Тег: Pozharsky

Review of Mikhail Pozharsky’s video about how he grew to love war

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Mikhail Pozharsky released a video in which he began to justify violence and war as entirely normal human phenomena and tools for solving problems, while insulting opponents of war in every way and accusing their position of being untenable. Of course, it is first and foremost the position of Pozharsky himself that can be called untenable, which we will now examine in more detail.

He started well by criticizing the works of Steven Pinker, who claims that the level of violence has decreased throughout history, and that prehistoric humans suffered from chronic wars that could claim the lives of the majority of the population. Pinker was indeed wrong; he drew conclusions by considering only examples that were convenient for his argumentation. But if one considers all archaeological and anthropological evidence, we see that prehistoric populations did not suffer from wars—only 2% of representatives of past hunter-gatherer tribes died as a result of violence. After the agrarian revolution and the emergence of states, the level of lethal violence rose to 5%, after which it began to decline, amounting to only 3% for the 20th century (and this including the bloody conflicts that occurred within it). As anthropologist Douglas Fry believes, the level of violence in history changed according to an “n-type curve.” Pozharsky does not mention these data at all, and they do not align with his argumentation.

Instead, he decided to talk in detail about the violent nature of chimpanzees and cite primatologist and anthropologist Richard Wrangham, who believes that humans have an innate predisposition to cruelty, which he explains as an evolutionary legacy. But as Robert Sussman and Donna Hart write, the evolutionary paths of humans and chimpanzees diverged 8 million years ago. Meanwhile, the paths between chimpanzees and bonobos diverged only 2.5 million years ago, which did not prevent the latter from being peace-loving creatures. Pozharsky also mentioned bonobos, but spoke only of the aggressiveness of their females, failing to mention that their aggression is predominantly defensive, as well as the fact that they fundamentally do not have killings. Furthermore, many researchers, including anthropologist Brian Ferguson, believe that most violence in chimpanzees is provoked by human interference in their habitat, and that they have no innate predisposition to commit murder, just as humans do not.

Pozharsky also cites the Dani people as an example, among whom wars and killings are quite common. However, one could with equal success cite examples of the Paliyar, Semai, and many other peoples who are complete pacifists. Moreover, as Douglas Fry notes, research data shows that the majority of cultures (376 out of 590 studied) were either absolutely non-warlike or not inclined toward war (participating only in minor military actions). And only a third of the cultures participated significantly in wars, pursuing specific political or economic goals.

Next, Pozharsky provides individual examples of violence in history, which is an approach similar to that of Pinker (using episodes convenient for one’s argumentation while ignoring the full picture), claims that war can be just if a set of rules is adopted to reduce the harm it causes (but only suggests following them, without guaranteeing their execution in reality), and also attacks pacifists, portraying them as literally the worst people in the world by groundlessly attributing to them practices that only promote violence, such as appeasing the aggressor or waging war against a proclaimed “evil” without sparing any effort and ignoring the rules.

Of course, Pozharsky never once mentioned the position of anthropologists who quite reasonably do not consider war to be something natural for humans, or the position of military experts, according to which most healthy people possess a strong internal resistance to committing murder (or as researchers of human psyche and neurophysiology call it—the violence inhibition mechanism), and only a tiny fraction of individuals with high psychopathic predispositions are capable of engaging in such activities easily. All of this was ignored.

Learned helplessness, the illusion of control, and agorism

Mikhail Pozharsky has released a very good video about the illusion of control. Be sure to watch it in full if you haven’t already, and I, as usual, will provide the key points as I understand them.

  1. The experience of falling into a hopeless situation (one in which the subject’s position does not depend on their efforts) triggers the development of learned helplessness.
  2. Learned helplessness sharply reduces the subject’s competitive potential in situations where their actions actually do make a difference.
  3. An important psychological defense against learned helplessness is the illusion of control. In a hopeless situation, one can believe that something still depends on them, and thus learned helplessness will not arise.
  4. However, the rituals of psychological defense designed to create an illusion of control can themselves worsen the hopeless situation.
  5. Therefore, the skill of reflection is more effective, where the subject analyzes what they can actually control and what they cannot, and does not waste strength on the illusion of control, accepting force majeure as it is.
  6. Such a skill is formed through the experience of independently finding a way out of difficult situations, and in no other way.
  7. Therefore, creating cumbersome centralized structures and shifting the responsibility for everything onto them is an illusion of control, whereas a real fight against difficulties implies a decentralized approach based on personal responsibility. Period.

This is why, having outlined three main paths toward ancap — minarchism, panarchism, and agorism — I pay special attention specifically to agorism.

One can start a political party, like the big shots do, hold rallies, like the big shots do, and believe that through political pressure you are somehow influencing the policies pursued by the authorities — and when asked why life isn’t getting better, answer that the efforts undertaken are insufficient, and not a hundred thousand, but a million people must take to the streets.

One can propose reforms to create functional competing jurisdictions, dream of Facebook citizenship or the Bitnation project, and when asked why none of this is being implemented, answer that everything is heading that way anyway, but it would be good to double the propaganda efforts.

Or one can simply make a deal and not pay a tax. Or bypass an inconvenient ban. Or invent a service that is useful to people but invisible to the state’s servants. This is no longer an illusion of control. This is control itself. Through such things, a person learns to independently find a way out of difficult situations. And if they find themselves in conditions where they cannot control the possibility of getting out of the situation, they will already be resistant to learned helplessness, and will not fall back on rituals for the sake of an illusion of control.

One can remain an atheist in the trenches under fire. While one is shitting their pants and another is praying, the agorist digs the trench deeper.

https://youtu.be/pJuUbGwYH1Q

In Praise of Moderation

On February 1, the Tea Club held a conference with the elegant title “Keep to the Right” in Moscow. Among others, speaking was Mikhail Pozharsky, whom I have quoted many times, who used simple examples from the First World War to explain why you don’t need to fight the left to defeat them.

Today, the state handed down huge sentences in a flimsy case regarding the preparation of terrorist attacks, the so-called “Network” case. But this case was preceded by a real terrorist attack by anarchist Mikhail Zlobitsky, after which security services employees smirked with joy, having received new powers, budgets, and quotas for fabricating extremists. History has known cases where liberal reforms were rolled back or bloody wars were unleashed as a result of terrorist attacks, but I cannot recall a single instance where a terrorist attack prompted the state to loosen its grip on society. At best, the state limits itself to increased security measures for top officials, as happens in the USA, with its traditions of shooting presidents.

The other day, a second round of debates on anarchy took place between a team of ancaps and a team of left-wing anarchists. This was preceded by a long period of personal negotiations and attempts to find common ground; now, they managed to organize a civilized conversation in a public forum. And this is bearing fruit—for example, this review in an anarcho-channel. Each side is discovering the other, searching for conciliatory language, avoiding escalation during the debates themselves—and realizing that the main common enemy is not the left or the right, but the state.

Perhaps, over time, it will be possible to sway the brave left-wing anarchists away from revolutionary rhetoric toward something more moderate, so they stop their meaningless self-sacrifice for the benefit of provocateurs from the security services.

Indeed, I myself have significantly reduced the degree of approval for purely military tactics in my articles. I was quite rightly reprimanded during the discussion of my article on the doctrine of deterrence for the example of eliminating the King of Thailand. Truly, the will of one person does not decide so much that one can expect to solve a problem by eliminating that person or creating a deadly threat to them. It is far more useful if the idea of an attack by state representatives is viewed as ethically unacceptable, and this is achieved through the softening of manners.

So, let us continue our activity of education and persuasion, continue peaceful protest and the creation of a mass feeling of the state’s uselessness—and under no circumstances let us give it a reason to claim its necessity for the sake of fighting various dangerous extremists. The slogan that extremism in the defense of justice is not a vice is false.

As for those innocently imprisoned, they must, of course, be fought for against the state. This means taking to the streets, public appeals from celebrities, and other boring but effective political practices.

P.S. I was immediately written to saying that I confused cause and effect, and that Zlobitsky’s bombing happened precisely as a reaction to the “Network” case. Please forgive the blurred take; however, in such a scenario, the situation only becomes even more tragic.

Interview with Mikhail Pozharsky on Libertarian Band

While I was relaxing in Germany, the well-known and highly respected libertarian Mikhail Pozharsky visited Novosibirsk to give a lecture. It is a great pity that the lecture itself was not recorded, and consequently, I was unable to listen to it. Fortunately, the Libertarian Band studio team caught Mikhail before his presentation and conducted a fairly thorough interview.

In my opinion, it turned out to be very interesting; thanks to Katya Khudoleva for the questions. It’s great that the studio proves itself to be a quite viable team, even when someone is away for a while. I would have asked different questions, but I’m not sure the result would have been better.

Is it possible to sell libertarianism to people who fear that robots will take their jobs and hope for UBI? How can ancap improve a society in which 75-90% are unemployed?

…And Justice For All

answered by Alexey Nefedov

The majority of libertarian arguments regarding UBI were presented in his 2016 article by economist and LPR member Yuri Kuznetsov. In it, he shows that replacing the system of conditional benefits with an unconditional income eliminates the stagnation poverty trap and increases the overall efficiency of the redistributive system by reducing bureaucracy.

Ekaterina Schulmann also touched upon UBI and the fears of neo-Luddites in one of her programs on Echo of Moscow. She pointed out that those countries with poor institutions should be more concerned about mass unemployment due to robotization. They won’t get any UBI; instead, they will face a transition to subsistence living. Thus, Ekaterina Mikhailovna gives citizens a simple recipe: engage more in politics so that they are perceived as political subjects.

In Russia, on the one hand, there are poor institutions, and on the other—a strong demand for social welfare. If global robotization suddenly begins, it is more likely that several million more public sector jobs will be created here than UBI will be introduced. Public employees are too valuable for securing administrative resources during elections and similar matters.

And here are arguments for UBI from another LPR member, Mikhail Pozharsky. UBI means not only less bureaucracy but also a common set of rules for everyone, which is a crucial part of liberal doctrine.

However, both Kuznetsov and Pozharsky still remain within the framework of minarchism. Uniform rules are imposed on everyone, and we shall see how long this model can last. Furthermore, the so-called unconditional income still remains conditional, since the condition for its payment is citizenship of the country that established UBI for its citizens.

Can ancap improve a society where unemployment is at 90%? Yes, if unemployment is caused by state regulation, and otherwise people are offered work and are willing to take it. No, if work is not needed by ninety percent of people because they already have enough to live on.

Will there be UBI under ancap? Yes, if during the dismantling of the state, those who contributed to the UBI fund decide to continue doing so on a voluntary basis. Is this likely? Yes, if it is not burdensome and brings respect and prestige. What should be done to bring this bright future closer? Either increase the productivity of one’s labor or improve one’s ability to show respect and prestige. One can combine these strategies.

In connection with the shooting, but not about shootings

As usual, after every shooting, a discussion about the regulation of gun control begins. Mikhail Pozharsky took an interesting approach. Generally being a supporter of the liberalization of such control, he points out that both those who demand a ban on weapons in connection with shootings and those who demand their liberalization are based on an illusion of control. Namely, statists are under the illusion that the state can effectively protect against shootings, and liberals are equally convinced that armed citizens can protect themselves effectively; meanwhile, effective protection against shootings does not exist, people are simply afraid to admit that their lives depend on chance. He then provides statistics.

I have already promised to refrain from formulas here, and similarly, I do not want to get bogged down in the analysis of those very statistics. There are a number of grievances regarding them; as an example, I will provide a link to a post by Vladimir Popov; more can be found, but I will not delve into the depths.

The factor that seems most important to me is practically impossible to measure with statistics, because it is psychology. I already mentioned this yesterday in the context of the fact that weapons are a powerful stimulus for the development of mutual politeness; therefore, an increase in the armament of schoolchildren will lead to them having to curb their enthusiasm for bullying and other teenage antics, and this will also affect the frequency of mass shootings. To this, Mikhail replied that he does not understand where the myth about the politeness of armed people came from. Take the States, for example—no particular politeness is observed there, “fuck” every other word.

Yes, let’s take the States. It is clear that referring to the extremely low number of murders in the Wild West is banal; one can always counter that such ancient data is irrelevant. Let’s take modern America, specifically African Americans—who, from the perspective of the average person, are all thugs with guns and complete contempt for the law.

What have these guys contributed to world culture? Rap battles! In Russia, the art of profanity is primarily the art of humiliating a completely powerless subordinate. The boatswain’s tirade, warrant officers, and so on. To a lesser extent, it is an undirected complaint about a hard life. There, however, it is precisely a dialogue between equals, in which the virtuosity of the insult is valued, and victory is awarded for exactly that; and if someone loses their temper and pulls out a gun during a battle, well, that is, excuse me, bad form.

This is simply another example for you that any armed community will inevitably develop its own means of conflict de-escalation, whereas a forcibly disarmed one is more likely to invent sophisticated ways to spite others from the shadows.

What do you think about Mikhail Pozharsky’s article

“The Conservative Owl and the Libertarian Globe”

anonymous question

I have already touched upon this topic approximately in the post dedicated to the dispute between Mikhail Svetov and Vera Kichanova.

Then I was asked to clarify Svetov’s position regarding borders with peaceful and prosperous countries—does he really propose closing off from them as well? I had to devise a logical twist that makes Svetov’s proposal relatively acceptable for a minarchist society, and quite universal in the sense that no official is given the right to rank countries: these ones are good, and we are welcome to no one from here.

Mikhail Pozharsky’s article from July 1st is clearly inspired by the same dispute, but he dug deeper, while also addressing Hoppe’s concept that the transition from monarchy to democracy is social regression and a departure from libertarian ideals. Of course, the democratic state is terrible, as is any other state, but the claim that autocracies are generally healthier reveals Hoppe to be a person not very familiar with life under an autocracy.

I would bring another party into this dispute—political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, who has repeatedly mentioned in her presentations such a characteristic of society as the degree of citizen involvement in decision-making.

If we plot the volume of redistribution carried out by the state on one coordinate axis and the degree of citizen involvement in decision-making on another, and map existing states onto this grid, we will see that the resulting cloud of points is fairly uniform; that is, movement along each axis is generally quite independent. Therefore, both the demand for a reduction in state redistribution in the most direct democracy and the demand for the democratization of authoritarian states are equally justified. There is no need to necessarily link the reduction of taxes and regulations with a transition from democracy to authoritarianism; this assumption seems unfounded.

conservative owl

Raising the same topic for the third time, I begin to remind me of that very Ekaterina Schulmann, who also sings seemingly the same thing, but always in a different tune. And yes, here is my usual chorus about donations: 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8

Do you share the personal views and values of Mikhail Svetov? What do you disagree with him about?

anonymous question

Misha has greatly expanded my circle of supporters, and this naturally influenced my personal views and values, so yes, I share them for the most part.

What parts of his agenda can I not fully agree with?

First, there is a whole series of claims about what a party should be. He is very afraid of a corporate raid, and therefore wants to introduce something like taxpayers’ democracy within it, with a vertical structure. I am more often afraid of it turning into a gutted bureaucratic structure, so I usually practice decentralization in decision-making and private initiatives.

Secondly, he has controversial claims regarding, for example, what is more dangerous in modern states — open borders or closed ones (he believes open ones are more dangerous). It is clear that state borders as such are dangerous, but to view a state border as almost a collective private property is some kind of strange selective trust in the state.

Thirdly, he introduced some concepts into common usage that are unconventional for libertarianism, such as “communities,” which smell more of sour cabbage than of freedom. Now he more often replaces this word with the term “contractual jurisdictions,” but it still implicitly follows from his words that under libertarianism, a person has one single jurisdiction for all occasions in life, which is categorically not necessary. In general, this is a case where his personal conservatism, it seems to me, slightly permeates the ideology.

What I also deeply regret is that other libertarians are not particularly promoted through the SVTV channel. There was Pozharsky — then Pozharsky was gone. There was Bazhenov — then Bazhenov was gone. In fact, all the co-hosts are gone, and it was a very good, unobtrusive way of demonstrating new faces to the public. But Misha is not the strongest team player. Perhaps that is exactly why he would prefer the party to have an organizational vertical, so as not to negotiate, but simply to give orders.

Thank you for reading me; my guest was Mikhail Svetov, a member of the LPR FC. Like, subscribe to the channel, and send bitcoins if you like what I do. 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8
Until next time!