War Crimes and Psychopathy

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It will be quite obvious that extremely cruel people who commit violence both privately and by official order—for example, while serving in the police or armed forces—are psychopathic individuals with problems in the inhibition of violence. While a large number of studies compare the distribution of psychopathic traits between private criminals and the general population, there is very little such data regarding war criminals. However, there is one study examining men who served in the police or armed forces in Chile under the regime of dictator Augusto Pinochet and committed crimes against humanity, such as mass arrests, torture, murder, and the “disappearances” of people unwelcome to the regime.

The average psychopathy level according to the PCL-R test (scale from 0 to 40) for a sample of Chilean men who were not criminals was 5.21. Chilean men who were criminals demonstrated an average psychopathy level 4 times higher—20.93. This result is consistent with other studies conducting similar comparisons between samples of violent criminals and the rest of the population in various countries.

But far more interesting results are shown by Chilean men who committed crimes against humanity. Their average psychopathy level was 21.06, almost the same as that of ordinary criminals. It would seem there is no difference between them. But let us move to the comparison of different components of psychopathy. For each of the 20 items of the PCL-R test, a person can receive 0, 1, or 2 points, depending on the absence, partial presence, or full presence of a certain psychopathic trait. These items are divided into 4 categories representing the assessment of manipulation in interpersonal relationships (tendency toward lying and deception), affective psychopathy (lack of empathy and guilt), an impulsive lifestyle, and antisocial behavior. In the first two categories, the average scores for these criminals were much higher (1.43 and 1.64) than the scores of ordinary criminals (0.91 and 1.19) and the rest of the population (0.31 and 0.37). Meanwhile, in the last two categories, their scores (1.00 and 0.51) were much higher than those of the rest of the population (0.24 and 0.16), but lower than those of ordinary criminals (1.28 and 0.99).

The commission of cruel and mass crimes against humanity is associated with extremely pronounced manipulativeness and deceitfulness, as well as insensitivity and ruthlessness, even when compared to the commission of ordinary private acts of violence. At the same time, the perpetrators of such crimes appear much more normal than ordinary criminals in their lifestyle; they are not as impulsive or antisocial.

It should be noted that the second category of PCL-R test items, responsible for affective psychopathy, can be most directly correlated with the mechanism of violence inhibition. A malfunction of this mechanism in a person primarily leads precisely to the absence of internal rejection and resistance to causing harm to others, whereas the other categories rather reflect traits that often accompany such ruthlessness. Based on this, it can be concluded that in those who commit crimes against humanity, the malfunction of the violence inhibitor is far more severe than in private violent criminals. At the same time, they are well able to restrain themselves in situations where it is rationally beneficial, for example, in everyday life. This may be linked to a sufficiently high level of intelligence in these individuals, which allowed them, among other things, to successfully enter police or military service and be honored with the dictator’s order to destroy people unwelcome to him.

What to do with the “free rider” effect in the case of ancap in the sphere of defense, security, and law?

Evgeny Fishkin

I have had to answer something like this many times, but it’s easier to answer briefly once more than to search for links to old posts.

General recommendation: increase the level of decentralization. The more decentralization there is in a particular sphere, the fewer free riders there are—there are no incentives left for them.

Decentralization in the sphere of defense means arming oneself. To a neighbor with a rifle, you are no longer just a neighbor, but also someone who will provide friendly cover fire. There is a non-illusory danger of an attack by a serious enemy—this is a great excuse for regular team-building activities. Have a few shots, then go drink beer.

Decentralization in the sphere of security is, conventionally speaking, about keeping private keys yourself rather than on an exchange. Installing an alarm system in your apartment so that security you’ve hired arrives on call, rather than some state police. And so on.

Decentralization in the sphere of law means settling things yourself, and if you cannot, turning to those you trust, rather than those appointed by other people. Most conflicts are resolved out of court even with a state, although, one would think, here is a centralized conflict resolution service provided to you, why not use it? Inconvenient? Exactly!

Why doesn’t this picture surprise us? Because it is natural behavior when there is no state.

Bitcoiners discuss Montelibero, continued

A month ago, the guys from the projects HypeCoinNews and Bitcorn tried to launch a joint podcast Bitcom in Bitcoin, inviting Soz for the first episode to tell them about Montelibero. There was a false start, and they had to discuss Montelibero among themselves. I later commented on one of the takes from this conversation on my page.

And so yesterday, they finally released the recording of the conversation with Soz.

I was briefly reprimanded for the inaccuracy of my comment: by freezing BTC in the Liquid sidechain, I receive LBTC coins in exchange, which I can then use to buy LMTL tokens or any others, and the fund, after selling me its tokens, is free to dispose of the received LBTC as it sees fit, including selling them for euros. But since the liquidity of this market is extremely low, the comment remains essentially valid: using this mechanism to accumulate resources offline is inconvenient.

And then the conversation continued for over an hour about other things (if anyone is ready to make timecodes, it would be very helpful—drop them in the comments). I listened and felt envious: I have to give a talk about Montelibero at the upcoming festival, and it certainly won’t be better than Soz’s, no matter how hard I try(

I’ll probably add one more thing to what Soz said about “broke people.” In principle, a broke person just needs to arrive in the country and start earning; they can completely ignore legalization. The culture of under-the-table payments is extremely developed here. Documents aren’t demanded at every step (and if they ask once every six months, there are no sanctions for saying your documents are at home). Difficulties only arise when trying to leave the country. But if you’re broke, why would you be traveling abroad! Stay in Montenegro, enjoy its—no joke—immense natural and cultural diversity, participate in the activities of the local community, and just don’t worry. Roma people make up five percent of the population here; learn from them the correct attitude toward the state (though it’s better to learn the attitude toward private property from us).

The link between a person’s socioeconomic status and insensitivity to violence

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is well known that a person’s socioeconomic status is closely linked to their capacity and inclination to commit acts of violence. However, it would be incorrect to say that this link is direct and that every person is equally susceptible to the negative influence of the environment, even in the case of youth, who are generally considered highly suggestible. As we know, the absence of a sense of repulsion and internal resistance to causing harm to others, which stops a healthy person from committing violent attacks, stems from a mental disorder consisting of a dysfunction in the violence inhibition mechanism. And the findings of some studies indicate to us that this may mediate the link between socioeconomic status and violence.

To begin with, let us recall that psychopathic traits can serve as a fairly good indicator of this dysfunction, primarily those related to interpersonal and affective (emotional) psychopathy. Psychopathic traits are also linked to violent crime, and especially to intentional and targeted acts of violence. In this dysfunction, not only the environment but also genetic factors play an important role. Research has already shown that the MAO-A gene mediates the influence of childhood abuse on violent crime. Whether under good or abusive treatment, carriers of the high-activity variant of the gene did not become more violent; however, carriers of the low-activity variant were 4 times more prone to brutal violence in the latter case. Similarly, the HTR1B gene mediates the link between abuse and psychopathic traits. Both genes are directly linked to the functioning of the violence inhibition mechanism.

An equally important result is demonstrated by a study of different variants of the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4, encoding the 5-HTT protein) in young people with different socioeconomic statuses, determined based on the income and professional status of their parents. As was discovered, homozygosity for the long allele of this gene in the case of low socioeconomic status significantly increased the risk of the development of narcissistic traits and traits of callousness-unemotionality compared to average statistical indicators. These very traits are components of psychopathy that demonstrate a dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism. Naturally, the higher a person’s socioeconomic status, the lower the indicators for these traits were. However, an increased risk of their occurrence was in any case not observed in carriers of the short allele of the gene; their indicators did not differ significantly from the average statistics regardless of socioeconomic status.

Once again, we see that certain variants of genes related to the functioning of the violence inhibition mechanism are capable of either making a person resistant to environmental influence or creating a risk that this influence may reduce their resistance to causing harm to others. Violence is not simply the result of socioeconomic status or abuse. Although these factors create a risk of violence, this is far from always the case, as the roots of such pathological behavior lie in human neurophysiology and genetics. And this suggests to us the necessity of creating therapeutic solutions to the problem of violence.

On the right of nations to self-determination

I recently happened to listen to a debate between two Russian emigrants about how to behave toward the Russian people. As it turned out, they sparked a heated discussion in one of the Montelibero chats, so I decided to join in with my own opinion.

Briefly, the positions of the parties:

Mikhail Svetov. The people must be loved; the people are victims of the regime; speaking out against the regime now is pointless, one must wait for the right moment; the people need a leader, a kind master, who will take power and rule guided by love.

Mark Feigin. We have no time to coddle the people, they have already squandered every opportunity; if the people do not overthrow Putin themselves, then there is no reason to be offended if others continue to decide everything for them; reparations will be taken, and the country will be dismantled; by the way, if it is dismantled, that’s not bad—there is a chance for the emergence of a Russian Taiwan, where Mark himself could settle his weary bones.

What causes the greatest repulsion in me throughout all this rhetoric is that everyone talks about some “Russian people.” But the right of nations to self-determination is not about some outsider labeling a particular community of people as a “nation” and allocating a piece of land for them. It is about people defining themselves as a nation, beginning to behave as a nation, and achieving their recognition as a nation. People have such a right—to self-determine as nations.

The people of Montelibero, for example, have already self-determined. Any person can affiliate themselves with our people, ensure that the people recognize them as one of their own, and in time decide on an “aliya”—physically relocating to the home of their people. If they are truly ours in spirit, a warm welcome awaits them.

Mark Feigin, with his dreams of a Russian Taiwan, unexpectedly turned out to be closer to us in spirit than Mikhail Svetov with his dreams of a kind Moscow master. But Mikhail possesses a very valuable ability to pique people’s interest in libertarianism, even if they previously had no clue about it. Later they will figure out the subject and gradually move away from Mikhail’s position, but as an appetizer, Svetov is good.

Therefore, we are very glad that Mikhail Svetov is planning to visit us at the end of September for the Montelibero festival (the website has just been created, please bear with us, it will be updated). And since he is coming, he will, of course, give a presentation. The topic has not been decided yet.

I will also be speaking, providing a brief overview of what the people of Montelibero have managed to achieve in a little over two years, and what still lies ahead for them.

But such presentations are only a small part of the program; after all, it’s not a conference, but a festival. Let’s have some fun—it motivates one to live.

Why Europe became the most developed region in the world

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In world history, a situation has arisen where Europe, or the so-called “West,” became a more developed and progressive region than the rest of the world. Even the “East,” which seemingly also had many achievements, was unable to achieve the same level of wealth and development. One could reflect on this topic for a long time and provide various arguments, but now we will examine this issue from the perspective of the concept of a culture of compromise, introducing some reflections regarding violence in human relationships. This post will be a brief summary and commentary on a video on this topic by Savromat.

How did the history of the West differ from the history of the East? One can look at China, the leading power of the East, which constantly collapsed and reunified, and this entire process was accompanied by one side destroying all others—the sole winner took everything. This is an example of a zero-sum game, where wealth is not created but redistributed, or even lost due to the costs of conducting conflicts. A completely different situation arose in Europe, where there was no single winner who destroyed everyone and took everything. In many European conflicts, instead of destroying the defeated, the winner merely forced them into submission, while recognizing their right to life, property, and even political rights. Recall the medieval free cities and religious orders, which, although formally under a king, nevertheless maintained autonomous jurisdiction. Such a culture of compromise was clearly established by the beginning of the second millennium and for a long time contributed to the accumulation and multiplication of wealth.

Many reasons can be named for why this happened. But the essence is as follows—brutal violence is certainly not a strategy that could lead to enrichment and development. Societies prone to the total destruction of opponents condemn themselves to the non-observance of the most basic rights and the squandering of wealth. Societies prone to seeking compromise and establishing agreements multiply wealth.

One presumptive factor contributing to the development of a culture of compromise in Europe could have been biological—a lower percentage of violent individuals with a dysfunction in the violence inhibition mechanism, and especially cruel psychopathic personalities. Even if this were true only for a part of European society, it might have been enough to develop and spread such a cultural norm. Of course, psychopathic personalities are inclined toward power and conquest in any case, but if some of them were not absolutely unfeeling clinical psychopaths, it increased the chance that they would be predisposed to have mercy on the defeated and thereby not destroy the wealth of society as a whole.

Of course, in any society, the overwhelming majority of the population is quite non-violent, and extremely cruel psychopathic individuals are a tiny minority, but even a small difference in what exactly that minority percentage constitutes can have a radically different impact on society. And apparently, a higher percentage of such individuals creates a greater risk of societal impoverishment due to the total non-observance of basic rights to life and property.

Fucking circus

It is quite difficult to add anything original to the explosion of all sorts of analytics and meme-making that has occurred over the last couple of days regarding the tank getting stuck in the circus gates.

The most realistic version of what happened seems to me to be the one proposed by Alexei Shustov, (who, by the way, recently released a new edition of his book After the State, I still can’t find the time to read it and post a review), so I am now spared the need to provide my own version.

The most balanced suggestion, in my view, on how this incident should have been utilized, was encountered with Roman Popkov. In short: it was an excellent demonstration for reasonable skeptics that the Putin regime can indeed be realistically overthrown by direct violence; for this, it is sufficient to have a small army. I remember when I spoke with Peter Young from the Free Private Cities fund, I mentioned that I consider Zelensky’s biggest mistake in this war to be the refusal to recruit a full-fledged contract army from Russian citizens.

I will add, however, that generals always prepare for past wars, and now Putin will almost certainly remove from the front those couple of divisions that are theoretically supposed to protect Moscow. Thus, repeating the Prigozhin maneuver will now require far more substantial forces. Therefore, something else will likely need to be invented. Well, at least this will slightly weaken the RF at the front, which is something.

If Ukraine still does not start ramping up the rhetoric about the need for international support for the collapse of the RF, then I simply do not know what other signs its leadership needs. Not that I have a high opinion of it, but the move seems completely obvious today. Simply announce that Ukraine will immediately recognize the statehood of any subject of the RF that secedes from it. It is not so important whether Ukraine can guarantee the protection of each such new state. It is important that this becomes a routine part of political rhetoric, a common place for any decent politician. Does a subject of the RF have the right to separate from the RF? Of course it does, because the Moscow regime is criminal and illegitimate. Period. Nothing more to discuss.

Only I fear that nothing will change in the Ukrainian fucking circus either. They will simply continue to grind down the Russian army in the designated corner and beg the West for equipment; no other lines were written for them.

Do you think it is possible in the future for technologies to emerge that will divide humanity into superhumans and serfs, for whom this will not be accessible?

For example, through gene editing, mind uploading, immortality-granting drugs, etc. Where will this lead? Does libertarianism have any original answer to this?

Will such technologies spell the end of the ideas of freedom?

For instance, Mises believes that tyranny collapses precisely because, due to nepotism, the mediocrely capable oligarchs are replaced by their untalented children, leading to such inefficiency that the state becomes unable to perform even the role of a bandit. How do we fight tyrannies in the future if imperfect mortal bandits are replaced by perfect and immortal ones?

Nenavision

Suppose that our technology provides only individual, non-heritable non-aging, and no other superpowers. Simply, there is now an option for an insane amount of money to ensure the absence of age-related degradation of the body.

Let us also assume that access to non-aging is granted only by money. If there were some actor capable of denying access to the technology, one could speculate about a ban on immortality for dictators.

Finally, let us assume there is some factor that prevents the technology from becoming significantly cheaper over time—meaning the proportion of non-aging people in the population will grow very slowly. Otherwise, we would have to consider a rather short transition period before moving to a completely immortal humanity, but the question is about something else entirely.

So, we have a non-aging Putin, and a hundred non-aging billionaires across the rest of the RF. Will much change in the style of governing the country? No. The degradation of politics, and subsequently the economy in the RF, is caused not by Putin’s physical degradation, nor by the shortening of his planning horizons, but on the contrary, by the consolidation of his power and the centralization of all decision-making processes in himself. A dictator may rise on a wave of fighting a certain crisis for which he is most competent, and may even beneficially influence the situation in the country, but other crises require other competencies, and without the rotation of power, the state will quickly lose the early achievements of the dictatorship. Well, except perhaps that the dictator will not lose his passion for feasts and harems over time, so he might become less interested in playing tank games and reading Ilyin.

The same applies to business empires. Will Buffett suddenly understand the power of Bitcoin if he physically strengthens and no longer fears death from old age? No, he will still have his set of time-tested criteria for asset evaluation. Business empires will practically cease to be inherited—well, that means the children of their creators will immediately look for themselves in something else. Perhaps this will even be for the better if the son of a successful investor becomes a talented musician rather than an unsuccessful investor.

In general, I assume that the appearance of such technology will lead to the division of humanity not into superhumans and serfs, but into societies where there is political dynamics and societies where there is none. This division already exists, but currently the border between them fluctuates actively: yesterday’s dictatorship democratizes, yesterday’s democracy slides into shitty putinism. It will become more static: Putin’s Russia or Saudi Arabia will remain stable abscesses, while political regimes with a rotation of power will value their rotation much more.

The same goes for ancaps. A conditional Mikhail Svetov, upon achieving immortality, will not become a more effective conduit for libertarianism; he will inherit all the qualities that limit his effectiveness already now. The attractiveness of libertarianism as a system of views will not change much just because a few chosen ones are able to ensure their immortality. Although, perhaps, ambitious guys might become more intolerant of left-wing ideas because of this, because the more the state takes away, the further away that coveted immortality becomes. Therefore, the attractiveness of economic growth and the investment climate may increase relative to the attractiveness of egalitarian ideas.

Now, if we endow our immortal being with a bunch of other superpowers, then, of course, the changes will be far more serious

Who benefits from regulations and what threat they may lead to

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Who is always the first to demand the introduction of new taxes? And who demands the introduction of new laws regarding the regulation of the economy and the market? Etatists will say that ordinary citizens are primarily interested in this for the sake of protecting their interests, ensuring security, and providing social benefits. But such an answer would be foolish, because the correct answer is large corporations, which are literally “in bed” with the state.

Why did Jeff Bezos—founder of Amazon, a company that writes off its profits as expenses to avoid paying taxes—support the increase of corporate taxes in the USA? To any sane person, it will be obvious that this is necessary to eliminate competitors in the market. But that is an old story; there is a more current example—well-known corporations and billionaires, such as Elon Musk and Microsoft, are actively calling for the regulation and limitation of the development of Artificial Intelligence. All of this, of course, they justify by the alleged need to ensure safety, since AI is so far a technology that is not fully understood, including in terms of risks. But such words sound like a fabricated excuse; moreover, why would major market players limit a technology upon which they can make money? Obviously, the point is to prevent private developments in the field of AI from entering the market; many small companies simply will not be able to afford the regulations, whereas large corporations will easily handle them. It is especially worth noting that those calling for the regulation of this field are themselves extremely active in its development.

The drive toward market monopolization is clear, as are the results of this process. Due to the lack of competition, everyone will only become poorer, and technological progress will be stunted. But the problem is not only this; there is a far more terrifying scenario. If AI technology truly carries some danger, then it would be extremely foolish to try to limit it, especially in developed Western societies where law-abiding citizens, who do not seek to harm anyone, will indeed follow the regulations. However, those who wish to use AI to cause harm will not follow the regulations. This applies to government authorities and their various structures. And it especially applies to those structures that are not under the control of Western jurisdictions at all. Some hackers from North Korea, already famous for hacking and stealing funds from crypto exchanges, persecuting people, and attempting to breach the defense networks of other countries, spit on Western bans; they will actively develop and use AI to cause harm to others. And military structures everywhere will certainly use AI, and even if the West bans its own military from doing so (and even that is a doubtful scenario, as the military usually has a completely free hand in such matters), jurisdictions hostile to the West will engage in it. In the end, only the civilian sector and the development of AI tools that could be used to counter AI threats will suffer from the bans and regulations.

The ability of large corporations and monopolists linked to the state to promote favorable regulations through it not only harms everyone economically, but can also jeopardize the very security for which all of this is allegedly being done. And will anyone still justify the very existence of stationary bandits and their ability to impose bans on everyone after this?

Preventing nuclear war under ancap

Hi! I really dislike your answers regarding the prevention of nuclear war. You say that ancaps will shift the costs onto the nomenklatura, but these answers are far from reality. A bounty of 11 million euros was placed on Lukashenko’s head, yet there weren’t even any attempts to eliminate him.

Suppose there is a nomenklatura sitting in a very deep bunker under a densely populated city. They are protected by loyal security services.
What will libertarians do if this nomenklatura starts a nuclear war against Ancapistan (=what do they threaten with to prevent it)? It would be preferable to provide some specific military measures.

Nenavision

Okay, let’s imagine such a picture. Zelensky arrives at the front to hand out another box of medals, and there he is suddenly kidnapped by an enemy sabotage and reconnaissance group and taken to the RF. Next, they push a peace treaty on him, which he agrees to sign publicly. At the solemn signing ceremony, he inevitably gets within handshake distance of Putin, after which he clenches his jaw, breaks a fake tooth—in short, some trash in the spirit of Frank Herbert happens, only Vladimir Putin turns out not to be as lucky as Vladimir Harkonnen, and also dies.

In the RF, power is seized by a club of angry patriots, who move into a bunker under Moscow, surround themselves with loyal security services, and give the order for an immediate general mobilization, as well as bring the Strategic Missile Forces to a state of highest combat readiness.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the central government is paralyzed by another Maidan; control over the supply of the front, as well as other state functions, are taken over by volunteers; the Maidan declares the complete abolition of taxes and complete freedom of private initiative, as well as general armament—in short, literally a month after the incident with the kidnapping of Zelensky, Ukraine becomes an ancap society in a first approximation.

Great, a minimally plausible picture of a deadly deadlock between a fanatic dictator and an ancap society with clear territorial borders has been established. How do the ancaps defend themselves against Girkin? They have no nuclear bomb, no medium-range missiles, no strategic aviation, no unified command, and no time to waste.

The ancaps react to the threat in their favorite manner: everyone does what they are best at. For the most part, this means occupying themselves with matters far more important than war. For example, importing goods from the EU into Ukraine duty-free, and also exporting them duty-free through the leaky Russian border in the area of a conditional Shebekino, and selling them there for bitcoins.

The front gradually collapses because the mobilized realize that there will be no criminal prosecution for desertion, provided their own don’t shoot them in the back immediately. Armaments and ammunition from warehouses gradually and mysteriously disappear into someone’s private stores. Several highly motivated groups prepare for partisan warfare, while the less flexible prepare to stand to the death on their tiny section of the front, but for some reason the enemy prefers to attack where they are not.

Girkin realizes that he no longer needs general mobilization, and that he can do without nuclear weapons as well. He focuses on organizing an effective occupation administration, plus he is forced to pay more and more attention to the internal agenda. He has to climb out of the bunker more and more often, travel through the regions, solve purely civilian issues—and after three months he is finally killed by Ukrainian partisans, somewhere on the way from Vladivostok airport to the city. The first car hits a mine, then the motorcade is shelled by mortars, and then the survivors are cleaned up with small arms. This episode becomes the occasion for previously scattered attacks on representatives of Girkin’s occupation administration to turn into a full-scale hunt.

Power in Russia is taken by Sobyanin, who orders an immediate retreat to the 2014 borders and begins bargaining with the international community for the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Crimea as well, replacing them with UN peacekeepers. Along the way, he releases Navalny, stating that he would be happy to see his former opponent in the post of Moscow mayor, as he is not in doubt that this time he will definitely win the election. But that is a completely different story.

A column of light armored vehicles is an easy target