The book on libertarian theory of war is steadily moving toward completion. Having previously analyzed wars initiated by an individual, I am now describing situations in which a group starts the war. So far, the sections on a group attacking an individual and group on group have been completed. The “group versus state” scenario is on the way.
The process of writing the book is bringing me unexpected discoveries. For instance, at the very beginning, I had to deviate from strict methodological individualism and introduce collective subjects. Now, I have come to the point where I am encroaching on the holy of holies, asserting that when analyzing group-on-group war, there is no practical sense in determining who is the aggressor and who is the victim. In short, read it, and I will be glad to receive your comments.
I’ve been advised that I haven’t talked about Montelibero at all lately. That’s not entirely true; it’s just that I usually write about specific problems, whereas there truly hasn’t been a general overview of the state of affairs in the project for a very long time. I’m correcting that now.
Overview
For a long time, the project’s calling card was MTL-City. This is also what undermined it. One day, a local journalist appeared who, based on separate and loosely connected facts, concluded that Montelibero was a Putin project created for another attempt at a coup in Montenegro, similar to the one that took place in 2016. As a result, the state, having received such a public denunciation, became interested specifically in the activities of DOO Montelibero, the legal entity through which the land in City was purchased. A criminal case regarding illegal construction was opened, and as a result, the construction of all permanent structures was frozen pending the investigation. Well, now only modular houses are being assembled there, which, being temporary structures, require no installation permits. However, the unfinished construction doesn’t look very pretty, not to mention the money buried in vain.
Nevertheless, people live in City, public breakfasts are held on Fridays—for those wishing to meet the project participants—plus there are occasional creative evenings and other cultural events. However, to people who have just arrived in Montenegro and want to “settle in this commune of yours,” I advise against jumping on this idea without thorough prior acquaintance. In City, the ratio of costs to comfort is not very optimal, and there is practically no choice of housing. This situation will improve as new modular houses for rent are put into operation—but not very quickly.
The main Montelibero community, as before, resides in the city of Bar, spreading fairly evenly across the city, some in rented housing and some in purchased. They have the opportunity to gather at the First Montelibero Club (it was evicted from its premises in the spring, but recently opened in a new location), at Quiet Backwater (it was evicted from its premises in the summer, but reopened in a new location almost immediately), as well as in several non-Montelibero Russian bars, where the crossing of Monteliberians with the rest of the Russian diaspora occurs most naturally. In Budva, the Montelibero movement has practically gone quiet; in other cities, it never started.
Tokenomics is used by the local Montelibero community no longer with the enthusiasm of neophytes, but simply as a clear and long-familiar tool. EURMTL and EUROMUT are used for cashless payments. USDM mainly serves as an auxiliary token for currency exchanges (I, for example, withdraw dollars from a crypto exchange into USDM, and then exchange them for “mulki”). Some businesses fix debt obligations in their own tokens. The Blockchain Social Network still hasn’t acquired a convenient viewer and editor, so it remains deeply marginal. The Stellar wallets being developed by community members, Montelibero Wallet and especially Sunce, are gradually becoming more convenient. The MTL Fund has sharply reduced its public activity and is now effectively interesting only to its shareholders, and even then, not to all of them. The Montelibero Association has de facto become the mouthpiece for the project as a whole, so let’s discuss it in a bit more detail.
Of course, the fears of paranoiacs that the Association was created only to leak lists of members of an organized criminal community to “comrade major” have about as much relation to reality as that Montenegrin journalist’s ideas that Montelibero was dreamed up by Putin to destroy Montenegrin democracy. Everything is much more boring. The project activists simply rearranged the furniture in the room. I hope they’ve become more comfortable. The Association implies liquid democracy, a secretariat, and a small budget for its routine expenses. This internal kitchen has little effect on the lives of others (which is good), but draws some resources away (which is bad).
Fortunately, the Association activists also handle periodic contacts with the outside world, which is potentially the most useful part for fitting Montelibero into the global libertarian movement. Alas, I rarely have the strength to keep track of this. For instance, in recent months, there have been public calls and private negotiations with representatives of the Cosmos blockchain ecosystem (they have their own rich developments in DAO), with the MetaState project (creating a system of non-governmental electronic passports), with a project to lobby for a simplified visa and entrepreneurship regime for relocants to Albania, with volunteer fire organizations in Montenegro, the Free Private Cities fund, and certainly with others—it’s impossible to mention everyone.
The Association also includes corporate participants, among whom are the aforementioned MTL Fund and the First Club. Besides them, Green Zyland is more or less noticeable, a producer of modular houses for rent (they had a business back in the RF, and now they are expanding into three more countries). In November, they plan to hold a festival in Georgia; a few people from the Montenegrin Monteliberians will go, but I cannot afford it financially. Another active participant is the MTL Alert group. They are preparing for a zombie apocalypse; it’s a cool hobby, but for some reason, I find it hard to take seriously.
The Association is divided into factions, but only the panarchist faction is more or less publicly active. Two of its members, Stas and Ved, both run very sensible thematic channels.
The previously announced redirection of Montelibero’s efforts toward Argentina has not yet led to the formation of a Russian-speaking libertarian community there that is in contact with the rest of the project. The only news from those parts is that a delegate from Montelibero spoke at some Argentine libertarian conference and delivered a letter to Milei. What was in that letter and what effect it had, history remains silent about.
Conclusions and forecasts
At the start, Montelibero participants acted monstrously irrationally and made a ton of mistakes. How could this have been avoided? For example, by delaying the start of construction and other loud activity to instead more thoroughly scout the situation, and only then decide what to do and how. Was it realistic to act according to a more rational scenario? No. Montelibero is a movement, not an organization. It was precisely the drive of the pioneers and their enthusiastic mistake-making that attracted many new participants to the project. Without all this, a fairly strong libertarian community in Montenegro might simply not have formed, just as it didn’t form in Serbia, Georgia, Thailand, or even Argentina. So once again I state: centralized planning sucks, the market decides.
Nevertheless, many initiatives within Montelibero have successfully fizzled out, and many previously active project participants have, at best, tempered or completely lost interest in it, and at worst, moved into open opposition, considering the project to be meaningless “info-gypsyism.”
The economic part of the project must be mentioned separately. Here, the miscalculation proved fatal. It’s one thing when nine out of ten startups fail and one takes off. This happens thanks to fierce competition that selects the truly best. It’s a completely different matter when nine out of ten startups fail, and the tenth balances on the brink of breaking even. This happens thanks to a disgusting investment climate, under which one simply should not invest serious market capital here, just as one should not invest it in some Donbas. Even if something does take off, it will be not thanks to high utility for clients, but thanks to connections with the authorities, for example. And for libertarians, making money this way is usually considered “beneath them.”
Therefore, the following forecast can be made about Montelibero now. This project will not make Europe, or even just Montenegro, free. But it allowed those who believed in it to create a free society around themselves, and also became a platform for testing interesting ideas and technologies suitable for application in other places.
Читатели знают, что в последнее время я больше обычного интересуюсь таким феноменом, как война. Это неизбежно сместило и акцент моего восприятия недавнего громкого убийства в США. Что в нём странного?
То, что в США считают политических оппонентов легитимными военными целями? Это рутина. В США богатейшая традиция политических убийств, где целями выступали кто угодно, от низовых активистов до президентов. То, что мишенью стал человек, принципиально стремящийся к деэскалации конфликта? Это как раз и делает его приоритетной целью, поскольку ястребы обеих сторон конфликта выигрывают от его смерти, даже если и не причастны к ней. То, что он был убит единственным выстрелом в горло с двухсот метров? Ну, это средняя дистанция, и он представлял собой удобную неподвижную мишень. Нет. Самое удивительное во всей этой истории в том, что стрелок выбрал себе позицию на открытой крыше.
Понимаете, на дворе стоит 2025 год. Человек планирует совершить убийство во время охраняемого собрания и обустраивает свою стрелковую позицию так, что она прекрасно видна сверху. Это сопоставимо по тупости с атакой плотными колоннами пехоты в начале 20 века. Тогда колонна была бы уничтожена пулемётным огнём. Сейчас стрелка уничтожит или хотя бы выявит дрон. Рассчитывать, что у охраны многотысячного собрания не будет дрона – это примерно как рассчитывать, что у защитников полевых укреплений в начале 20 века не будет пулемёта.
В качестве средства наблюдения дрон может позволить себе примерно каждый. А в США всего год назад было покушение на кандидата в президенты, где стрелок точно так же занимал позицию на открытой крыше. И после этого службы охраны массовых собраний не внесли в свои протоколы безопасности хотя бы обязательный мониторинг с воздуха? Непугаными идиотами их назвать уже нельзя, потому что пуганые. Но вот необучаемыми – это будет, пожалуй, более чем уместно.
Думаю, тут есть какая-то симметрия мышления. Нам угрожает потенциальное нападение со стволом, значит, расставляем охрану со стволами. В таком случае дроны охраны мы увидим в воздухе на подобных ивентах не ранее, чем состоится первое покушение с дрона.
In chapter 3.1 of the book on libertarian theory of war, the sections “Individual vs. Group” and “Individual vs. State” have been completed. The next two chapters will follow a similar pattern, so I hope they will go more smoothly.
I’ve somehow lost interest in the idea of illustrating the book in the style of red-figure Greek vases; I’ll put that plan on hold for now and see how it goes.
In 2023, Javier Milei became the new hope of libertarianism, as he managed to be elected president of a very left-wing and very troubled state using open anarcho-capitalist rhetoric. Since then, he has been under the close scrutiny of libertarians, and gradually they are beginning to turn away from him. This is inevitable. The problems of minarchism as an approach to the political imposition of libertarianism by the state were outlined by me in the corresponding chapter of my book on ancap. But here we have a slightly different situation: libertarians are turning away from Milei not because he is too radical, but because he is not radical enough. Every compromise generates disappointment among supporters, and some of them have begun to speculate that he was a plant from the start, and that Milei was put in place specifically to discredit libertarianism.
Among the latter is such a master of the Austrian School of Economics as Saifedean Ammous, author of the books “The Bitcoin Standard“, “The Fiat Standard“, and another that has not been translated into Russian. His recent tweet denouncing Milei’s policies was translated by the SVTV publication and continues to be discussed in the Russian-speaking libertarian community. Earlier, another prominent libertarian theorist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, turned away from Milei. I suppose I will have to figure out what is actually happening in Argentina, and whether I should already start justifying to socialists that this was the “wrong” kind of libertarianism, as Ammous and Svetov have begun to do.
I have little insider information about Argentina: some say it has become a bit safer, others complain that it has become noticeably more expensive, others are sad that it has become harder for immigrants to naturalize. Therefore, an interrogation of ChatGPT was conducted. Those interested can look at the transcript of this conversation, but I will move straight to my reflections.
What turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for me?
The budget surplus so widely advertised in laudatory articles is not exactly a surplus. The state collects more in taxes than it spends on officials, public employees, the army, infrastructure, and so on, but taking into account the necessary payments on old loans, it is still in the red, and therefore borrows more.
Milei is indeed increasing spending on the army. Yes, from the position of minarchists, national defense is a strictly state prerogative; however, in conditions where the country’s neighbors pose no threat, this increase in spending is completely untimely. I can only assume that this is driven by a desire to arrange a second Falklands conflict, should it become necessary to urgently raise his popularity before running for a second term.
Inflation is indeed accelerating again.
Migration policy is indeed tightening, and in many ways, this is economically senseless.
The key attack by Hoppe and Ammous on Milei—that he did not close the central bank—is akin to reproaching him for not bringing down the moon from the sky. Milei himself did not have such powers. The parliament had the power, but it did not pass the bill. What should global libertarian authorities do in this case? Certainly not accuse him of never intending to close anything. Moreover, although he failed to stop the printing of pesos, he at least permitted, by decree, the use of any currencies and goods in private contracts. So Ammous can be at ease: Argentines are free to switch to the Bitcoin standard in private settlements, and only buy government wrappers for settlements with the state.
Overall, in my view, Milei is very effectively using the opportunity granted to him to make Argentina freer in some respects; however, he should also ensure that in the future, these changes are difficult to roll back by any given opponent who might occupy the presidential chair. Purely technically, by expanding the powers of the executive branch, Milei is actually, conversely, making it easier to repeal most of his reforms through a simple series of decrees. It is already clear that he will not obtain a majority in the next parliamentary elections, which means it is important for him to devote maximum attention to PR. The obtained freedoms must look so necessary and natural to society that their removal should seem unthinkable. In principle, something like this was achieved by Saakashvili. The Georgian Dream tightened the screws in politics and put Saakashvili’s supporters in prisons, yet it fears touching economic freedoms and has even cautiously continued liberalization in some areas.
By a strange coincidence, both Hoppe and Ammous are unanimous in their criticism of the Israeli state’s actions against Palestinians, while Milei emphatically sides with Israel. I maintain a strong suspicion that this factor is precisely what drives their desire to criticize Milei; once bias exists, arguments can always be found.
Both critics claim that Palestinians have the right to wage war against Israel because the property rights of Palestinians to their land have been violated. However, Palestinian Arabs, in general, have never had property rights to this land that were particularly legitimate for libertarians. Their ancestors conquered Palestine, including from the Jews. Then they were conquered by the Turks. Then the Turks lost the First World War, and their inheritance was distributed by the British.
A specific Palestinian can always defend his property right to a specific plot of land that belonged to his grandfather and was seized by the state of Israel. If he agrees to live peacefully on this land of his, then what is the problem? However, this Palestinian denies an analogous right to Jews, even if their grandfathers acquired their specific plots of land through voluntary market transactions. Consequently, according to the principle of estoppel, he cannot insist on the return of his own land, for he recognizes the right of one people to forcibly expel another people from their land.
Israeli Jews and friendly Israeli Arabs have, in my eyes, the full right to evict unfriendly Palestinian Arabs to any state that agrees to accept them. Of course, for this purpose, it is desirable to distribute Palestinian Arabs in small portions, settle them dispersedly, and under no circumstances allow them to form ghettos—that is, to ensure their full right to work and do business, but provide no social welfare except for a small sum of relocation assistance. This is, undoubtedly, ethnic cleansing (de facto ideological, because belonging to the Arabs does not in itself make a person an enemy of the Jews). And this is, undoubtedly, preferable to genocide. But if the world community is against ethnic cleansing, what can be done—there will be genocide.
Why does Milei support Israel? I hope there is more pragmatism in this (potential economic ties with Israel and the USA, support of the Jewish diaspora in Argentina, distancing from the rhetoric of the previous Argentine government) than emotion; however, I cannot rule out that this support is his mistake, since he received a mandate primarily to save his own country, not to help a foreign state. I hope that supporters of Hoppe and Ammous will restrain them before their blind hatred for Milei begins to bring tangible harm to Argentine liberal reforms, and that Milei himself will moderate the degree of his public support for Israel when he feels that it puts his policy at risk.
Overall, the Argentine reforms clearly show that a libertarian society cannot be built through politics alone. Milei is doing his part, but he cannot do it all. Libertarians should not forget their part. And this is not so much about constructive criticism of the locomotive of reform. It is far more important to cite his real achievements at every convenient opportunity on every public platform, to defend the people’s right to freedom, carajo!—and to live in accordance with one’s own conception of that right.
Thank you all for your attention; the topic turned out to be complex. The italics are the part of the article that could probably have been done without, but somehow it didn’t work out that way. Let it remain for the sake of generating flame wars.
Mishsha Oreshnikov, whom I happenedto write about in connection with his experiments in anarchic law enforcement against government officials, asked me to comment on an article from a tiny channel that he runs among many others to create the appearance of mass support for ethnic separatism in Russia.
The article, however, has nothing to do with ethnic separatism, but is instead devoted to “traditional values.” In fact, it is part of the political program of the Bulgar Confederation.
The text, written in a simplistic style, lets the reader know that if anyone needs spiritual anchors and good demographics, they should look to the rugged rural libertarians, and that we Bulgars have no need for these megapolises, where breeding grounds for cultural Marxism naturally form.
Don’t think the worst; the author does not advocate for any forced eviction from cities—merely for a ban on the redistribution of taxes between locations. Let the size of a settlement be determined by the value it generates, not by how much value it is capable of looting. He discusses this in other chapters of the program.
In short, I invite those interested to get acquainted with the rugged Bulgar libertarian program. There were two libertarian parties in Russia, and now, it turns out, a third, local one has emerged. In any case, its formal status is exactly the same as that of the first two: as far as the state is concerned, none of them exist.
A post titled “On the Necessity of Libertarian Metaphysics” was recently published on the “Classical Liberal” channel, which caught my attention. The author accuses modern libertarians of drifting away from the clean and clear concept of God-given natural rights and instead engaging in some kind of atheistic nominalist nonsense. He argues that because their ideology stands on a foundation as shaky as nominalism (that is, the denial of the real existence of ideas and the assertion instead that the world consists of unique objects, and any generalizations are merely terms), libertarians are unable to prove anything to anyone.
Of course, the idea of God-given natural rights is completely shattered by a simple objection: no, Odin gave me natural rights because I honor him, and he also gave me the right to rob you and take you into slavery; he gave you no rights because you don’t even know how to hold a sword.
Nominalism lies at the very heart of the scientific method. By observing countless unique objects and phenomena (more precisely, simply receiving signals from the sense organs), a person notices patterns, proposes a hypothesis about the nature of the observed regularity, tests this hypothesis, and integrates it into a theory. Theories exist within a scientific paradigm, but the process of observing the world does not cease, which means new hypotheses, theories, and paradigms will emerge that describe and explain what is observed more accurately.
Libertarianism as an ideology has existed for as long as there has been the power of man over man and, accordingly, the desire to avoid power over oneself. The concepts used to describe this ideology differ across different times and societies. One can only conditionally trace that, for instance, the concept of self-ownership appeared in the 18th century, and the beloved NAP appeared in the 20th; perhaps in another two centuries, some other fashionable principle will be on the lips of the libertarians of that era.
Building a system of logically correct conclusions from non-contradictory postulates is not such a difficult task. Rebuilding the system in accordance with the redefinition of one of the concepts used is also not a problem. The problem is how to make this system generally accepted, or at least dominant, or at least authoritative, or at least known. An old theory has many advantages over a new one: it also explains the world, it also predicts facts, and additionally, it already belongs to the dominant paradigm. The new one still has to prove that its descriptive and predictive power is higher and that it interfaces better with other theories. How does it do this? Usually quite simply: it just survives until the carriers of the old paradigm physically die out (hello, Odin).
Therefore, libertarians do not need to prove anything to their opponents. Their task is to preserve and gradually expand the core of supporters, accumulate experience in applying their theories, and gather useful technologies that work within libertarianism but malfunction within other ideologies… And, of course, not to physically die out before their opponents.
As for how the concept of “human” will be defined by the time libertarianism becomes dominant, that is purely a matter of convenience of application. For some, “a featherless biped” will suffice, for others “a representative of the species Homo sapiens,” and for some, the concept of “human” may already seem redundantly narrow, so they will operate with some “legal agent.” And so be it.
I have started writing the third part of the book on libertarian war theory. So far, not even a full chapter is ready, but only one section, and the style has mutated somewhat compared to the first two parts, so I would like your opinion on how well it harmonizes with the content. Plus, I finally gave in to the current trend and am now illustrating texts with neural networks. This book will be filled with illustrations in the style of red-figure Hellenic vase painting. Gradually, I will add images to other chapters as well.
I listened to the debates on the subject that took place on August 10th on the “Gorbushka Istorii” channel. Boris Strannik, who defended his invented concept of the right of way, and Alexei Sherstnev, who opposed him, were the discussants.
I will admit my bias right away. I like Boris. When he was in Montenegro for a few months, we met; he stayed at my house for about a week. It didn’t go beyond kissing, but nevertheless, he left me with the most positive impression. I dislike Alexei. He used to be rude and dogmatic, so I removed him from my echo chamber quite quickly, especially since there was no ideological novelty in his views, meaning there were no reasons to tolerate his tone. Therefore, I will not comment on who was more convincing in the debates.
Next, I want to note one point in the debates, simply because I was mentioned there. One of the listeners asked the opponents what “right” (pravo) is. Alexei formulated a rather confused idea of right as a spontaneous order of human interaction, clearly drawn from Zolotovrev (I prefer to operate with a narrower concept of right as a spontaneous order of conflict resolution, to separate it from morality as a spontaneous order of entering into conflicts). Boris, however, began to speak not about “right” (law/pravo) but about “rights” (prava), and quoted my definition: “rights are claims that have been accepted.” Only he said it in the singular. And, naturally, when the moderator summarized his impressions of the debates, he said he was appalled that Boris gave some irrelevant slogan instead of a definition. Here we have a banal misunderstanding related to the features of the Russian language, in which “right” and “law” are expressed by the same word “pravo.” The debaters understood the question differently, and the moderator didn’t even grasp what was happening. Well, it happens.
I will not say more about the debates; you can listen to them yourselves and form your own impression. I would rather reflect on the concept of the right of way itself.
After Montenegro, Boris visited several other countries and is currently living in South America. In Uruguay, he saw countless latifundia enclosed with barbed wire and realized that, although the country is not small, one can effectively only walk along the roads—no cozy paths through fields and woodlands. He began to reflect on this within the framework of libertarian ideology and reached certain conclusions.
Originally, the entire surface of the earth is unowned. When someone, according to the homesteading principle, appropriates a plot of land for use, they acquire the right to the resource they use for their economic activity—but not an absolute property right to everything located in the area of space limited by rays from the center of the Earth passing through the boundaries of the land plot and extending to infinity (this is the purely geometric approach to drawing land property boundaries that Alexei Sherstnev defended in the debates). But by acquiring the right to dig in the soil, he does not automatically acquire the right to forbid anyone from moving across that land. At most, he can insist on a certain penalty for the destruction of crops and similar specific measurable costs. The right to move in space belongs to every person according to the same homesteading principle—simply by the fact that they love it, know how to do it, practice it, and cannot exercise their self-ownership without it. A ban on movement is traditionally called deprivation of liberty, so why on earth does some latifundist deprive people of liberty? These are roughly the arguments in favor of the existence of an unconditional right of way.
What proposals does Boris make next, having presented arguments for the existence of such a right? In essence, it is about changing the defaults. If existing legal systems that provide for private land ownership assume by default the owner’s right to impose a ban on movement across their property, and then specify certain exceptions where the owner must still provide the right of way—then now a reverse scheme is proposed. By default, the landowner does not have the right to prohibit passage through their territory, however, they can present various grounds why in a specific case a ban is nonetheless appropriate.
Boris is quite radical, stating approximately the following: yes, a landowner can physically enclose themselves with a wall, but they cannot thereby steal from other people the right to pass through the wall-enclosed area: they can climb over the wall and continue moving. If the space is covered by a roof, then that’s great—the traveler will simply move across the roof; thus, their right of way is not infringed. And whatever is under the roof is already fully private. Generally speaking, exactly such a legal system existed long ago in the Neolithic settlement at the site of present-day Çatalhöyük: houses are built tightly together, and the roofs of the houses are public space. Thus, Boris’s legal intuition finds direct reflection in history.
Of course, supporters of full private property have their own arguments: the right of way is too easy to abuse. Once you allow the possibility of moving across someone else’s territory without permission and without compensation, tomorrow you could organize a flash mob on the lawn in front of an unpleasant person’s house, trample the flowerbeds, and so on, not to mention the constant stomping on the roof. But since rights (claims that have been accepted) are merely a generalization of principles that allow for the implementation of right (a spontaneous order of conflict resolution), constructive compromises are entirely possible between those who defend the right to prohibit trespassing and those who defend the right of way. They boil down to the landowner agreeing to a limited right of way if those passing through minimize the inconveniences caused to the landowner, and perhaps even compensate for them. The landowner, in turn, takes measures to simplify passage across their land: by laying paths. Why? First, a path organizes the flow of people, reducing the load on the rest of the territory. Second, the landowner’s appeal to the fact of providing a path is a strong moral demand in favor of limiting passage to the path specifically, and in some cases—in favor of charging a fee for passage (more often for driving).
However, for such practices to spread more widely, it is indeed necessary to change the presumption from “forbidden by default” to “allowed by default,” and here Boris is likely right. I will add that changing presumptions in this direction also prepares the ground for a future ancap, where all land becomes private. Just as the abolition of state social welfare forces people to be more responsible regarding the prevention of life’s difficulties, the abolition of the concept of state-owned public land will force people to approach the issues of freedom of movement more consciously.
Alex Rozov, author of the Meganesian cycle, began in his LiveJournal preliminary inquiries into how he might best write a capitalist transutopia—that is, a realistic positive picture of pure capitalism, the processes that led to it, and the processes that make it sustainable. I have serious doubts that he will succeed, because his understanding of the market does not seem entirely adequate to me. Roughly speaking, he will be inclined to think about the market more according to Marx than according to Mises. The crowd grazing in his comments is more likely to exacerbate his problems, because, as usual, it is full of choice Hobbesians who believe humanity to be thoroughly depraved and in need of a strong regulator, without which people would, of course, devour each other.
Also interesting is a certain passage set forth by one of his commenters, with which the author generally agreed:
“Professional” supporters of capitalism (writing in popular analytical media) gloss over real capitalism.
“Unprofessional” ones (participating in online flame wars) imagine a picture-book capitalism—or rather, not capitalism at all, but some phantom feudalism interspersed with farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers with primitively structured family businesses.
Real capitalism, however (in which the main players are large companies with pyramids of bureaucracy, complex ownership relations, unspoken deals between top managers and majority shareholders, and even more complex relations with financial-banking and state systems) is unacceptable to the “unprofessionals.” Such capitalism seems (suddenly) to them to be a “leftist distortion of capitalism.”
In short, the state is considered by them to be an indispensable, inevitable, and inherent attribute of capitalism, which accordingly makes all ancap ideas, for them, mere picture-book images that cannot have any relation to reality.
Mikhail Svetov once promised to write a book about libertarianism and flaked. I had to take it upon myself and write my own. Vladimir Zolotorev complained about the lack of a libertarian theory of war; I had to start thinking in that direction as well. Now, it seems, I will also have to compose some sort of fictional text about what one of the many possible embodiments of ancap looks like. I am currently in the bargaining stage: well, maybe I should wait a bit, and perhaps Alex will write something passable after all—he is a prolific author, he even wrote about a cesspit cleaner under communism, so why shouldn’t he solve this new problem, and I won’t have to take up something I’m not good at.
But just in case Rozov doesn’t deliver, or the result matches my current low expectations, I am starting to think about how to do something of my own. My strengths are a sense of style, conciseness, and analytical abilities. My weaknesses are difficulty keeping a broad vision in mind and a poor imagination; that is why my creative work consists of short posts on specific topics assigned by others. However, what is required here is a fairly voluminous fictional text.
Most likely, a passable solution would be a cycle of stories. A sort of Montelliberian cycle as a counterpoint to the Meganesian one. I don’t know. I don’t want to think about it yet. It’s scary to dive into these waters.
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