A Month in Montenegro. A Brief Report.

I arrived in Montenegro on May 21st to work on the Montelibero project. During this time, I have personally accomplished a little for the project: I settled in relative proximity to the plot of land being acquired as part of the project, participated in clearing the territory so that the surveyor could mark the cadastral boundaries of the plot and the future road leading to it, and submitted documents to be appointed as the director of the LLC Montelibero, which is currently in the process of registration. Until the company is registered, the possibilities for further offline activity regarding the land are limited.

Surveyor at work

Many are concerned about the cost of living in Montenegro. Here is a summary for the first month.

A total of 834 euros was spent — this is only for myself, excluding expenses within the framework of Montelibero. However, this amount includes some items that will be significantly lower in the future.

Housing cost 282 euros; it will be much less moving forward. First, the first 7 days were in a hostel at 6 euros per night. Second, when I rented long-term housing for 120 euros a month, I had to leave one month’s payment as a deposit, with a potential return not for a long time.

113 euros were spent on furnishings. For instance, I brought almost my entire desktop computer from Russia, except for the monitor and the case because they are heavy, and I forgot to take the router. I had to buy used hardware locally. Or, for example, the apartment turned out to have no electric kettle or clothes drying rack. In the future, I expect one major expense in this category, and after that, it will almost vanish.

A very unpleasant expense is the 30-euro tourist tax, which is 1 euro per day of stay in the country. The tax must be paid until a residence permit is obtained, which in turn is tied to the registration timelines of the company where I am the director. So this expense will decrease next month and eventually disappear completely. However, company maintenance costs will begin; but in my case, fortunately, these will be paid for by the project — a kind of social package for an employee with a monthly salary of 80 euros.

The wildest expense item from the perspective of former residents of Russia is the cash-out commissions, which cost 29 euros. Local ATMs charge 2% + 5 euros. In supermarkets, of course, you can pay by card, but between people — only cash; there is no “I’ll transfer to Sber via phone number” here. This is a serious reason to start earning cash here or making useful acquaintances for more profitable cash-outs than via an ATM.

170 euros were spent on shops, and another 54 on establishments. These expenses can be optimized, but I would assume that food and small household needs will continue to cost around two hundred.

In short, if you rent a very modest apartment in a cheap city (Bar is perhaps the cheapest city on the coast), then once life more or less settles down, you can expect to fit within 350-400 euros per month — if living alone. A family will have lower per capita rental costs and will likely fit within a price tag of 300 euros per person.

However, for expenses to stay within this modest price tag, a couple of other conditions must be met. First, forget about smoking; cigarettes are very expensive here, more than 2 euros per pack. I didn’t even start, which is easier for me. Second, you can choose not to apply for a residence permit and instead do a visa run. More on that below.

If a tourist does not pay the tourist tax, the state theoretically threatens to fine them. In practice, only those who apply for a residence permit without having paid their taxes are fined. Therefore, instead of applying for a residence permit, you can simply cross the border with Albania once a month. My landlord actually makes a side income from this: he crowds 4 people into his car, charges 10 euros from each, and drives them to Shkodër, a lovely Albanian town on the shore of Lake Skadar. In Albania, almost all fruits and vegetables are about twice as cheap, as are many items in supermarkets. So many people go there just to stock up, and at the same time, they get a border crossing stamp, which gives them the right to extend their legal stay in Montenegro. So, if you aren’t planning far ahead and aren’t chasing Montenegrin citizenship in ten years, then a visa run is the cheapest way of legalization. No PCR tests are required; I haven’t even seen people wearing masks in Albania at all.

Just a funny Albanian brand

In conclusion, a scattering of general impressions about the country.

The language is related enough to Russian that after a month, you can understand most of what is being said to you, especially if they speak slowly. Ordinary communication happens in a mixture of Montenegrin and Russian, but in difficult cases where this is not enough, switching to English is sufficient and solves the problem.

Locals are quite friendly, although not as breathtakingly hospitable as, say, Georgians. They love to chat: communication with locals almost always boils down to them talking, you occasionally giving one-word answers to their questions, and them being happy that they were understood and that you even replied on topic. They talk little about politics, and this usually concerns the question of whether they should join the European Union, rather than whether some Russians or Belarusians have a dispute with their government. Libertarian values are quite organic for them, though they are not articulated.

Business culture in Montenegro is a legendary topic. You get the feeling that by the time you manage to pull off a more or less complex deal, you will have already gotten to know the counterparty’s entire family and perhaps even become related to them. The price of the deal ultimately turns out to be noticeably higher than expected, but in the process, some unexpected benefits arise that have a completely indirect relation to the original subject of discussion. In short, you have to immerse yourself in it, and it’s harmful to spend too many nerves on it.

There is work here, in principle, both skilled and unskilled. Until your knowledge of the local language is proficient, you can look for work through Russian-speaking groups on Facebook; they are populous and informative. When a person begins to chat fluently, their opportunities expand significantly. Also, nothing prevents working remotely, but you already understand that. The internet is expensive, but the quality is decent enough.

The food is tasty, but the cuisine is not very diverse: meat, cheese, bread, vegetables, fruits. The culture of smoking meat is top-notch. There is fish, but it’s not highly prized by the locals. They eat a lot of pastries, but here I don’t particularly align with the locals.

The climate surprised me at first: at the end of May, evenings were openly cool. Now it much more resembles my idea of the subtropics: hot during the day, pleasant at night. Humidity is not very high and isn’t irritating. I haven’t even turned on the air conditioner yet, but I think it will be needed after some time. The sea is still quite cool, so the beaches are already quite crowded, while the waves are still spacious. They say the locals migrate to the mountains, where it’s cooler, during the height of the heat. I haven’t been there yet, but I plan to.

In general, in terms of tourist attractions, Montenegro is still passing me by. I visited the Old Town of Budva — and that’s pretty much it. Although literally right next to me is some breathtakingly ancient olive tree, 2400 years old, which all the locals speak of with literal breathlessness, and three kilometers away are the ruins of Old Bar — but somehow I just haven’t found the time. Instead, today I plan to visit the tourist center to extend my registration after the visa run, and tomorrow I’ll go to the capital, where I spotted a used scooter (that same expected major expense for furnishings). Perhaps when I have wheels, I’ll be able to ride around the country and explore it in more detail, but that will likely be the topic of the next report.

Old Town Budva — the only tourist attraction I’ve explored in detail

The book about ancap is being written little by little

I think I’ve finished writing the first section of my book on ancap, regarding the basic principles of libertarianism. I’ve broken it down into separate chapters so it’s not too cumbersome. Also, for the convenience of the readers, I’ve moved all the numerous definitions of terms provided in the text to a separate page. There, you will have the opportunity to get a concentrated overview of the strange conceptual apparatus I use.

I’ve also sketched out a rough table of contents for the second section, which is currently tentatively titled “Power.” The third section will presumably be devoted to the relationship between ancap and libertarianism, serving as an afterword to the first part of the book. I haven’t sketched out the structure for the other two parts of the book yet.

As before, I don’t rule out various edits, additions, and removals, especially if you provide active feedback.

Violent bans and nonviolent condemnation

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The fight against violence, like any other social activity, implies the unacceptability and inadmissibility of certain phenomena and practices, as well as the use of specific methods to achieve the intended goals. In this regard, those who popularize the idea of fighting violence are accused of wanting to forcibly compel everyone to submit to their own ideals. Sometimes one can hear statements suggesting that life in a society where our goals have been achieved would be less free and more unjust than even under some quite authoritarian state regimes.

However, such argumentation is linked to a simple lack of understanding, and often a refusal to understand, the methods we propose using in the implementation of practices to combat violence. The gaze falls exclusively on the practices themselves, while the methods are completely ignored. To make it clear what this conversation is about, I will list both the practices and the methods.

What, in our opinion and based on our research, should be achieved to suppress, or even eradicate, violence? The inadmissibility of any violent practices, universal armament (a balance of violence potential), and the application of gene therapy against violence. All of this reaches critics, at least partially. What methods do we propose? The application of non-forceful pressure using reputational and financial instruments, as well as self-defense during a direct attack. But this point is very often ignored. For some critics, even repeated explanations fail to convey that we propose a completely different approach to implementing our goals. They view everything within the exact same framework used by states.

But that is not the case at all. Even the aforementioned gene therapy against violence, which some critics claim we want to use to turn all people into “vegetables,” is absolutely not proposed for forced imposition. The scenarios for its application do not go beyond the methods we listed earlier. We propose applying it to specific violent offenders during the commission of direct attacks as a means of self-defense. We also propose introducing reputational and financial sanctions against those who have committed violence in the past, and as an option to lift these sanctions, offering them a choice of gene therapy against violence. And that is all!

Another point that was subject to criticism is our condemnation of any violent practices, even those by mutual consent. The argument is that we have no right to interfere in what is done by voluntary agreement, even if as a result someone causes physical harm to another (a vivid example of this would be no-holds-barred fighting). Yes, we propose interference, because such practices lead to an increase in violence in society as a whole. But we absolutely do not propose forceful interference.

Condemnation and the promotion of anything on our part always fit within the framework of applying non-violent pressure and self-defense during a direct attack. And if someone says that our methods are cruel, or even totalitarian, they are simply criticizing the idea without having understood it at all, merely for the sake of criticizing. Such accusations sound even more absurd given that we never propose the initiation of violence or forceful coercion toward anything. Yet it is precisely this that is the tool of any totalitarian and cruel policy, so we are clearly very far from totalitarianism (or more accurately, not connected to it at all). In fact, accusations of cruelty and totalitarianism look very foolish coming from those critics who advocate for forceful punishment and violence in general as a method for achieving various goals. And it is very foolish to equate non-forceful pressure with forceful coercion.

Salvador and the BPN

Everything is fine with the right to bear arms in El Salvador (ownership from age 21, carrying from 24, a test and a criminal record check are required for a license), freedom of activity for private security companies, a government sector share of only 7.6% in the economy, and the lowest tax burden in all of the Americas. Now they are even giving permanent residency for three bitcoins. It’s not exactly ancap, but much has been successfully implemented. At the same time, El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the world: robberies, murders, etc. Where is the notorious BPN (Balance of Violence Potential) if any law-abiding citizen can be armed no worse than any gangster?

Anonymous question

The Balance of Violence Potential (BPN) is a concept once used by Bitarch as a universal recipe against violence (later he abandoned such a vulgar interpretation), which he drew from Auzan, who in turn recounted Hirschleifer’s model regarding the conditions for the stability of anarchy. However, in the original model, everything was by no means reduced to the BPN alone. For the stability of anarchy according to Hirschleifer, low conflict intensity, high resource dispersion, and a sufficiently high income from peaceful activities are required.

The intensity factor is a sort of integral indicator consisting of the characteristics of military technologies, the motivation of the parties, and so on. It cannot be calculated directly, so it is rather understood through comparison between different conflicting societies. Resource dispersion ensures the difficulty of achieving hegemony through control of the economy. High income from peaceful activity reduces the motivation for war.

What do we have in El Salvador? Its history includes a war with Honduras in 1969, followed by a civil war that lasted until 1992, meaning one can assume a certain habit of solving issues by force—something institutionalists trace back to ancient colonial times and which is quite characteristic of Latin America in general. Resources are distributed very unevenly: in a tiny, densely populated agrarian country, there is a severe shortage of fertile land, and it is all concentrated in mountainous areas. Poverty and unemployment levels are very high, meaning there must simply be a large number of cheap fighters in the country who will inevitably dispose of themselves while terrorizing businesses, thereby further increasing poverty and unemployment.

What factors should lead to a decrease in the level of violence in El Salvador? First, the notorious second demographic transition. Fewer young people mean less banditry. Second, because a significant share of the economy consists of remittances from abroad, this increases resource dispersion. Recognizing bitcoin as legal tender will reduce remittance fees, which will increase income from peaceful economic activity. Finally, the country has recent experience with a truce between gangs and the government, during which the murder rate dropped sharply. If they wish, they can repeat this, which would not only reduce the level of violence but also increase the decentralization of power.

Why might the government in El Salvador be willing to decentralize? Because there is neighboring Honduras, a former military adversary. And Honduras is implementing panarchic projects, such as the Prospera charter city on Roatan island and a couple of smaller ones. Small El Salvador cannot afford the Russian Federation’s tactics toward neighbors attempting liberalization because it lacks the strength. Instead, it will have to catch up to their level. And wealthy citizens are a far more significant factor in reducing violence than any mythical BPN.

The Debate Between Kagarlitsky and Kapelyushnikov

I listened with great pleasure to the debates between Kagarlitsky and Kapelyushnikov on SVTV.

Of course, Kapelyushnikov’s position was closer to me from the start, so I didn’t expect anything particularly interesting from him, but I was wrong: there were many witty phrases that could be broken down into quotes. It was known that Kagarlitsky is a strong polemicist; he proved himself to be a strong polemicist here as well. The most amusing thing to me was that his position largely echoes the position of Ekaterina Schulmann expressed in the program Status, when she was talking about Hayek:

Essentially, put your liberalism in the background; democracy is more important.

Of course, if one strictly follows the terms of the “two chairs” problem, both options are bad: both an authoritarian ruler who first liberalizes the economy but gradually turns to bronze and goes mad, and a democratic big state acting as a means for everyone to parasitize everyone else, and thus falling into a positive feedback loop.

In the debates, Kagarlitsky actively pushed for democracy instead of state planning; his interlocutor was not prepared for this, and as a result, there wasn’t much room for the critique of democracy in the debates. However, there was one good take regarding the fact that decentralized democratic planning would simply bind private initiative with others’ plans even more tightly than if it were centralized, and practicing pure economics without politics would prove simply impossible.

And yet, I didn’t quite understand: if both participants in the debate were not thrilled with the topic they were discussing and considered the subject of the discussion to be outdated by about seventy years—then what topic could they have argued about with more sense and pleasure, and what stopped them?

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Hayek and his spontaneous orders.

The donation for the translation of this chapter was quite decent, 6000 rubles, but the volume of text in it is also quite outstanding, so I had to toil away in the intervals between voluntary libertarian hard labor at the logging camp.

In this chapter, Eric Mack explains how Mises’s calculation argument regarding the unviability of a total planned economy influenced Hayek, describes the alternative approach developed by Hayek to describe society through the idea of spontaneous orders, and also analyzes in detail (in my opinion, even excessively meticulously) the idea that freedom is when everyone observes a certain single set of abstract rules, proudly called the rules of just conduct, and they observe them not for reasons of profit, but elevate them to the rank of a transcendent value. In short, if God is dead, it doesn’t mean that everything is permitted.

I hope that the next donation will be for the translation of Stephan Molynieux; his style is simpler, and the chapters are not of such monstrous size, so the interval between the donation and the product can be kept relatively short.

Provocation or violence?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

One of the methods of fighting rapists and violent offenders is the strategy of provocation, a “masquerade” against violence. For those who are not yet aware, this concept suggests provoking people prone to violence into attacking and applying self-defense against them, including the use of lethal weapons. This will allow for the identification of many hidden violent offenders, or even their destruction during the act of violence (initiating violence from our side toward anyone is not required; we only defend ourselves against violence). Moreover, the provocation does not suggest anything intrusive—it could be as simple as walking in expensive clothes through a dark alley or wearing LGBT symbols in a city square. If someone wants to attack a person with physical violence solely because of this, then they are a violent offender, against whom self-defense is entirely justified.

However, criticism of this concept can be heard from those who believe that force is an acceptable method for achieving goals and maintaining certain orders. In their opinion, even the smallest provocation, which involves no active actions at all, is still one of the worst and most immoral things one could possibly devise. Yet, beating someone up or even killing them for such a provocation is considered perfectly normal. I think certain conclusions can already be drawn about this position, given its violent nature.

I, of course, agree with the expression “don’t bring your own rules to someone else’s monastery”; in certain cases, it applies to this criticism (for example, if an LGBT supporter wanders into a conservative neighborhood). But if someone does venture in, must they be immediately attacked with fists? This is a non-violent violation, and therefore it can be resolved by non-violent methods. The threat of reputational sanctions would be particularly appropriate. And if someone cannot restrain themselves from attacking, then they are, again, a violent offender.

This strategy is also accused of being violent itself, since its practitioners calculate in advance that they will commit violence. But they are calculating only on defense, not on attack. Anyone who goes out into the street with means of self-defense calculates that there is a certain probability they will be attacked; otherwise, they would not take those means. So now, is everyone who wants to protect themselves a violent offender?

I remind you once again: any non-violent violation of order can be dealt with in a non-violent manner, using reputational and financial sanctions. And any initiation of violence indicates that the person who committed it is a violent offender. That is all one needs to understand to dismantle any criticism of this kind.

The next step in the evolution of humanism

Voluntarist, Bitarch

We all know well how the history of punishments for offenses has evolved. In the distant past, the death penalty was an acceptable, if not mandatory, measure in the event of violations of various social orders. Usually, this concerned religious norms and traditional life principles. Burning, hanging, or stoning could occur for some kind of “witchcraft,” for treason, for non-traditional sexual relations, for theft, or even simply for words that contradicted the dominant opinion in society. And this was considered absolutely normal; violence bothered few people—on the contrary, crowds of onlookers often gathered to watch such a spectacle.

Over time, the scope of the application of the death penalty has steadily shrunk. This punishment was abolished for non-violent crimes; it remained only as a supreme measure against particularly distinguished brutal rapists. But even this did not last long; in most developed countries, this measure was soon completely abandoned and replaced by imprisonment. And punishments for non-violent crimes became even more lenient.

But even this cannot be called a desirable state of affairs. Of course, many are still at the very beginning of the path of humanism, and in some countries, one can still be stoned for treason, theft, or an improper lifestyle. But at the same time, some societies have already surpassed everyone else in the development of humanism. A good example is Norway, where even the most hardened rapist, Anders Breivik, was placed, effectively, in luxury quarters with all amenities. Of course, he was deprived of his liberty—this is still a coercive measure—but the punishment ends there; besides the loss of liberty, nothing bad awaits the prisoner. In general, the Norwegian law enforcement system is one of the most humane in the world; several prisons are closed annually due to a lack of prisoners, and those who do end up in incarceration have many benefits and considerable freedom (including movement) within the prison institution. To some, it may seem extremely surprising that prisoners can freely, solely of their own will, go to the football field, the library, or the kitchen, and in the latter, kitchen knives may even be at their disposal. But for some societies, this is already a reality.

Now I want to make a small note regarding why we should be humane at all. This may seem completely unfair in the case of certain categories of criminals. But the answer is quite simple and obvious: to carry out violent punishments, we need people prone to violence. If no one can pull the trigger at the sight of an unarmed person, then a death sentence cannot be carried out. However, if someone is capable of doing this, nothing will stop them from killing not only to execute the “supreme measure,” but also to punish insignificant and non-violent offenses, or even to pursue personal goals or satisfy their violent nature.

By making violence a normal phenomenon, even as a measure of punishment, we contribute to the negative selection of the species Homo sapiens in favor of people more prone to violence. Without this, there would be no executioners, who are necessary for a legal system based on force. But an executioner can always become a rapist, and by fostering executioners, we cannot help but foster rapists in general. And it will be impossible to restrain this phenomenon. If a person is not prone to initiating violence, they will not commit it regardless of what views they hold. If a person has such inclinations, then with a change in views, only the circle of victims of their violence will change, but in general, there will always be victims. They will also always initiate violence in situations that provoke it, for example, in conflicts, quarrels, when raising children, and in many other cases. Violence in society will only increase, and the problems of violence will worsen.

In some societies, executioners have almost disappeared; there are only people capable of limiting the freedom of others by force, and even then, not fully. But this is not the end of the development of humanism, because according to the scenario we described, by fostering even such minimal agents of force, we will quite possibly get people who, while perhaps not as dangerous, are still capable of initiating violence. This, among other things, will be enough to maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance in society (the current state system). Likewise, the development of scientific and technical progress will be impossible due to the probability of catastrophic consequences for all mankind if (or rather, when) dangerous technologies fall into the hands of a person prone to violence. Therefore, we need to take one more step in the development of humanism.

This step is the complete renunciation of the initiation of violence, including for the execution of punishments. The only scenario in which violence may be permissible is defense against a direct attack. This is defensive violence; people capable only of such violence pose no problem, as they cannot initiate violent actions themselves for any reason whatsoever, including the fact that they cannot create and maintain a violent hierarchy of dominance, as it requires precisely the initiation of violence in the form of forcing people into submission. Such a behavioral model is evolutionarily optimal for all highly armed species in nature, one of which is Homo sapiens thanks to the ability to manufacture weapons. In all other cases, non-forceful measures of pressure and punishment must be used against criminals and violators of order. These can be various reputational and financial instruments.

This step is a natural continuation of the process of making society more humane, which has already lasted for many centuries and has currently led us from the permissibility of widespread killing to punishments that, while still forceful, are quite lenient and involve only the restriction of freedom without depriving one of the benefits necessary for leading a normal life. This step is needed to further suppress, and in perspective, eradicate violence as a phenomenon as a whole. This is the next stage in the evolution of man and human society. Let us contribute to this process, rather than hindering it and sliding back into violent barbarism!

If there is an ancap territory, let’s say Ukraine

Won’t all the other states crush it with all sorts of sanctions, like they did with Belarus—banning all firms from flying here, all ships from sailing here, all banks from transferring money here, all goods from being delivered here… or will the black market and smuggling ultimately win?

Orlik

The fears are not unfounded. One recalls, for example, the initiative to unify tax rates worldwide and pressure countries where taxes are too low—to discourage them from poaching capital from welfare economies.

Or we don’t even have to go that far; we can simply remember that customs require the country of origin of the goods to be specified. If the state (recognized by that specific customs office) does not exist, the declaration cannot be filled out. This wouldn’t even be due to anyone’s malicious intent. Simply put, the ancap case does not fit into existing state regulations, and even the most well-meaning official will just shrug their shoulders, saying they can’t help.

Of course, the market will provide some kind of crutches. The most obvious solution is not to abolish the state on paper. Let other states interact with the ancap zone through an emulator. In the cheapest version, I see it roughly like this: there is a nominal head of state, elected by lot from everyone who expressed a desire to participate in a drawing held every, say, four years, who has one single power, which is also a duty: to issue any documents upon request to anyone within a specified timeframe on behalf of the state “let’s say, Ukraine,” in whatever format the client requires—without taking any fee for the transaction into their own pocket, but placing all costs for preparing the documents on the customer. The very first refusal to sign or a delay in delivery leads to immediate resignation and the start of a new drawing. That’s it.

Need a package of documents for trade with “let’s say, Germany”? Draw them up, bring them for signature to the head of state of “let’s say, Ukraine,” and he is obliged to sign. A troll wants permission to eat small children? Let him draw up the permission and bring it for signature. The state doesn’t care; it will sign. The state emulator simply has absolutely no authority to enforce any directive. And if some other state gets the emulator to sign a request to introduce a peacekeeping contingent into the territory of “let’s say, Ukraine” to prevent the genocide of mice by frogs—this will in no way increase the legitimacy of its actions should it begin to fulfill that request.

But let’s return to the actions of other states against “let’s say, Ukraine,” dictated by malicious intent. It might feel as though, without active interstate diplomacy, businesses in the ancap territory are unable to defend their interests, which would worsen the territory’s investment climate. However, on the other hand, this territory is completely free from protectionist norms and places no obstacles in the way of international investors. This means that any influential corporation will be interested in ensuring that its home state does not hinder its operations in a stateless territory. In other words, foreign business will begin to play the role of its own diplomats. So, the market has tools to resolve things here as well. Yes, certain rigid states will easily ban any business working with the ancap zone—fortunately, there are enough states that it would be difficult for them to consistently violate the interests of the businesses that feed them. Seriously significant sanctions require consolidated public opinion to support them—even sponsors of terrorism are not always met with a serious response, and a peaceful stateless society is even less likely to agitate the global public enough for serious economic sanctions against it to be introduced, and once introduced, maintained for long.

See a state?

Libertarianism, children and tort

An article was published on the website of the Libertarian Party of Russia by Karl Franco, known for the sharpness of his views, concerning children. The author is a member of the LPR and the lead of the Telegram channel No Compromises, a name that already quite well characterizes this thinker inclined toward dogmatism. In short, he claims to outline how libertarians should approach the issue of dealing with children based on strictly libertarian principles of law, namely the principle of self-ownership, which every child possesses from the moment of conception.

I have also had to write repeatedly on the subject of children, which can be seen via the “children” tag, so you likely have an idea of my position on many specific issues related to children, and perhaps in general. In short, I view law as a spontaneous order for resolving conflicts (and morality as a spontaneous order for entering conflicts), and I consider the principle of self-ownership to be nothing more than a characteristic of a libertarian society, showing that the right to dispose of oneself is respected significantly more than a claimant to self-ownership could achieve by force, but it is still not elevated to an absolute, just as many other useful principles, such as regular tooth brushing, are not elevated to an absolute.

But today we are not talking about my position, but about the position of the article. Its key premise is the assertion that by the very act of conceiving a child, parents commit a tort against the child, because the consequence of conception is the plunging of a self-owning subject of law into a state of complete helplessness. From this, parental duties, principles of upbringing, and other such beauties are derived. And they are derived, of course, completely incorrectly, because such a rigid premise leads to conclusions entirely different from those Karl makes.

You have been raped. This is a tort committed by the rapist against you. The judge obliges the rapist, as restitution for damages, to live with you and care for you for a certain fixed term. Would you not tell such a judge to get lost with such sentences? The first and most important thing you need is to be completely out of reach of the rapist, and only then can you think about the amount of compensation. If conceiving a child is a tort against the child, then the first thing that must be done after birth is to take the child away from the criminals and give the child to truly worthy people who have certainly never encroached upon the birth of any children. Ideally, they should even be incapable of it. For example, those who have undergone sterilization. After all, people get vaccinated to prevent accidental torts against uninvolved bystanders whom they might infect. The same principle applies here: get sterilized, and you will protect children from the danger of being conceived.

From time to time, people are hit by cars on the road. These are tragedies that stir the public, and the public seeks ways to reduce accident mortality, ideally to zero. Additionally, people from time to time conceive children. If conception is a tort, then such tragedies should also stir the public, and then the public should seek ways to reduce the birth rate, ideally to zero. At least accidental conceptions. Again, whose behavior is more responsible: a driver who was driving in their lane while observing the speed limit, but a pedestrian who suddenly jumped under the wheels gave them no chance to avoid the collision—or a driver who consciously rams a pedestrian on the sidewalk? The same goes for childbearing: if conception is a tort, then the behavior of those who manage to get pregnant despite all efforts at contraception should be recognized as more responsible and perhaps even exempt them from paying serious compensation to the child for this accident. And those who consciously practice unprotected sex, pursuing the criminal intent to conceive a child, should be recognized as malicious thugs and punished exemplarily more severely, should they not?

Why did Karl Franco enter into a conspiracy with a girl and cohabit with her without first undergoing a vasectomy? Was it not with the aim of plunging a self-owning being into a state of helplessness by conceiving them into the world? Should we not lynch this hypocrite, who discourses on torts while himself craftily making preparations for one?

Of course, all of this is nonsense. When we live to see the invention of fully autonomous, self-developing embryos, within the framework of a creative free search, downloading info from the internet and self-modifying their bodies, assimilating necessary resources from a dispersed state—then we can talk about archaic procreation being a terrible tort. For now, humanity proceeds from different premises, and the acceptance of the notion of conception as a tort (real acceptance, not hypocritical intellectual constructs that have no connection to reality) makes the systematic extinction of humanity a moral duty, until the last happy childless old man leaves this former abode of sin.

Don’t twist things, Karl. It won’t help children’s rights, Karl.