This is especially relevant if hard times come for many.

4. What effect does this system of incentives produce?

As is easy to guess, these incentives will encourage people to gather in communities, strive to be useful and grateful to others, but not forget to create a safety net for themselves. Serious deviations from the described socially responsible behavior can mostly be afforded by very proud and self-sufficient people who, in essence, refuse social support themselves, and who are we to impose it on them?

5. What forms will social support take under ancap?

Let us stipulate: market behavior cannot be planned, therefore, in describing the future of self-regulating systems, we can only make plausible assumptions.

5.1. Spontaneous support

A person suddenly needs help, they broadcast a request among their circle of communication, and those willing either satisfy the request without further communication or get in touch to clarify the optimal option for themselves and the object of help.

The market is able to provide the necessary tools here: verification of need, convenience of money transfer, selection of providers of in-kind services — either on a gratuitous basis or at the expense of funds transferred by donors.

5.2. Regular support

A person requires constant help, or funds are needed to maintain some costly infrastructure that is not paid for by direct contributions from those who use it.

The market here provides a competitive environment in which the following operate: (a) funds that accumulate one-time and regular voluntary contributions and spend them on charitable projects; (b) contractors ready to implement these projects on a commercial basis.

6. Limitations of social support under ancap

Charity is an exchange of resources for moral satisfaction. In the absence of coercion, support will be received not by those who need it most, but by those whose support provides more moral satisfaction. This triggers competition among those in need of help, in which those who best satisfy the criteria in section 3 win.

Will everyone get help? It is impossible to say for sure, but the probability is higher the wealthier the society and the more developed the market, including the market for charity.

Will the volume of help be higher than under state distribution? It is quite possible that not, but it will certainly be spent more efficiently, and such a distribution will definitely be perceived as more fair.

Network State. Translation of chapters 5.1 and 5.2.

The translation of The Network State is steadily nearing completion. Chapter 5.1 (a short preamble to the fifth part of the book) and Chapter 5.2, where Balaji Srinivasan analyzes the phenomenon of the nation-state in detail: what a nation is, what a state is, how they differ, how they influence each other, what their combination represents, and much more along those lines, are ready.

From some fairly recent thoughts: various strategies of public administration are likened to various programming paradigms.

The next piece will definitely, certainly be the last, and I hope the most interesting—after all, we must finally figure out what the author proposes in a practical sense, after going on for so long and in such detail about the global situation and upcoming challenges!

My partners and I created the MEREXP investment fund and share some of our analytics in a Telegram channel. Could you evaluate the channel?

Lisoz Tech (the question is accompanied by a donation of 15 USDC)

Here is the link to the channel: https://t.me/merexp_analytics

It only started being populated recently, since May 2, and so far it has been doing so on a daily basis (at one point, my own channel had a similarly auspicious picture). The materials can be roughly divided into two categories: reviews of specific markets and articles explaining the advantages of Merexp Analytics.

As far as can be understood, the advantages lie in the fact that the company uses its own proprietary metrics. I particularly liked the breakdown of how these metrics work based on historical Bitcoin data. Admittedly, based on the channel’s materials, it remains unclear how the raw data for all these metrics is collected, but perhaps the company shares this information with its clients.

The fund views Bitcoin as simply another asset in the stock market, which gives the reviews their own charm, since the Bitcoin market is usually written about either in the context of cryptocurrency world news or in the context of technical analysis; here, however, the focus is mainly on the influence of fiat liquidity fluctuations and similar matters.

Strictly speaking, this is already at least the second attempt to launch the fund’s channel; the first happened in December 2023, and by February 2024, publications had already ceased. Back then, the publications were much less regular and concerned Bitcoin exclusively.

It was somewhat surprising that there is no link anywhere in the channel’s materials to the investment fund’s website or its analytical division. This is inconvenient both in terms of presenting materials (for example, the website could contain a convenient archive of review publications broken down into categories by individual markets), as well as a lack of information about the fund that is awkward to present in a Telegram channel format (for example, information about the volume of attracted investments and the fund’s portfolio). Instead of a website, it is suggested to contact the support bot for all questions. This model of presenting material and interacting with potential clients is not very clear to me, although perhaps it is simply a trend. After all, people even manage to do business on Instagram.

The feedback bot was tested by me at the most unfavorable time — on a Friday evening. The response time was 40 minutes, which is very good.

Or perhaps the website and other interactive tools are currently being actively finalized and will soon see the light of day. If so, I even appreciate such an approach: first fully develop one’s key know-how that provides an advantage over competitors, and only then pay attention to how to present them to the public. This is much more honest than first making a beautiful presentation and website, then attracting venture investment, and only then, possibly, spending that investment on the development of metrics and algorithms.

In any case, I subscribed to the channel because the content provided there is quite original. Regarding Bitcoin, it will even be possible to track how the forecasts come true, and if they prove reliable, then perhaps I will start looking for entry points, rather than just buying coins blindly as soon as I receive income exceeding the subsistence minimum.

As a right-libertarian and legal individualist, can I support the Russian Volunteer Corps?

Max Stirner

From the proposed positions, it is strange in general to ask questions about whether one can do something. Of course, one can; the only question is the extent of responsibility.

If we are talking about sanctions from the Russian state, then solving the problem comes down to finding sufficiently safe ways of transferring money, publishing propaganda, delivering equipment, and so on.

However, I believe the question is more about whether other right-libertarians and right-individualists, upon learning of such activity, would feel obligated to obstruct you.

The RDK is a semi-autonomous armed formation within the AFU: in some ways it obeys the central command, it depends on it significantly for supplies, and it seems to be quite autonomous in matters of recruiting and the informational coverage of its activities. But there are other units within the AFU that independently conduct recruiting and crowdfunding. How is the RDK so different that the German Stirner asks about the permissibility of helping specifically the RDK, and not some Azov?

Azov was mentioned for a reason. Both this brigade and the Russian Volunteer Corps face numerous accusations that Nazis serve there. Economic theory tells us that values are subjective. Any person has every right to prefer one nation over all others; this in itself does not provide grounds to condemn them. Do the guys from Azov and RDK exterminate representatives of all other nations for the sake of the greatness of the nation they prefer over all others? No, they exterminate people according to a different criterion, and this criterion is no different from the one guided by other military formations within the AFU.

The only remaining difference between the RDK (and a couple of other smaller units) and other parts is that they physically, on foot, crossed the internationally recognized Russian-Ukrainian border to fight the Russian army on Russian territory. And what, does this make them aggressors? No, they are still participants in a defensive war. Just like the drone operators striking refineries deep in the Russian rear.

Ah, yes, they also have Russian passports, or at least they did at the start of the war. And what, does this somehow change their legal status? No, not even under Russian laws. They still remain AFU servicemen, toward whom all sorts of rights and restrictions associated with the laws and customs of war apply—laws which the RF pledged to observe (but does not). But even if there were a law in the RF according to which any RF citizen who joined the ranks of foreign armed forces was subject to execution without trial, what significance would this have for a legal individualist?

However, I assume that the reader with the nickname Max Stirner is a Russian citizen. Therefore, his question can be reformulated more sharply: does libertarian morality justify war against one’s own state? Actually, libertarian morality justifies war against any state. Even against states led by libertarians, such as Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele, or Hans-Adam II. Fighting against one’s own is even more meaningful, because that is where your main grievances lie, it is that state that causes you direct harm, whereas all others are just some predators roaming nearby, who, of course, should also have no place on earth. However, a successful war requires allies. Most of us do not have them. The RDK does. Let us be happy for them.