We live in interesting times

Following protests, the Georgian parliamentary majority withdrew the foreign agents bill that had been passed in its first reading. Is this like a victory? Well, not exactly. Over these few days, many people were beaten, arrested, and their property was damaged. We can talk about a tactical victory after all the detainees are released and all the victims are paid compensation. But generally, of course, it would be great to achieve the dissolution of parliament and new elections—what trust can there be in the creeps who allowed such bullshit to happen?

In Montenegro, the seizure of assets (so-called nationalization) of businessmen who acquired pieces of property under the previous administration is in full swing. Moreover, this is being done by a technical prime minister whose government has already been issued a vote of no confidence. This has already led to one city being almost completely cut off from the rest of the country, and if the government cannot solve the problem before the start of the tourist season, I very much hope that this will finally paralyze the government, the prime minister will be exiled back to Ulcinj, or wherever he crawled out from, and they won’t be able to form a new government at all.

Everything has long been clear in the RF and Belarus: the opposition there is either in prison, has fled abroad, or has kept its mouth shut and is waiting to be imprisoned or drafted into the army, which is nearly the same thing.

It’s the same in Ukraine, except you can’t even leave the country due to martial law—on the other hand, the government has the full support of the international community.

I won’t speak for the USA and the rest of the world, since I’m not particularly interested in the details, but there is also a feeling there that politics is becoming radicalized, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for people to reach compromises within the state as part of the political process.

This can lead to various consequences.

In states with developed federalism, people can cluster by interests, reducing the degree of political confrontation within the federal subjects and increasing it between them. In this case, central decisions will be increasingly sabotaged. This is conditionally the US scenario.

In unitary states or fictitious federations like the RF, regimes will either gravitate toward dictatorship (the Belarusian scenario) or lose the ability to make any decisions at all—since any decision in favor of one side of a political confrontation will lead to massive and increasingly radical protests from the opposing side. This is conditionally the Georgian or Israeli scenario.

As a result of the processes described, we will get the following picture.

In the world, on one hand, there will be an increase in the number of authoritarian dictatorships, as well as democratic political entities with the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority. On the other hand, there will be an increase in the number of anocracies, where state power is paralyzed, and real decisions are made outside the legal political process.

And besides all this splendor, there will be a huge number of expats who have no political rights but live in countries whose politics suit them even slightly more than the countries they migrated from, and who play an important role in the economy of the countries where they live, and therefore their silent demand of “just don’t meddle in our affairs” will also have to be taken into account.

I, of course, urge all my readers to contribute to increasing the number of the latter in every way. Political power is evil. To become an expat—that is, to voluntarily renounce political power over others in favor of self-governance—is the most libertarian path in the current situation.

This is the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Dritan Abazović; he was burned in effigy at the Kotor carnival last Sunday. You should burn your politicians too.

What is often not taken into account in the assessment of the reproductive success of violent individuals

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Violent behavior and psychopathic predispositions were long considered, and through many studies, to be adaptive traits that should provide a reproductive advantage. Of course, more current research refutes this view. Studies of tribal peoples found no real advantage for killers in the number of children over non-killers. Studies of psychopathic personalities, while showing their success in romantic relationships (which is explainable by manipulative behavior and the ability to use the feelings of others for their own benefit), do not always show success in long-term relationships and having children. These conclusions, which at first glance seem counterintuitive to many, are actually very logical if we look at what violent individuals are like and how this affects success in continuing the lineage.

It is worth asking one simple question: why would a violent individual need children at all? The answer to this question is quite obvious in the case of normal people, who would like to care for someone, raise someone, leave something behind for the future, simply because they feel a need for it. But violent people are far less concerned with such things; they are more interested in direct personal gain here and now, which the need to care for someone or worry about the distant future can only hinder. Of course, this does not mean that such feelings are entirely absent in violent individuals; they can be expressed as much as in normal people. But at least on average, one should expect this from them less often.

Even if you simply browse the internet, for example, visit the site “Quora,” where various people communicate in a question-and-answer format, you can see confirmation of what current research says. As an example, let’s take a comment from a woman answering a question about whether psychopaths want to have children. She points to both her own selfishness, unwillingness to care for someone and spend her time, as well as the negative aspects associated with having children. She believes that most parents are unhappy, and that having children is a “hellish cult.”

However, it should be noted that there are reasons why a psychopath may strive to have children. First, let’s note social influence. In the past, consciously and openly refusing to start a family and continue the lineage was something unacceptable and condemned; such a person would likely be considered abnormal by many. Such pressure could have played its part, just as its absence certainly plays a part in the modern world, where the refusal of family and children is becoming an absolutely normal personal choice. Of course, a normal person with the previously mentioned feelings will often still be inclined to have children, at least one child. But for a psychopath in such conditions, there is a much higher probability of becoming a staunch “childfree” (no offense to non-violent people who have decided not to have children).

Reasons could also include a person’s personal beliefs, the social influence that still remains in some situations encouraging the having of children and condemning the refusal of it, or even simply an accidental pregnancy. But even if a psychopath does have a child, they are unlikely to influence them in a positive way. On the contrary, the result will most likely be psychological trauma for the child, which will only reduce their own reproductive success in the future. As we can see, violence is once again not an adaptive trait in the long term.

It is good that psychopaths are nevertheless less successful in continuing their lineage than normal and mentally healthy individuals, especially in modern social conditions. Although it would be even better if none of them had or raised children, at least until an effective therapy for their condition is developed, aimed at restoring the function of the missing mechanism of violence inhibition.

Stéphane Molinier. Practical Anarchy. Chapter 18.

This chapter, Stateless Society and Violent Crime, had already been roughly translated by a volunteer, and I have now simply proofread the translation.

Here Molynieux, sparing no colors, continues to paint that totalitarian hell he is trying to sell us instead of ancap—with a global network of “dispute resolution organizations” (DROs) to which, however, he grants powers of total control over the smallest aspects of life. According to the author’s design, this should make it impossible for a person to exist without “cover,” as the intimidated DRO businesses would not dare sell even a damn hot dog to someone who finds themselves struck from the lists.

No bitcoins, total KYC, and other wonders of totalitarianism—this is what happens to otherwise decent people when they get fascinated by moral philosophy. Children, do not be like Molynieux. Moral philosophy corrupts, as does any pursuit of absolutes. If you feel an attraction to it—keep your hands above the blanket.

What guarantees against abuses by DROs does Molynieux offer? Here you go, this is everything he writes on the matter:

Ah yes, but what if an “outcast” has been treated unfairly and is being blackmailed by a DRO or a PCR?

Well, remember that anarchism is always a two-way negotiation. To attract people to sign a contract with your DRO or PCR, what checks and balances would you include in it to soothe their fears on this issue?

In other words, he believes that DROs will figure out for themselves what guarantees of their own integrity they could provide to attract clients—and this is in a situation where not being a DRO client means becoming a total marginal. Quite hypocritical, much like expecting states, with their monopoly on violence, to compete in the attractiveness of their laws to attract potential citizens—rather than striving to extract maximum money from citizens while providing minimum services.

Fortunately, the proposed model simply will not work as described. For example, here is the simplest way to bypass it. A person simply declares that they have created their own DRO, which provides insurance services personally to them—and to everyone else, they honestly offer contracts with prices so exorbitant that no one would ever insure with them. That’s it; we have a “non-outcast” with a zero-value contract, which they concluded with a zero-value firm, and which they honestly observe, since they indeed pay themselves for all insurance cases.

If Molynieux believes that such a system bypass should be suppressed by the large, venerable DROs—otherwise, various outlaws will exploit this bug, and they could not be distinguished from honest individuals by the formal criterion of having a DRO contract—then we arrive at the idea of business licensing, which is already state regulation. Well, fine, let’s call this regulation “guild-based”—does that make life any easier for people? Today the DRO guild decides who to let into its market and who not, and tomorrow every random person will start regulating entry into their own business plot.

If Molynieux agrees that self-service in the sphere of dispute resolution is legitimate, then this kills all his totalitarian pathos. A person who is de facto outside the insurance system would still be able to conduct ordinary economic activity, which means there is no point in the myriad of procedures devised to ensure not even a mouse slips past the system. “All the better,” countless hotels and diners would say. “Our business costs will decrease, and if some snobs want to insure themselves against every sneeze—be their guest; we choose risk and champagne.”

In short, one should not take any static model and give it a total character. People will seek ways to improve their own personal situation. The result at any given moment will be largely determined by the balance of profits and costs of one behavior or another. But it is extremely unlikely that at any point in time the result will resemble the DRO system as Molynieux describes it—it is based on too narrow a conception of who should be considered respectable, and therefore will inevitably be in conflict with numerous more libertine anarchists, to whom this system appears as a totalitarian hell.

As a reminder, posts in the channel will be more frequent and interesting if you encourage the author with donations.

Working through the news hook of the invasion anniversary

Since everyone is remembering how it was today, I will also go through some old materials. What I wrote about the war is easiest to find via the tag #war. Rereading it now, I realize that, in general, I expressed the key wish for the Russian people in the very first post on the day the invasion began: to scatter across the world, ridding themselves of their statehood. Now, a year later, I am glad to realize that a huge number of former Russian subjects are implementing this program, and I very much hope that they will live in peace and prosperity. Of course, I do not consider myself a Russian nationalist, and therefore I did not limit myself to anti-Russian posts, but also scribbled an anti-Ukrainian one, where, in essence, I wished for representatives of the brotherly people the same thing: the opportunity to freely move far away from the war, where they could build their peaceful lives far from interstate disputes. And this is despite the fact that, overall, I view the activity of the Ukrainian state in destroying the RF rather positively.

For those who wished to stay in the RF and become heroes, a recommendation was also provided, and I am glad that quite many followed it (or thought in a similar direction) — I am talking about burning down military enlistment offices. For expats, the most important tasks were identified as defeatist chatter and helping everyone fleeing the war. I can state that here too, in general, it was a total hit.

As for the positive agenda for international politics laid out by me, alas, it penetrates minds with terrible friction. What can one do — for the average bureaucrat, it is somehow too radical. Nevertheless, I note with satisfaction that the topic of the dismemberment of the RF is gradually ceasing to be marginal. Everyone is simply waiting for it to happen somehow on its own. And I am waiting too, for that matter. After all, territorial collapse goes much easier when the breaking-off scraps of the empire quickly receive international recognition, and for that, you shouldn’t come to me.

A month after the start of the invasion, it became clear that this was for the very long haul, which was the subject of my most pessimistic post, about the routinization of horror and about how not a single useful niche for activity remained for libertarian politics in the RF, and that both libertarian parties should get out of there in full force — it is a moral duty. Alas, only one party out of two left in full force; the other left hostages for the regime.

In April, the theme of future reparations began to play out on social media, and here, unexpectedly for myself, I took the same position as Mikhail Svetov, although within the framework of completely different argumentation. In short, reparations are an evil primarily for Ukrainians.

On July 1, I indicated that a transition from diversions to individual terror would soon be quite likely. At the end of August, the first fairly loud terrorist attack occurred, about which I did not fail to reflect. Perhaps, this was a collection of my most controversial reflections in connection with the war.

Before the elections, I published a rather beautiful idea, which, however, as far as I know, no one utilized. Then mobilization happened, and after putting out a couple more posts, I lost interest in further reflections on the war. Everything has been said, all conclusions have been drawn, sides have been chosen, there is no one left to persuade. Which village was captured today by Russian troops has finally become less important than the fact that the Montenegrin government nationalized the Kamenari-Lepetane ferry crossing.

It’s time, high time for aliens to invade or a machine uprising to occur, so that we can all with a clear conscience retrain from military analysts into xenopsychologists and artificial intelligence experts.

A sad picture of the state’s offensive against private business, which occupies me far more than the war somewhere in the east

What is the influence of genetics and environment on the capacity to commit violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Different human abilities and inclinations in terms of character and behavior, of course, arise due to neurophysiological characteristics formed both genetically and under the influence of the environment. However, it is often a contentious issue to what extent these two types of factors determine a person’s personality. Disputes may especially concern the problem of violence—what is the role of innate predispositions and the social environment in which a person exists? Let’s try to provide a clear answer to this question.

Let’s start with a study examining the genetic risk of developing psychopathy in 7-year-old children. Important components of psychopathic predispositions are callous-unemotional traits, manifested by a lack of empathy, guilt, and other social emotions, as well as antisocial behavior manifested by increased aggressiveness. As this study showed, the coincidence of both components in children has an extremely high level of heritability—81%. Meanwhile, in cases where children exhibit only antisocial behavior, a moderate level of heritability is observed—30%.

The difference between these two groups of children is that representatives of the first group, in whom callous-unemotional traits are observed, are capable specifically of intentional antisocial behavior and violence. They have a high risk of developing psychopathy and a tendency toward violent crime in adulthood, and they are resistant to educational measures. Their condition is more severe than that of children in the second group, whose behavioral problems are not as serious or long-term.

Another study should be mentioned, which examined the stability of different types of aggression from childhood to adolescence. The stability of reactive aggression, which arises as a subject’s reaction to frustration or threat (defensive aggression also falls under reactive), can be explained in nearly equal measure by genetics (48%) and environmental influence—shared (11%) and non-shared (41%). However, the stability of proactive aggression, i.e., the use of aggressive actions to achieve certain goals and the intentional infliction of harm on people, was predominantly genetically mediated (85%). Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in adulthood, a strong genetically mediated stability of callous-unemotional traits still persists. For example, between the ages of 17 and 24, it is 58%.

The ability to commit intentional acts of violence, or proactive aggression, certainly has an extremely strong genetic influence. This is consistent with the concept of the violence inhibition mechanism, according to which the average healthy individual experiences a reaction of rejection and resistance to causing harm to other people. This mechanism is expressed as an innate unconditional reflex that emerged during human biological evolution, and callous-unemotional traits and psychopathic predispositions are the result of a failure in its correct functioning.

As we can see, this impairment, leading to the capacity for intentional violence, can certainly be called a genetic abnormality, for which the best treatment would be the development of appropriate gene therapy. Strong candidates for its application could be genes associated with the correct functioning of the serotonin system, such as MAO-A, SERT, TPH2, as well as the 5-HT1A/1B receptor genes.

The situation is slightly different with reactive aggression. Its increased level is often linked to hypersensitivity to threats, and this may indicate not only a malfunction of the violence inhibitor but also of the threat response mechanisms. Since, as the concept of the threat superiority effect tells us, these mechanisms are activated both by innate threats (for example, snakes and spiders) that humans encountered during evolution and adapt to threats through acquired experience, environmental influence plays a significant role in their correct functioning alongside genetics.

An example of a truly libertarian reaction to state lawlessness

Not long ago, I told you about a major international terror attack carried out by the authorities of several countries against a small crypto exchange, Bitzlato. It seemed that everything in this story was already clear: the company was crushed, and the depositors’ money was lost.

However, the exchange team decided to preserve the service. Since the servers were seized and the bot’s code was compromised, they are currently rewriting the code; starting March 1, they promise to organize the possibility for every user to withdraw half of their deposit, and later gradually provide full access to the remaining funds.

I like the fighting spirit in the news published by the project team. No “bleh, meh, we are not to blame, force majeure, there’s nothing to be done, bye-bye.” Instead, the seize-ers are clearly called seize-ers, and they are almost openly sent away in the manner of the Russian warship—remember that ancient meme?

Yes, using centralized services is dangerous, but completely avoiding trust in certain intermediaries is a very costly endeavor. And that is why I especially value those centralized services that have, in one way or another, passed the “test of character.” Not every company can manage this. For instance, the Bitfinex exchange managed to reimburse depositors for losses from a major hack in its time, while the btc-e exchange could not survive a raid by bandits in uniform. I very much hope that the Bitzlato service will pass its test of character.

How do libertarian institutions regulate advertising?

Will market regulation of advertising be more effective than state regulation? For example, advertising for psychoactive substances, child pornography, or gambling.

Anonymous question

The question of how libertarian institutions regulate something is, in essence, a question of how market institutions regulate something.

The person placing the advertisement does so to increase the return on their activity. In the limit, they would like to force everyone and anyone to buy their product for any amount of money by a simple act of will. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of consumption.

The person consuming the advertisement wants to receive information as a result about which goods are available on the market, how they satisfy their particular current or potential needs, and where these goods can be found. In the limit, they would like to force the producer by a simple act of will to do exactly what the consumer needs, right at the moment of the order, and deliver it right to where the consumer indicates. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of production.

Finally, there are those who produce the advertising and show it to the consumer. In the limit, they would like to force product manufacturers by a simple act of will to pay them the lion’s share of the product’s value for the right to sell this product to the consumer. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of sales.

How do market institutions regulate the relations between these listed groups? Through a multitude of spontaneously emerging feedback loops. Advertising is too expensive — producers try to minimize their purchases, and the consumer is forced to spend a huge amount of effort to find anything outside of their daily basket. There is too much advertising — the consumer develops banner blindness, and it becomes ineffective. As a result, the advertiser stops paying for impressions, preferring to pay for results — and the advertising market is forced to restructure in favor of more targeted advertising tools. This leaves both the advertisers satisfied — their ads give the maximum return per unit of funds invested — and the consumers — they receive information exactly about what they want, and unnecessary things do not clutter their eyes. For each of the stakeholder groups, the situation ultimately turns out to be imperfect, but it is a kind of dynamic compromise that more or less satisfies everyone. And as soon as it stops being satisfactory, a fairly rapid restructuring of the market occurs.

And what about state regulation? The state is a regulator of production, consumption, and sales. In the limit, it would like to determine every aspect of the life of each of its subjects by a simple act of will (by “desires of the state” I here mean a somewhat simplified reflection on the activities of its individual functionaries, as well as the persons who make up its support group — “statists”). The extent to which the state is successful in this pursuit is also determined by spontaneously emerging feedback loops. If it succeeded in selling the consumer the necessity of fighting child pornography, the consumer will tolerate difficulties in receiving the corresponding advertising, and the increasing cost of the corresponding services. If it failed to sell the necessity of fighting alcohol consumption, the consumer enjoys the fact that they are at least not imprisoned for consumption, even though advertising, for example, is restricted.

Now, your question essentially concerned whether market institutions can allow third parties to restrict the advertising of certain products in which both the producers of the product and its consumers are interested. How effectively these third parties can perform the role of the state in this case, without being the state and without resorting to direct violence.

Answer: they can, but not as effectively as state institutions. The task of an influence group is to make a certain consumer behavior reprehensible, to make the person feel ashamed of it and, conversely, proud of avoiding it. If your advertising campaign proves successful — congratulations, your opponent is marginalized. If it proves unsuccessful — well, then you yourself end up as the marginals. Everything is fair.

The economic price of violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In 2017, the Institute for Economics and Peace released a report that provided a comprehensive assessment of global economic losses from activities aimed at “containing, preventing, and eliminating the consequences of violence.” As it turned out, violence costs us 13.6 trillion dollars per year, or 13.3% of global GDP (estimate given for 2015). To put this in perspective, a 10% reduction in the economic impact of violence would free up more funds than the total value of global food exports or the total volume of global foreign direct investment in 2014. These are gigantic figures.

Military spending plays the primary role in this matter, reaching 6.16 trillion dollars, or 45% of all economic losses from violence. Internal security expenditures, such as spending on police, the judicial system, prisons, and private security, account for 3.5 trillion dollars, or 26% of all losses. It is also worth highlighting homicides and violent crime, which directly lead to medical expenses and loss of income for victims, and indirectly to their loss of productivity, as well as the productivity of their families and friends due to psychological consequences. This accounts for 1.79 trillion dollars, or 8% of all losses. Of course, violence leads to many other losses, for example, those related to internal and external conflicts, as well as the refugees that follow them.

Naturally, it is impossible to add certain less obvious losses to this assessment, especially those related to systemic violence and missed opportunities. Of course, we have already accounted for spending on military and security sectors, as well as losses from private violent crime. But how much benefit could these funds have brought if they had been invested in productive activity, rather than being taken by states to sponsor security structures, as well as other bureaucratized, corrupt, and inefficient state structures? How much potential was lost due to the harm caused by perpetrators, whether by the state—for example, in the persecution of people and wars—or by private individuals? Obviously, the real economic losses from violence will be much higher than 13.3% of global GDP per year; this estimate is merely the absolute minimum from which to start.

We could lose far less if we invested funds into solving the problem of violence rather than into its containment and the elimination of its consequences. The Institute for Economics and Peace article states that a dollar invested in education will bring more benefit and contribute more strongly to maintaining peace than a dollar invested in prisons. But we must also remember that the source of all serious violence is a minority of pathological individuals with a dysfunction of the violence inhibitor, who feel nothing wrong with causing harm to other people. A dollar invested in the development of an effective therapy that restores inhibitory control over aggression in those who lack it would eliminate losses from violence that are orders of magnitude greater than such an investment. A great deal of funds, time, and human lives could be saved and directed toward productive activity that increases the well-being of everyone.

Ancaps’ love for children — moving into the practical plane

I recently had the opportunity to present my book at the Montellibero club. There were about twenty-five people; no one threw tomatoes—on the contrary, they threw donations. Despite the fact that the decision to speak was spontaneous and not properly prepared, it seemed to go quite well.

However, as a result, I was asked to create some kind of adaptation for children, so that there would be a way to explain clearly to them what these strange games their parents play are all about, and to involve them in these very games.

Well, games it is. I want to make one game in a purely conversational genre, as a trial run. We will play “The Kind Tsar.” A child inherits a kingdom and wants to make their subjects happy. They can ask how things are going in their kingdom, give orders, and find out from me what is reported back to them. I am mainly interested in what questions the children will actually ask. Considering that I don’t have any of my own, this should be a mutually beneficial experience. I think that within a couple of weeks, I will decide to hold the first game there, at the club.

Another game will require more serious development; I want to create a board game about life under etatism. In the basic module, I want to offer the roles of employee, entrepreneur, official, and politician. The goal is to show their relationships as simply as possible, but without losing realism. I also want the game to leave room for ethical decisions.

Such are my ambitious plans. I spent over a year tinkering with the book on ancap, so I hope I’ll manage this significantly faster.

I also strongly hope that in the near future, I will have much more free time and will be able to devote as much attention to the channel as it deserves.

The link between age and the propensity for violence in humans

Voluntarist, Bitarch

As is well known, the majority of crimes, including violent ones, are committed between the ages of 15 and 25, after which the criminal activity of individuals declines, if it does not cease entirely. There are even claims that such a link between age and crime is universal across different groups of people and societies, meaning this phenomenon has a strong biological determination. The decline in criminal activity with age is often linked to the formation of the nervous system and the development of emotional control.

For a full understanding of the topic under consideration, it is worth mentioning one important biological factor. The average healthy individual possesses a violence inhibitor, which triggers a rejection reaction toward causing harm to other people. Of course, its function develops with age, but this process can already be observed at the age of 4-7; as an unconditional reflex that automatically activates when observing distress signals (expressions of sadness, fear, pain), the violence inhibitor is present in humans from birth.

Obviously, the commission of violence requires that the violence inhibitor function in a person be impaired or suppressed. However, it is very important to note that such an impairment does not provoke violence on its own. It only means that there is one fewer deterrent against committing violence. And this is where social factors come into play, which mediate the link between age and crime. Their list is as follows:

– over time, criminals begin to realize that their activities do not provide much benefit compared to the risks they take and the effort expended;
– with age, people strive to “settle down,” and the negative influence of peers in youth is later replaced by social disapproval;
– as they age, criminals may lose partners for committing crimes due to death, imprisonment, or loss of trust in them;
– the decline of physical abilities due to aging makes crime a more dangerous and less successful occupation;
– the propensity for crime is reduced by life experience, the loss of aspirations that require it, or the acquisition of legal methods for satisfying those aspirations.

As we can see, many social circumstances make crime less profitable in the eyes of the criminals themselves over time. But there are also circumstances that can bring back violent urges. There is a common belief that in the Rwandan genocide, the bulk of the violence was committed by young people aged 19-20. However, as data shows, the main perpetrators of violence were men over 30. The median age of all perpetrators during the genocide was 34. And only a third of them were involved specifically in violent crimes.

It is also worth mentioning that aging is often associated with neurodegenerative processes, and this can contribute to increased aggression. An example can be found in those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. Particular attention should be paid to the functioning of their serotonergic system, which is responsible for the violence inhibition mechanism. Research links the impairment of its function to the increased aggression observed in Alzheimer’s patients who have a reduced density of serotonin 1A receptors. Meanwhile, aggression remains at a low level in those patients whose 1A receptor density is not reduced.

It can be concluded that the link between age and criminal activity, including violent activity, is mediated not by biological, but by social factors. Most individuals are not prone to it due to a sufficiently expressed violence inhibitor. But those in whom a deficiency can be observed are dependent on environmental influence in the manifestation of their violence. And certain social factors can incite them to violence at any age. Also, it seems that these individuals risk manifesting increased aggression due to aging and neurodegenerative diseases, however, it should be noted that this can rarely evolve into actual criminal activity due to their condition and age.