Автор: Анкап-тян

Following the MTL-fest, part 2, Pavel Usanov

Pavel Usanov is an economist from St. Petersburg, a proponent of the Austrian School, who teaches at the European University and runs his own Hayek Institute. He posts many of his lecture courses on his YouTube channel. He came to the fest in the following way. Initially, they wanted to invite Grigory Bazhenov—also an economist, but a mainstream one, and also a teacher, I don’t remember exactly where, I think at HSE, plus he works for the Union of Independent Fuel Producers. Grigory also has a video blog that is roughly four times more popular than Pavel’s, which makes the fest organizers’ priorities quite clear. However, at some point, Bazhenov backed out, citing a department meeting, and so he was replaced by Usanov.

The proposed topic for Bazhenov’s lecture was: “Monetary Policy under Libertarianism: Between the Gold Standard and Crypto.” When the speaker was changed, the question of a new topic arose. Knowing that Pavel is primarily an economic historian, I suggested a modified version: “Non-Governmental Monetary Systems: Theory and History.” That is what they agreed upon. I wanted to get a good introduction to our Montelibero tokenomics, from which it would become clear why our current financial system has the specific shape it does.

On the Montelibero channel, the lecture is currently available only as a fragment of a stream, but Pavel has already posted it on his own channel.

In the lecture, one can indeed see an introduction to our tokenomics: Pavel states that whether we like it or not, today money as a universal medium of exchange is still the dollar and, to a lesser extent, the euro; Bitcoin is great for its potential, but that potential still needs to be realized. Thus, in Montelibero’s tokenomics, everything is measured using stables in euros, dollars, and bitcoins; we decided not to invent any proprietary exotic currencies like the Liberland merits to serve as money.

The day after the festival, Pavel and I recorded a separate video, this time about my book, and he also posted it on his channel. I hope that after some time, he will also record a short review of it. At least he has a book review section there.

Overall, he turned out to be a very simple and sociable person, and this is clearly not the last episode of his cooperation with Montelibero. I am not certain that Grigory Bazhenov would have done better; however, time will tell.

How should a libertarian behave if they find out that children in their neighbors’ family are being subjected to domestic violence?

Yesterday we were sitting in a club, and someone asks me: so, apparently, at the MTL-lunch Svetov was grilled with questions, and he didn’t answer the subject, so what, you wonder, do you think about this?

In Svetov’s defense, I will immediately note that if he is incriminated for communicating via canned responses, then I, as a rule, base my answers on my own previous responses to similar questions, or on more general concepts I have formulated earlier. Therefore, here you go, to start with, the answer to a related question about what a child should do when they are subjected to domestic violence. And then I will expand the thought on what third parties should do when they encounter violence against other people’s children.

Libertarian morality dictates intervening in conflicts on the just side. Justice is the feeling of proportionality between the value of the subject of the conflict and the damage caused during the conflict. Therefore, the first thing to do when seeing a conflict is to quickly determine by eye what the subject of the conflict is, compare it with the damage suffered by the parties involved, and then make a decision for oneself whether to intervene or not.

However, in the case of children, the situation is complicated by the fact that a child is not fully a legal subject and is under the jurisdiction of the parent, and damn strong grounds are required to invade someone else’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the best tactic our hypothetical libertarian can adhere to is to attract a sufficiently substantial support group to their side. These could be other neighbors (a neighbor can most easily justify why this conflict concerns them at all—they hear it, see it, and feel irritation), but one can also attract simply outsiders, as long as they are ready to express their independent opinion about what is happening.

In some ways, this process is similar to bitcoin mining. In conditions of conflicting chains, the one backed by the most accumulated hash rate is considered true. Similarly, in our case—the parent provides justifications for their correctness and attracts supporters of their position—and the neighbor, opposing the violence against the child, provides their own arguments and attracts their own supporters. Each supporter acts as a node in the network with their own hash rate, that is, the ability to impose costs on the opposing side. If those who speak out against domestic violence are able to cause serious problems, this becomes a strong argument to stop the violence or avoid the problems some other way, for example, by moving.

Of course, the clash of positions will not necessarily be so harsh; it is quite likely that the parties will reach a compromise. For example, an agreement may be reached that on payday the child goes to stay overnight with a neighbor, and then the parents can drink to their heart’s content while the child is safe. Or the neighbors might propose a system of non-violent penalties for the child if they are indeed prone to causing serious damage to those around them.

Nevertheless, it is always useful to keep the scenario of possible escalation in mind, so as to intervene in others’ conflicts with a view to one’s own capabilities. And to upgrade those capabilities in advance.

The Network of Moral Pressure

Following the MTL-fest, part 1, Liberland

Vít Edlička, the self-proclaimed president of the self-proclaimed republic of Liberland, intended to speak at the MTL-fest on the topic of “how to build the freest state in the world.” Liberland is located on a territory called Gornja Siga, which from Serbia’s perspective should be in Croatia, from Croatia’s perspective should be in Serbia, but in fact, it is on the Croatian side of the Danube, and it is specifically with the Croatian authorities that the Liberlanders experience the most problems.

Shortly before the fest, Edlička and a couple of other Liberlanders were arrested by the Croatian side, followed by deportation to Hungary. And on September 22, one day before the MTL-fest, Croatian security forces went as far as to invade the territory of the settlement, destroying all the buildings there and confiscating all movable property. Thus, Vít’s account of his project was enriched with fresh, hot facts.

Croatia’s position is roughly as follows: yes, the border location is not settled, but we are responsible for the security of the external perimeter of the Schengen area, which we recently joined, and therefore we strive to curb any provocations, including provocations from some quasi-state.

Liberland’s position, in turn, boils down to the fact that since Croatia is part of the Schengen area, it no longer has full sovereignty over the border and cannot act lawlessly according to its own whim. For the destruction of someone else’s property, as well as the baseless detention of people outside its state borders, it will have to answer in court. Liberland also insists that a territory claimed by no current state is terra nullius, and the emergence of a new state upon it does not contradict any international norms; and if that is the case, please respect our state sovereignty as we respect yours, gentlemen Croatians—and in general, why fight, let’s be friends, don’t you want a powerful tourist cluster right next to you?

There is nothing that irritates those in power more than a reminder of legal norms. After all, legal norms place the parties of a conflict on the same level: the democratically elected government of a sovereign state in the EU and some clowns with a couple of wooden sheds and a houseboat. Therefore, naturally, the Croatian side will ignore any legal procedures as much as possible, simply leaving any statements from Liberland unattended. Nevertheless, this entire story is capable of raising a lot of stink, provided, of course, that the public does not forget to throw manure onto this fire.

Here is the contact page of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior, which organized the invasion of the territory of the sovereign Free Republic of Liberland. Here is the same page in English. You can send complaints to various addresses from the list provided there, which will be especially useful if you represent an official media outlet. Also, of course, reposts would help.

MTL fest 2023, impressions

Yesterday I had the chance to attend MTL-fest. The festival was held in MTL-City literally on a construction site, and the preparation for it was completely decentralized, based on the principle of “whoever wants it most, takes a piece of the work and does it.” So, naturally, there were some glitches, but as a result of this approach, the festival certainly gained its own eclectic charm.

I ran into Svetov in person; we chatted, although I didn’t manage to hand him the book yet, as everyone was too busy. Usanov, however, did not go empty-handed. We are still thinking about recording a separate video with him. Unfortunately, my level of spoken English didn’t allow me to give enough attention to the English-speaking speakers.

Surprisingly, I managed not to fuck up my own presentation; thanks to Dan Lesnov for forcing me to do two preliminary dry runs. To be honest, speaking immediately after Svetov is a questionable pleasure, because about twenty people immediately swarm him and start throwing questions; he continues to speak, moves further away, and the audience suddenly shrinks.

If you look at which parts of the festival were more crowded and which were less, it’s clear that libertarians have well-honed the skill of organizing conferences and all sorts of small-scale trade: people mostly hung out in the lecture hall, at the food court, and at the fair. However, as it turned out, this theme blends poorly with a music festival. Firstly, the loud music interfered with the lecture hall, and secondly, almost no one came specifically for the DJ program; everyone preferred either to listen to the speakers or to sit further away and chat—to dance in front of the stage, apparently, requires a completely different audience.

As expected, there was a severe lack of shade: a whole day outdoors is not for Montenegro. There was a moment when I felt a heatstroke coming on, so I had to lay out the foam mat I brought with me and lie in the shade for a while. Also, at the food court, there was a certain bias toward alcoholic beverages: beer, cider, and various strong liqueurs were offered, while coffee and mors were only available at one spot, which had the longest queue. The mineral water I brought with me saved the day.

However, all these small rough edges do not negate the main point: the festival went very energetically, about 270 people attended, and the lineup of speakers for a first time was beyond expectations—and at several venues, the fest was described as annual and far from the first. In other words, there was no feeling of a modest debut in the air; the fest was immediately perceived as part of an unshakable tradition, which is cool!

Various pictures and short videos from the fest can be seen in a separate channel. I hope that text reports will also start appearing there soon.

Network State, Chapter 2.3: Political Power and Technological Truth

I am posting the translation of another chapter of The Network State. In it, Balaji Srinivasan argues that if you look at history from the top down, it is a narrative dictated by power, allowing the establishment to maintain its power—but if you look from the bottom up, it is simply a dispassionate recording of facts from the past. And while there seems to be a temptation to focus entirely on the bottom-up approach, on the purely technological aspects of history—no, that is a path to political defeat. Anyone wishing to have an acceptable world around them must push their own historical narrative, and they cannot manage without a top-down approach.

Work on the translation, as you can see, has slowed down a bit. I hope this is temporary; once the festival is over, I will continue more briskly. By the way, a tiny print run of my own book on ancap will be sold on paper at the festival, which we decided to print as a trial.

Alternatives to the right to carry a pistol

I’ve noticed that almost all answers to the question “how will it work?” boil down to “gun law.” If anything goes wrong—shoot, and figure it out later. If you break the law (which doesn’t exist, meaning you just seem like a bad person to someone)—you’ll be killed. Don’t want to pay a court judgment—shoot your way out, but the plaintiff can hire a private special forces squad against you. And so on. The principle of proportionality of punishment is somewhere far off, but the right to shoot is right here. Everything indirectly leads back to the idea that “whoever has the gun is right.” Wouldn’t it be better to organize a social order where such situations are prevented in advance and long before they happen?

Muscovite (not Chinese)

To start, I’ll note that the status quo is exactly as described in the question: the principle of proportionality of punishment is somewhere far off, while the right to shoot is right here. Therefore, whoever is armed can easily dictate their will to those who are unarmed. Anyone could be armed—a bandit, for instance, or a cop. If he uses a weapon with particular cynicism, there’s a chance he’ll be reprimanded, fired, or given a suspended sentence after the fact; even if it’s a real sentence, it is, one way or another, a delayed punishment that in no way prevents either the already occurred outrage involving the use of weapons or new similar actions.

Ancap differs from the status quo in that everyone has the right to own a weapon, everyone can use it, and whoever wants to dictate their will to a randomly chosen victim by threatening them with a weapon risks encountering armed resistance not only from the victim but from anyone else. Can it be said that under ancap, whoever has the gun is right? Well, then we would have to admit that everyone who bothered to bring a gun is right. Even so, this seems more attractive to me than a situation where “the one who decided to use armed violence is right, and the others are unarmed, disenfranchised cattle.” But anyway, enough about ancap, the question is about a hypothetical society without “gun law.”

The first idea is the most obvious. No guns—no gun law. Alas, if you deprive society of guns, you simply get brass-knuckle law, knife law, or even just fist law. Not to mention the possibility of plowing into a crowd with a truck.

The second idea is the creation of a smart environment in which any violence is suppressed by technological means so quickly that you can barely manage to exercise your “gun law.” Among sci-fi writers, I read a description of such a society by Lem, but I didn’t like it: it exaggerates too much; instead of serious forecasts, it becomes a kind of parody that discredits the idea. I can only note that this path implies enormous trust in technological solutions. If we don’t leave them to state monopolies and allow private entities to independently design solutions in this vein, we could very well end up with numerous commercial zones where a high level of security is ensured purely through technological means.

The third idea is being actively pushed by Bitarch. He proceeds from the premise that there is nothing terrible about self-defense, but the inclination toward aggressive violence is something that can be worked on. To take away a person’s desire to attack is far more humane than killing. What can be said here? For me, the moral status of a “vaccination against violence” is roughly the same as the moral status of any other vaccine. If you can ensure mass testing and vaccination through non-violent means—well done. If you can’t—prepare for acts of mass disobedience, lawsuits, and an extremely poor reputation for your proposed solution.

So, in short, those are the options for replacing a “gun law” society that came to mind. Do you have any others? Describe them in the comments.

You stand there and wonder: am I right enough, or should I tuck a couple more guns under my crinoline?

Network State, Chapter 2.2. Microhistory and macrohistory.

I continue to grind away at the translation of Balaji Srinivasan’s book (soon I’ll even memorize that surname) The Network State.

In the new chapter, Microhistory and Macrohistory, the author moves along a narrow and dangerous path along the border of the heresy of scientism, which, as is known, is based on the approval of applying natural science methods to social sciences. So far, it seems the line hasn’t been crossed, but I am viewing all of this with great suspicion and hope to notice any methodological incorrectness in time.

For the first time during a book translation, the layout is taking up almost more of my time than the translation itself—all these endless external and internal links and such. I find it hard to imagine how this will look on paper, although it seems a print version is also planned for publication.

Ancap-paternalism

Something peculiar happened in Montelibero recently. Someone appeared who wanted to enter our tokenomics with a large sum. Most likely, he read the instructions and began to follow them. He obtained dollar stablecoins from some external exchange and went to exchange them for our euro ones. Meanwhile, the order book usually looks something like this:

What do we see here? There is a certain number of tokens trading in both directions with a more or less reasonable spread, and then orders begin at completely absurd prices; for example, 5 EURMTL are offered for sale at a price of 1000 USDC each. For such an order to be triggered, someone would first have to buy more than four thousand EURMTL at a price of around 1.12, and under normal conditions, this of course never happens. But when someone, without looking and with a broad gesture, throws, for example, 40,000 USDC into the market, they will buy up all the cheap euros, and with the remaining amount, they will stock up on overpriced ones. That is exactly what happened.

According to libertarian principles, this deal, like any other voluntary transaction, is completely legitimate. A person has every right to sell a glass of water for a diamond in the heart of a desert or a kilogram of flour for an antique icon in besieged Leningrad. Likewise in our case—there were no more favorable offers on the market, and the buyer agreed to what was available.

What is the difference between our case and the aforementioned cases of buying under conditions of extreme scarcity? In our case, there was no real scarcity in the market. It would have been enough to buy as many tokens as were listed for sale at an acceptable price, then wait a bit and make sure that other traders arrived and placed new orders at prices not much worse. One could also have written in the chat: “I want to buy euros for forty kilobucks, but there aren’t that many on the exchange, who is ready to sell more?” Finally, one could have contacted the MTL fund directly, saying, “Guys, you’re emitting a stablecoin here, how about you issue more coins against my dollars.”

But to do this, one must understand the specifics of the acquired asset and the specifics of the trading tools. And this leads us to a discussion of paternalism under ancap.

What is paternalism? It is a demand for a social arrangement that reduces the cost of a mistake. Is there such a demand under ancap? Of course, yes. Even looking only at tokenomics, it exists, firstly, from the side of beginners who do not yet fully understand the principles of how it works and therefore risk losing a lot through carelessness. Secondly, there is a demand from the developers of tokenomics tools: if a tool is dangerous to use, people will use alternative solutions. Thirdly, there is a demand from community activists: it is important to them that people come and stay, rather than fleeing in horror after hitting such pitfalls.

How was the case described above handled?

Firstly, additional checks were added to the MTL-Wallet. If a user wants to exchange a large amount at market price, the bot compares the effective exchange rate for the proposed amount and for an amount a hundred times smaller. If they differ by more than 10%, the bot issues a warning.

Secondly, the trader who made a fortune on their order was found and persuaded to return the earnings (I am not aware of the details; perhaps they kept some for themselves, but the victim, nevertheless, remained completely delighted). This was the hardest part, as the ancap community has no tools for forced coercion to return funds, nor should it have any.

Thirdly, the fund plans to place protective orders for all main trading pairs so that it would be extremely difficult for a careless buyer to break through them.

What conclusions can I draw from what happened?

Firstly, paternalism is natural, and there is no need to fight it.

Secondly, under ancap, paternalism is limited by libertarian principles, namely self-ownership and the non-aggression principle.

Thirdly, even with such limitations, fully functioning paternalistic tools can be created in society.

So here is another argument for your collection of debates with statists, proving that ancap is not cannibalism, and that private paternalism is more effective than state paternalism.

Network State. Part 2, History as a Trajectory. 2.1. Prologue.

I am continuing the translation of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State. In the comments for the translation of the first part, the idea was mentioned to translate the fifth part next, which concerns the actual construction of the network state. It is tempting, but no: every sufficiently original work tends to introduce its own conceptual apparatus (this is also very evident in my book about ancap), and reading out of order proves to be more difficult without it.

Therefore, here is the beginning of the second part of the book, where the author presents his thoughts on the fact that history is an applied discipline, that there is no predestination in history, and that true communities should be created specifically on the basis of properly processed history. In the prologue, a brief outline of the entire second part is provided.

I still hope to occasionally mix the translation of the book with my own original posts, otherwise you will get completely bored and scatter. But the translations will be released quite frequently.

I am starting to translate a new book

A year ago, the channel Russian Crypto Frontier began publishing a translation of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State. The enthusiasm lasted only for the first chapter, and even a piece of that translation is already unavailable. So, I am picking up the process, as I have done previously with the translation of Friedman’s Mechanics of Freedom and his Legal Systems Differing Significantly from Ours.

I will not host the original text here because the author promises to keep it on his own website dedicated to this book and provide updates as needed; therefore, I will limit myself to hosting the translation.

In brief, the book is a comprehensive guide to building one very specific type of extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction: a self-governing archipelago of territories located around the world, possessing diplomatic recognition from traditional territorial states—at least from some of such states.

The first chapter is essentially an extended introduction, which is entirely sufficient to understand whether one should continue reading.

Since the translation has a sponsor, I expect to be able to produce the text quite quickly. Unfortunately, my other ongoing translations do not have such sponsors, and the process is moving extremely slowly. I continue to hope that the situation can still improve somehow.