A question regarding military actions in Ancapistan

For example, there is a large amorphous country in the north of the continent; the climate there is cold, there are few valuable resources, and a freedom-loving people live there, where almost everyone has an AK under their bed. There are cities in Ancapistan, where order is maintained by private companies and a small PMC for special operations.
Suddenly, some valuable resource is found in this beautiful country. A neighboring country, Etatistan, is an ordinary country with corruption and standing armed forces (of a sort). And Etatistan decided to seize this resource. It failed to acquire it through market methods (the landowner did not sell his land, and blackmailing him to get it also failed), and Etatistan declares war on Ancapistan.
And my question is: how can Ancapistan defend itself in order to maintain its independence and remain Ancapistan?
How can an armed people, who have plenty of firearms and light armored vehicles (like jeeps and BMPs), withstand an army with aviation and heavy equipment?

Baker

This question has been hanging for a long time; I was too lazy to answer it because I had already answered a very similar one. And then a post on the Freedom pride channel appeared, which touches upon a related topic. Why not take advantage of such a free ride?

As is easy to see, the topic of direct military confrontation between a non-state society and a state military machine worries many, because war is historically the most important thing a state had to be able to do if it wanted to survive; and thanks to its competencies in military affairs, practically the entire Earth is today divided among states, while non-state societies lead a marginal existence on the fringes of civilization.

Zolotorev, whom I am quoting, emphasizes that the ancap community, all other things being equal, is definitely wealthier than the state; due to decentralization, it can afford more flexible tactics, and the costs of implementing a state from scratch on the territory of Ancapistan conquered by the state would be disproportionately high for the state—in other words, the game would not be worth the candle.

Freedom pride shows why it would be difficult for a single gang to seize power in a conditions of an already established ancap. But it also states that if it were not a gang, but a state, it would become a problem.

Therefore, in conclusion, I want to suggest you read my longread on the doctrine of deterrence, which shows exactly that a means has already been invented to prevent a state from attacking you—the threat of guaranteed destruction of the state leader. The state is centralized, and this is its weakest point: it is enough to demotivate a very small circle of people from attacking, and the attack will not take place.

So, of course, an AK under the pillow is great sports equipment, but the key role in the conflict will be played by that very small PMC for special operations you described. This “department for working with difficult clients” at the insurance company, in the event of military action, simply captures the commander-in-chief of Etatistan and twists his balls until he agrees to withdraw the troops and pay a penalty. And if they can’t capture him alive, the problem will be solved by a dozen Tomahawks or something along those lines. This is significantly cheaper than heavy armored vehicles and other means of destroying large military formations that Etatistan possesses.

I will note that Etatistan cannot respond symmetrically, as there is no government in Ancapistan. And even sabotage at a PMC military base would only lead to the insurance company simply having to hire another PMC somewhere else, or simply announcing a substantial reward for the head of the dictator of Etatistan.

Although, to be honest, personally I don’t quite understand why the deposit could not be acquired through market means. Everything has its price, and if a price per share with a large premium to the market is offered, what is the point of refusing? But since that is the condition of the problem, then the word goes to the Tomahawks, provided that the shareholders of the deposit are willing to pay for it.

A so-so rocket against a so-so target

How will a country without a state represent itself to other states?

Choosing a private representative? An armed population is great, but tanks, planes, and missiles—who sells them, who buys them, and consequently, who stores them? And obviously, how does a private individual profit from this? Donations? Or will they offer to protect a certain part of the population? Quite strange. Military personnel will go, for example, into various PMCs and become mercenaries, but what about deterrent weapons? A private individual will be paid from the outside, and that’s it. Kaput. Cosmopolitanism is cool, but this scenario is quite real. Again, terrorist attacks carried out for the purpose of intimidation, or due to disagreement with the population based on certain criteria. Who will investigate them? Private security organizations that engage in security activities? People who are interested in what happened? Quite likely. What about firefighters, who are supposed to arrive after the fact? They arrive, but the homeowner is gone, or simply doesn’t exist because the plot of land is a wasteland. Let it burn? Will the city saved from the fire pay them via donations? “Donations” is a crude word, but essentially, if people aren’t obligated to pay for it, they will more likely pay into insurance, and the insurance companies will handle it? Consequently, each insurance company will have its own ties with firefighters, etc. Okay, I answered that myself. But as for weapons of mass destruction and heavy military equipment, it’s still unclear.

Royal hacker

It is quite difficult to answer such broad questions, so I will focus on the very first part.

Indeed, there is a rather peculiar service that seemingly only a state can provide to a person: the service of representation before another state. States do not consider citizens of other states to be subjects of treaties. They negotiate with other states, while citizens and companies act as objects of agreements. This applies to trade tariffs and regulations, visa regimes, and the extradition of criminals. How can the market respond to such rudeness?

Fortunately, states can make decisions regarding foreigners not only in a bilateral but also in an autistic mode. For example, issuing an order that products receiving certain certificates are not subject to customs duties. This means nothing prevents the company issuing the certificates from working with influence groups in those countries that are of interest as a sales market. Similarly, some consortium of travel agencies could work with lobbyists regarding a visa-free regime for buyers of certain tour packages. In general, the task looks difficult but solvable, although it seems more likely to me to obtain visas by purchasing some convenient citizenship (and the more wealthy apatrides wanting to travel there are in the market, the more various small island states will compete for them, and due to the volume, the price of the matter will quite quickly drop to a quite acceptable level).

It is more difficult with the pursuit of criminals. I once wrote about the functions of a prison under ancap, arguing that the criminal needs it primarily as a refuge from retribution. If a criminal has the opportunity to flee to the territory of a state, they effectively receive the same refuge, just without being locked within four walls. On the other hand, the state in terms of protection is a prison for the poor. That is, protection exists, but it is purely nominal. So, if someone hiding on the territory of a state manages to be discovered (which is a quite feasible and legal task for private detective agencies, which they can perfectly perform on the territory of a state), then one can either enter negotiations with them or deal with them in one way or another, since state structures are unlikely to be able to or want to protect them. Finally, one can threaten the criminal not with retribution, but with deportation to the state whose citizenship they acquired to cross the border, and there they can be judged by a state court. A mediocre solution, but threatening to hand one bandit over to other bandits for retribution if they don’t compensate for the damages is more or less permissible.

The rest of your long question is mainly devoted to issues of the use and sale of heavy weaponry. Nothing prevents a private company, operating on stateless territory, from producing weapons and legally supplying them to the territories of states if appropriate contracts are concluded with buyer companies (defense ministries can also act as such). Of course, national armies usually follow standards, and if a specific tank model has been adopted for armament, pushing through a procurement decision for another model is quite a hassle. But these are issues that are already being solved without state patronage, so under ancap, arms companies will handle this—they aren’t children.

As for the purchase of heavy weaponry by some hypothetical ancap PMCs, I personally do not believe in the market justification for such purchases, but I cannot provide clear arguments. Perhaps a few PMCs on stateless territory will go all out; after all, a tank biathlon is a quite monetizable show, something to keep them occupied in peacetime.

Anarcho-statism as the highest stage of ancap

Many people have insisted to me that a stateless society is impossible due to human nature. Man is a natural etatist; he always seeks a leader to follow, and in the absence of one, becomes one himself. This is confirmed by experiments on rats, the Stanford experiment, and many other independent studies, and it fully corresponds to the reality we observe. The time has come to admit that these guys are completely right; enough denying the obvious.

But who said that the current leaders are the only possible ones and there is no alternative? The “new transparency” that Ekaterina Schulmann tirelessly drones on about in her lectures clearly demonstrates to us the wretchedness of their motives and the shallowness of their minds. They are no better than we are, and we are no less worthy of ruling. The time has come for each of us to release our inner Leviathan!

It is the Leviathan, as Thomas Hobbes quite rightly notes, that is the only thing keeping humanity from a war of all against all. So, can two hundred Leviathans really save such a vast humanity? No, we need more Leviathans, otherwise the bright anarchist ideal will remain unattainable! Everyone reading this appeal must immediately declare themselves the authorized and sovereign ruler of their entire neighborhood, demand signs of respect from everyone around them, and begin collecting taxes, for it is precisely thanks to taxes that the construction of civilization is possible. Who, if not states, grants people all public goods? There are not enough public goods, which means we need more states!

Those who do not follow the appeal, fearing to recognize their own sovereignty, will only prove that they are unworthy of it. Well, there will always be those who take them under their benevolent patronage and make them their kind taxpayer. Thus, from shitty democracy, bypassing the pointless intermediate stage of monarchy, we will return once again to the ideal of natural aristocracy, in full accordance with the teachings of Hans-Hermann Hoppe—but on a new dialectical level, in full accordance with the teachings of Marx and Engels.

With this manifesto, I announce the founding of sovereign Ancapistan, the best of states. Bitcoins are declared the only legal means of payment in Ancapistan. Taxes are paid to the wallet 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8

Those who do not pay the tax will be left in Putin’s Russia. Is that really what you want?

Happy April 1st!