What will happen if Mikhail Svetov wins the 2024 elections and becomes the president of Russia?

〇人三厂 (question accompanied by a donation of 0.00002602btc )

Before answering the question of what would happen in the event of a victory, it is important to understand under what conditions such a victory could occur at all.

Part 1. Before the elections

One could devise many scenarios of varying degrees of implausibility, but they would all share one common premise: both Putin and Navalny are physically removed from the race before the elections. That is, they do not simply decline to participate for one reason or another, but they have no possibility of influence whatsoever. Simply put, they die. Let us assume a rather crude scenario: Navalny dies in colony from COVID, and Putin dies of a stroke. Thus, we are not inventing any terrorist organizations or lone wolves, but leaving the realization of this historical coincidence to the will of Mother Nature. Mishustin becomes the Acting President; he tries to seize the reins, fails, and the Federal Assembly unexpectedly passes a law that explicitly prohibits the acting president from running. Mishustin is smart enough not to veto it.

New elections are announced. They are preceded by a broad public campaign to repeal the law that strips those involved in the activities of extremist organizations of their passive voting rights. The campaign yields no result, and Navalny’s associates, from Volkov to Guriev, find themselves ineligible—some due to extremism, others due to residence permits. The opposition holds primaries, where the remaining old democrats easily drop out, and in the second round, Svetov defeats Yuneman by a slim margin. Putin’s associates also struggle, and they too have to organize primaries in which Sobyanin loses to Shoigu; dirty scandals break out about how municipal workers voted for one candidate in formation, and conscripts for the other. Things are no less dirty for the Communists, where Zyuganov still hasn’t dared to let anyone run instead of himself. To top it all off, Patrushev is nominated for some reason from Rodina, and Prilepin from A Just Russia. Thus, by the time the signature collection campaign begins, the largest systemic parties are in total disarray, huge public attention is fixed on the elections, and the CEC lacks the political will to cut Svetov off at the start. He receives generous funding from both liberal business emigrants, like Chichvarkin, Durov, and Khodorkovsky, and from certain entrepreneurs who did not flee under Putin, starting with Potapenko. This proves sufficient to collect signatures and get on the ballot.

But is such a setup enough for a libertarian to win the presidential election in Russia? No. Therefore, let’s add two more factors. First, extremely successful liberal reforms—for example, in Kazakhstan—which, a couple of years before the Russian elections, provided him with a serious leap, and his successes are currently very well known. Second, Svetov announces a left turn, telling a tale that the super-rich are to blame for all the people’s woes and explaining how he will strip them of their levers of political influence. He also promises to transfer state corporations to a pension fund and pledges to introduce a progressive income tax by abolishing personal income tax for everyone earning less than two minimum wages, while leaving the previous rate for others minus the aforementioned two minimum wages from the taxable base. Furthermore, he announces a 30% reduction in military spending by abolishing the entire conscription system and a 90% reduction in spending on special services—transferring the savings to social budget items. In short, there is plenty of room for libertarian fantasy when writing a radically left program.

Against this backdrop, Zyuganov’s promises of nationalization look not only unconvincing but bland, and reasonable doubts creep in regarding Shoigu’s ability to reduce the army—what stopped him before? To top it all off, for the first time in many years, all candidates participate in debates, and this is where Svetov crushes everyone, demonstrating the highest level of discourse in Eastern Europe. This is how grandmothers on television learn about him, and it secures his victory.

Part 2. After the elections

Svetov comes to power, but he is a president without a party. Elections to the State Duma will not take place until 2026, but he needs to show at least some results. By the way, regarding the State Duma. In 2021, a very small cross-factional group of deputies was formed who managed to get in thanks to smart voting and did not condemn Navalny for it, but instead worked, however poorly, for the voters. After Svetov’s victory, their informal influence increases significantly, and they become conduits for a large number of bills that materialize Svetov’s program. Nevertheless, all these bills progress with difficulty and slowly.

On the other hand, measures where the president can rely on his own orders as Commander-in-Chief are carried out very quickly. Thus, Russian security forces begin to leave Donbas even before the Duma approves a new prime minister. By the way, that becomes Dmitry Potapenko—he didn’t start sending money to Svetov’s headquarters first for nothing. Navalny’s followers demand Milov and Guriev in the government. Milov gets the post of Minister of Energy, and Guriev is appointed to run the pension fund. Kudrin triumphantly returns to the post of Minister of Finance, which ensures that the State Duma becomes slightly more cooperative. Ekaterina Schulmann becomes the Minister of Education. There are many ministries in Russia, and even more worthy people; I am too lazy to fantasize about other posts, but one way or another, the government will soon be updated. The president also introduces a bill for broad amnesty for all political articles, as well as for Article 228. The bill stalls, so Svetov simply issues pardons for the political prisoners. The Federal Agency for State Property Management is transferred to the jurisdiction of the pension fund.

What manages to be done in the Duma?

First, changing the election law once again, continuing the good tradition of not holding two elections under the same rules. The bill is written by “Golos” and introduced by the president. Election deposits are restored, the entry threshold for parties is lowered to 3%, signatures for candidate registration are permitted to be collected electronically via Gosuslugi accounts, electronic and multi-day voting are abolished, the rights of observers are expanded, and, of course, lustration norms for convicts, holders of foreign residence permits and dual citizenship, and those involved in extremism are abolished.

Second, the president guarantees a veto on any law passed in violation of regulations. No more accelerated consideration in three readings at once.

Third, the share of secret budget items drops sharply. Serious public battles take place in the Duma over the budget. Reducing the budget for security agencies is only partially achieved, and the savings are indeed redirected to education and healthcare. Spending on state propaganda is radically cut, and this becomes a problem—as in Yeltsin’s time, the president begins to be attacked via private channels, and he counters them with his own streams.

What is not achieved? Naturally, all lustration plans fail. It is impossible to abolish personal income tax for the poor. It is impossible to abolish even the transport tax, despite it being such a small thing, so it would seem.

After this, in 2025, the president dissolves the Duma and announces early elections. About fifteen parties enter the Duma, including one libertarian party. The largest faction belongs to the Communists—twelve percent. The pace of reforms accelerates after this, but only slightly, because the team of reformers effectively has to form their own coalition for every new bill. Towards the end of his first term, Svetov manages to achieve the adoption of a constitutional norm stating that every new federal law or other regulation, except constitutional ones, must contain an expiration date, which cannot exceed ten years. If the norm is not extended or modified before the end of its term, it automatically ceases to be in effect. At the same time, since the constitution is being amended, a second important edit is adopted: from now on, the president may serve for only one six-year term.

What manages to be done in foreign policy?

The issuance of loans to other countries ceases. All troops are withdrawn from abroad. Ukrainians rejoice, Armenians are sad. Crimea is declared a free economic zone, which has the right to choose in any matter which legislative norms to follow—Russian or Ukrainian. Ukrainian citizens receive the right of free settlement in Crimea, with the granting of voting rights in elections of all levels up to the presidential. Ukrainian political parties receive the right to operate in the territory of Crimea. Residents of Crimea with Russian citizenship receive the right to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections in Ukraine. The border between Russia and Ukraine in Donbas is handed over to Ukrainian control. Ukraine receives a long-term headache in the form of former people’s republics, which must be brought back to a human state. Thanks to this compromise, Russia gradually emerges from most foreign sanctions—all except restrictions on the supply of high-tech weaponry. Its own sanctions, of course, are lifted immediately.

The market for external hydrocarbon supplies is liberalized. The buyer purchases them on the Russian exchange or directly from the producer, after which they choose the exact method to ensure delivery. Thus, the volume of oil and gas pumped through Ukraine is now determined only by how competitive the transit tariffs set by the Ukrainian side are.

Results of the rule

Russia entered a peaceful path and stopped acting foolishly in foreign policy. Internal policy was also rid of the dictate of the security forces. A strong left opposition in parliament did not allow a serious reduction in the tax burden and state spending, however, their character changed to be more social. Under Svetov, Russia remained a country with a low level of public debt and a budget surplus.

In 2030, Mikhail Svetov leaves the post of President and in the same year is elected to parliament, where he leads the libertarian faction. In 2035, he leaves parliament, buys a house in Kamchatka, settles there with his young wife, and leads a private life.

The problem of “consensual violence” and various violent practices in general

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The potential structure of a free society is usually presented as a system of territorial and extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions (CJs) with voluntary participation and various internal orders. Thus, proponents of differing views on life and social organization can unite into separate communities to realize their own scenarios of happiness. Such an approach assumes absolute freedom and voluntariness of human choice. However, along with this, a question arises: what should be done if violent practices begin to be carried out in one of the CJs?

First, let us examine the question of “violent” CJs more closely. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how violence could occur against the will of the participants themselves. Effectively, a CJ is simply a service provider that has no ability to restrict freedom of movement within certain territorial borders (as states do now), which is necessary for carrying out forced violent practices. Moreover, this becomes impossible if there is any sort of uniform balance of violence potential in society (universal armament), because in such a case, infringing upon their freedom to exit would be, at the very least, disadvantageous for rational agents.

But besides the scenario of forced violence, there is also the option of consensual violence, or violence against people who are not fully capable of self-defense and are not considered independent legal subjects in that CJ, such as children. Such a CJ could be established by some fanatical traditionalists and conservatives. Through propaganda, they could convince weaker members of society that a violent hierarchy of dominance is normal, or even necessary. And as for children, no one will ask them at all. By the way, regarding children, the idea of a pedophile CJ is sometimes brought up as an attempt to discredit the concept of a free society. But, of course, no true supporter of freedom and the impermissibility of violence would support such a thing and, in the event of such practices, would advocate for intervention aimed at stopping them. In real life, intervention would also inevitably occur in CJs that support any forms of slavery, regardless of any previously concluded contract.

Some might believe that there is nothing wrong with consensual violence, or with violence as a method of raising children, and that these are acceptable practices within separate communities. However, violence in any form leads to sad consequences. It becomes a “normal” social phenomenon, and the people most prone to violence, who best fit violent orders, achieve the greatest success in life, while people without such inclinations effectively become outcasts. Both socially and in terms of “human nature” (evolutionarily), violence is reinforced and becomes an integral part of life.

Recently, I posted a picture depicting human sacrifice, typical for the Mesoamerican peoples who lived in the territory of modern Latin America, where one spectator says to another: “It’s fine, they built the roads for us.” In the comments, people immediately began to point out the inaccuracy of the analogy with current states, since these sacrifices were performed with the voluntary consent of the victims, who often sought benefit for their relatives, who received certain privileges after the ritual. But I am sure no one will dispute that such practices clearly leave behind only people prone to violence, capable of murder, while those not prone to it become the victims. Selection works in favor of violence and violators, reinforcing extremely weak variants of the Lorenz violence-inhibiting mechanism in the population. We can even see the result of such negative selection in Latin America today, especially its northern part (not to be confused with North America where the USA and Canada are located). Many people living there now are descendants of the indigenous population with their violent rituals and descendants of cruel Spanish conquerors. This mixture ultimately caused an extremely high homicide rate (it is the highest in the world in El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela), as well as excessive brutality in the massacres occurring there, against which even the activities of some Islamic terrorists pale in comparison.

Obviously, it is precisely from violent CJs, due to the extremely high percentage of violators within them, that one can most expect military attacks on other peaceful CJs and their participants (including the use of weapons of mass destruction), and ultimately the restoration of a violent hierarchy of dominance across the entire society. We cannot justify even voluntary violent practices, as they will inevitably lead to an increase in the number of people capable of violence and the corresponding consequences.

Of course, we are against violence and war as a solution to any problem, including the problem of violence itself, therefore we do not support military intervention. Moreover, to carry it out, we ourselves would have to become violators, capable of initiating an aggressive attack. But overall, specifically on this issue, we are for intervention, as only it will prevent the growth of the number of violators and the expansion of the problem of violence. Any violent practices, such as intentional infliction of physical harm, forced coercion, and even more so killings (even if they are voluntary), must be condemned, and their perpetrators must at least be subjected to various reputational and financial sanctions, making their lives extremely difficult and unpleasant (of course, until they decide to abandon such practices). If this proves insufficient, then the opposition (opponents of violence in such CJs) should be helped with supplies of weaponry and gene therapy drugs, so that they can eliminate violators at the immediate moment of attack on themselves, as self-defense. Not even the slightest justification of violence can be allowed. And this intervention is not a violation of freedom and voluntariness as such, since we are not proposing specifically forceful measures. And various non-forceful measures of influence are absolutely justified in the case of the risks carried by any violent practices.

What is a poor, foolish person to do in the market? If he cannot adapt or does not want to.

Haegansn

I don’t know if I’ll disappoint you or if this will simply be feeding a troll, but for the poor and foolish, whether in a market economy or under socialism, there are only two paths: to lean on someone else or to find unskilled work. If they are also lazy, only the first option remains.

Leaning on someone is more profitable in a country with a market economy: there are charitable shelters and soup kitchens, freeganism, crashing on couches, acquaintances who are more or less well-off (there will be more of them in a market economy), or begging. Under socialism, there are fewer options: he who does not work, does not eat, so only acquaintances and crashing on couches remain (even begging is often forbidden under socialism).

Unskilled labor is easier to find under socialism, since the right to work is one of the most important positive rights guaranteed by the socialist system. The utility of such labor for people may well be zero or negative, but that depends on luck. In a free market, unskilled labor will likely be more intensive, but it will also be paid higher.

Finally, there are intermediate regimes, which are the majority. There are regimes like the Russian one, where there is no proper social safety net, but you can hardly make any money in unskilled work. There are social democracies eating away at their liberal inheritance: there, one can live quite well on benefits—however, there are many such poor, foolish, and cunning people there; they form ghettos, and few would like the conditions within them.

Entrepreneurial Theory of Property

Shortly after my summary of Konstantin Morozov’s article stating that libertarians must either accept moral realism or give up the idea of proving that their ideology is the best, I began reviewing materials from the recently held “Capitalism and Freedom” conference in St. Petersburg. There, I came across Sergey Sazonov’s presentation, “Entrepreneurial Theory of Property.”

It seemed to me, and Valery Kizilov confirmed my suspicion in the Facebook comments, that the topic of this presentation echoes Morozov’s article.

The presentation showed that, purely philosophically, the concept of property can be based on two opposite foundations: deep private property (initially all property is the domain of individuals, and they can subsequently delegate their rights to society) and deep public property (initially everything belongs to everyone, and subsequently society may agree to allocate something into individual ownership).

It was further explained that the idea of deep private property in the most widely accepted Lockean interpretation has an insurmountable flaw—which is exactly what Konstantin Morozov points out. The basis for primary appropriation is the universal right of non-exclusive use of any ownerless resources, but everyone who appropriates them thereby deprives all others of their right of non-exclusive use. Deep public property, however, is devoid of such a logical flaw.

Although both concepts of the origin of property rights allow for the derivation of similar worldviews, there is a serious difference between them. By deriving property rights from deep private property, we must prove the extreme necessity of any state intervention. By deriving them from deep public property, conversely, we must prove any of our own authorizations to dispose of certain things—whether this will indeed be a socially beneficial use of property.

Sergey then demonstrates a justification for deep private property that is devoid of the aforementioned flaw. The transformation of a simple object into a resource that can be turned into property occurs not at the moment of the Lockean “mixing of labor with land,” but at the moment of making an entrepreneurial judgment about them. One sees how something unwanted by anyone can be applied—and that’s it, it’s appropriated. The Lockean contradiction is resolved because a simple object is transformed into a resource instantaneously, and no one is deprived of their non-exclusive right of use in the process. In contrast, within this approach, the idea of deep public property develops insurmountable problems.

In short, I highly recommend getting acquainted with the presentation; it’s a great mental workout. As for me, I will need to think about whether to include this material in my book, and if so, in what form.

Either don’t hit, or kill!

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The security forces of a stationary bandit (state) are, on average, staffed by people who are clearly more prone to violence than the general population. However, even their violent tendencies are not absolutely unrestrained. Most of them would still be unable to kill a person by initiating violence against them, rather than acting in immediate self-defense. Murder is an order of magnitude more serious act of violence than knocking someone onto the asphalt, twisting their arms behind their back, or beating them with a baton, which we can observe at the same rallies. To commit it, a person must be a completely reckless violent criminal. But in most cases, such individuals are unlikely to even make it into the security services, having been caught committing violent crimes in their adolescence. This means we can develop one very radical but effective strategy for fighting the stationary bandit.

To implement this, we will need a “self-destruct device,” for example, a collar with a small amount of explosives. Few people would voluntarily put such a device on; however, there are activists who, as a sign of protest, go so far as to commit self-immolation, and here, sustaining significant or fatal damage to oneself is not even necessary, as the goal is not to commit ritual suicide, but to deter security forces from committing an act of violence. How? An automatic activation device must be built into this collar, for example, triggered by any attempt to strike or immobilize the wearer (an artificial intelligence program can be used to determine this). The activation must be specifically automatic, since only a very small percentage of people (only those capable of self-immolation) would dare to manually activate it. Security forces know this, and therefore they would likely venture to immobilize and disarm a person if the activation were not automatic, which they would most likely succeed in doing. Additionally, the activist must inform the media before the action or the security forces directly during it that they are wearing such a device.

Thus, any violent action by the security forces would lead to serious injury or even the death of the activist. And they cannot afford this; after all, there are very few completely deranged maniacs among them, and even they might not dare, given that this would result in serious consequences for them, considering that such a death of an activist and the security forces responsible for it would immediately be in the public eye. Even with terrorists, security forces initially try to negotiate rather than liquidate them immediately. By the way, there was a recent case where an armed man, visited by security forces on suspicion of stockpiling weapons, decided to offer armed resistance, barricading himself in his home. The simplest option for the security forces to solve this problem would have been immediate liquidation, given that there was no one else in the house except this man. However, for a full 9 hours, they spent time cordoning off the house and attempting a storm; in the end, it ended with a grenade launcher shelling, which caused a fire in the house, during which the defender died.

Now imagine that even a small percentage of activists put the security forces before a choice: either don’t hit, or kill? Effectively, the activity of the security forces would be paralyzed; they would have to spend their strength and time dealing with these activists (though they would not be successful, as the only acceptable option for the security forces would be to persuade the activist to remove the device, which not everyone would fall for). Meanwhile, other protesters would be able to conduct their actions more freely and calmly while the security forces are distracted from them. Also, over time, they may generally begin to fear using violence against protesters, as such a device could be on any one of them.

Moral Realism and the Tribal Customs of Ancaps

I was sent a link to an interesting article on the god-forsaken VKontakte, where a certain Konstantin Morozov discusses the moral justification of taxation, specifically for the purpose of implementing a Basic Income, and other interesting mental constructs of the left-libertarian camp. Without irony, I was interested in understanding their logic.

In short, the author’s argument is as follows. The compulsory nature of seizure is not in itself a criterion for its injustice: this is easily demonstrated by the example of damage compensation. Thus, to speak of the injustice of seizure, one must show that property is being seized to which you have a right. But how do you determine what a person has a right of ownership to? What makes them think they have ownership rights to that which is seized as a tax? Legally, this is state property and is subject to payment. Therefore, the libertarians’ resistance to taxes is rooted not in laws, but in morality.

This raises the question of the objectivity of morality. If we stand on the positions of moral relativism, where one thinks one way and another thinks another, and both are right, then the state is just as right in collecting taxes as the libertarian is in refusing to pay them. Thus, if a libertarian wants to justify to others that he specifically is right, he will have to adopt the position of moral realism.

By tracing the immorality of taxes back to the non-aggression principle, the libertarian relies on the idea that freedom requires no rational basis; it is some kind of self-evident good toward which everyone strives. But what exactly is the freedom being discussed? The libertarian conception of freedom as the absence of coercion is far from the only formulation, not even the most popular one, and certainly cannot be considered self-evident.

Next, the author examines several possible approaches to justifying the morality of compulsory seizures for redistribution in favor of the poor: the Lockean proviso, utilitarianism, Nozick’s compensatory justice, reducing the concept of negative liberty to its republican formulation… The author does not insist on the truth of any particular argument; he merely points out that smart men know how to reason beautifully and competently with logic and facts, while frenzied Eastern European libertarians, having filled their heads with their Svetov and up their asses… remain unconvincing, narrow-minded dogmatists demonstrating an extremely low level of discussion.

I am not going to start refuting the points from the article right now. For me, this is rather a useful warning that will come in handy when writing the brochure on ancap. In particular, I need to figure out what to do with moral realism. I define morality as a spontaneous order of entering into conflicts, and it will, of course, differ in various communities. Thus, the book about ancap acquires a sort of ethnographic character. As in, listen, there is such a people as ancaps in the world, and they have these amazing tribal customs, so unlike what is accepted among civilized people, but attractive in their own way, just as the customs of some Polynesians regarding free love are attractive to us. Will I justify why the libertarian social order is the best? Well, I don’t know. I’m not sure.

The state is a form of violent hierarchy of dominance

Voluntarist, Bitarch

A state, which possesses undisputed power and a monopoly on violence, is typically regarded as a purely human social phenomenon. However, if we look at the very foundation of the state’s structure—namely, the fact of coercive force exerted on people by political power—it can boldly be called one of the forms of a violent hierarchy of dominance, much like the hierarchies that arise under certain conditions in many animal species. This prompts us to analyze the phenomenon of the violent hierarchy of dominance as a whole, the prerequisites and consequences of its emergence, including in the case of humans.

We will cover all points of this topic. We will examine the history of the emergence and development of states and compare it with how violent hierarchies of dominance arise in animals, including known experiments such as “Universe 25,” in which a mouse population went extinct despite an abundance of resources, or the experiment by Didier Dezos, where some rats forcibly compelled other rats to swim across a pool for food. As a result, we will draw certain conclusions regarding the influence of violence on society as a whole.

First, let us confirm the violent nature of the state. To do this, we must turn to the theory of the stationary bandit. According to this theory, the state is a settled (stationary) bandit who decided to establish themselves in a certain territory, control it exclusively, and rob the population in the long term [1]. We should look at what serves as a prerequisite for the independent emergence of states in different corners of the world. Consider the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates, and Indus valleys in the Old World, and the Mexico Valley, as well as the mountain and coastal plains of Peru in the New World. All these places have one thing in common: lands suitable for agriculture that are limited by seas, mountains, or deserts. In such places, there is simply nowhere to flee from coercive force, which led to the appearance of the first states there. We should also add social boundaries to this. Communities located in the center of populated lands are far more likely to be subjugated than those located on the periphery [2].

Over time, the entire world came under the violent control of certain groups of people, and this continues today. Let us not forget that modern state borders were drawn as a result of wars and subjugations. Even if we assume that in the past some group of people truly volunteered to form a monopoly government, they were either forcibly subjugated by someone else, or they themselves engaged in the subjugation of others. The same happened with subsequent generations, who did not initially agree to such a contract. Current states also actively control your life and their borders, resorting to all possible means. If the state does not allow you to do something, your chances of hiding or escaping from it will be extremely slim.

Let us keep in mind what the stationary bandit theory tells us about the state and move on to considering the issue of violence in the animal world, which is very important for understanding the reasons behind the emergence of a violent hierarchy of dominance. It is worth starting with the research of ethologist Konrad Lorenz, which showed that species with strong innate weaponry have evolutionarily developed a strong innate intraspecific morality of non-violence—that is, a mechanism that inhibits the manifestation of violent behavior in intraspecific clashes [3]. The following example can effectively demonstrate this mechanism:

“During a territorial clash, venomous snakes exaggerate their size by stretching, competing to see who can stand higher; they sway and push each other, but they never bite, nor do they even display their weapons. Some species even threaten each other by turning their heads away. It is no wonder that not only ordinary people, but many zoologists, mistook the tournament battles of snakes for mating dances.” [4]

No one will dispute that venomous snakes are heavily armed species; with a venomous bite, they can instantly kill a member of their own species. But they do not bite their own. This is all due to the Lorenz mechanism (LM), for if its development had been impossible over the course of evolution, many species would simply have self-destructed. However, the development of this mechanism is a fairly obvious process, given that individuals without an innate inhibitor of violent behavior would very often face death due to repeated attacks on heavily armed conspecifics, and therefore their genetic material would not be passed on to future generations.

This mechanism can be observed to varying degrees in many species. The more heavily armed a species is, the more strongly the LM is expressed in its representatives, and conversely—in weak species, it is weakly expressed. Lorenz gave quite interesting examples regarding wolves, which do not bite their tribesmen in the neck, and ravens, which under no circumstances peck out the eyes of other ravens even during clashes. However, after leaving two turtle doves—seemingly peaceful birds of the pigeon family—in one cage for some time, Lorenz discovered that one of them nearly killed the other. Of course, a strong LM could not have developed in turtle doves because, in this case, its absence does not threaten their survival, as they have weak weaponry and can easily flee from an attacker in nature.

Based on this, we can link the development of the LM to two factors: the presence of strong innate weaponry and the impossibility of escaping from violent pursuit. Now it is time to move to the topic of the emergence of a violent hierarchy of dominance among animals, and we will take the famous experiment called “Universe 25” as an example. In this experiment, ethologist John Calhoun created an enclosure for mice in which he provided an abundance of resources. Initially, the mouse population grew rapidly up to 2,200 individuals, but after that, their numbers began to decline, and in less than 5 years, the population became completely extinct.

Many reasons for this can be cited; the conditions of Calhoun’s enclosure were actually far from paradise, and there is also an opinion that the problem lies in the abundance of resources itself—and humanity, by the way, with its current high level of prosperity, faces the same fate. However, the main factor that led to extinction, especially compared to vivariums in other laboratories where mouse populations lived peacefully for decades, was that the design of the enclosure promoted the emergence of a violent hierarchy of dominance:

“The enclosure built by Calhoun, unlike a standard vivarium or natural environments, had one characteristic feature: an extremely irrational and inconvenient systematization of space for the mice, as a result of which a situation arose where the 65 largest males were able to monopolize access to food sources and females, while the mice driven into the center of the enclosure were forced to lead a wretched existence.” [5]

Under such conditions, further reproduction became impossible. The stress level of the mice simply skyrocketed, and the males who occupied the top of the dominance hierarchy did not allow other males access to females even after losing their own ability to reproduce due to old age.

Let us recall another experiment conducted by French researcher Didier Dezos. Six rats were placed in a cage with only one exit—into a pool. At the end of the pool was a feeder with food, but the rat could not eat there—after swimming across, it would take the food and had to return to its companions in the cage. Under these conditions, a rigid hierarchy of dominance formed, in which some rats forced others to swim for food and took it from them. Here too, we can clearly link the emergence of a dominance hierarchy to the limitation of space and the impossibility of escaping from it.

Interesting cases can also be noted in the world of primates. Observation of three species of macaques showed that in two of them (the rhesus macaque and the crab-eating macaque), a strong hierarchy of dominance can be seen, whereas the social relationships of the third species (the Tonkin macaque) are non-violent in nature [6]. Different researchers explain this difference through both environmental factors and genetics. However, it is most likely that a combination of these factors is at play—the corresponding environment led to the development of corresponding innate tendencies, specifically a weaker LM in the first two species and a stronger LM in the third (this explanation is not provided in the macaque study, but it fits perfectly based on the explanation of the nature of violence in many other species).

Another interesting case was observed by biologists Robert Sapolsky and Lisa Sher regarding a troop of baboons—primates known for their aggressiveness. In 1982, the most aggressive males of this troop began feeding at a tourist dump and ate contaminated meat. Eventually, they all died, leaving behind less aggressive males. As a result, the level of violence in the troop decreased sharply [7]. It is also worth remembering the pygmy chimpanzees—bonobos, whose behavior is less violent than that of other chimpanzees. This fact is explained by the fact that they do not have to share their habitat with large and aggressive gorillas. The latter displace and limit the resources of other chimpanzees, which effectively leads them to the very situation where there is nowhere to flee from violence within society due to the limitation of available living space.

Let us now return to humans. Humans are naturally a weakly armed species, which is one of the prerequisites for the development of a weak version of the LM. Combining this with the fact of the limited space suitable for agriculture in the territory where the first states emerged, one can conclude that the state is the same form of violent hierarchy of dominance as in the case of other species when they also find themselves in similar living conditions. And over time, people most prone to violence, who occupied the top of this hierarchy, gained increasing opportunities to control and restrict the freedom of all other people. Thus we have arrived at the modern state of total control, in which, as we mentioned at the beginning, without permission from above, you have no right to anything, including the right to escape from the violence of the stationary bandit.

This state of affairs seriously threatens the survival of humanity. Let us recall Calhoun’s experiment. Many call it prophetic in view of the observed decline in birth rates in developed countries. But usually, incorrect reasons are given, related to the high level of prosperity. The only correct reason is the existence of a violent hierarchy of dominance. This also explains why birth rates do not decline as sharply in less developed countries—states there simply lack the technical means and resources to control their population, regardless of what level of control is written in their laws.

Another reason why violence is a major problem and must be fought is the multitude of negative externalities. These include the increase in stress levels in society and the slowing of economic development, but most importantly—the risk of the destruction of humanity due to the use of weapons of mass destruction. And such means are becoming more accessible every day, even for small organizations and individuals. For example, trends in the development of biotechnology tell us that creating artificial viruses will soon be a fairly easy task, which in turn will allow some violent individual to create and release a very dangerous infection, far more serious than the coronavirus we recently faced. You can learn more about these externalities and methods for fighting violence in another material titled “Violence: Problems and Solutions” [8].

Sources:

1. M. Olson “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”: http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/2012/11/22/1251382788/13.pdf

2. R.L. Carneiro “A Theory of the Origin of the State”: https://vk.com/@bitarchy-teoriya-proishozhdeniya-gosudarstva-roberta-karneiro

3. Konrad Lorenz “King Solomon’s Ring,” chapter “Morality and Weaponry”: https://vk.com/@bitarchy-moral-i-oruzhie

4. V.R. Dolnik “Ethological Excursions into the Forbidden Gardens of Humanitarians”: http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/PAPERS/ECCE/VV_EH4_W.HTM

5. Pavel Khokhlovsky “Universe 25: Crushing Critique of Myths and New Conclusions”: https://tjournal.ru/analysis/212316-vselennaya-25-razgromnaya-kritika-mifov-i-novye-vyvody

6. Bernard Thierry “Feedback Loop between Kinship and Dominance: The Macaque Model”: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022519305804850

7. Kathryn Stutzman “Are war and violence natural? Animal behavior and how it relates to humans”: https://www.goshen.edu/bio/Biol410/bsspapers05/Kat.html

8. Voluntarist “Violence: Problems and Solutions”: https://medium.com/voluntarity/насилие-проблемы-и-решения-c348a72c5bdc

How do you feel about anarcho-punks, being an anarchist yourself?

Mohawks, metal, port wine, speakers, Yegor Letov, Grazhdanskaya Oborona, Yuri Hoy and Viktor Tsoi! And of course, mother-anarchy!

But seriously, do you think there are common grounds between libertarians and anarcho-punks, and is interaction or even cooperation between them possible?

Ahmad (question accompanied by a donation of 0.00005166 btc)

Perhaps the most punk thing I’ve ever seen is the movie “Fight Club.” There, it’s no longer just Tsoi’s “you must be strong, you must be able to say don’t tread on me,” but an aggressive denial of the dominant system as a whole, in which, of course, the distinct contours of some anti-system are visible: how wonderful it is to destroy something beautiful, how wonderful it is to wage guerrilla warfare against the regime by any means from spitting in soup to blowing up buildings, and most importantly—how wonderful self-destruction is. Self-destruction proves the sincerity of one’s views and provides a person with a high platform, even if before that they were nobody and had no name. And here, everyone repeats in chorus—his name is Vladislav Roslyakov! That is impressive.

Of course, the punk movement is a product of the twentieth century with its disregard for individual human life and very large-scale thinking. Punks did not defend their own individual freedom (freedom within the existing system is shit), because it is only possible through a transition to anarchy, and that primarily means the breakdown of the existing system. It is pointless to discuss whether punks have a positive agenda and to make its presence a condition for cooperation with them. It is quite enough that a punk will fight not against every system, but only against the one that spawned him. We are all a bit like virologists now, so I think the analogy of punks as antibodies to the state would be quite appropriate.

I think it’s clear from the above that there are common grounds between anarcho-punks and anarcho-libertarians. But what about interaction and cooperation? Here, I’m afraid, anarcho-libertarians will seem like boring, stifling and useless theorists to anarcho-punks. What is this “respect for private property”? The state holds you as property tighter than it holds your balls; forget about it. As long as you are afraid of living in shit, they will scare you by dipping you in shit, and in the fight against the system, one cannot be distracted by such trivial fears.

Punks are guerrillas. I think they could have quite mutually beneficial and mutually understandable cooperation with sufficiently hardcore agorists, who are also essentially guerrillas. But still, I would like to see a lecture, say, by Pavel Usanov before an audience of anarcho-punks, dedicated to some kind of brutality. Well, for example, a talk on the economics of Mexican cartels from the position of AEL. Naturally, Pavel should be in full dress, with a bow tie, otherwise the picture won’t be right.

The image is very important in terms of influence on society, so there should, of course, also be many carnival punks in a strong subculture, who mostly copy visual images rather than the style of thinking and, most importantly, actions. But please forgive me for not dwelling in detail on the visual component, such as mohawks and studs: that’s for the designers, they understand the language of material culture better.

A joke question

If there is no state, and my wife cheats on me, would it be lawful to throw her out the window if I live on the second floor of a building owned by a homeowners’ association that has opted out of insurance services, but has an oral contract for territory security with a private security company (PSC) registered in a territory where a state exists, of which our joint daughter is a citizen, and who, under their law, is obliged to look after disabled parents—a category that includes stateless persons, which my wife is, having applied for a residence permit that was formally accepted due to the difference in time zones?

Topotushka

This question, if I recall correctly, was cited by Alexei “Komendant” Tereshchuk as an example of how even non-trolls—but quite enthusiastic ancaps—can be intensely interested in the most minute details of a completely hypothetical stateless society of the future, falling into the deductive heresy of deriving any, no matter how subtle, specifics from a few general principles.

But no. In order to derive specific consequences from general principles, one must add additional information to the general principles regarding the conditions to which we are deriving those specific consequences. The more assumptions the initial data rely on, the more unstable the result of such reflections becomes.

Does this mean that the deductive method is useless? Of course not. It simply means that to obtain reliable results, you need to take the general principles and bring them as close as possible to the local environment to which you will be applying them.

Now, let us return to the joking question and provide a serious answer to it.

The question of the lawfulness of throwing a cheating wife out the window can only have a positive resolution under conditions where cheating is considered a legal offense. Can cheating be considered a legal offense in the absence of a state? It can. Let us note that in our hypothetical society, marriage is officially considered a property relationship—at least, Topotushka’s “ownership” over his wife.

Moving forward. The homeowners’ association’s refusal of insurance services means that causing harm to the health of one of the association’s residents does not constitute a tort against the association.

The fact that the PSC is fulfilling an oral contract for territory security means that oral contracts are recognized in our hypothetical stateless society.

If the PSC operating legally on the protected territory records damage to the adjacent territory caused by the fall of Topotushka’s wife, I find it difficult to imagine a legal construction within which the responsibility for the damage would be placed by the PSC on the wife rather than on the Topotushka who threw her. Thus, we can state that since throwing a large object out of a window entails a risk of damage to the adjacent territory, it is an unlawful act, and we have obtained an answer to the original question without even delving into the intricacies of time zones. Moreover, according to the oral contract, the PSC may be obliged to prevent even the throwing of cigarette butts on the lawn, which are viewed as litter; therefore, Topotushka’s arguments that his wife is quite compact and did not cause any significant damage are unlikely to hold weight. Littering under the windows is an unlawful act, period.

Recording an offense

Private monopolies pose no threat to you

Voluntarist, Bitarch

One of the claims against a free society is that monopolies cannot be avoided because there are certain physical limitations. For example, it is unlikely that several companies providing water or electricity could operate in a single building simultaneously. Living in a certain place, you will in any case have to accept that some services will be provided by only one supplier, meaning they will be able to manipulate the prices and quality of these services as they please, since you will still have no way to opt out due to a lack of alternatives. This is why political control and regulation of the activities of some service providers are necessary.

This argument often confuses many supporters of the ideas of freedom, but the answer is actually quite obvious. Let’s consider what happens when a state-owned company (or a state-regulated private company) and an independent private company try to inflate the prices of their services and lower their quality.

If you cannot simply switch to an alternative, people in such a situation usually begin to boycott the unscrupulous service provider. They stop paying them money, organize rallies at their offices, block entrances—in short, they hinder the organization’s ability to continue its activities in every way possible until the problem is solved. How, exactly, does a boycott affect the activities of different types of companies?

For a state-controlled company, a boycott is not scary at all. It can always receive subsidies from the state to cover all associated costs. People are more likely to give up and accept high prices and poor service quality than the boycotted company is to suffer any damage. Of course, there is a chance that through their boycott, people can influence political power, but even in such a case, improvements are not guaranteed. Most likely, one politician will be replaced by another who promises improvements to appease the people, but will also do nothing much himself.

For an independent private company, a boycott is quite critical. It can rely only on its own income, which simply will not exist in the event of a boycott. There is no one to provide it with subsidies. Any unwillingness to please consumers can lead to bankruptcy. The company would have to be run by complete idiots not to react to a boycott appropriately, as anything else would lead to a loss of profit. But even if there are actually idiots there—this company will simply go bankrupt, and another company with more adequate management will take its place.

As we can see, private organizations are quite easy to boycott, even if they hold a monopoly position, because their profit still depends on voluntary payments from customers and the fact that they will not hinder the company’s work. Boycotting state-controlled companies is almost useless, because they do not care if they do not receive profit through market means—they will receive it from your taxes.

The conclusion is simple: natural monopolies arising in a market environment do not threaten you in any way, because you always have the option to boycott their activities. However, you have almost no chance of defeating a state monopoly and demanding that it fulfill its duties with quality.