Тег: Ancap

Book about ancap: third part started

I have started writing the third part of the book, about how exactly to build an ancap state, given the current state of affairs at the start. Naturally, I am beginning with an overview of the difficulties. So far we have a brief introduction and a chapter about our inner paternalist. I thought about writing a bit more right off the bat, but I got stuck for some reason, so I’m posting what I have.

I won’t nag about donations this time, as I successfully sold my debt tokens for exactly the amount I was counting on.

Finished writing the second part of the book about ancap

I have re-read everything written previously in its entirety, making minor edits to a couple of chapters as I went along, and then immediately finished the chapter on how ancap copes with the previously described difficulties associated with the imperfection of society. After that, all that remained was to summarize the second part of the book—and then I can proceed to the third and final part.

I can state that, overall, the book contains a fairly high concentration of my own original thoughts and definitions of terms. The structure of the presentation may also seem unfamiliar to those who have previously read other works on libertarianism. I hope this will not repel the reader, but rather spark their interest.

For those who find it more convenient to read on mobile devices rather than a large screen, the book is available in epub format.

And, of course, I cannot help but hint that the completion of the second part of the book is a great reason to donate so that I can celebrate this event.

Book about ancap – started the section on the imperfection of society

Since my recent posts have featured translations of smart books, it is high time to squeeze out another fragment of my own smart book. In the second part of the book, as the reader may recall, I first briefly described an ideal ancap, and then began to show the difficulties on the path to its implementation, dividing them into three categories: the imperfection of the world, the human, and society. Well, now I have slowly crawled my way to society.

Firstly, in a real society, the construction of ancap is hindered by communication difficulties — it is difficult, you know, to establish voluntary relations if you are unaware of what the counterparty’s good will consists of because you cannot understand them. Secondly, opportunism turns out to be a very harmful thing — when people may verbally acknowledge the appropriateness of observing the non-aggression principle, but find it hard to refrain from violating it in conditions where it leads to obvious personal gain (and sometimes to obvious gain for many people).

Every time I write another pair of chapters about the difficulties of ancap, I try to do it conscientiously enough that, in the process of writing, I begin to suspect that this is a disaster and there is truly nothing that can be done about it. So, I need some time to restore my emotional balance and counter my gloom with text about how the aforementioned difficulties are overcome. Fortunately, the second part of the book is nearing completion, and the third part will be about the tools for building ancap, which is a much more positive topic.

As usual, if you find it more convenient to read the book in e-reader format, you can download it; I try to maintain the current version on the website. And, as usual, if you have a desire to donate, do not delay the fulfillment of that desire.

Why doesn’t any sufficiently strong agent automatically become a state under ancap? How do you abolish the state without becoming a state?

Anonymous question

The state is an order that determines exactly how it is customary to systematically rob people in a given place. Anarchy implies a high degree of decentralization of power in society, where in the worst-case scenario, people unite into situational alliances to restore justice, and once the task is solved, the alliance begins to struggle with goal-setting and tends to dissolve. A certain analogy can be found in modern interstate relations: the NATO defensive alliance almost collapsed from neglect when the threat of the USSR vanished, but immediately revived and is ready to accept new members when the RF began rattling sabers. But for a victim of aggression to receive support under anarchy, they do not even need to formally belong to an alliance, which we can clearly see in the example of Ukraine.

The same applies to ancap: no one will object to a particular market agent becoming stronger: why not, if they satisfy their clients so well. But as soon as they begin to exercise non-market power, clients begin to flee, and competitors begin to consider which side is most convenient to strike from.

A sufficiently strong agent under ancap

Is this mechanism sufficient to ensure that ancap, once established, prospers for all eternity? I cannot guarantee it. Fukuyama deceived us: there is no end of history. The stability of ancap is based on economic incentives that prevent inefficient centralization, but anomalies cannot be ruled out. For example, the proof-of-work mechanism in Bitcoin is a good model of ancap, and we see that over time, the decentralization of mining only increases, yet the history of Bitcoin has by no means been devoid of crises related to miners’ attempts to dictate their will to coin holders. And a poorly balanced PoW, as we see in the example of ether, does not prevent the creator of the currency from ruling it unilaterally at all.

Liberal democracies are precisely an example of such crooked systems, where checks and balances are drawn on paper, but in fact, it still results in a vertical of power or, at best, an oligarchy. Designing a reasonable system of anarchic self-government from scratch and launching it instead of a particular state is a non-trivial task, and it does not occur to me how it could be implemented in the absence of crises. However, since the state is a system of robbery in which positive feedback loops are historically much stronger than negative ones (the more you have robbed, the easier it is to rob more—positive feedback; but the more you are hated—negative feedback), crises in states are inevitable. From time to time, I come up with some story about how, in one place or another, a transition from a rigid state to something like ancap occurs against the backdrop of a crisis. For instance, right here about liberal parliamentary democracy.

The Limits of the Competence of a Libertarian Court

You described a situation where, to resolve a conflict between a rapist and a victim, the court takes measures that physically isolate only the former from the latter, but not the former from society as a whole. But what about the fact that a rapist, who has demonstrated in practice a readiness for violence, continues to pose a potential danger to others while remaining free, even if in another city?

In other words, how should one deal with pathological personalities like Alexander Pichushkin, who, due to their mental characteristics, will continue to commit crimes as long as it is physically possible?

What are the general limits of deterrent measures for a court following libertarian principles? Does this mean that forced deportation to another city is permissible, but, for example, life-long house arrest or placement in a psychiatric clinic is not?

Anonymous question

The court can offer any recommendation to resolve a conflict. For example, “since the defendant’s actions are primarily caused by his mental state, the court believes that the conflict will be resolved after the defendant pays the plaintiff such-and-such compensation, as well as undergoes psychological rehabilitation until complete recovery, confirmed by a medical board including a representative of the plaintiff, a representative of the rehabilitation institution, and a representative of such-and-such independent medical non-profit organization.” The problem is that within its decision, the court can only operate with the funds available to the parties of the process, including those voluntarily provided by third parties. If the defendant is not wealthy enough for his assets to pay for his rehabilitation, and the plaintiff or third-party benefactors are not generous enough to make such a broad gesture, then the court’s recommendations will in no way resolve the conflict; there will be no means to execute them.

In such cases, cheaper solutions will inevitably come into play. The simplest is a banal declaration of outlawry, in the Old Icelandic spirit. The first person they meet has the right to kill the defendant, and the court, by its authority, guarantees that other means of resolving the conflict in this case do not work or are prohibitively expensive. And that’s it—then the defendant searches for a stump to hide under themselves, to live there and keep a low profile.

The poorer and harsher a society is, the larger the proportion of court decisions of the “outlawry” type will be, and the fewer hesitations individuals will experience when encountering such an outlaw before exterminating them. If memory serves me correctly, the longest term an outlaw managed to survive in Iceland was sixteen years, and this remarkable epic was honored with a separate saga.

Accordingly, the wealthier and more benevolent a society is, the larger the proportion of court decisions of the “hand over to the guardianship of such-and-such charitable foundation for rehabilitation” type will be. Again, nothing prevents such foundations from picking up those who have already been declared outlaws. What will compel people to donate money to such foundations? An unwillingness to personally shoot outlaws who wander onto the lawn in front of their house. And so—you donate some money to good people and be happy.

Admit it, an unpleasant sight. Why would you want that in your yard?

The book about ancap – finished polishing the section on human imperfection

I have finished the chapter about the likely approaches in an anarcho-capitalist society to solving problems related to the fact that a real person is by nature not necessarily always fully ready to act as a full legal subject, as well as the fact that their planning horizon may in some cases be extremely short. Now all that remains is to finish the section on the non-ideality of society, and then I can summarize the second part of the book.

As a reminder, the book can be read online by chapters, or it can be downloaded for offline reading in e-book formats. I suspect the latter will be relevant for most only after the book is completed, but just in case, I keep this file up to date. And while I’m at it, I’ll remind you that I am always glad to receive your donations and comments. Regarding this book, I welcome comments even more, as they can help improve the text.

A book about ancap – analyzing the imperfection of man

After venting about the sudden outbreak of war, I took a bit of a break, and now I am gradually returning to my routine. I have started the second section of the second part of the book on ancap—it sounds soothingly boring and mundane, exactly what the doctor ordered.

Right out of the gate, I wrote a short introduction to the section, a chapter on the fact that a person is not fully a legal subject (ancap and children are an eternal theme), as well as a chapter on the fact that humans are mortal, and this also hinders the triumphant march of ancap.

Humans have many other shortcomings, but I will leave the dwelling on them for next time, and perhaps then I’ll get around to discussing what we should do with all of this.

What if a monopoly has a larger economic cushion and can operate at a loss for several years?

How do you plan to fight it? How will small companies, even those with large investors, be able to withstand a giant, and will investors even take such risks by investing money in small companies? Yes, I know the arguments that monopolies cannot arise, but what if it happens anyway, and moreover, I understand that ancap is not planned to be built from scratch, but on an existing market where large producers already exist.

Anonymous question

A monopoly is the desired and most comfortable state for any business. Under the conditions of centralized political power, large businesses are economically motivated to engage in lobbying to ensure a privileged position in the market through regulatory capture. Small businesses are economically motivated to create associations and engage in lobbying through them. In a country with a sufficiently diversified economy, this creates a situation where most entrepreneurs, one way or another, feed politicians, regulations become more complex, exceptions to the rules multiply, and business, having spent a lot of effort acquiring the regulator’s favor, in the best case remains where it started. If strategic industries are singled out in a state, then all is lost: this means the guaranteed infringement of other industries.

And so, according to the problem’s conditions, we have managed to gradually move from this depressing situation to a free market, primarily free from political power. Let’s assume this happened quite quickly, and we inherited a skewed market where some enterprises are disproportionately large, even up to monopolies in certain industries. What does this mean? If they are larger than is economically feasible, it means they produce their goods with higher costs than if they were smaller. At the same time, they have serious reserves and prevent the emergence of small competitors by supplying their goods at a loss. This only means that some small (and therefore more economically efficient than the monopoly monster) entrepreneurs will constantly try to enter this market, thereby creating pressure on the monopolist, preventing it from relaxing and raising prices to a comfortable level. Speculators will stockpile its goods by buying them cheaply, and as soon as the monopolist raises the price, the stockpiles will be sold for a profit, forcing the monopolist to lower the price again. This will continue until the monopolist’s shareholders replace the directors with more sensible ones, because they want stock growth and dividends, not all of this.

The small players, who all this time were simply doing something else where there was no monopoly, will then breathe a sigh of relief and flood the newly opened market. And the consumer, all the time while the goods were sold at a loss, was happy and had no reason to be outraged by the monopolist’s behavior. So why fight a dumping monopolist? He is doing great; this is what socially responsible business looks like under ancap.

What will happen to abandoned buildings under ancap?

1) Youth often sneak into an abandoned building, which displeases many city dwellers: you never know what might happen. Can they, and in what way, organize its security, fence it off, or demolish it entirely? Would the installation of a fence by a concerned public be a restriction of the freedom of urban exploration enthusiasts?
2) A group of squatters has settled in an empty cinema, arranged their own electricity (finding people on the free market who agreed to connect them), and lives there, organizing non-conformist concerts right in the cinema hall and inviting hitchhikers for overnight stays. Some believe this negatively affects property values in the area. Can anything be done about them?
3) A developer saw an unfinished business center and wanted to complete it and put it into operation. The last owner of the unfinished building is either unknown, unresponsive, or has already been dissolved as a legal entity. What should the developer do?
4) An initiative group of citizens wants to demolish an abandoned building and create a park in its place; many district residents have signed in support of the idea. However, the squatters living there do not want to move. They appeal to the right of the property they have acquired and the lack of rights to it by outside citizens, while the activists appeal to the illegality of the squatters’ settlement and their lack of any rights to such housing. Who is right and what is to be done?

Stalker

So, we have a city, which is a fairly dense settlement where the rights of its inhabitants to certain spatial objects are complex, mutually conditional, mutually overlapping, and constantly enter into minor collisions, and this is perceived as the norm. A person pays for developed infrastructure not only with money, but also by the fact that they are constantly bothered to some extent by their neighbors. Sometimes collisions become significant, and then they require a resolution.

Let me remind you of the principles of legitimate acquisition of property rights under ancap: homesteading, exchange, restitution, production. How can sufficiently clear property rights to an abandoned building be acquired in the complex conditions described above? Squatters quite logically apply the first method and occupy an empty building simply because no one before them used this method. What will protect them from indignant neighbors appearing on their doorstep tomorrow, waving the Lockean proviso? Only the other three methods of acquiring property rights.

  1. Voluntary exchange. Squatters can agree with other city residents on what specific benefits they will provide in exchange for the recognition of their right to the squat. For example, organizing those very concerts, providing shelter for the homeless, maintaining the neat appearance of the building, or paying utility bills.
  2. Restitution. Squatters could stand on the threshold of their new property with guns and declare that those who contest their ownership can only take it from their cold dead bodies. The willingness to bear the costs of war to protect one’s property has always been a very strong argument in favor of recognizing property rights, provided that someone else’s rights do not appear more compelling (and in the case of an abandoned building, no one has more compelling rights than the squatters). Squatters could also announce that as restitution for seizing the property (and thus for taking away the right to seize the same property from other potential claimants), they are ready to donate a certain amount to a city improvement fund. Agreement to accept the money would mean recognition of the legitimacy of the squatting.
  3. Production. Squatters can begin converting the seized building for their own needs, and then anyone who might claim an alternative use for the abandoned building will calculate that if they had, for example, forcibly evicted them a month ago when they first moved in, and the squatters had sued, they would have received at most the price of a hostel rental for a couple of nights. But today, they would already be demanding reimbursement for all the effort and resources invested in the squat.

I have outlined what the squatters should do. But what should the citizens do if they really do not want abandoned buildings to end up in the hands of just anyone? Simply avoid their formation whenever possible. For example, utility service contracts could include a clause stating that if the owner of the serviced object loses their right without terminating the service agreement, then until a new owner takes possession, the provider continues service at the latest applicable rates as a loan secured by the object. Thus, squatters find themselves in a situation: this house belongs to no one; it is collateral for the companies providing water, electricity, internet, sewer services, and waste removal. If any one of these companies needs the house, it will squat it itself (but it will have to negotiate a buyout with the others). And if none of them need it, they will all be happy with anyone willing to take the building on their balance sheet and pay off the utility debts.

I have provided only one possible mechanism, but there could be any others, including a city fund for abandoned buildings, to which citizens donate funds so that it can be the first to squat abandoned buildings, create groups for discussing their best use, search for investors, and so on. And if people who do not inspire enthusiasm among the citizens have already moved into a particular abandoned building, this same fund could act as a negotiator to change the format of the squat’s use or pay the squatters a buyout to move out.

Ancap and the Imperfect World

Summarized the first section of the second part of my book about ancap: in the first two chapters, I covered the problems caused by the imperfection of the world, and now I’ve added a chapter about how ancap overcomes this family of problems. The chapter is short, but I’ve packed into it the main approaches from Friedman’s talmud The Machinery of Freedom, which first required me to tackle said talmud—something I suggest you do as well, as it’s far more interesting than my work.

Further, I plan to proceed in a similar manner with the family of problems caused by the imperfection of humans and the imperfection of human society.