I suggest investing in Nostria

In brief

Sondre Bjellos, an activist in two communities, the Norwegian Liberstad and the Montenegrin Montelibero, with extensive experience in building decentralized systems, is launching a startup called Nostria. Until May 31, anyone interested can invest in it at the pre-seed stage on quite favorable terms. For participants of the Montelibero tokenomics, there is an opportunity to form an investor pool to gain greater control over the project.

Now in more detail

Nostr is a decentralized protocol for exchanging “notes and other things” via relays. I have been using it for quite a while now to publish my notes; I see great potential in it and am always glad when someone takes it upon themselves to develop it.

The idea of the Nostr protocol is that relays store their users’ content in JSON format and provide it to other relays upon request. Such content can also be a Bitcoin payment transaction via the Lightning protocol; thus, Bitcoin payments are natively integrated into Nostr, allowing for the decentralized provision of both content monetization and storage monetization (it is precisely in the area of monetization, for example, where the nearest analog to Nostr, the ActivityPub protocol, has its weak point).

The startup Nostria intends to:

  1. Develop its own client for the Nostr protocol
  2. Create a network of several relays in different parts of the world to ensure fast ping and wide bandwidth for its users (performance speed is the bane of decentralized systems)
  3. Promote, at the protocol level, the idea of specialized relays for storing only user metadata, which will offload large relays by distributing users more evenly across relays, and drastically speed up the collection of all messages related to a particular account and their delivery to clients.
  4. Monetize its service through premium services, offering users dedicated relays, a connection to a dedicated Lightning node, a human-readable name tied to a public key, media content storage, and other perks.
  5. Keep all code open on GitHub, as is proper for decentralized systems.

In this video, Sondre talks about his plans:

Those who prefer text over video can check out the pdf.

For now, Nostria’s medium-term goal is to catch up and surpass the struggling Bluesky. In the longer perspective, it should result in a decentralized solution that one wouldn’t be ashamed to migrate to from Telegram, once Durov finally declares that state security is incomparably more important than user convenience and security.

To launch the MVP, a pre-seed investment round is taking place until May 31. Putting it in plain language: Sondre wants to raise 30 thousand dollars by the end of May, and then spend ten thousand a month throughout the summer to bring the project into commercial operation. First month – hardware deployment. Second – software refinement. Third – marketing. In the autumn, when the project is ready to be shown to more serious investors, fundraising for global expansion will continue, and those who invested at the preliminary stage will have a preferential right to reinvest to maintain their share in the project, and their preliminary investments will be credited to the share capital with a coefficient of 1.15.

By default, investments are attracted in Bitcoin using the decentralized crowdfunding service Angor. Sondre has also released a separate video showing how the investing process works.

Important: the project founder can only unlock the collected funds after confirming the completion of the stated development stage. Until that moment, an investor can request their investment back at any time. All these features are implemented through the relatively simple smart contract mechanism that exists in Bitcoin and do not require the interference of a third trusted party.

However, the entry threshold for these investments is currently quite high: the minimum amount to receive any bonuses is 1000 dollars. Therefore, a solution suggests itself: participants of the Montelibero tokenomics can gather a pool of small investments and invest jointly as a large entity. I want to organize such a pool. My benefits: I will receive various non-monetary bonuses such as a premium account subscription. The benefits for co-investors, besides the financial return on investment: through me (or directly, if agreed upon), they will have convenient feedback with the developers, which means influence over the future functionality of both Nostria and, indirectly, the entire Nostr protocol.

Therefore, I have created a pristine Stellar account, issued the NostriaPre token on it, and created an order to sell it for EURMTL. You have until the end of May to buy this token; then I will also buy as much as possible, close the sell order, and transfer all collected EURMTL to Sondre. In the autumn, Sondre will set up an official Stellar account for his startup and create an order to sell official tokens for NostriaPre tokens at a rate of 1.15. When the startup begins to generate income from premium account services, the distributable profit for token holders will be accrued monthly proportional to the number of tokens.

To purchase the NostriaPre token, you must first open a trust line to it. Your Stellar wallet should have this capability. Token name: NostriaPre. Issuer’s public key: GABAZTSE4DOD4JKFPWQYK5QPUSW57QNZBJBREU2K2UFSGWPHBHNYF46A

This is, for example, how the trust line opening dialog looks in the Sunce
wallet.

Soon, the trust line will also be possible to open via a direct link.

I don’t want to overload the post with detailed instructions on using various types of Stellar wallets, as I assume the pool will be joined by those who already participate in the Montelibero tokenomics (an instruction is even posted on my website, but it is very outdated and I haven’t gotten around to updating it). But if you want to jump in from scratch in “Shut up and take my money” mode, please ask questions in the comments or via DM.

The Myth of Eternal War: How Did Hobbes Deceive Us?

Once, the philosopher Thomas Hobbes confidently stated that the natural state of humanity is an endless “war of all against all.” Sounds familiar, right? This concept has become so ingrained that we sometimes forget to check its truthfulness. But in reality, it turns out that people are not as bloodthirsty by nature as we are led to believe.

Take, for example, the well-known story of anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, who claimed that killers among the Yanomami tribe were more successful in reproducing. The idea is clear and frightening: kill more, and you will have three times as many children! It sounds too harsh to be true, and indeed, it later turned out that Chagnon “stretched the truth” a bit—he was comparing elderly killers with young non-killers. And independent research showed that killers in tribal societies do not reproduce faster than others; in fact, to be honest, fewer of their children survive.

And in general, who said that wars are the norm? A famous myth from Steven Pinker goes like this: 15% of the prehistoric population constantly perished in wars until states emerged and brought order. Great advertising for the state, isn’t it? Except that archaeology shows something completely different: violent deaths in pre-cultural societies were no more than 2%. Moreover, the emergence of states did not reduce the level of violence at all. On the contrary, the first large structures often fueled conflicts and increased the percentage of killings to about 5%.

It is worth noting that anthropologists may unconsciously reinforce the notion of the inevitability of war. For example, researchers “record” groups as warlike that actually hardly ever fought, simply because of the presence of weapon images in rock paintings. But these images do not necessarily evidence actual aggression: weapons could have been used for hunting or symbolic ceremonies. As a result, a false impression is created that ancient people were constantly at war.

Data on so-called “simple” hunter-gatherer societies is also quite telling. Despite being depicted in many works as brutal and always ready to fight, in reality, they are the ones characterized by extremely low levels of aggression and violence. Real war is a rarity for them, not the norm. Conversely, societies with a complex social structure and a more developed hierarchy more often become participants in conflicts and wars. Interesting, isn’t it? It turns out that the more complex a society is, the more conflict and aggression it generates.

Furthermore, many proponents of the Hobbesian perspective fully acknowledge this fact, but they try not to emphasize it, seriously studying only cases of “complex” societies, as, for example, Lawrence Keeley did in the work “War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage.” Alternatively, they may simply categorize “complex” societies as “simple,” subsequently labeling the latter as warlike.

In general, peaceful coexistence is the norm for many peoples. Thus, a study of 590 cultures from around the world showed an absence of wars in as many as 64% of them. Of course, they might have defended themselves against attacks, but initiating attacks is something only a minority of cultures engage in.

So why do we continue to believe in the myth of a human nature doomed to eternal war? Perhaps the problem here is habit—this belief was passed from generation to generation without critical reflection. Or perhaps someone intentionally maintains this myth to justify the existence of a strong and powerful state “saving” us from ourselves.

Let’s admit it to ourselves: the idea that people are by nature inclined toward peace and cooperation sounds much more realistic, optimistic, and attractive. Perhaps it is time for us to stop considering peace a utopia and start seeing it as a natural part of human life. After all, as history and research show, peaceful communities are not the exception, but rather the rule. So is it worth continuing to cling to gloomy Hobbesian imagery? Probably not. It is time to stop allowing fears to dictate our view of humanity and start trusting each other a bit more!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Libertarian Theory of War. Chapter 2.5. Summing Up the War.

Writing a new chapter of my book about war happened to coincide by pure chance with another anniversary of the end of the European phase of World War II, as well as with the vibes in the air regarding the conclusion of the current Russian-Ukrainian one. The chapter turned out to be somewhat pensive and lyrical. Also, while creating it, I was occasionally plagued by imposter syndrome: what right do I have to write about such matters without having military experience? May those who do have it forgive me, or better yet—comment on my amateur fantasies from their expert perspective.

This concludes the main, theoretical, second part of the book. The third part is expected to feature the practical applications of the theory.

Biohacking and the freedom to conduct experiments on oneself

Throughout history, people have experimented and performed various procedures on themselves. They tried different foods and medical remedies, underwent diverse rituals, and so on. In some cases, such experimentation even had significant scientific value. For example, one article cites 465 instances where researchers tested disease pathogens, tried new drugs, or performed other procedures on themselves. And although 8 of these cases ended in death, indicating a certain level of risk in such experiments, the vast majority (89%) led to positive results—confirmation of previously proposed hypotheses or the acquisition of valuable data.

Of course, today there is a negative attitude toward such experimentation, and toward independent intervention in the human body and health in general. State regulation has played a huge role in this, imposing strict restrictions on what a person can and cannot do, often insisting and deciding on behalf of ordinary people that this is allegedly safer. The state has done everything to ensure that biomedical experiments and procedures do not take place outside of approved institutions.

However, none of this has prevented the existence of biohacking. First of all, it should be noted that many means for its implementation are very common and not regulated at all, being simply bioactive supplements. No one can forbid you, based on current research or biohacking books, from purchasing certain vitamins or nootropics and taking them in the specified dosages and manner, let alone modifying your lifestyle or diet based on experimental data or even hypothetical assumptions. By the way, a good collection of useful tools and practices can be found in Daria Babkina’s book “Brain Biohacking: How to Manage Neurochemistry, Emotions, and Intelligence,” which was released this year.

But the matter doesn’t end there. Modern technologies make it possible to organize entire genetic laboratories at home, and there are already ready-made solutions for this. For example, for just 3,000 dollars, you can purchase a home laboratory with all the additions for bioengineering from “The Odin” (and educational kits for simple experiments cost only hundreds of dollars). You don’t have to go far for instructions on what exactly to do with such a laboratory—you can simply replicate step-by-step what has been done in various studies. This is exactly what one biohacker did—whose video you can see here—to correct his lactose intolerance; he simply recreated a gene therapy drug from an experiment on mice and tested it on himself. The result was excellent—a single pill allows for the free consumption of dairy products for over a year without experiencing any negative consequences whatsoever.

Considering how deeply modern science is stuck in countless regulations and the need to wait for state approval, sometimes even for decades, biohacking can give a boost to progress in the field of biotechnology, especially if we are talking about solutions that people need here and now to treat their diseases and various conditions that cause discomfort but do not yet have a sufficiently effective solution among those approved and allowed on the market by the state regulator.

Is there a danger in this? Naturally, among those engaged in biohacking, undesirable outcomes will sometimes occur. But people have every right to voluntarily assume such a risk, and an attempt to introduce a total ban on self-experimentation would not be justified, and to a large extent, would not even be feasible. Even now, there are fully approved activities that carry huge risks, such as extreme sports. And if a person can choose to do base jumping, rock climbing, or motocross, then why can’t they choose to control the biochemical processes of their own body, or even edit their genome?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

How ancap courts work in territories occupied by states

The misconception that the state’s power is insurmountable for non-governmental communities in the sphere of court decision enforcement is extremely deeply rooted, despite regular practical refutations.

Nothing and no one can be strong in everything, and the state has plenty of weak points. On one hand, the state is a fairly centralized organization. On the other, it is a completely decentralized mental parasite. The weakness of centralization lies in the long transit of orders through the chain of hierarchy, multiplied by the distortion of the order at each stage. The weakness of decentralization lies in the possibility of a covert independent attack on any node.

The state is a tool of institutionalized violence. However, it is not the only possible one. Any bounty hunter, blood avenger, or duelist is exactly the same tool of institutionalized violence, just from a different lore. But if humanity has learned anything from postmodernism, it is the construction of lores and switching between them.

Now, imagine a clash of two lores: etatism, with its laws written by bureaucrats, adopted by politicians, and enforced by low-paid employees under the command of bureaucrats venturing into politics — and ancap, with its decentralized pluralistic legal system based on the right to restitution and enforced by any interested parties. In a well-functioning etatist system, the second lore resides somewhere in the back of the mind, where adventure novel characters dwell. But what about an etatist system at the stage of collapse?

Let’s leave the theorizing here and turn to a practical example.

There is the state of the RF, which is at war with the state of Ukraine. War is a deeply anti-legal endeavor. To wage it, the state crudely tramples upon the rights of its own subjects that it established itself. Subjects who, in a normal situation, obey simply out of habit (and this is the most energy-efficient way to command), in conditions where extraordinary demands are placed upon them, obey thanks to stronger incentives, for example, serious reward and/or strong fear. Both money and fear lose their value as an incentive with every dose, so to maintain controllability, the doses must be increased. People to whom such powerful incentives for obedience are applied master the skill of serial murder of people unknown to them.

Let’s consider a couple more factors. First, the accounting of weapons in war conditions inevitably becomes extremely negligent, and they flood the black market. Second, the opponent, a citizen of Ukraine, is culturally close, possesses perfect command of the Russian language, and communicates without problems with any subject of the RF. These factors lead to the fact that various military objects or high-ranking officials are constantly exploding on the territory of the RF. The perpetrator could be a Ukrainian saboteur, an ideological Russian dissident, or a simple Russian mercenary for whom this is a less dangerous and more reliable earning than rotting in a dugout waiting for a drone strike.

And it is against this background that ancap gets a serious chance to establish itself in minds not just as a theory detached from reality, but as a fully working practice.

A native of Chuvashia, Mishshi Oreshnikov, moves to Ukraine and arms himself with a lore according to which Chuvashia never voluntarily joined the RF but is an occupied territory; he states that until the state legal institutions of a future free Chuvashia are formed, the use of norms of customary law is quite appropriate — and simply begins to offer court services. Primarily — over those with whom it is most pointless to litigate in state courts, namely, state officials. Middle-management officials find themselves in the highest risk zone here — those who make some responsible decisions, but of whom there are too many for the state to provide each with even a moderately reliable protection.

In an interview with Sota, Mishshi reveals the mechanisms of the court’s operation and his motivations in more detail, while the host demonstrates certain facets of his understanding of the phenomenon.

What other features of the anarcho-capitalist legal mechanism on state-occupied territory can be noted?

  1. There are several courts; entry into the market is formally open, but the mechanisms for admission into the association are informal. At the same time, the exact number of courts in the system is fundamentally unknown, and some of the publicly designated organizations participating in the movement are placeholders, false targets. The possibility of appealing a decision of one court of the association in another court of the association is declared. In fact, in the case of trials of state officials, this is unlikely to become a necessity.
  2. Fundraising for the execution of court decisions is carried out by non-public organizations via cryptocurrencies. Technically, the lion’s share of the budget could consist of funds from the state of Ukraine, but that is completely irrelevant.
  3. The executors of sentences are non-public organizations that formally have no connection to the courts. Technically, the executors could be professional Ukrainian saboteurs, but that is completely irrelevant.
  4. The initiator of the movement is out of reach of direct threats from the army and police of the RF, since the Ukrainian army stands between him and the RF security forces. Thus, he can be destroyed only accidentally during a raid or as a result of sabotage. It is unknown how many people are capable of picking up the banner in the event of his elimination. Technically, this could be handled by some professional Ukrainian officer, but that is completely irrelevant.
  5. Sentences against state officials and, more importantly, the execution of these sentences are primarily advertising. An official commits a crime as part of their job, and therefore is unlikely to seriously consider the possibility of paying compensation to victims from their own personal funds. Therefore, it is convenient to demonstrate on them what happens to those who refuse to pay compensation. After several such demonstrations, the court can be rolled out into production to resolve conflicts between private individuals. There, it is far more likely that the defendant will appear at the court hearing and provide a full defense, and therefore acquittals, court refusals regarding claims, actual compensation payments, and other riches of law enforcement are probable.
  6. However, even if this specific model of courts does not progress beyond ritualized retribution against members of the “State” organized crime group, it is still a significant step in bringing ancap ideas to life.

In several places, I state that for us it is completely irrelevant to what extent we have a confrontation between ancap and the state, and to what extent it is a confrontation between states. Since we are talking about a struggle of ideas regarding the world order, a state imitating ancap mechanisms works for ancap.

Stefan Molynieux, The Practical Anarchy, translation of chapter 21

The newly translated chapter of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinieu is dedicated to the problem of collective folly. If a certain community, from the perspective of an outside observer, decides to go crazy and begin adhering to idiotic rules, who will stop it in an anarchic society?

The author’s argumentation proceeds from two directions.

First, he reasonably asks: why have we decided that this problem must be solved in any way at all? As long as a certain whim is voluntary, people tend to leave those who practice it alone.

Second, what if certain moral attitudes prevent people from leaving alone those who practice a certain voluntary whim? Here, the author shows that a proactive legal system, which interferes in the relations of third parties without a request from them, is simply expensive. And if the funding of this legal system is voluntary, a powerful economic incentive arises to evade this funding. At the start, people may strongly dislike drug addicts and, out of old statist habit, ganging up on them. Later, they will pick all the low-hanging fruit, realize that addicts are no longer lying in every alleyway, and are actually hard to find—and searching costs money—and they will calm down. A certain dynamic compromise will emerge: one set of eccentrics does not offend the eyes with their stoned bodies in public spaces, and another set of eccentrics does not offend the ears with scandals on this topic. And so it goes with any moral foundations.

Here, credit must be given to the author: the social theorist has triumphed over the moral philosopher within him—that is what life-giving economics does!

Essential oils are effective anti-aggressive agents

Substances that have an anti-aggressive effect can be not only synthesized in laboratories but also found in various natural remedies. One category of such remedies is essential oils. Although they have traditionally been widely used to improve a person’s psychological state, the question of their effect on the nervous system is still insufficiently studied, especially when addressing the topic of aggressive behavior. However, existing research conducted on animals and even on humans indicates a great potential for studying this direction.

First, let us look at a study on the effect of a substance called linalool, which is present in a vast number of essential oils (bitter orange, neroli, petitgrain, rose, lavender, citronella, lemon, geranium, and others), on mice. It demonstrated that inhalation of this substance significantly reduces the number and duration of attacks on unfamiliar conspecifics, and at certain concentrations, almost completely eliminates them. At the same time, as shown in other experiments, such an effect cannot be explained by a general decrease in the activity of the mice, as this does not occur during the inhalation of linalool.

Another study was conducted on fighting fish, or Siamese fighting fish, whose males are known for their extremely aggressive behavior toward conspecifics, which is why they must be kept strictly alone. In the experiment, either lavender essential oil or pure linalool was used, which were added in various concentrations to a container of water. The test subject was placed in this container and given two minutes to acclimate, after which a container with another individual was placed next to it to allow visual contact. As a result, while individuals in the control group (without drugs) attempted to actively attack both during and after acclimation, individuals under the influence of both lavender essential oil and pure linalool showed almost no such behavior—their desire to attack disappeared. Moreover, although the aggressiveness of the individuals was restored over time, it did not return to the pre-test level even three months after the trial with the essential oil. Accordingly, we can conclude a limited permanent anti-aggressive effect from lavender oil.

But is all this applicable to humans? There are strong reasons to believe so, as many experiments have been conducted on the anti-aggressive effect of essential oils on people with cognitive impairments. A meta-analysis of 15 studies with 693 participants showed that although further research is needed to determine effective dosages and side effects, overall, the use of essential oils in therapeutic procedures has a significant anti-aggressive effect.

Although the mechanism of such an effect of essential oils is not yet sufficiently studied, it is known that their molecules can enter the hippocampus, the limbic system, and the amygdala of the brain through the nasal cavity and olfactory cells. It is worth noting that linalool and other substances from essential oils work as 5-HT1A receptor agonists (activating them), and such an effect is known for its selective anti-aggressive effect (eliminating attacking aggression without affecting defensive behavior and other activity), which is achieved through the strengthening of the violence inhibition mechanism. In addition, upon entering the blood, for example, through the skin, essential oils can affect various physiological reactions. Finally, by exerting a certain influence on the function of cholinergic synapses, they can prevent neurodegenerative processes.

Voluntarist, Bitarch

What is the guarantee of freedom of speech under libertarianism?

Fyodor Svetlov

In short: the guarantees of freedom of speech under libertarianism are the same as under liberalism.

Now, in more detail.

Originally, the concept of “freedom of speech” is a liberal doctrine implying that citizens deny the state the right to prosecute its citizens for their utterances. Usually, freedom of speech is promoted in conjunction with freedom of religion, the press, and so on, because citizens, understanding that the state will inevitably find loopholes in a general prohibition, separately specify spheres where the state is not just forbidden, but completely prohibited from prosecuting citizens. What guarantees freedom of speech according to liberal doctrines? Of course, the separation of powers. The executive branch encroaches on freedom of speech, the legislative branch describes exactly what limitations the executive has, and the judicial branch interprets what the legislative branch has dreamt up; as a result, the branches of power trip over each other, and if they suddenly start marching in step, citizens have the right to rebellion, interpreted as the right to reconstitute the government if the previous one, through a long series of abuses, has completely discredited itself as a bearer of liberal values.

Libertarianism implies that the only permissible function of government is the protection of private property rights (since not everyone believes that private property rights can also be effectively protected in a decentralized manner without any government at all).

Can a libertarian government prosecute its citizens for their utterances? Yes, easily. For example, a certain citizen slanders another citizen, and the latter suffers losses because of it. There is a loss—there is a reason to sue. The court may award compensation to the victim of slander at the expense of the slanderer, and this, certainly, can be interpreted as a violation of freedom of speech. Another example is fraud. No slander here; on the contrary, the product is praised so much that it makes your mouth water, but the real qualities of the product fall far short of the description. Could a court consider this statement a violation of private property rights if the transaction took place and is subsequently contested? It could.

Finally, there are countless examples where freedom of speech is not entirely correctly understood by people as the right to make any statements without punishment on any private platform, provided that the platform is fundamentally intended for making statements. Can the owner of the platform ban someone who prevents them from developing their business? Of course, it is their private property. Will a libertarian government support such an encroachment on freedom of speech? It is obliged to support it. But what if the platform belongs to a member of the government? Here we have a clear legal conflict.

What follows from all these arguments? Yes, a libertarian government has fewer powers than a liberal one. But it does have the power to encroach on freedom of speech. Could it begin to abuse these powers? It could. What is left for citizens as a last resort? The same sacred right to rebellion.

Don’t forget to water the garden bed with oil.

The tomatoes, grandson, might wither, but the machine gun won’t rust

Garage Revolutionaries: How Free People are Changing Science

Do you know what airplanes, personal computers, Bitcoin, and home-produced insulin have in common? All of these things were once “absolutely impossible” from the perspective of official science. And they all started literally in garages, basements, and on the kitchen tables of enthusiasts who didn’t give a damn about the approval of academics and bureaucrats.

Why is this so important? Because it is in such garages that real breakthroughs are born. Take the Wright brothers: the prestigious New York Times wrote that the first human flight was still a thousand years away. And a couple of months later, two guys who were considered local crazies proved the opposite. And today we have similar stories. For example, insulin—in the US, pharma giants jacked up prices so high that diabetics are literally forced to choose between food and medicine. A few guys and girls from Oakland, fed up with this, decided to start the Open Insulin project to simply make it themselves, without insane markups and bureaucracy. Professors rolled their eyes, saying it was impossible. But these guys have already made serious progress and may soon radically change the entire market. Not because they have permission or government support, but simply because they care.

Or take the diabetics from the OpenAPS movement, who took old insulin pumps, glucose sensors, and wrote code, creating an “artificial pancreas” at home. Regulators warned: “Dangerous, no FDA approval!” And tens of thousands of people replied: “We can’t afford to wait; we want to live normally right now.” Today, even pharmaceutical companies are forced to replicate their ideas to avoid losing the market.

Do you think this is only about medicine? What about Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, who assembled the first Apple in a garage? Big bosses at the time claimed, “Nobody needs personal computers.” Today that sounds like a joke, but their ideas were truly considered foolishness. Or Bitcoin—an invention that no state would have officially approved. The initial reaction of economists? “It’s a bubble, child’s play.” Today, Bitcoin’s capitalization is estimated in the trillions of dollars, and it has become a symbol of freedom from state and banking monopolies.

An even cooler story is Copenhagen Suborbitals—Danish guys who decided to send a person into space simply by raising money through crowdfunding. Although the failed launch of the first rocket due to a breakdown caused mockery, a year later they successfully launched the next one. Without billions in budget, simply because they wanted to prove they could. And how about the story of 14-year-old Taylor Wilson? The kid built a nuclear reactor in his garage. Academics: “That’s impossible!” Reality: he demonstrated a working reactor and met with the President of the United States.

These stories don’t just inspire; they prove that bureaucracy, regulators, and official structures often become barriers rather than helpers. Requiring enthusiasts to publish in official journals is roughly the same as asking a runner in sacks to compete with athletes. Of course, official science and peer review are good, but they should not become the sole measure of truth. Grigori Perelman proved the Poincaré mathematical conjecture without any official publications—and received the equivalent of a Nobel Prize. His work was verified by mathematicians themselves, and that proved sufficient.

We must support garage science, DIY laboratories, and open communities. People should have the opportunity to experiment freely, create, and share discoveries without looking over their shoulders at officials and corporate monopolies. After all, science belongs not to institutions, but to people. Every garage can become a laboratory, every kitchen a workshop for innovation. This very freedom to create is what makes the world better. Let us not be afraid to create what is officially “impossible.” For it is exactly here, at the intersection of freedom and dreams, that the future is born!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A question from Georgy Nemov regarding non-accession to contract jurisdictions

Let’s simulate a situation:

Territorial and extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions are formed, as well as a decentralized cross-arbitration mechanism linking them. Natural law continues to be supported only by religious or ethical organizations, in whose understanding the guarantor of rights is God/karma. Thus, these organizations remain the only ones who guarantee the life and freedom of a person in territories with a population that has not entered into contract law. These people may be marginal, fragmented, poor, or simply very far from the ideas of ancap. And these people flock under the protection of such religious organizations.

1. Do you think such a situation is possible?
2. If so, is this process natural, and is it a legal objectification of the human being?
3. If this happened, how should our union of contractual jurisdictions proceed? Should it be perceived as a threat, and how should it be fought? Or, conversely, supported?

Ancap-chan’s Answer

1. In fact, this describes a fairly ordinary case of tribalism. While some people, in the event of legal conflicts, rely on those organizations that are obliged to provide assistance by contract, others simply rely on the help of coreligionists/like-minded people. There is nothing surprising about this; there are currently many extremely decentralized communities of interest in the world, from hitchhikers and fencers to libertarians and Krishnaites. They already generally provide primary legal assistance to their members, especially locals to newcomers. I don’t see why these mechanisms should suddenly look different in our model world with greater decentralization of law.

2. I realize that you and I interpret the model situation somewhat differently. You likely view “jurisdictions” as organizations to which a person is legally attached, and those who are not attached are as if outside the law. I view jurisdictions more as “areas of norm imposition,” into which a person may fall both according to contracts and outside of them. And since in the model situation states, as organizations of general jurisdiction on their territory, exit the stage, a huge number of situations arise in which the jurisdiction is unknown in advance. If I’m having sex in a car parked opposite a church, whose jurisdiction is it? The parking owner’s? The church’s? The wife of the person I’m having sex with? It all depends on the context. If the car is parked incorrectly, the parking owner deals with us. If the parking owner is a church, its employee may suggest we have sex elsewhere and not distract the parishioners from pious thoughts. If my partner’s wife has an agreement with him that such things are not accepted between them, then demanding information from me about how aware I was of his availability is entirely within her jurisdiction. But some universal jurisdiction, which cares about everything and can dictate its norms in any sphere—that is already the dark etatist past; in our model situation, these dinosaurs died out long ago and ignominiously.

3. Let’s consider the situation where, say, in some locality, some people call their insurance company during a conflict, while others write in a thematic chat “alarm, ours are being beaten!”, and people from the surroundings start gathering, ready to defend the interests of a member of their community. Should such a thing be perceived as a threat? That depends on what interests the community defends in the conflict. If it is determined to protect its own at any cost in any conflict, then it is a clear threat, and a conditional insurance company must be ready for war with this gang in such cases. But if it is determined to extinguish the conflict, then there are no problems; this is one of the most important functions of communities. A person feels comfortable in them, but in order to belong to them, they accept that other members of the community care about their behavior. In this situation, from the insurance company’s point of view, the community acts as an “insurance cooperative” and can be viewed as an equal counterparty.