Автор: Анкап-тян

Arguments for Well-Meaning Etatists

I often have to use a phrase like this in arguments with impenetrable estatists:

“By supporting the state, you are initiating violence, including against me, therefore the Doctrine of Deterrence (DD) will be applied to you until you stop!”

Could you write a post on this topic, arguing why this is exactly the case?

Bitarch

Allow me two quotes. The first is from the movie “Brother 2”: “Strength is in truth”. The second is from Mikhail Svetov: “You can be a thousand times right, but what’s the point if you are powerless?”

At the same time, the character who uttered the first tirade preferred to assert his truth through the use of force, while the author of the second statement limits himself exclusively to conveying his truth to people in verbal form. Both, despite the apparent contradiction between word and deed, succeeded in their endeavors.

What is this supposed to tell us? That—and here I will bring in a third quote, whose author is traditionally Al Capone: “You can achieve much more with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word alone”.

Now then. When you threaten an estatist with the doctrine of deterrence, you are essentially saying to him: “dude, I have a gun, therefore I am right.” Meanwhile, he is convinced that strength is in truth, and the truth is that he personally did not initiate aggression against you, but merely verbally supported the state. In other words, you are threatening a person with retribution for words, and with rather vague claims at that, since anything can be declared as support for the state. For instance, many Ukrainians accuse Russians of supporting Russian aggression in Ukraine simply by the fact of Russian citizenship (and the incorrect use of prepositions, of course).

As a result, the estatist gets tense and looks for a way to deal with you, for example, through the state. And, I suspect, it will be especially frustrating for you if he manages to find a way to deal with you, but you cannot do the same to him. In other words, not only did you threaten a person with a gun, but it was a gun you didn’t even have. And here I will allow myself a fourth quote, a quite insulting one, from a character in the comedy “Spizdili”: “Just as a brainless dick should—you don’t understand the situation, and now you’re starting to shrink, and your little balls are starting to shrink along with you—and that’s because on the side of your gun it says—TOY, and on the side of my gun it says DESERT EAGLE .50”.

In order for an estatist, if not to side with you, to at least recognize your right to criticize the state, you first need to demonstrate exactly how it has wronged you. Moreover, complaints in the vein of “I may be evading taxes, but VAT is still included in the price of some goods I buy” are, of course, unconvincing to him. Similarly, pointing out that your grandfather was shot under Stalin will only serve as a supporting argument: first, it didn’t happen to you, but to a person you didn’t even know personally, and second, one can always claim it was a different state. The ideal approach would be to find a story where the state infringed specifically upon your rights, and did so lawlessly, in violation of its own laws, and where no truth could be found through other state agencies. “I was picked up at an unauthorized rally and had my leg broken”—again, this fits poorly unless you are Konstantin Konovalov—for him, this is a perfect case: he had nothing to do with the action, was detained three hours before it began in violation of the police law, suffered bodily injuries—and to top it all off, the court fined him. If you can find something equally convincing, the estatist’s sympathies will, of course, be on your side. To start with, it is important for you to demonstrate that the state is not just a bandit, but a lawless bandit who does not play by the rules.

Next, it would be a good idea to say something like “you understand it all perfectly yourself, I’m sure similar shit has happened to you too,” and let him tell something from his own experience. In Russia, it is customary to play the victim and complain about life, so the interlocutor will likely feel awkward if it turns out that the state’s boot overlooked him, and he will either make something up, or remember something that happened to acquaintances or leaked into the press.

And only then does it make sense to lead the interlocutor to the thought that if a bandit does not play by the rules, then what right does he have to demand that people treat him according to the rules. Therefore, hiding money from him is a virtue, and helping others who have been crushed lawlessly is a good cause, and those who support these thugs are shameful bastards.

And for dessert, you can savor stories about how people are fined for improving their own neighborhoods, how punks repair playgrounds, how the founder of Vimpelcom funded science only to be declared a foreign agent—in short, lead the former estatist to the thought that state people only know how to cut ribbons, while in fact, people provide all the benefits for themselves, and are even forced to bypass the traps set by those very state people.

There are no impenetrable estatists. At least not in Russia.

In amperes, brother

Happy Bitcoine’en!

Satoshi Nakamoto was so kind as to time the publication of his paper “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” exactly for Halloween, so that we can celebrate two holidays at once, addressing our unchanging trick or treat not to offline neighbors, but to the entire internet.

So let us glorify our ability to perform online peer-to-peer financial transactions on this evening of Saint Satoshi, without which true hardcore agorism today would simply be unimaginable! As for the state, let it be afraid—it is better at that than anything else—so if Bitcoin didn’t exist, it would have found something else to be afraid of anyway.

Personal Deterrence Doctrine

Bitarch’s Column

I will start by noting that this is a thought experiment and a test of a philosophical concept, not a discussion of technological implementation.

The essence of the idea is very simple. There is a potential aggressor in the form of a group of people (a criminal organization). You probably already guess who is being referred to. Although besides a Westphalian state, this could also be an aggressive ECU or a territorial community. A lone individual possessing a technology, which we will conventionally call MinMAD, opposes the criminal organization.

This technology ensures mutual assured destruction (MAD) of only two individuals—if the victim of aggression dies, one person from the criminal organization dies immediately (for example, a random government official, regardless of their relationship to the specific case). The victim of aggression may use conventional weapons to oppose the criminal organization (for example, firing a machine gun at a police squad sent to detain them) and remain alive as long as the aggressor does not destroy them. But if a cruise missile is then launched at their house and they perish, a random member of the criminal organization will die instantly. They can also activate MinMAD independently, for example, if they are taken prisoner. In that case, both they and one random member of the criminal organization will die immediately.

From the conditions of the problem, it is clear that both the criminal organization and the victim are not anonymous. Suppose that in a certain territory, at least 10-20% of the residents have MinMAD. Question: is it possible to maintain institutionalized coercion (the state) in this territory?

My assumption is an absolute “no”: no one will want to participate in the criminal organization (the state), knowing that there is a very high probability they could die. Accordingly, the necessary deterrent effect is achieved, forcing government officials to abandon coercion and seek other ways of making a living that are not based on robbery (which is what “taxes” actually are).

Ancap-chan’s Comment

Bitarch and I disagreed on the prospects of such a doctrine, and now we are submitting the discussion for your judgment.

I believe that we already live in a society where this experiment was conducted and led to results that differ significantly from those intended. In the past, the state was relatively compact, and those who opposed it were executed. This led to the emergence of tactics of individual terror by the resistance, which strongly demotivated government employees from performing their duties. But since then, the state has adapted to this threat, and, firstly, it has exponentially expanded the number of government employees, budget workers, and other beneficiaries of the existing system, and secondly, it has stopped killing its opponents, preferring more “vegetarian” methods, such as short prison sentences and fines. Thus, on the one hand, the resistor is demotivated from self-sacrifice, since they only face temporary inconvenience—and on the other hand, the risk of death for government employees has become significantly lower, since there are now millions of them.

So—no. A modern deterrence doctrine should imply the elimination of specifically the person who gives the order to initiate violence, and the higher their position in the state hierarchy, the better. Also, a modern deterrence doctrine should, whenever possible, remove the person practicing it from the line of fire, rather than relying on proud self-sacrifice. A “minimal” deterrence doctrine is like a vaccination against a disease for the state, rather than the disease itself.

P.S. By the way, since the deterrence doctrine is so prominent in Bitarch’s work, he created a separate VKontakte public page, where he puts all materials on this topic to make access to them more convenient.

Anarchist Deterrence Doctrine)

And again about the monopoly

This question was inspired by an article on Habr and the subsequent comments. The gist is: there is Yandex — they have a search engine. In the search engine, they promote their other products, thereby limiting competition. How correct is this? In the article and comments themselves, there are quite a few arguments IN FAVOR of antitrust legislation. What do you think?

анонимный вопрос

In connection with this question, I would like to recommend Vyacheslav Kostrov’s lecture “Platform Economy and the Hayekian Market Process,” delivered by him at the “Capitalism and Freedom” conference in 2019.

The lecture is very rambling and contains no conclusions, but it places the question you are asking into a broader frame — it considers not a specific case of using a dominant market position, but the principles of the functioning of the platform economy as such.

Let’s consider a platform such as a search engine. By design, it is a service that searches the web for mentions of information that interests the user, based on certain input data provided by the user. After attracting a sufficiently large number of users with the convenience of the service and the quality of the search, the owner of the search engine may raise the question of monetizing the platform.

The most direct way to monetize a service in its original form is through customer donations. This method is implemented by Wikipedia, and it allows it to focus its efforts on the completeness of content and the neatness of its presentation, that is, on improving exactly those consumer qualities of the supplied product for which the user came to the platform. Of course, Wikipedia is not a search engine in the pure sense, but theoretically, nothing prevents the use of the same model for classic search engines. My channel practices this method of monetization.

A search engine could also sell analytics on user search queries to interested clients. This is also a fairly “herbivorous” way to make money and, as in the case of Wiki, is unlikely to bring in mega-bucks. My channel also practices this method of monetization in a sense — these are answers to questions with attached donations and commissioned articles.

Next come the methods of earning money whose application degrades the product itself.

First, there is advertising. In addition to providing the user with what they are searching for, the search engine slips into the results something that the advertiser would like them to be introduced to. Thus, for the user, the product becomes worse due to the lower relevance of the results, but the platform owner gets a profit. I no longer practice this method, and if a request to sell advertising on the channel appears, I try to switch the requester to one of the monetization methods mentioned above.

And finally, the owners of the search engine may start earning not only from others’ advertising, but also lure the user to their own subsidiary services that have no direct relation to the search engine. This is exactly what we see in the article under discussion. As a result of such a policy, search results become even less relevant for the user, and they start looking toward DuckDuckGo, but before the user has completely fled the search engine, the subsidiary platforms, thanks to the inertia of human thinking, will manage to build their own customer base. I do not practice this either, but I can well imagine a blogger periodically advertising some own business on their channel.

As a result of the development of such a mega-platform, after some time it turns out that some businesses under the general brand are more profitable, others less, and some are completely loss-making. However, making decisions about optimizing the asset structure is quite difficult because they influence each other. The platform flounders, making increasingly less balanced decisions, until it finally goes belly up. Just relatively recently, one such behemoth of the platform economy went bankrupt — Cook’s outfit, which existed for over a century and a half. It was the first to implement the package principle for organizing tourist trips, thanks to which it quickly became a global hegemon in the tourism industry, and it ultimately burned out on exactly that: too many of its assets, instead of reacting to market stimuli, were engaged in serving other subsidiary companies of the holding. Its own airlines, its own hotels, its own tour operators — it would seem, here is a monopoly, just collect the rent — but no, it failed to keep up with progress and lost to a conditional Booking.com, a next-generation platform business.

Exactly the same fate will befall Yandex, without any antitrust authorities.

Contract Enforcement

Bitarch’s Column

The question of permissible methods of contract enforcement was touched upon during Mikhail Svetov’s lecture in Novosibirsk. Svetov once again unequivocally expressed his position—physical violence (coercion) must not be used. The maximum that can be done against a violator is ostracism.

Unfortunately, not everyone accepts this moral position, so I will try to explain it, relying on utilitarianism and game theory. The example described below is an original illustration for the summary of the RAND Corporation study On the Doctrine of Deterrence, chapter “Local Balance of Power: An Important, but Not Always Decisive Factor.”

“Suppose I entered into a contract with you and decided to break it on my own. You dug in your heels and began to threaten me with ‘special forces’ who would forcibly seize my property. Assume you can send ten fighters, but I can guaranteedly destroy one of them. I make it clear that I am prepared to go to the end. For the fighters to agree to such a risk, you would have to offer each of them $10M. Suppose the contract amount is $100K, and I possess assets that can be liquidated for only $1000. You evaluate the ratio of benefits to costs—and tell me something like: ‘Get out, I don’t want to have anything to do with you anymore; people are right, it’s better not to touch shit!’. After that, we part ways, and you no longer enter into any deals with me. Under certain circumstances, you can retaliate by placing information about my behavior in the public domain, thereby prompting other people to join the ostracism.”

As seen from the example above, contract enforcement through physical coercion becomes impossible in a society where there is at least some balance of violence potential (different from the conditional ‘zero’ for citizens and ‘infinity’ for the state, as is usually the case in etatist societies).

In his book “For a New Liberty,” Murray Rothbard provides historical examples confirming the described theory and shows his affinity for it.

“The fact is that in the Middle Ages and up until 1920, merchants relied exclusively on the power of ostracism and boycotts by other local merchants. In other words, if someone refused to obey the decision of an arbitrator or ignored his decision, other merchants brought this fact to everyone’s attention and everyone refused to deal with the rebel, which quickly brought them to their knees. Woolridge provides a characteristic example of this:

‘Merchant courts were effective because merchants agreed that their decisions would be enforced. One who refused to obey was not sent to prison, but he did not remain a merchant for long after that. The influence of his colleagues and partners proved more effective than physical coercion. Take John of Homing, who made his living in the wholesale fish trade. John sold a batch of herring, all of which was supposed to be the same as in the three barrels presented to the buyer, but it soon turned out that it was actually rotten, and even mixed with sprat. He had to quickly reimburse the buyer in full under threat of ostracism from other merchants.’

Over time, ostracism became an even more effective means, since a situation arose where one who had once disobeyed an arbitrator’s decision could no longer expect any other intermediary to deal with them. Industrialist Owen D. Young, head of General Electric, concluded that moral censorship carried out by other businessmen operates far more effectively than the official judicial system. Modern technologies, computers, and credit ratings make the threat of nationwide ostracism more effective than ever before in the past.”

Why, when discussing representative democracy, do we always have upvote in mind? Today, when everyone is lying to everyone and everyone is buying everyone, downvote is significantly more productive.

анонимный вопрос

What is the downvote mainly used for in politics today? These are dislikes under harmful bills, petitions to repeal harmful laws, rallies demanding the government’s resignation, actions like egging, and so on. In other words, it is a standard tool of direct, rather than representative, democracy.

Let’s try to imagine what the consequences of implementing the downvote for representative democracy would look like.

An elective body, a dozen candidates are running, all of them appear on the ballot; the voter comes to the polling station and gives dislikes to everyone they definitely do not wish to see in the specified position. The candidate with the minimum number of dislikes wins.

What are the downsides of such a system?

  1. The chance of victory sharply increases for a “slippery Joe” who hasn’t managed to offend anyone because nobody really knows who he is. Politicians will compete for the image of the most featureless nobody.
  2. A nobody might turn out to be lacking agency and simply hand over the levers of real control to their puppet master. We get the same result, just from a different angle, and with an even greater dilution of responsibility for political decisions.

What are the pluses?

  1. The concept of a spoiled ballot disappears. An empty ballot means all candidates are liked. A scribbled-out one means none are liked.
  2. No candidate with even a moderately high anti-rating will pass; that is, unpopular measures in a previous position effectively kill a public political career, even if there is a significant support group.
  3. Voter turnout increases sharply: for the pleasure of giving a public politician a dislike, even the paralyzed will drag themselves to the polling station.
  4. The fear of drastic measures will ensure that the state becomes far more inactive, and that is exactly what we libertarians want.

So, I approve of the proposed system for improving representative democracy. It’s just a pity that neither you nor I will live to see this wonderful time…

Is it permissible for a libertarian party to become a vozhdist party with a strong vertical?

Judging by the charter that Svetov wants to adopt at the congress, that is exactly the case.

Anonymous question. A donation in the amount of 0.00099851btc

was attached to the question.

This question turned out to be today’s record holder among questions with an attached donation in terms of the time I needed to answer: usually, if an answer is paid for, I answer on the same day. The fact is that I have no relation to the Libertarian Party of Russia, so I had to scour both of your charters — the one currently in effect, and the one Mikhail Svetov expects to adopt at the LPR congress, which will take place on November 2 in Moscow (I was sent links to the cloud, but for safekeeping, I preferred to move the documents to my own site). The reading was not easy, so I apologize in advance to those who may find the answer a bit boring; it is a very specific question.

So, if we rely on the letter of the charters, then both now and in the wonderful Svetovian LPR of the future, you have a typical oligarchic party where all real power is held by committees that control the mechanisms of their own reelection. The changes proposed to be made are, in essence, cosmetic:

  • regional branches are prohibited from engaging in entrepreneurial activity (very strange for a party that, in theory, should treat entrepreneurship as a fetish).
  • on the other hand, regional branches are allowed their own symbols, albeit in agreement with the federal committee (I didn’t even know that previously your charter had only one symbol for the entire party; this norm was violated left and right).
  • the general meeting of a regional branch loses the right to expel members from the party (all power to the committees!).
  • the general meeting of a regional branch loses the right to consider an appeal against expulsion from the party by the branch’s steering committee (the power of the committees is indisputable!) .
  • the moratorium on the return of previously expelled members to the party is increased from three to five years (this reminds me of the constant extension of Disney’s copyrights for Mickey Mouse — it feels as if someone was expelled from the LPR whom they really don’t want back, and now they are extending the term during which this cannot be done).
  • previously, the federal committee was dissolved if more than a third of its members left; in the new edition, it is more than half (if the dominant faction has an absolute majority, the opposition is in principle unable to block the committee’s work).
  • a limit is introduced on the maximum size of the committees (increasing the administrative weight of each committee member)
  • the federal committee will be able to suspend the powers of individual members and dismiss the party chairman (expansion of the dominant faction’s power).
  • appealing to the ethics committee becomes paid. If you win the case, the deposit is returned. If you lose, the money goes into the party coffers. No sanctions are provided for those who made an unlawful decision upon which an appeal was won (very convenient, for example, to kick out the entire opposition from the party before the congress, and by the time the ethics committee reinstates everyone, the train has left, all decisions at the congress have already been made, profit).

I probably didn’t notice all the changes, but I hardly missed anything fundamental. Another feature of Svetov’s charter is that it contains two charters: the first part works until the party is registered, and the second part replaces the first in the event of official state registration of the party.

The volume of the documents is quite large. The current charter has 44 pages; the one proposed by Mikhail Svetov has 78 pages. Usually, when people draft such detailed agreements for joint activity, it speaks of an immense lack of trust they have for each other and a certain external force to which one can always appeal if something goes wrong in the joint activity. A charter is important specifically for an external judge who knows nothing about what is happening in the organization and for whom the map equals the territory. Organizations that are created naturally for the maximum efficiency of joint activity, and which do not intend to rely on someone’s external legitimacy, do not typically describe internal norms in such tomes.

A natural organization is characterized by first relying exclusively on informal agreements, then introducing some written norms as it grows, and then consolidating them into charters. An unnatural one, complying with the Russian law on political parties, is forced to take a template charter and demonstrate to the state that it lives by it. In fact, however, it will still operate within the framework of certain informal agreements.

And now I will allow myself to deviate from the charters and quote a fragment of a lecture by Mikhail Svetov, given by him on October 16, 2019, in Novosibirsk:

The Libertarian Party of Russia today is the only organization that seriously says that the regions need to be given broad powers, transferred in such a way that it would be impossible for Moscow to take them away again.

Mikhail Svetov

Mikhail has been talking for several months, and especially often in the last month as part of his unprecedented tour across the country, about how the regions should impose a new federal treaty on Moscow. So impose it!

A regional branch of the party brings together local politicians who interact directly with local politicians representing other political forces. It is with them that they form coalitions and alliances, agree on the distribution of candidates by district and the order of speeches at rallies, or arrange to borrow equipment or use an office. Moscow in all this real regional political activity is a disorganizing factor that can only contribute to the disruption of agreements carefully built on the ground, but is almost never able to help. This is especially relevant for parties without centralized funding from above. If the main source of the party’s money is membership fees from ordinary members, then how shell-shocked by the vertical of power must one be to pay any attention at all to the whims of the Moscow leadership! He who doesn’t buy the girl dinner doesn’t get to dance with her.

The Libertarian Party of the Russian Federation does not need a charter. It needs a federal treaty. I will allow myself to quote again a fragment from the same lecture:

What is the libertarians’ criticism of democracy? That democracy adopts equal inconvenient laws for everyone. There is no such law that is equally suitable for Muscovites, Novosibirsk residents, and residents of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

Mikhail Svetov

Well, if it doesn’t exist, it doesn’t exist. Thank Mikhail for the useful lecture and do as he suggests. If you can manage to impose a new federal treaty on Moscow within the party, it will be the first step toward imposing it on Moscow within the state. If you can manage to limit such a mild and intelligent leader as Mikhail Svetov, it will be the first step toward limiting such a brutal and unpleasant type as Vladimir Putin.

Mikhail Svetov and the new federal treaty

Autoimmune Damage to the State, or How the Power of the State Itself Can Be Used for Its Destruction

Bitarch’s Column

In medicine, there is a class of diseases known as autoimmune. These include muscle weakness (myasthenia gravis), type 1 diabetes, multiple sclerosis, and others. The essence of these diseases is that antibodies (killer cells) begin to recognize the host’s tissues (human, animal) as harmful and attack them. Most often, this happens after infection by a specific virus that, in terms of recognition by the host’s immunity, resembles healthy tissues (to put it simply). The antibodies simply fail to see the difference between whom to attack—the virus or healthy tissues—and kill everyone.

Autoimmune damage can be observed in any complex system, not just biological ones. For example, many users of computer antivirus software are familiar with the problem of the deletion of normal files that the antivirus mistook for malicious. Those who use browser extensions for ad blocking (AdBlock) know well that they often disrupt the normal operation of a website. This happens precisely because the blocker takes normal website code for an advertisement—and removes it.

The state also represents a complex system and can easily be subjected to an autoimmune attack. An interesting situation arises here—the more security forces and various services a state has, the more effective the autoimmune strike will be. This strategy bypasses the well-known assertion that “the state is stronger, it can easily crush you, therefore a forceful struggle is useless,” since for the forceful struggle against the state, it uses the state’s own force.

How can an autoimmune strike against the state be implemented? There are many ways; the main thing is to understand the general meaning. Here are some examples:

1) Realistic silicone masks of the faces of officials, security personnel, and other enemies of freedom (hereinafter – etatists). In them, we do whatever it takes to set up the etatists to be targeted by other security forces.

2) Imitation of the fingerprints of well-known etatists. Throw a bottle through an FSB window, and they “bottle” whoever we want.

3) Planting Trojan horses on the computers of etatists to proxy traffic. From there, one could, for example, engage in carding, stealing money from state banks and other organizations linked to bandits, and spending it on the promotion of libertarianism. They will “come” specifically for the etatists (or they won’t come, deciding that these etatists have the right to steal money from the state—the main thing here is that another Magnitsky or even Navalny does not suffer from this—note by Ancap-chan).

4) Ordering drugs from the darknet to the addresses of etatists and reporting it to the proper authorities.

5) Not hesitating to send anonymous tips for any reason against etatists: smoking in a prohibited place, parking under a sign, cruel treatment of their own children, walking a dog without a muzzle, meetings with girls under 16, non-compliance with fire safety/labor protection/health and safety regulations/taxes/illegal immigrants, and other violations at enterprises owned by etatists.

6) Registering a SIM card in the name of an etatist and committing several victimless “crimes” using a smartphone that has never been used before.

Ancap-chan’s Comment

The tactic considered above is another tool from the agorist toolbox against the state, alongside the uber-retribution that you perceived so ambiguously, for agorism is not reduced to counter-economics alone. Counter-economics is its most important part, as those claiming a life without a state must be able to demonstrate that they can provide themselves with all the most important benefits of civilization without the state. However, the state must not only be undermined but also tamed, otherwise the home-tormentor will not perish.

Hello, government, we have illegal migrants on our roof!

In your review of Svetlov’s lecture, you sharply condemned the phrase “a child becomes a subject of law when they conclude a non-aggression pact,” calling it monstrous. Can you expand on this thought?

In my view, any person is a subject of law by virtue of their belonging to the human race. At the same time, any person can be an object of law by virtue of the fact that other people, in the course of legal interaction with one another, act upon this person as an object. For example, my father may gift me an apartment or, conversely, bequeath some of his property to third parties, thereby disavowing my right to inherit this property, which I have by default. This is a unilateral action affecting my rights; that is, here I am an object of law.

If a person is incapacitated or for some other reason is unable to carry out subject-based legal activity, other persons may act on their behalf and in their interests. And although their direct expression of will is absent here, from the perspective of the persons with whom transactions are carried out on their behalf, they are already a full subject of law. For instance, a transaction carried out by proxy remains a transaction with the person who issued the proxy, not with the person to whom it was issued. But they remain a subject of law and can at any moment delegate the right to perform transactions in their name to someone else—or begin to perform them independently. To do this, they do not need to sign any non-aggression pacts—neither literally nor figuratively. They simply, so to speak, consume the right that they already have and have had all along.

Refusing a subject the exercise of their rights is a usurpation of law. A child has the right to leave home at any moment and live independently, and if they own a share in that house, to demand the division of property. This will likely be an imprudent decision on their part, and if this imprudence is obvious to everyone around, they will try to convince the child that it would be better to change their mind. Or simply not help them (but not hinder them) in the legal formalization of the actions to divide the property. But justifying the usurpation of someone else’s right by the fact that some non-aggression pact has not been signed is a kind of mental gymnastics that is beyond me.

Uber-retribution and uber-justice

It seems that no other post of mine has sparked as much discussion as the description of the uber-retribution concept. Perhaps it is worth breaking down the main arguments of the opponents.

Scientific novelty

It was rightly pointed out to me that similar functionality has already been implemented in Hydra and other similar darknet marketplaces, so I find it necessary to emphasize the differences from existing services, since they proved to be insufficiently articulated in the original post.

  1. Ads placed on the service must be open. Why?
    1.1. While classic hitman exchanges aim not to scare off the target, here the target’s knowledge of the pending retribution is part of the retribution.
    1.2. The more widely a specific injustice becomes known, the greater the likelihood that third parties will add their own money to the prize pool (both those affected by similar actions of the target of retribution, and simply those who are not indifferent).
    1.3. The target of retribution is given a chance to settle things amicably.
  2. The already mentioned possibility of crowdfunding the prize pool (although a similar mechanism is used by prediction markets, where a large number of people can place a bet on a death).
  3. Third parties can apply their own expertise to the provided proofs—both proofs of injustice and proofs of the completed retribution.

And beyond this, such an aggregator of retribution requests must possess far more powerful usability than just a message board; otherwise, it will fail to gain sufficient popularity, without which there will be no network effect, and without a network effect, most requests in the service will remain a voice crying in the wilderness.

Ethics

It was pointed out that this tool could easily be used to carry out attacks on the innocent: all sorts of freaks, gays, drug addicts, lovers of voluntary sex with minors, and so on.

To this, I can say that in a society where such attacks find mass demand, people do not need a special application; they will happily stone an undesirable person anyway, or demand that their relatives commit an honor killing. In our case, the possibility of public retribution is organized against those who would be difficult to deal with without hiding: primarily, people like the hypothetical Petrunko.

At the same time, one must realize that the executor of the retribution risks getting hit back from the target, from state representatives, or even from random passers-by—if they act carelessly and get caught. At the moment the retribution is carried out, they look like the criminal to all witnesses. But, by the way, such an executor could perfectly well be a state representative, for whom it would be easier to evade responsibility.

Retribution is not justice

Retribution, normally, is only part of the justice process, while the proposed mechanism somehow ignores the judicial process: the sentence is passed by the initiator of the request themselves.

It seems to me that designing a universal instrument of justice, where investigation, trial, and punishment are all provided within a single service, is excessively cumbersome. I also want to point out to the public that there are currently no major problems with investigating injustice: this is handled by projects like Scanner and Russian Elephant, FBK, Bellingcat, and a huge number of other independent agencies. Problems arise at the stage of issuing and implementing sentences, because this area, unlike investigation, is monopolized by the state.

So I focused on expanding exactly this bottleneck. Let diligent journalists provide the facts and the evidence base—and through Wanted, a third party, having no direct connection to the hypothetical FBK, organizes the retribution. Meanwhile, by the way, several competing requests can be created for the same case. For example, one person might order a splash of green ink in the eye of the aforementioned Petrunko, while another orders acid. Which contract will more people support? Which contract will be executed? The market will decide that. Let’s trust the market.

Or perhaps no one will order this patriot-statist at all: what a brave young fellow he is