Mechanics of “Freedom”

I don’t quite understand publishing books on paper, unless they are books for small children that can be physically chewed on or, at a slightly older age, creatively doodled in. Even if a person leads a sedentary life in their own home, storing paper books at home is a luxury, as it requires acquiring such a strange vintage interior item as a bookshelf (if there are few books in the house, a small shelf in the toilet would be more suitable). And if a person rents housing, is forced to move from time to time, and doesn’t even know in which country they will be in six months, then for them the expression “paper book” is definitely something for the rich. Therefore, paper books migrate to public spaces, and they can more often be seen in some time-cafes next to board games. The few paper books that for some reason ended up with me in recent years quickly migrated to one of these spaces, and now in the apartments I rent there lies a single comic in Serbian about Corto Maltese, which wandered in from a comics festival.

Nevertheless, paper books, this deeply niche product, are still not only being bought but even produced in new editions. For example, my acquaintances were engaged in this back in Russia, founding the “Svoboda” publishing house, then continued in Montenegro, and now in Germany. However, they are still oriented towards the Russian market and are sold mainly on Ozon. I doubt that my own books will be published in this way because they are extremely small in volume, which means that the share of postage costs in the expenses of obtaining the finished product will be disproportionately high. However, if I happen to write another work, then three books under one cover would already have a chance.

On the other hand, “Svoboda” published my translation of Friedman’s “Mechanics of Freedom,” and there are even a couple of dozen reviews on the Ozon website. You can perfectly well read the translation absolutely free in electronic form, but if you enjoy owning a hefty souvenir brick, then you are welcome. As I understand it, the links I will provide here contain a mention that they were received specifically from me. I think this is for analytics, so that the publishers understand how effective advertising in this way is. I have no idea myself; we’ll see.

What’s there on libertarianism, besides Friedman?

2. Alya Zanoza. A Guide to Rational Egoism. Well, I’ve started with my trump card, of course. You are probably familiar with Alya from her YouTube channel, which will likely be soon renamed to “Serbian Political Stove.” The text of the book is not in the public domain, so buying a two-hundred-page brick is not only a souvenir but also an extremely perverse way to get acquainted with the content of Alya’s creativity. If the author throws the text my way, maybe I’ll even post a review.

3. Linda and Morris Tannehill. The Market for Liberty. This is another exclusive, previously unpublished in Russian. Friedman and the Tannehills almost certainly actively cross-pollinated each other’s ideas (judging by the nearly identical publication years and references in Friedman, since I am not directly familiar with the Tannehills’ work). For instance, the famous idea of private security agencies, which are intended to replace the most toxic function of the state, was launched to the masses in the 20th century specifically by the Tannehills.

4. Hans-Hermann Hoppe. The Theory of Socialism and Capitalism. This is no longer an exclusive of “Svoboda” publishing, but a reprint of an edition by the Novosibirsk Hyde Park Library. Judging by the annotations, the most valuable part of the book is not the discussions on socialism and capitalism at all, but Hoppe’s argumentative ethics, upon which he presumably builds all further constructions.

5. Ayn Rand. Capitalism: An Apologia. This is a noticeably less popular author, judging by the number of reviews on Ozon. This is a collection of various articles in which Ayn Rand applies the tools of her developed objectivism to discuss different political concepts. Maybe in my old age I’ll also put together a collection of appendices to different aspects of reality for my own theories…

6. David Bergland. Libertarianism in One Lesson. Somehow it happened that I knew about this book with the basics of libertarianism, but didn’t get around to reading it in my time, immediately rushing to gnaw through Rothbard. As a result, I have no idea how good this direct competitor to my Ancap is for carriers of Russian culture. If anyone has compared them, please share your opinion.

Perhaps in the foreseeable future I will make more detailed reviews of these books, as well as new releases from the publisher, should any appear.

How do libertarian institutions regulate advertising?

Will market regulation of advertising be more effective than state regulation? For example, advertising for psychoactive substances, child pornography, or gambling.

Anonymous question

The question of how libertarian institutions regulate something is, in essence, a question of how market institutions regulate something.

The person placing the advertisement does so to increase the return on their activity. In the limit, they would like to force everyone and anyone to buy their product for any amount of money by a simple act of will. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of consumption.

The person consuming the advertisement wants to receive information as a result about which goods are available on the market, how they satisfy their particular current or potential needs, and where these goods can be found. In the limit, they would like to force the producer by a simple act of will to do exactly what the consumer needs, right at the moment of the order, and deliver it right to where the consumer indicates. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of production.

Finally, there are those who produce the advertising and show it to the consumer. In the limit, they would like to force product manufacturers by a simple act of will to pay them the lion’s share of the product’s value for the right to sell this product to the consumer. In other words, they would like to take the position of a regulator of sales.

How do market institutions regulate the relations between these listed groups? Through a multitude of spontaneously emerging feedback loops. Advertising is too expensive — producers try to minimize their purchases, and the consumer is forced to spend a huge amount of effort to find anything outside of their daily basket. There is too much advertising — the consumer develops banner blindness, and it becomes ineffective. As a result, the advertiser stops paying for impressions, preferring to pay for results — and the advertising market is forced to restructure in favor of more targeted advertising tools. This leaves both the advertisers satisfied — their ads give the maximum return per unit of funds invested — and the consumers — they receive information exactly about what they want, and unnecessary things do not clutter their eyes. For each of the stakeholder groups, the situation ultimately turns out to be imperfect, but it is a kind of dynamic compromise that more or less satisfies everyone. And as soon as it stops being satisfactory, a fairly rapid restructuring of the market occurs.

And what about state regulation? The state is a regulator of production, consumption, and sales. In the limit, it would like to determine every aspect of the life of each of its subjects by a simple act of will (by “desires of the state” I here mean a somewhat simplified reflection on the activities of its individual functionaries, as well as the persons who make up its support group — “statists”). The extent to which the state is successful in this pursuit is also determined by spontaneously emerging feedback loops. If it succeeded in selling the consumer the necessity of fighting child pornography, the consumer will tolerate difficulties in receiving the corresponding advertising, and the increasing cost of the corresponding services. If it failed to sell the necessity of fighting alcohol consumption, the consumer enjoys the fact that they are at least not imprisoned for consumption, even though advertising, for example, is restricted.

Now, your question essentially concerned whether market institutions can allow third parties to restrict the advertising of certain products in which both the producers of the product and its consumers are interested. How effectively these third parties can perform the role of the state in this case, without being the state and without resorting to direct violence.

Answer: they can, but not as effectively as state institutions. The task of an influence group is to make a certain consumer behavior reprehensible, to make the person feel ashamed of it and, conversely, proud of avoiding it. If your advertising campaign proves successful — congratulations, your opponent is marginalized. If it proves unsuccessful — well, then you yourself end up as the marginals. Everything is fair.