Non-forceful measures and the logic of proponents of violent coercion

Voluntarist

As you know, proponents of voluntarism and ideas of non-violence actively advocate for non-violent measures for damage compensation, as well as punishments for those who violate agreements and criminals, such as ostracism, financial sanctions, deposits, transaction insurance, etc. The use of force is permissible only for the purpose of self-defense against a direct attack; in other cases, violence is absolutely unacceptable. There are many reasons why such a behavioral model is most optimal, which I have already discussed extensively in my previous materials. Now, we will examine one very common argument aimed at discrediting non-violent measures.

So, I am talking about reputational institutions and ostracism, about how a person who violates agreements or has committed an act of violence in the past can be blacklisted and denied future transactions. And do you know what argument often follows? “This looks like the social credit system in China, you are actually inhuman totalitarians! This is the ‘cancel culture’ currently practiced in the West; you just want to cruelly torture people and deprive them of the right to a normal life!”

Now I want to ask a question to those who express such criticism. What alternative do you propose? Let me guess: should everyone who has erred be beaten with clubs, dragged through courts in handcuffs, or perhaps locked behind bars for many years? Nothing else can be proposed; there is only one alternative to our non-violent measures—violent measures. So, how does it work: we, with our ostracism and financial sanctions, are inhuman totalitarians, but your clubs and prisons are humane and extremely civil tools? If anyone believes this, they are simply a complete idiot!

And, by the way, we do not propose a lifelong “cancellation” of the offending person, which some also mention. In fact, it can be avoided entirely: if a person immediately admits their guilt and willingness to compensate for the damage, no ostracism or blacklists threaten them. In the end, everyone benefits if the perpetrator works off the damage they caused at their own pace and in conditions where they can work with maximum productivity. Also, to put a person behind bars, you will need to forcibly take a portion of peaceful people’s funds (i.e., forcibly tax them) to maintain the prison infrastructure and the prisoner himself. Of course, if someone doesn’t mind paying for this—let them pay, and let them offer criminals their own measure for lifting ostracism in the form of voluntary imprisonment. But I do not want to pay for this. What will you do, beat me with a club too? Then you are a violent aggressor, absolutely no better than any other!

Furthermore, one should not say that non-violent measures won’t work because a criminal can bypass them simply by committing further acts of violence and stealing for their own sustenance. Even in such a case, their life would be extremely unpleasant, since a whole range of goods and services cannot simply be taken and stolen, and if a criminal decides to attack, they can be stopped by means of self-defense. Do not forget that we advocate for general armament and have nothing against self-defense during a direct attack!

Could you criticize Stasik Ay Kak Prosto in this video?

https://youtu.be/ymVOQpFkQSY

The video contains several assertions.

  1. From the perspective of world-systems theory, civilization constantly goes through the same cycles: a new center of global business activity rises, money flows to money, a huge bubble inflates, and soon any production at the center of the bubble becomes unprofitable, and money begins to be made directly from money, through the turnover of various securities. Eventually, the bubble bursts, and soon a new one begins to inflate around a new center. The US will burst as the global hegemon, and China will take the stage.
  2. Any attempts to imitate the global hegemon can no longer be successful: it is pointless to try to increase one’s investment attractiveness, open markets, reduce tariffs, and build institutions—it is impossible to break out of the status of the periphery during the inflation stage of a financial bubble.
  3. Cryptocurrencies have become exactly the same overvalued financial asset, and when the bubble bursts, they will similarly lose the lion’s share of their value.
  4. The shortage of graphics cards caused by increased demand from miners cannot be covered by expanding production because the era of globalization is ending, trade wars are beginning, and the local Chinese market does not need that many graphics cards; fear, honest gamers, you will be stuck with five-year-old junk.

I will answer briefly by points.

  1. As strange as it may sound, stocks are not just numbers in brokerage accounts. These are investments that go to the companies that issued the shares, and they, in turn, by no means spend everything on management bonuses and buybacks—some is indeed invested in production, specifically in the periphery, where it is cheaper. At this moment, it is important for peripheral countries to be attractive for these very investments.
  2. If it is pointless to imitate the hegemon, then how will a new hegemon emerge? If world-systems theory reflects real processes adequately enough, then someone must launch a new cycle with themselves at the center. This means there is a mechanism for leaving the periphery. And it is logical to assume that for this purpose, one really should not simply imitate the hegemon. One should not imitate the hegemon in its current dying state, but rather look back to the time when it was young and healthy—while, of course, adapting to current technological realities.
  3. What does a burst bubble mean? Many companies suddenly lose value and find themselves unable to find a buyer for their goods. Demand is mainly for consumer goods, which become more expensive relative to capital goods. The proud owner of crypto, who previously invested in mining, begins to invest in potatoes, selling first the miners (and they become cheaper), and then the crypto itself (its price also falls). The market becomes saturated with cheap used graphics cards, demand for new ones decreases, it becomes unprofitable to invest in their production, and no trade wars are even needed—gamers are stuck with five-year-old junk. I will only note that miners and crypto will get cheaper relative to conventional potatoes during the deflation stage of the bubble, but relative to a conventional dollar—that is far from certain; it might enter a tailspin of hyperinflation.
  4. Will globalization end as a result? For adherents of world-systems theory, it is somewhat strange to discuss this. Where will a new global hegemon come from if there is no globalization? Without it, hegemons will be local. So, since everything goes in circles for you, global trade turnover will not disappear anywhere.

I am not attempting to judge here how correct the theory itself is. The theory is relatively young, more or less explains the observed facts, and makes verifiable predictions. As it becomes clear which predictions turned out to be false, they will either be patched, or this line of thought will be considered a dead end, and a theory based on completely different premises will be used—why not.

A couple of lectures on crypto

Ekaterina Schulmann in her program introduces a distinction between news, meaning that which attracts attention, and events, meaning that which has consequences. For example, when I announced the debates between Litreev and Milov, it was news, but the debates never took place because Navalny returned to Russia, and everyone stopped caring about trifles.

A bit later, I announced a doublet of lectures by Alexei Nefedov and Alexander Kotov as part of the Ural libertarian lecture series. There was no broadcast of the lectures on the day they were held, and I soon conveniently forgot about them. But this event had consequences: after a considerable amount of time, the Ural libertarians channel quietly uploaded the recordings of the lectures, and I finally watched them.

1. Alexei Nefedov. Bitcoin and the Theory of Money.

The lecture first analyzed why money appears in human collectives at all, what function it serves, which types of money achieve wider distribution, and which rely solely on state coercion. Then it briefly described how Bitcoin is designed and why this construction ensures its wide adoption and price growth. Finally, it explained why Bitcoin never actually became money, but instead turned into a defensive financial asset.

The parts about economics were clear and interesting enough for me. Where it concerned technology, I didn’t dive too deep, trying not to be intimidated by phrases like “quantum superposition.” I learned some specific new details, such as how the rules for the Bitcoin network’s operation are changed, or how the price forecast was built based on the stock-to-flow model.

It seemed to me that it would have made sense to expand the topic of altcoins a bit more, but Alexei is a Bitcoin maximalist and apparently believes that if you don’t talk about them, they will disappear on their own.

2. Alexander Kotov. Technological Solutions to Social Problems.

I hoped to hear ready-made recipes in the lecture, but it turned out to be more philosophical than practical. Interestingly, Alexander believes that state actions are not the cause of problems such as, for example, censorship in social networks, but that these are purely social problems. It seems to me that in the absence of a state, these problems would at least be less acute, because attempts to silence opponents are linked precisely to the task of political dominance, which is nonetheless a state phenomenon. Nevertheless, several interesting recipes were mentioned in the lecture, for example, regarding moderation in large social networks that would significantly reduce social tension—through subscriptions to rating agencies that would act independently of the social network’s administration and provide services directly to its clients.

The lecture turned out to be quite sobering; it became much clearer to me why there is such low mass adoption of decentralized social networks, and now I am not entirely sure that I want to bother with it myself—at least as long as centralized solutions provide some room for maneuver.

At the end, Alexander demonstrated how a hardware wallet works; it was curious but not very clear, however, it is evident that it is a fairly paranoid piece of hardware that is unlikely to allow the user to lose their money in a very stupid way. Unfortunately, I don’t have enough money to be that obsessed with security, but it was interesting to watch.

Preventing rapists from procreating

Voluntarist, Bitarch

There is one very effective method for eradicating violence that few people usually think about. It is quite obvious — violence can be eliminated by preventing people with violent tendencies from procreating. The violent tendencies of some people may be genetically determined, so it is obvious that their children are also most likely to inherit this violence. Furthermore, abusers provide very poor upbringing for their children and raise them in an unstable environment, which pushes them to become abusers themselves in the future.

But how can this be achieved? We cannot use force to compel such people not to reproduce, as we would then be no better than them, and by applying violence, we would be introducing negative externalities of our own. However, this can be done by resorting to a series of non-violent measures.

First and foremost, reputational institutions must be used. People who have committed acts of violence should be exposed and ostracized, thereby lowering their well-being. It is also very important to discredit them among their close circle, such as relatives, friends, and neighbors. It is entirely acceptable to exert pressure on people in this circle, for example, by threatening to ostracize those who cooperate with the abuser. In principle, this is logical, as ostracism is not an effective tool if the people cooperating with the criminal are not also declared criminals to whom corresponding sanctions can be applied, because otherwise these people will have fewer incentives not to cooperate with him, meaning ostracism will not be applied sufficiently.

Thus, the abuser’s environment can quite well renounce him or, at the very least, begin to exert pressure on him from their side. And a person with a ruined reputation, a low level of well-being, who poses risks in any relationship, and who is additionally under pressure from those subjects who still cannot give up cooperation with him, has very low chances of finding a partner and starting a family.

In addition to reputational methods, other tools can be used, one of which we will consider now. There are agencies that, for a certain fee, are capable of arranging a series of events that are highly likely to lead to the deterioration of relationships between people, for example, to the divorce of a married couple. In our case, this can be applied against people with violent tendencies who are in relationships or marriages. Funds to pay for the services of such agencies can be collected through donations from concerned people, for example, by announcing a crowdfunding initiative to eradicate violence.

It is especially important to prevent those people from procreating who work for a stationary gangster and carry out his instructions to use force, that is, the security forces. They are most often people with violent tendencies, for who else would go to protect a violent power and, on its instructions, commit acts of violence against innocent people—for example, beating them at rallies or breaking into their homes for a “wrong” post on social networks.

And, which is very important for us, they receive a giant bonus to reproduction. Security forces have many benefits; they can count on free housing, discounted public transport, recreation and treatment in health resorts, they have education benefits, an early retirement age, and large pension payments. Thus, security forces receive very favorable conditions for reproduction, at least more favorable than ordinary people. Unfortunately, I have not found statistics on the number of children among security forces, but I venture to suggest that, on average, the fertility level in their families is much higher than in ordinary families. This only increases the number of people prone to violence. This state of affairs must be destroyed as soon as possible; then the problem of violence will begin to be solved even without the physical removal of aggressors from the population.

Violence Prevention (no, this is not a Bitarkh article)

One of the central ideas of ancap is that all arising problems and disputes should be resolved ex post facto—through a court (assuming that courts under ancap work perfectly fine, no questions there). But real problems are easier to prevent than to “clear the rubble,” and this may require prohibitions. What do you have to say about this? Suing for compensation and a pile of penalties is all well and good, but doesn’t this resemble the famous phrase “come back once they’ve been killed”? Perhaps, if only for the possibility of preventive measures (but not those that infringe upon reasonable rights and freedoms!), it is worth having at least a minimal “protection” state?

Minarchist

The central idea of ancap is more that the problems whose resolution has been usurped by the state today should be solved privately, and only when there is a market demand for their resolution. This means that the same problem may be solved differently at different times, in different places, and in different situations. In one case, a condominium finances the work of police patrols; in another, an insurance company compensates the victim for the costs of an attack; in a third case, people rely on the success of self-defense and do not intend to spend money on insurance or security. Each time, the situation is based on a multitude of individual choices, and generally, it doesn’t matter whether economic calculation, religious prejudices, or ethical preferences were behind them.

There is nothing terrible about a certain community providing solutions to a number of typical tasks for itself using a “protection” state. What is terrible is if this state provides protection forcibly, based on territorial criteria. But as long as state services are provided within the framework of individual contracts that imply free exit from them—then by all means.

Moreover, if someone’s culture implies a number of prohibitions, the observance of which is expected from everyone, including outsiders, then it will be quite natural for the carriers of such a culture to conduct prevention privately. An example is in the image below.

It is another matter that under ancap, the role of prisons differs somewhat, but that is a completely different story

Online Anonymity: Recipes from Libertarian Band

Libertarian Band has released the second video in their series on agorism, and since I am no longer involved in production, I am personally very curious to see what they’ve put together this time.

It’s about methods for ensuring anonymity. Judging by the thoroughness of the presentation, Bitarch acted as the consultant. The set of recipes looks even more hardcore than in Svetov’s video on a similar topic.

In my view, the video feels like a “how to assemble a class five body armor” guide, with a hint that the real pros actually build tanks, but this will do for a start. In other words, it’s clear that if you want to, you can secure yourself very effectively, but it’s not very clear how to actually walk around town with all that. Perhaps it would have been better to structure the material differently: here are the possible threat levels, and here are the recommended protections for each threat, what the consequences of ignoring the recommendations are, and what the probability of getting caught is.

In this regard, from a purely screenwriting perspective, Svetov acted more competently, because he didn’t talk about abstract online anonymity, but tied it to a specific case involving a Chechen who beat up some “cosmonauts” at a rally. Perhaps in this case it would have made sense to tie it to the case of Bitarch himself. Like, if you want to be unrestrained in your expressions while communicating on VK and not have anything happen to you for it—here is a set of tools to satisfy this urgent need.

And so it goes: all it took was to look at the material of a favorite channel from the outside, and instead of an advertisement, it turned into a critical review.

The Problem of the Frozen Conflict

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In many cases, when discussing the problem of violence, only the use of force by ordinary citizens on their own initiative is taken as an example of this phenomenon. In the same case, if a forceful measure was applied under orders from above and within the framework of state law, it is as if it is not considered violence at all; this measure is already called a form of law enforcement. From such an absurd formulation usually comes the assumption that the problem of violence can be solved simply by pursuing some “correct” state policy. This point of view is actively promoted by supporters of Steven Pinker’s ideas; in the Russian-speaking space, the most active evangelist of these views is Ekaterina Schulmann. But let us look at why this will never work.

Firstly, the very attempt to divide coercive forceful measures into those that can be considered violence and those that cannot encounters a logical contradiction. The difference in when, to whom, and for what reason a coercive forceful measure was applied does not cancel the fact of its application, the involuntary nature of its character, and the intentional physical restriction of a person’s freedom. All of these are constituent factors of such a phenomenon as violence. It cannot be said that the exact same action at one time, for one reason, and toward one person is violence, while at another time, for another reason, and toward another person, it is no longer so. This is merely a subjective assessment of a specific person.

Precisely because of this, all coercive forceful measures entail the same problems and risks, no matter how they are justified. Looking from the point of view of practical results, there is no difference whether violence was applied by a police officer or an ordinary citizen, whether it was applied to a simple passerby or a gangster who has committed many crimes in the past; one can always encounter resistance, especially if the victim of the forceful measure is placed in a hopeless position. And in today’s world with rapidly developing technologies, this threatens the use of very dangerous and destructive means as tools of defense or weapons of revenge, up to weapons of mass destruction, the most accessible of which are viruses. Therefore, from a practical point of view, the use of forceful measures can be justified only in the case of immediate self-defense, since in such a case an act of violence is already being committed and it must be stopped to avoid the subsequent negative externalities. In all other cases, the only optimal strategy of behavior will be the application of methods of influence to the violator that differ from physical violence, such as reputation lowering and ostracism.

Secondly, and this is the most important point—the attempt to get rid of private violence with the help of state violence actually only deters it, but does not eradicate it. A vivid example of this can be the USSR. The intentions regarding private violence among the ideologues of authoritarian communism were very noble; by the method of the “iron fist,” they intended to eradicate interethnic and domestic conflicts. Obviously, parents will not beat a child, and an Azerbaijani will not attack an Armenian, if someone stands over all of them with a club. But no power is eternal. As soon as changes occur within it, all problems come to the surface. The conflict is reborn, and with new strength, given the stressful condition people are in due to years of forceful control over them. We were lucky that after the collapse of the USSR, those same Armenians and Azerbaijanis ended up with only assault rifles and tanks in their hands, rather than nuclear missiles and viruses. However, over time, they, and others as well, may acquire very dangerous means. Then we will face a catastrophic threat endangering the existence of all humanity, due to the problem of violence left unresolved by the “iron fist” method.

Prospects for political activity in Russia

Democracy in Russia has not yet been formally destroyed completely. No one can be elected to any legislative body above the municipal level without permission from the current regime, because they will not even let you get onto the ballot. But at the municipal level, independent candidates are still able to get on the ballot. For this very reason, a fairly large number of opposition figures have been elected as municipal deputies over the last few years.

This has had very little impact on the decisions made at the municipal level. Independent deputies are usually in the minority. They are typically not allowed into even remotely important commissions. They are not given the floor at meetings. In practice, they can only achieve something in the districts they were elected from, but the powers of deputies at this lowest level are completely negligible. To top it all off, as a result of every sufficiently large protest action, deputies are collectively sent behind bars, because they either participated in it, called for participation, or could have called for participation.

Today in Moscow, municipal deputies from over fifty regions gathered for the “Municipal Russia” forum to get to know each other, socialize, and discuss possibilities for horizontal interaction. Now, instead of a conference hall, they are carrying out the planned program in police vans and at police stations.

Any attempt to engage in unauthorized political activity in the legal or illegal field today in Russia is interpreted by the regime as a crime against the regime and is punished quite arbitrarily—from preventive detentions without a formal report to killings. For a reason I do not understand, many opposition figures claim that if they had not heroically held back the advance of the Leviathan, things would be even worse now. This assertion is in blatant contradiction with the observed reality, in which the tightening of the regime occurs strictly in response to protest demonstrations. The suppression of grassroots activity is a resource-intensive activity, and those who would prefer to spend resources on palaces rather than batons hire the baton-bearers strictly as needed. In the absence of protest, they would spend roughly the same on palaces, but they would not breed so many security officers and so many laws allowing those officers to commit any kind of robbery.

The best thing we can do in this situation is to leave the country and succeed in a new place. This will not bring down the regime in Russia in any way. A submissive Uzbek will be brought in to take your place—there are eighty million of them, and they have it even worse; that will be enough to fill the vacating positions. But that is not important. If you are behind the wheel, you follow the principle of giving way to the fool. Give these fools the road in politics. If you honk your horn, they will run you over and keep driving. We only have a chance if we are the majority. Therefore, we need to concentrate where that majority is easier to secure. That is exactly why we chose the sparsely populated Montenegro.

From now on, I will regularly report on how the project to create a libertarian outpost in the Balkans is doing. Forgive me, but this seems much more important to me than attempts at political activity in Russia.

Political activity in Russia looks like this

The Influence of FSP on New Hampshire

Author: Dennis Pratt. Translation: Dirk Diggler. Editing: Ancap-chan

After the announcement of the project to gather libertarians in Montenegro to adopt the experience of the Free State Project, an English-language chat was created in addition to the Russian-language one. Among others, Dennis Pratt joined, introducing himself as the Chef de Village of Porkfest—which is likely something like a commandant. We were slightly concerned that some strange friction might arise because we borrowed their name, but on the contrary, the guy was happy for us and shared his article, written over a year ago under the impression of his own move to New Hampshire. We thought it would be interesting to translate it, so I am glad to post the translation on my website. I hope this will allow people to get a rough idea of the direction our project could take.

Analysis of the criticism of Konrad Lorenz’s theory

Voluntarist

People who consider Konrad Lorenz’s conclusions regarding the nature of violence and his concerns about the risks it entails to be unfounded often refer to or use arguments from a piece titled “The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique“. To avoid any misconceptions about the phenomenon of violence, let us examine what is wrong with this critique.

At the very beginning, an argument is made that Lorenz defines aggression as a combat instinct implemented toward members of one’s own species and is genetically innate, inherited from biological ancestors. However, according to the critics, this definition strips the term aggression of its meaning. In general, when discussing aggression and violence, the question of what we actually mean by “aggression” and “violence” almost always arises. In this context, it is reasonable to reduce these terms specifically to innate tendencies toward intraspecific violence in the form of inflicting physical harm (or the threat of inflicting it), as this is the object of study. Everything else, for example, the fact that aggression is subjectively defined differently by different people (for some, even an impolite greeting would be aggression), we do not take into account.

Based on the critique, such an understanding of aggression does not correlate with activities manifested not directly, but through social institutions developed by humans. Firstly, all institutions that apply coercive measures always work through coercive agents. You might say that if a person becomes a politician, they can sit in an office and issue inhumane orders, thereby committing acts of violence without actually performing any corresponding physical activity. However, these orders are worthless without the coercive agents who execute them directly; therefore, one must look specifically at them and their propensity for violence. Secondly, other social aspects, such as wealth, status, and skills (which were mentioned in the critique), do not provide such an opportunity on their own without methods of directly inflicting physical harm on a person, for example, using the same security forces. We cannot speak of violence where there has been no such direct impact. Of course, a person may attempt to harm another person through indirect influence via a chain of many instances; however, this chain will sooner or later encounter the need to apply a coercive measure. For example, some might say that a monopolist in the market can turn people into slaves using purely economic methods and even drive them to starve to death by unilaterally setting the cost of labor and products. However, to be a monopolist, one must have coercive agents (one’s own, or an agreement with the agents of an existing monopoly, such as the state) ready to destroy all competitors in the market through direct violence, especially those who refuse to make concessions and negotiate peacefully.

After this, Lorenz is criticized for mixing the behavioral models of quite different animal species and humans, arguing that the justification of a common origin of species is insufficient for this. However, it should not be forgotten that the unbreakable basis of the behavioral model of any living creature is always the biological processes occurring in its organism. It would be foolish to believe, for example, that by mere desire, due to some social factors or with the help of some supernatural forces, a highly developed primate, including a human, could ignore the action of hormones and receptors of the nervous system. And biological processes, in turn, are determined by genetics. Of course, one should not forget the gene-environment link—certain genes are activated in a certain environment. But this fact only confirms our correctness, if we consider two factors: humans share a large part of the genome with animals due to the same common origin, and Lorenz observed the same behavioral mechanisms regarding the manifestation of violent behavior in very different animal species. According to the critique, it is wrong to extrapolate observations of animals to humans, even if these observations coincide for a very wide range of species. Of course, I agree that Lorenz’s works may lack observations of specifically human behavior; however, based on the two factors described above (common genetic heritage and the observation of identical behavioral patterns in different species), it can be boldly presumed that his conclusions regarding the nature of violence are very likely true for humans as well. And referring to the social sciences, psychology, etc., which was also mentioned in the critique, makes no sense, as we are considering the biological and genetic component, which is more fundamental—these sciences cannot contradict biology or make changes to it. In the end, if someone still continues to deny these conclusions, it would be better to criticize them with observations of human behavior, corresponding systematization, and comparison with Lorenz’s conclusions, rather than simply pointing to the incorrectness of the fact of extrapolation.

The critique also addresses Lorenz’s instinctive-hydraulic model. It explains the phenomenon of instinctive reactions triggering in the absence of a specific stimulus by the accumulation over time of a certain specific potential, which lowers the threshold necessary to trigger the reaction; this also explains spontaneous acts of aggression. This model is criticized due to the lack of neurophysiological evidence for its correctness. However, firstly, it has not been refuted, and secondly, Lorenz himself acknowledged the limitations of this model and the fact that it possesses a number of flaws; that is, in fact, he did not propose it as an absolutely correct and final solution.

Next, the influence of intraspecific aggression on the survival of species is criticized, especially in the case of humans. Statistics are provided as an example, showing that wars between different groups of people (including modern wars starting from the 19th century) have had a very insignificant effect on the survival of humanity. I will not argue that this conclusion is correct at the moment. However, here, Lorenz’s fears regarding the threat of violence to the survival of humanity should be linked to scientific and technical progress. After all, humans have become the most heavily armed species on the planet; they have already faced nuclear threats more than once, and every day the threats become more serious, as dangerous means become increasingly accessible for acquisition and reproduction by small groups of people and even individual individuals. In fact, the destructive potential of small groups and individual individuals is increasing every day. For example, viruses are a very accessible means of mass destruction, although other things could be devised. It is hard to argue with Lorenz’s fears here!

Another point in the critique caught my attention because it only confirms Lorenz’s theory rather than refuting it. But first, we need to remember something. As we know, Lorenz’s observations show that species with strong innate weaponry do not use it in intraspecific clashes. This primarily concerns hedgehogs, porcupines, venomous snakes, and insects; Lorenz also mentioned wolves, which do not bite their fellows in vulnerable places such as the belly or neck, and ravens, which in fights do not even try to peck out each other’s eyes with their very sharp beaks. The emergence of such mechanisms during evolution is quite logical; otherwise, representatives of these species would simply exterminate each other. As for poorly armed species, this mechanism manifests to a lesser extent, since either their representatives are unable to inflict serious harm on their fellows, or the latter can escape from the attack—meaning violence does not threaten them as much. For example, when Lorenz put two turtle doves—seemingly peaceful birds of the pigeon family—in one cage, the dislike of one bird for the other led to it severely maiming and almost killing the other during Lorenz’s absence. All because there was nowhere to run in this case.

In the case of humans, this mechanism also does not manifest very strongly, as their natural weaponry is quite weak. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that humans have inherited this mechanism to a certain extent; moreover, we can confirm this with observations regarding war, which the critique itself refers to, again, to prove the insignificance of the influence of violence on the survival of humanity. In many armies, more than half of the soldiers who were supposed to shoot simply could not pull the trigger. There is also mention of a refusal by one of the US army brigades to obey orders during the Vietnam War. Cases such as the mass killing in My Lai are a great exception and an abnormality for modern wars. In general, most soldiers considered the Vietnam War meaningless, and throughout its duration, a typical soldier spent only a few hours in combat. Also, a social study conducted by the information and education department of the US Department of Defense shows that during World War II, most soldiers actually tried to pretend they were busy with something rather than actually engaging in military affairs.

Based on this, it can be concluded that humans possess Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism. Although it is expressed in a weaker form than in heavily armed species, it nonetheless provides the prerequisites for solving the problem of violence, which concerned Lorenz so deeply and, in principle, is a cause for concern for any sane person. And, by the way, in the material we are considering, an attempt to criticize this specific theory is not even undertaken.