Suicides among veterans or why war is unnatural for humans

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Some might argue that there have always been wars in human history, and therefore it is a completely natural phenomenon. Many arguments can be made as to why this is not the case, but one of the most telling is the prevalence of suicide among veterans. In September 2019, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs published a report stating that at least 60,000 veterans committed suicide between 2008 and 2017. According to statistics, nearly two dozen veterans commit suicide every day in the US, and according to some claims, more Iraq War veterans have committed suicide than died on the battlefield. An extremely high suicide rate can also be observed among veterans of Afghanistan.

Moreover, it is not even necessary to take the US as an example. There is recent data that since November 2020, at least 26 Azerbaijani veterans of the second Karabakh war have committed suicide. In 2018, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, one of the representatives of the veterans’ affairs committee reported thousands of suicides among participants in the battles in Donbas. As for Russia, there are data that in 2004, more than 1,000 suicide attempts were recorded among those who had been to Chechnya. Surely, the list of suicides among veterans even only in the countries and conflicts we have considered is far from over. And the list of psychologically traumatized veterans who did not decide to commit suicide will be dozens of times larger. And it is frightening to imagine how many psychiatric losses, besides the direct cases of death in battle, await us on both sides after the end of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Military experts have long known that the average healthy individual possesses a strong internal resistance to killing, and only less than 2% of people are able to do it easily. But in war, a person is forced to try to suppress their violence inhibitor and commit killings, because otherwise they will not be able to cope with the task at hand, will fail their comrades, and will ultimately contribute to defeat in battle. These two contradictory factors—the necessity to kill and the inability to kill—together are the main cause of psychological trauma on the battlefield. Even among those who were able to kill in war, such traumas are not uncommon, because after realizing what they have done, they cannot come to terms with it and suffer for the rest of their lives. Definitely, war is absolutely unnatural for human beings.

What children’s rights does anarcho-capitalism provide for?

Can parents commit an act of aggression against their children, or do they have full ownership rights over their child?

Is it an act of aggression against one’s child to stop feeding them, condemning them to death by starvation? Probably not, but if so, from what age to what age?

If parents have full ownership rights over a child, does this ever end, and if so, at what age does a person gain the ability to become a full member of society and sign the NAP?

Is it possible to intentionally kill one’s own child without violating the NAP?

Is selling one’s own child into sexual slavery aggression?

From what age are children allowed to work and consume alcohol/substances?

Andrey Fridges

The author of the question prefaced it with a quote from Rothbard’s The Ethics of Liberty about how a free market for children should be developed in a free society (I omitted this fragment), and it seems appropriate to me to supplement this deontologist with the utilitarian Friedman, who in his The Machinery of Freedom dedicated one entire chapter to the rights of children.

Now, I will express my own opinion on the specific questions asked. To start, of course, I suggest re-reading the chapter of my ancap manual that I have to refer to most often—the one on conflicts, morality, and law.

A child, being a human, possesses self-ownership from a libertarian point of view, and therefore the NAP is fully applicable to them—no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity. If a parent acts against the interests of their child, there is clearly a conflict between them. Libertarian morality dictates intervention in a conflict on the side of justice. Therefore, any third-party libertarian, driven by their own morality, will attempt to delve into the observed conflict between parent and child to determine which position is more just.

Justice, I remind you, is the feeling of proportionality between the damage caused and the value of the subject of the conflict. Therefore, a third-party adult, putting themselves in the place of the damage being caused to the child and comparing it with how valuable they perceive the subject of the conflict between the child and parent to be, may quite possibly conclude that the child should be protected.

Not feeding a child is not violence. But violence is preventing them from obtaining food, or preventing others from feeding the child.

Selling the rights to preferential guardianship over a child (that is, parental rights themselves) is not violence. If the buyer turns the child into a sexual slave, that would be violence.

Allowing a child to be hired for work or consume harmful substances is not violence. But violence is forcing them to work under a stick or imposing harmful substances upon them.

In all these cases, the guardian finds themselves in a situation where they can cause indirect harm to the child without direct violence. To what extent compensation for indirect harm can be recovered is impossible to predict under ancap conditions (decentralization of law plus the market); a unique solution may be found for every conflict, or a standard one may be consistently adopted if it generally satisfies everyone.

In short: here are the principles, and from there, decide for yourselves; books of ready-made recipes have some value, but they should not be perceived as dogma.

Hi, I live in Bar, I’m a radfem. Are there any in-person meetups for us in Montenegro? Because I’m politically lonely. I’m originally from St. Petersburg.

Nastya Tkachenko

Subscribe to the main channel of the Montelibero project and wait there for a post announcing the next MTL-breakfast. They always take place on Wednesdays, but in different establishments, which is why you need to keep an eye on the announcements. MTL-breakfasts are designed specifically so that anyone from the outside can come, see the project participants in person, get acquainted, chat, and perhaps even join in. We already have vegans; maybe radical feminists will fit in too.

Such regular meetings are not yet held in other cities, so it’s a good thing that you are in Bar.

However, Montelibero is not the only Russian-speaking community in Montenegro, nor even the only one in Bar. There is, for example, a quite independent beer club, there is a club for board game lovers, and there are certainly many other centers of activity that I have no clue about. In any case, one would have to be an exceptionally unsociable person to experience loneliness in this country. At least, to experience it for long.

Why direct democracy cannot exist within a state, but quite possibly can within a free non-violent society

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Many proponents of liberal views often consider the sole source of all problems in social and economic management to be the insufficient involvement of the population in the political process. They believe that the state, and especially its coercive function, is absolutely necessary for existence, but that it should be managed by all people simultaneously and without the mediation of any political elites. This can lead to the concept of direct democracy, where a referendum is held on every political issue and the decision chosen by the majority is adopted. It should be noted that the creation of a direct democracy state is often implied, albeit not always explicitly, even by proponents of anarchic views.

Let us ask ourselves: does the decision-making process itself truly play a key role in how social management works? Of course not, because the most critical role is assigned not to the making, but to the execution of decisions. But are the majority of people capable of taking a direct part specifically in their execution? Let us examine this question in more detail.

If we are talking about decisions of a violent nature—for example, the use of force to compel people to comply with certain norms—then the obvious answer to the previous question is no! The majority of people are unable and will never personally execute violent decisions. When it is said that someone must be forced into something by power, it means the execution of this decision by certain separate security agents, who constitute a specific minority in society. This means that even if a violent decision was made by the majority, it will still be executed by the minority, and it cannot be any other way.

The right to commit violence, even in a state of direct democracy and majority choice, is still completely transferred into the hands of a minority. Moreover, the security apparatus must be capable of ensuring the realization of this right. Thus, a direct democracy state also presupposes that the ability of individuals and private communities for self-defense must be lower than the security forces’ ability to attack. This may mean the introduction of gun laws, if not a complete ban on civilian weaponry.

And why would anyone suddenly decide that this minority with the right to commit violence will not use such a position for its own benefit? Will it really execute decisions made by the majority, while effectively having the power to compel that majority to do anything? In practice, in the best case, it will simply pretend to execute the majority’s decisions, but the process of their execution will be organized to maximize its own interests.

In comparison, a free non-violent society, in which the primary tools for implementing punishments for the violation of certain norms are reputational and financial sanctions, can be organized according to the model of direct democracy. Imagine that as a punitive measure for a certain violation, a decision was made by majority vote to ostracize a person in certain types of relationships, including limiting or refusing them the ability to conduct some purchase and sale transactions. Furthermore, it was decided to subject those who continue full cooperation with the violator regardless of everything to this punishment. In such a case, the majority that made these decisions will also be their direct executor. It is the majority that will, in practice, refuse or limit cooperation with the violators.

If someone really likes the idea of society being managed according to the principles of direct democracy, they should first think about how violence can be eradicated from human relationships and how to completely get rid of it as a tool for implementing decisions. Otherwise, the choice of the majority will simply have no practical meaning if the decisions are still executed by a minority of people.

If a judge handed down an unjust death sentence, and it was later overturned, then who should bear the punishment? The judge, the executioner, or who?

Vagabund

If this occurs under one state system or another, the answer is simple: responsibility lies with whoever is legally required to bear it. Usually, this turns out to be the judge and the taxpayers, or only the taxpayers. Additionally, false witnesses and other individuals involved in fabricating the sentence may also be caught in the gears.

But the question, I presume, concerns ancap, that is, a social order in which law enforcement is decentralized, and developed commodity-money relations are in effect.

Are courts possible under ancap? Yes, because conflicts are possible, and the service of resolving them through a verdict by a third party not involved in the conflict may be in demand on the free market. Are courts that issue death sentences possible under ancap? As a procedure implying the voluntary participation of each party—it is quite doubtful, since the party who may be threatened with the death penalty by a court verdict has a strong incentive to simply refuse to participate in the court.

Are courts that issue verdicts in conditions where one of the parties does not recognize the jurisdiction of that court over them possible under ancap? They are. When I speak of possibility, I mean potential market demand under ancap conditions.

Such a court can function in two ways.

First, it can examine evidence of a crime in a situation where the criminal is in hiding, and give the go-ahead for their pursuit and retribution by any means convenient to the plaintiff. Why does the plaintiff need this? So that other people can familiarize themselves with the verdict and not obstruct this pursuit.

Second, the plaintiff can independently detain the defendant and forcibly bring them before the court. Why? So that the execution they intend to carry out is favorably accepted by those around them and not viewed as some kind of lawlessness.

Can a verdict of guilt be appealed? Yes, of course. The pursued party can present evidence of their innocence to another court, or even to the same one, and after reviewing it, the court may issue a verdict of innocence in light of newly discovered circumstances. If the plaintiff is not satisfied with this new verdict, they will have to act further without the support that the court decision provided, which could be critical for the ability to carry out the execution.

And what if the plaintiff has already executed the defendant using a court verdict, and then evidence of their innocence surfaces? That is, for example, some third party obtains the evidence and deems it important to make it public, after which one or several courts review it and issue an acquittal. By the way, will they do this if they aren’t paid? Actually, they have a market motive: if they can show that the court which issued the verdict of guilt was biased and conducted the procedure incorrectly, they will bury their competitor.

Thus, under ancap, the judge, the plaintiff, and those who execute the court’s decision (if the plaintiff does not carry out the death sentence personally) act at their own peril and risk, and bear responsibility to the extent that other interested parties are willing to spend effort to hold them accountable. Vague? There’s nothing to be done; decentralized systems rely on market incentives, not direct mandates. Just look at Bitcoin—that’s all it relies on, and, you must agree, it’s working out quite well.

How much are you willing to pay for the enforcement of a verdict under ancap?

Ancap handbook: the chapter on secessionism is ready

My book about ancap has been supplemented with a new chapter on secessionism. This is the term I’ve conventionally used for a family of approaches to building Ancapistan—a territorial libertarian community populated almost entirely by libertarians from the start, in contrast to the minarchist approach discussed earlier, where the state as a whole, with all its hereditary ailments, idiotic practices, and dominant statist majority, undergoes libertarian transformation.

Can violence be an evolutionary adaptation?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The fact that there is still a certain percentage of individuals in the human population capable of committing violence, up to and including murder, easily and without any internal resistance, may lead some to think that this is quite normal and natural. Since such people exist, and humanity has existed for a long time, could violence simply be an evolutionary adaptation that for some reason proved necessary for the human population?

To answer this question, we turn to the works of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, who first discovered the presence of innate inhibitors of intraspecific aggression in many animal species. He also described the conditions under which these inhibitors arise. The most important of these are the presence of strong innate weaponry and the inability to avoid violence through flight. According to Lorenz’s observations, ravens possess a strong inhibitor against striking their conspecifics in the eyes with their sharp beaks. Such inhibitors are often observed in wolves as well—when one of them assumes a submissive posture or demonstrates vulnerable parts of the body, such as the throat or belly, it leads to the cessation of aggressive actions by the conspecific. At the same time, collared doves, whose beaks are not as sharp as those of ravens, although they usually do not kill each other in natural conditions, are capable of doing so during a conflict if they are deprived of the possibility of escape by being locked in a cage.

Speaking of humans, Lorenz did not believe that they possessed aggression inhibitors, as they lack strong innate weaponry. Furthermore, humans were not prepared for the emergence of artificial weapons, as scientific and technical progress acquired rapid momentum that biological evolution simply could not keep up with. In view of this, Lorenz expressed concerns about the possible destruction of humanity:

“The day will come when two hostile camps will find themselves face to face, facing the danger of mutual destruction. A day may come when all of humanity is split into two such camps. How will we behave in this case—like doves or like wolves? The fate of humanity will depend on how people answer this question. We must be vigilant!”

Of course, as other researchers later found, humans do possess a mechanism similar to the one Lorenz wrote about. Its emergence can be explained by gene-culture coevolution, where factors of culture and society influence selection in the human population even over short periods of time. And it is worth remembering that primitive artificial weaponry in the form of clubs, spears, and stones appeared in early hominids presumably as far back as 5 million years ago.

However, to a certain extent Lorenz was right, and in the course of biological evolution, intraspecific violence was not completely eradicated from the human population. It is also obvious that humans could not evolutionarily adapt to modern remote weaponry, such as artillery or the atomic bomb. Of course, based on the model of the violence inhibition mechanism in humans, conditioned reflexes should be developed during its operation, preventing any urges to initiate violence. But military evidence shows that while 98% of soldiers experience strong resistance to committing murder during direct contact, in the case of remote weaponry, which allows one not to observe or even know about the potential victims, such resistance weakens.

Based on all this, it can be boldly asserted that violence cannot be called an evolutionary adaptation for humans. Any adaptation must benefit the species by increasing its chances of survival, which cannot be said of violence. It is quite the opposite—due to rapid scientific and technical progress, humans have not had time to fully adapt to new environmental conditions, to the fact that they are the most armed species on the planet. This, in turn, based on the evolutionary model, should imply the existence of extremely strong and pronounced inhibitors of intraspecific aggression.

Book about ancap: wrote a chapter on minarchism

The external background today is not very conducive to writing monumental works, so new chapters of the book on ancap are coming out infrequently. Nevertheless, last night another one was born: about minarchism. For those who have forgotten the context, let me clarify that I do not view minarchism as a branch of libertarianism asserting that the state must be preserved while being limited by certain boundaries. No, for me, minarchism is simply a method of implementing libertarian principles into society: through political reforms from above. This is the method, with its obvious advantages and inherent limitations, that I discuss in this new short chapter.

The epub version of the book has not been updated yet, sorry, I’ll polish it up when I get the chance.

Preventive attack as a non-existent category

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Sometimes violent actions, ranging from their use as a method of resolving interpersonal conflicts to geopolitical relations, may be justified by resorting to the so-called concept of a preemptive strike. In this way, violence is equated with self-defense, since the victim of the attack is allegedly the aggressor themselves, intending to carry out an attack and certainly would have done so if a preemptive strike had not been delivered. In practice, this line of thinking can easily be seen in conflict situations where, for example, violence was used in response to purely verbal threats. It is even more evident in cases where some threat of a future attack was presented as a justified reason for starting wars.

Of course, there are no preemptive strikes as a separate category of aggression, and certainly not as a form of self-defense. A certain “preemptiveness” in this case is exactly the same kind of justification as any other possible justification for violence; it in no way makes a specific instance of its use something else, qualitatively different from other cases. Certainly, if there were immediate threats of violence or a real attempt to attack, then responsive force measures can be called self-defense. But if there was no such thing, then we are dealing precisely with a violent attack, and everything else is simply speculation, invented to justify one’s violence to others.