In chapter 3.1 of the book on libertarian theory of war, the sections “Individual vs. Group” and “Individual vs. State” have been completed. The next two chapters will follow a similar pattern, so I hope they will go more smoothly.
I’ve somehow lost interest in the idea of illustrating the book in the style of red-figure Greek vases; I’ll put that plan on hold for now and see how it goes.
In 2023, Javier Milei became the new hope of libertarianism, as he managed to be elected president of a very left-wing and very troubled state using open anarcho-capitalist rhetoric. Since then, he has been under the close scrutiny of libertarians, and gradually they are beginning to turn away from him. This is inevitable. The problems of minarchism as an approach to the political imposition of libertarianism by the state were outlined by me in the corresponding chapter of my book on ancap. But here we have a slightly different situation: libertarians are turning away from Milei not because he is too radical, but because he is not radical enough. Every compromise generates disappointment among supporters, and some of them have begun to speculate that he was a plant from the start, and that Milei was put in place specifically to discredit libertarianism.
Among the latter is such a master of the Austrian School of Economics as Saifedean Ammous, author of the books “The Bitcoin Standard“, “The Fiat Standard“, and another that has not been translated into Russian. His recent tweet denouncing Milei’s policies was translated by the SVTV publication and continues to be discussed in the Russian-speaking libertarian community. Earlier, another prominent libertarian theorist, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, turned away from Milei. I suppose I will have to figure out what is actually happening in Argentina, and whether I should already start justifying to socialists that this was the “wrong” kind of libertarianism, as Ammous and Svetov have begun to do.
I have little insider information about Argentina: some say it has become a bit safer, others complain that it has become noticeably more expensive, others are sad that it has become harder for immigrants to naturalize. Therefore, an interrogation of ChatGPT was conducted. Those interested can look at the transcript of this conversation, but I will move straight to my reflections.
What turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for me?
The key attack by Hoppe and Ammous on Milei—that he did not close the central bank—is akin to reproaching him for not bringing down the moon from the sky. Milei himself did not have such powers. The parliament had the power, but it did not pass the bill. What should global libertarian authorities do in this case? Certainly not accuse him of never intending to close anything. Moreover, although he failed to stop the printing of pesos, he at least permitted, by decree, the use of any currencies and goods in private contracts. So Ammous can be at ease: Argentines are free to switch to the Bitcoin standard in private settlements, and only buy government wrappers for settlements with the state.
Overall, in my view, Milei is very effectively using the opportunity granted to him to make Argentina freer in some respects; however, he should also ensure that in the future, these changes are difficult to roll back by any given opponent who might occupy the presidential chair. Purely technically, by expanding the powers of the executive branch, Milei is actually, conversely, making it easier to repeal most of his reforms through a simple series of decrees. It is already clear that he will not obtain a majority in the next parliamentary elections, which means it is important for him to devote maximum attention to PR. The obtained freedoms must look so necessary and natural to society that their removal should seem unthinkable. In principle, something like this was achieved by Saakashvili. The Georgian Dream tightened the screws in politics and put Saakashvili’s supporters in prisons, yet it fears touching economic freedoms and has even cautiously continued liberalization in some areas.
By a strange coincidence, both Hoppe and Ammous are unanimous in their criticism of the Israeli state’s actions against Palestinians, while Milei emphatically sides with Israel. I maintain a strong suspicion that this factor is precisely what drives their desire to criticize Milei; once bias exists, arguments can always be found.
Both critics claim that Palestinians have the right to wage war against Israel because the property rights of Palestinians to their land have been violated. However, Palestinian Arabs, in general, have never had property rights to this land that were particularly legitimate for libertarians. Their ancestors conquered Palestine, including from the Jews. Then they were conquered by the Turks. Then the Turks lost the First World War, and their inheritance was distributed by the British.
A specific Palestinian can always defend his property right to a specific plot of land that belonged to his grandfather and was seized by the state of Israel. If he agrees to live peacefully on this land of his, then what is the problem? However, this Palestinian denies an analogous right to Jews, even if their grandfathers acquired their specific plots of land through voluntary market transactions. Consequently, according to the principle of estoppel, he cannot insist on the return of his own land, for he recognizes the right of one people to forcibly expel another people from their land.
Israeli Jews and friendly Israeli Arabs have, in my eyes, the full right to evict unfriendly Palestinian Arabs to any state that agrees to accept them. Of course, for this purpose, it is desirable to distribute Palestinian Arabs in small portions, settle them dispersedly, and under no circumstances allow them to form ghettos—that is, to ensure their full right to work and do business, but provide no social welfare except for a small sum of relocation assistance. This is, undoubtedly, ethnic cleansing (de facto ideological, because belonging to the Arabs does not in itself make a person an enemy of the Jews). And this is, undoubtedly, preferable to genocide. But if the world community is against ethnic cleansing, what can be done—there will be genocide.
Why does Milei support Israel? I hope there is more pragmatism in this (potential economic ties with Israel and the USA, support of the Jewish diaspora in Argentina, distancing from the rhetoric of the previous Argentine government) than emotion; however, I cannot rule out that this support is his mistake, since he received a mandate primarily to save his own country, not to help a foreign state. I hope that supporters of Hoppe and Ammous will restrain them before their blind hatred for Milei begins to bring tangible harm to Argentine liberal reforms, and that Milei himself will moderate the degree of his public support for Israel when he feels that it puts his policy at risk.
Overall, the Argentine reforms clearly show that a libertarian society cannot be built through politics alone. Milei is doing his part, but he cannot do it all. Libertarians should not forget their part. And this is not so much about constructive criticism of the locomotive of reform. It is far more important to cite his real achievements at every convenient opportunity on every public platform, to defend the people’s right to freedom, carajo!—and to live in accordance with one’s own conception of that right.
Thank you all for your attention; the topic turned out to be complex. The italics are the part of the article that could probably have been done without, but somehow it didn’t work out that way. Let it remain for the sake of generating flame wars.
Mishsha Oreshnikov, whom I happened to write about in connection with his experiments in anarchic law enforcement against government officials, asked me to comment on an article from a tiny channel that he runs among many others to create the appearance of mass support for ethnic separatism in Russia.
The article, however, has nothing to do with ethnic separatism, but is instead devoted to “traditional values.” In fact, it is part of the political program of the Bulgar Confederation.
The text, written in a simplistic style, lets the reader know that if anyone needs spiritual anchors and good demographics, they should look to the rugged rural libertarians, and that we Bulgars have no need for these megapolises, where breeding grounds for cultural Marxism naturally form.
Don’t think the worst; the author does not advocate for any forced eviction from cities—merely for a ban on the redistribution of taxes between locations. Let the size of a settlement be determined by the value it generates, not by how much value it is capable of looting. He discusses this in other chapters of the program.
In short, I invite those interested to get acquainted with the rugged Bulgar libertarian program. There were two libertarian parties in Russia, and now, it turns out, a third, local one has emerged. In any case, its formal status is exactly the same as that of the first two: as far as the state is concerned, none of them exist.
A post titled “On the Necessity of Libertarian Metaphysics” was recently published on the “Classical Liberal” channel, which caught my attention. The author accuses modern libertarians of drifting away from the clean and clear concept of God-given natural rights and instead engaging in some kind of atheistic nominalist nonsense. He argues that because their ideology stands on a foundation as shaky as nominalism (that is, the denial of the real existence of ideas and the assertion instead that the world consists of unique objects, and any generalizations are merely terms), libertarians are unable to prove anything to anyone.
Of course, the idea of God-given natural rights is completely shattered by a simple objection: no, Odin gave me natural rights because I honor him, and he also gave me the right to rob you and take you into slavery; he gave you no rights because you don’t even know how to hold a sword.
Nominalism lies at the very heart of the scientific method. By observing countless unique objects and phenomena (more precisely, simply receiving signals from the sense organs), a person notices patterns, proposes a hypothesis about the nature of the observed regularity, tests this hypothesis, and integrates it into a theory. Theories exist within a scientific paradigm, but the process of observing the world does not cease, which means new hypotheses, theories, and paradigms will emerge that describe and explain what is observed more accurately.
Libertarianism as an ideology has existed for as long as there has been the power of man over man and, accordingly, the desire to avoid power over oneself. The concepts used to describe this ideology differ across different times and societies. One can only conditionally trace that, for instance, the concept of self-ownership appeared in the 18th century, and the beloved NAP appeared in the 20th; perhaps in another two centuries, some other fashionable principle will be on the lips of the libertarians of that era.
Building a system of logically correct conclusions from non-contradictory postulates is not such a difficult task. Rebuilding the system in accordance with the redefinition of one of the concepts used is also not a problem. The problem is how to make this system generally accepted, or at least dominant, or at least authoritative, or at least known. An old theory has many advantages over a new one: it also explains the world, it also predicts facts, and additionally, it already belongs to the dominant paradigm. The new one still has to prove that its descriptive and predictive power is higher and that it interfaces better with other theories. How does it do this? Usually quite simply: it just survives until the carriers of the old paradigm physically die out (hello, Odin).
Therefore, libertarians do not need to prove anything to their opponents. Their task is to preserve and gradually expand the core of supporters, accumulate experience in applying their theories, and gather useful technologies that work within libertarianism but malfunction within other ideologies… And, of course, not to physically die out before their opponents.
As for how the concept of “human” will be defined by the time libertarianism becomes dominant, that is purely a matter of convenience of application. For some, “a featherless biped” will suffice, for others “a representative of the species Homo sapiens,” and for some, the concept of “human” may already seem redundantly narrow, so they will operate with some “legal agent.” And so be it.
I have started writing the third part of the book on libertarian war theory. So far, not even a full chapter is ready, but only one section, and the style has mutated somewhat compared to the first two parts, so I would like your opinion on how well it harmonizes with the content. Plus, I finally gave in to the current trend and am now illustrating texts with neural networks. This book will be filled with illustrations in the style of red-figure Hellenic vase painting. Gradually, I will add images to other chapters as well.
I listened to the debates on the subject that took place on August 10th on the “Gorbushka Istorii” channel. Boris Strannik, who defended his invented concept of the right of way, and Alexei Sherstnev, who opposed him, were the discussants.
I will admit my bias right away. I like Boris. When he was in Montenegro for a few months, we met; he stayed at my house for about a week. It didn’t go beyond kissing, but nevertheless, he left me with the most positive impression. I dislike Alexei. He used to be rude and dogmatic, so I removed him from my echo chamber quite quickly, especially since there was no ideological novelty in his views, meaning there were no reasons to tolerate his tone. Therefore, I will not comment on who was more convincing in the debates.
Next, I want to note one point in the debates, simply because I was mentioned there. One of the listeners asked the opponents what “right” (pravo) is. Alexei formulated a rather confused idea of right as a spontaneous order of human interaction, clearly drawn from Zolotovrev (I prefer to operate with a narrower concept of right as a spontaneous order of conflict resolution, to separate it from morality as a spontaneous order of entering into conflicts). Boris, however, began to speak not about “right” (law/pravo) but about “rights” (prava), and quoted my definition: “rights are claims that have been accepted.” Only he said it in the singular. And, naturally, when the moderator summarized his impressions of the debates, he said he was appalled that Boris gave some irrelevant slogan instead of a definition. Here we have a banal misunderstanding related to the features of the Russian language, in which “right” and “law” are expressed by the same word “pravo.” The debaters understood the question differently, and the moderator didn’t even grasp what was happening. Well, it happens.
I will not say more about the debates; you can listen to them yourselves and form your own impression. I would rather reflect on the concept of the right of way itself.
After Montenegro, Boris visited several other countries and is currently living in South America. In Uruguay, he saw countless latifundia enclosed with barbed wire and realized that, although the country is not small, one can effectively only walk along the roads—no cozy paths through fields and woodlands. He began to reflect on this within the framework of libertarian ideology and reached certain conclusions.
Originally, the entire surface of the earth is unowned. When someone, according to the homesteading principle, appropriates a plot of land for use, they acquire the right to the resource they use for their economic activity—but not an absolute property right to everything located in the area of space limited by rays from the center of the Earth passing through the boundaries of the land plot and extending to infinity (this is the purely geometric approach to drawing land property boundaries that Alexei Sherstnev defended in the debates). But by acquiring the right to dig in the soil, he does not automatically acquire the right to forbid anyone from moving across that land. At most, he can insist on a certain penalty for the destruction of crops and similar specific measurable costs. The right to move in space belongs to every person according to the same homesteading principle—simply by the fact that they love it, know how to do it, practice it, and cannot exercise their self-ownership without it. A ban on movement is traditionally called deprivation of liberty, so why on earth does some latifundist deprive people of liberty? These are roughly the arguments in favor of the existence of an unconditional right of way.
What proposals does Boris make next, having presented arguments for the existence of such a right? In essence, it is about changing the defaults. If existing legal systems that provide for private land ownership assume by default the owner’s right to impose a ban on movement across their property, and then specify certain exceptions where the owner must still provide the right of way—then now a reverse scheme is proposed. By default, the landowner does not have the right to prohibit passage through their territory, however, they can present various grounds why in a specific case a ban is nonetheless appropriate.
Boris is quite radical, stating approximately the following: yes, a landowner can physically enclose themselves with a wall, but they cannot thereby steal from other people the right to pass through the wall-enclosed area: they can climb over the wall and continue moving. If the space is covered by a roof, then that’s great—the traveler will simply move across the roof; thus, their right of way is not infringed. And whatever is under the roof is already fully private. Generally speaking, exactly such a legal system existed long ago in the Neolithic settlement at the site of present-day Çatalhöyük: houses are built tightly together, and the roofs of the houses are public space. Thus, Boris’s legal intuition finds direct reflection in history.
Of course, supporters of full private property have their own arguments: the right of way is too easy to abuse. Once you allow the possibility of moving across someone else’s territory without permission and without compensation, tomorrow you could organize a flash mob on the lawn in front of an unpleasant person’s house, trample the flowerbeds, and so on, not to mention the constant stomping on the roof. But since rights (claims that have been accepted) are merely a generalization of principles that allow for the implementation of right (a spontaneous order of conflict resolution), constructive compromises are entirely possible between those who defend the right to prohibit trespassing and those who defend the right of way. They boil down to the landowner agreeing to a limited right of way if those passing through minimize the inconveniences caused to the landowner, and perhaps even compensate for them. The landowner, in turn, takes measures to simplify passage across their land: by laying paths. Why? First, a path organizes the flow of people, reducing the load on the rest of the territory. Second, the landowner’s appeal to the fact of providing a path is a strong moral demand in favor of limiting passage to the path specifically, and in some cases—in favor of charging a fee for passage (more often for driving).
However, for such practices to spread more widely, it is indeed necessary to change the presumption from “forbidden by default” to “allowed by default,” and here Boris is likely right. I will add that changing presumptions in this direction also prepares the ground for a future ancap, where all land becomes private. Just as the abolition of state social welfare forces people to be more responsible regarding the prevention of life’s difficulties, the abolition of the concept of state-owned public land will force people to approach the issues of freedom of movement more consciously.
Alex Rozov, author of the Meganesian cycle, began in his LiveJournal preliminary inquiries into how he might best write a capitalist transutopia—that is, a realistic positive picture of pure capitalism, the processes that led to it, and the processes that make it sustainable. I have serious doubts that he will succeed, because his understanding of the market does not seem entirely adequate to me. Roughly speaking, he will be inclined to think about the market more according to Marx than according to Mises. The crowd grazing in his comments is more likely to exacerbate his problems, because, as usual, it is full of choice Hobbesians who believe humanity to be thoroughly depraved and in need of a strong regulator, without which people would, of course, devour each other.
Also interesting is a certain passage set forth by one of his commenters, with which the author generally agreed:
“Professional” supporters of capitalism (writing in popular analytical media) gloss over real capitalism.
“Unprofessional” ones (participating in online flame wars) imagine a picture-book capitalism—or rather, not capitalism at all, but some phantom feudalism interspersed with farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers with primitively structured family businesses.
Real capitalism, however (in which the main players are large companies with pyramids of bureaucracy, complex ownership relations, unspoken deals between top managers and majority shareholders, and even more complex relations with financial-banking and state systems) is unacceptable to the “unprofessionals.” Such capitalism seems (suddenly) to them to be a “leftist distortion of capitalism.”
In short, the state is considered by them to be an indispensable, inevitable, and inherent attribute of capitalism, which accordingly makes all ancap ideas, for them, mere picture-book images that cannot have any relation to reality.
Mikhail Svetov once promised to write a book about libertarianism and flaked. I had to take it upon myself and write my own. Vladimir Zolotorev complained about the lack of a libertarian theory of war; I had to start thinking in that direction as well. Now, it seems, I will also have to compose some sort of fictional text about what one of the many possible embodiments of ancap looks like. I am currently in the bargaining stage: well, maybe I should wait a bit, and perhaps Alex will write something passable after all—he is a prolific author, he even wrote about a cesspit cleaner under communism, so why shouldn’t he solve this new problem, and I won’t have to take up something I’m not good at.
But just in case Rozov doesn’t deliver, or the result matches my current low expectations, I am starting to think about how to do something of my own. My strengths are a sense of style, conciseness, and analytical abilities. My weaknesses are difficulty keeping a broad vision in mind and a poor imagination; that is why my creative work consists of short posts on specific topics assigned by others. However, what is required here is a fairly voluminous fictional text.
Most likely, a passable solution would be a cycle of stories. A sort of Montelliberian cycle as a counterpoint to the Meganesian one. I don’t know. I don’t want to think about it yet. It’s scary to dive into these waters.
The final version of the translation of another chapter of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinari is ready, this time concerning healthcare. In principle, the structure of the chapter is already quite familiar: an analysis of the current statist picture, followed by a description of how it would all look in a stateless market society. Unlike the situation with roads and similar infrastructure, here it was necessary to add a touch of socialism in the form of charity, without which purely commercial healthcare could present unsightly images of the poor dying by the fence. However, charity does not need the state, so this does not disrupt the coherence of the constructions.
Nihilist (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.00009₿)
Nihilism is a perfectly logical consequence of Hume’s guillotine. It is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is”; therefore, there is nothing objectively obligatory. There is no objective morality (hello, Dobroum), no natural law (hello, Rothbard), and this whole objectivism of yours is some kind of stupid joke (hello, Ayn Rand).
But a nihilist is not a solipsist. He is aware that there are other individualities in the world besides himself, with their own subjective tastes, values, and needs.
Nihilists are often attributed an intention of opposing the entire world, pitting themselves against it, and even almost waging war upon it. This is understandable, as nihilism was born precisely as a negation of imposed values and duties toward higher powers and society. You think I owe someone something? Push kurats.
Similarly, early libertarians are known not so much for their positive agenda as for their criticism of all sorts of statist filth. Nevertheless, a libertarian is usually not very inclined to physically exterminate all statists; likewise, a nihilist, despite all his aggressive and cynical rhetoric, if left alone from the moralizing that irritates him, will still be forced to contact people, negotiate with them, and even unite based on the coincidence of specific values and interests—though, one might ask, where is the nihilism and where are the values? However, even a subjective will has preferences. And where there are coinciding preferences, the possibility of cooperation emerges. And so, Stirner’s Unique unites in unions of egoists.
Of course, if left to their own devices, nihilists will inevitably change their rhetoric. “No higher values exist, no one owes anyone anything by default.” “Well yes, that’s obvious, but what was your point?” Will nihilists necessarily appeal to the right of the strong? At first, quite likely, they will. Then they will realize that no single natural law exists, and this applies to the right of the strong as well, which means they will have to negotiate with each person individually and state obligations in an explicit form.
In short, any ideology that puts individualism at its core (and nihilism is exactly that) will inevitably arrive at more or less libertarian practices, even if at the start people are full of cynical bravado about the possibility of bending everyone over. Universal bending only works where there is the consent of those being bent. And why would nihilists give such consent?
A quite significant portion of the questions people ask about Ancap boils down to whether one can do this and that, whether it’s permissible to do this and that, how Ancap views this and that. Can you kill pedophiles and murderers? Is slavery and abortion permissible? How does Ancap view intellectual property and global warming?
As you know from memes, Ancaps have a simple, concise, and even fully correct answer to all these questions: the market will resolve it/. In other words, in response to a question about the imaginative subject “Ancap” a specific imaginative subject, “the market,” is pointed out, which will establish the corresponding norms. Of course, this answer is too brief and therefore doesn’t satisfy those asking. Let me elaborate on the topic a bit.
Mostly, people aren’t bothered by what other people do because another person’s behavior fits into another person’s notions of what is proper. And when it stops fitting, that person starts to worry about it, begins to think about how he should relate to it and what can be done with it.
A libertarian can roughly describe his notions of what is proper as “self-ownership is respected, NAP isn’t violated.” This isn’t enough, and notions of what is proper are supplemented by all sorts of “here it’s customary like this.” For example: here right-hand traffic; we let children pass ahead in line; at a restaurant the person who invites pays, and so on. But besides all these ethically neutral customs, there are also those relating to various borderline situations. For example, at what age does sex stop being an adult’s business and become the business of whoever is doing it? Or what kind of natural compensation is permissible to demand from a debtor or from someone who caused damage? Or in what cases does an author have the right to restrict other people from using his work? These things are not derived from basic libertarian principles, as is, for example, right-hand traffic.
In ethically contentious situations, a person tends to offer as a norm the option that’s more advantageous to him personally. If he’s also influential enough – it can be painful to be hit with, it can bring much good, it evokes universal love or simply annoys – then they might agree with his proposed norm; but further down, this decision can easily become a precedent, and now others will cite this version of the norm as local custom. Then, for someone who wants to revise this norm, it will be necessary to be much stronger, more useful, more charming or more annoying, because he’s going against tradition.
Thus, one can speak about the right of the strong: that person who put in efforts to create a precedent, may thereby establish a legal norm. It will be difficult for him to change this norm whenever he wants – in legal tradition this is called the Estoppel principle – if someone previously demonstrated by his actions that he adheres to such-and-such a norm, then he cannot legally insist that it not be applied to him.
In artistic form, the Estoppel principle is well demonstrated in Maxim Shapiro’s famous story “Respect for Cultural Traditions”.
Of course, whoever possesses undeniable superiority in strength, usefulness, charm or sheer annoyingness, or who leads a united group of like-minded people, will be able to promote such a legal norm as “this specific idiot has the right to act in any situation, as he pleases,” creating thereby a state. However, until he creates legal norms for transferring his power, this state will inevitably end with his death, and death is usually quite early. At least this regularity ancient history shows us. But we are considering *ankap* here – that is, the public order in which the probability of success of such idiots is deliberately reduced to a minimum.
So how will they treat heretics, slavery and the rest at *ankap*? You decide. The more effort you put into making your opinion prevail, the more intolerant you are of other opinions – the greater the probability that heretics will be given exactly as many lashes as you outlined to the first one you met. And of course, the greater the probability that in defending your opinion you will suffer unacceptable losses – and wipe out. Nevertheless, if these topics excite you vividly, I recommend boosting strength, usefulness, charm.
And annoyingness.
