Libertarian Theory of War, starting to write a book

I think it’s enough throwing unstructured notes at you; it’s time to get started on the book itself.

The current version of the book will be available on my website at a fixed location at https://ancapchan.info/war/. Currently, there is a rough table of contents available there, which gives an idea of how I envision the structure of the future text. And to get things started, I am immediately posting a short preface.

The scale of the task scares me a little. Moreover, I don’t want to drag out the writing process for over a year, as happened with the basic book on ancap, but rather manage it a bit faster. Wish me luck, cheer me up with donations, criticize the text as it appears — let’s together expand the horizon of human conceptions of the world a little (well, okay, in our case, not so much about the world as about war).

Sketches on Libertarian War Theory. Part 2, on why the NAP is a poor criterion.

When I was writing the book on ancap, you could observe the results of the creative search process in real-time. After publication, the material was restructured; as a result of discussions in the comments, personal communication, and simply rereading the text, serious revisions to the wording were introduced, and a couple of chapters were discarded entirely, after which the second part of the book started over in a different vein. And this was while I was navigating relatively familiar territory: libertarian doctrine has long been and repeatedly laid out, and all that was required of me was its reimagining and a brief retelling.

As for the libertarian theory of war, this is uncharted territory, so I am not attempting to write a book right away, but am simply recording separate considerations for now. The only support I currently have are the questions laid out in the first part of the sketches that a libertarian theory of war should answer. These are the points I will go through.

How to determine when it is worth starting a war?

As a reminder, I define war as a class of conflicts in which, for at least one side, the survival of the opponent is not a deterrent factor. That is, to be strictly precise, the party to a conflict that is prepared to kill is waging war, while the party to a conflict that is not prepared to kill is not waging war, even if they are currently being attempted to be killed. Thus, even if someone is attacked with the intent to kill, they do not automatically find themselves in a state of war, but are free to choose for themselves whether to wage war or to evade it in some way.

Evasion can be direct: using passive defense, fleeing, hiding—something along those lines. Or it can be indirect: resorting to someone else’s protection. This immediately raises the problem of fuzzy boundaries. On one hand, even if a subject feeds and equips their protector, as well as pays them a salary and promises to recognize their ownership of captured trophies, they themselves are still not directly fighting. On the other hand, take a drone operator: they might be sitting a thousand kilometers from the target, sipping coffee and having nothing against the target of liquidation in general: should this operator be considered the one waging war—or their client, who feels enough antipathy toward the target of liquidation to shell out for the hire of an operator? How, fundamentally, does a drone operator differ from the drone itself? By the fact that they make the decision to kill? And what if the drone is controlled by AI and makes that decision itself?

In short, in conditions where there is a deep division of labor everywhere, finding someone who wages war completely independently is as easy as finding someone who lives entirely on subsistence farming.

By the way, this circumstance also complicates the precise determination of who started the war and, consequently, who the aggressor—that is, the initiator of violence—is. Parties can spend a long time inventively doing nasty things to each other, primarily through other people’s hands, and then some particular nasty act, for some reason, begins to be interpreted by observers as the start of a war and a legitimate reason to respond to aggression with all their military power.

What is my point in all this? That in the libertarian theory of war, it is not enough to simply say “NAP.” This is an abstract principle that can be applied to any interpersonal interaction to decide: in this specific elementary action, Vasya is the aggressor and Petya is the victim of aggression. And before that was an action in which Petya was the aggressor and Vasya the victim. And even earlier… and so on, until one grows tired. The aggressive IDF bombs Hamas. Well, yes, it bombs. If we take October 8, 2023, as the starting point, then the IDF is the aggressor. If October 7, 2023, then Hamas is the aggressor. Let’s wind further back into the past—and we slide into questions about land property rights, the content of sacred texts, and so on. In other words, the NAP as a criterion for when to start a war is inapplicable, at least in its pure form. At least when it comes to collective conflicts, rather than elementary situations like “you are just walking, someone lunges at you with a knife, and how to determine at what moment to shoot the attacker.”

With that, I conclude the second part of the notes; I didn’t even manage to fully analyze the first question, but it is better for me to post small notes more often, as the overall speed of work will be higher. In addition to sequential numbering and links to previous pieces of text, I will also use the tag LTV (libertarian theory of war) for these notes.

Sketches on Libertarian Theory of War. Part 1, Statement of the Problem.

Not long ago, I was listening to one of Vladimir Zolotorev’s Saturday sermons on the Libertarian.site channel (I’m too lazy to search for the specific sermon—the channel’s navigation is very mediocre), and he noted that the theory of war is poorly developed within libertarianism. This observation seemed fair to me, which means it is worth thinking in this direction.

War is a type of conflict in which the necessity of the opponent’s survival is not a deterrent factor for at least one party. If one of the parties to the conflict is destroyed, it means that the conflict, for all intents and purposes, has been resolved. Granted, this may give rise to new conflicts—with those who consider such a manner of resolving conflicts by the winner as a reason to assert claims against them.

To minimize such claims, humanity has developed certain customs of war. For instance, if a reliable casus belli is presented before entering a war, and collateral damage is minimized during the war by attempting to destroy only legitimate military targets, then according to these customs, such a manner of conducting war should not entail any sanctions, and may even help in acquiring allies.

However, this is all empiricism operating with collective subjects such as states, armies, peoples, and so on. Libertarianism, on the other hand, is about methodological subjectivism and individual responsibility. The fact that some collective imaginary entities are in a state of war does not create any moral obligations for a specific person to enter the war on either side. At the same time, libertarian morality suggests entering conflicts on the just side, which means that libertarians may not be foreign to wars, even those where they are not the party subjected to a direct attack.

Vladimir Zolotorev proposes using the standard legal approach of peacetime to describe war within libertarianism: a lawsuit is filed against the party that caused the damage; in the case of collective actions, the lawsuit extends to the entire collective proportionally to their contribution; courts make decisions, the assets of the party that caused the damage are seized and sold on the market, and the proceeds are transferred to the plaintiff—and so on. Unfortunately, this model, which would have worked perfectly for a tribal society from the Icelandic sagas or, adjusted for capitalist realities, in some conditional Wild West, begins to stall heavily in a society where the system of kinship ties and personal obligations has been replaced by a system of formal hierarchy and various group identities, such as religion or nation.

Obviously, in this situation, an obvious solution suggests itself to a libertarian—to simplify the task. In other words, let’s abolish states and all other imaginary collective entities, and then the analysis of conflicts will elegantly be reduced to a simple and clear basis of property disputes. Abolishing these mental parasites in reality is, undoubtedly, a boon for all humanity; however, if we close our eyes to their existence right now and analyze reality as if these entities did not exist, they will not instantly disappear because of it.

This was simply a pointer to some difficulties in considering such a phenomenon as war; naturally, it is far from exhaustive.

A viable theory of war in libertarianism must answer several diverse questions:

How to determine when it is worth starting a war?
How to determine the just side in a war?
How to determine the appropriate degree of one’s own participation in a war?
How to determine that a war is being waged against you?
How to determine who is waging war against you?
How to determine what collateral damage is permissible?
How to determine appropriate compensation for direct and collateral damage?
How to determine when it is time to end the war?
How to determine on what terms the war should be ended?

I do not yet have the sought-after theory; I want to think about the necessary formulations in my spare time. Your comments may prove to be very useful. I hope to be able to share the results of these reflections soon.

How should a libertarian behave if they find out that children in their neighbors’ family are being subjected to domestic violence?

Yesterday we were sitting in a club, and someone asks me: so, apparently, at the MTL-lunch Svetov was grilled with questions, and he didn’t answer the subject, so what, you wonder, do you think about this?

In Svetov’s defense, I will immediately note that if he is incriminated for communicating via canned responses, then I, as a rule, base my answers on my own previous responses to similar questions, or on more general concepts I have formulated earlier. Therefore, here you go, to start with, the answer to a related question about what a child should do when they are subjected to domestic violence. And then I will expand the thought on what third parties should do when they encounter violence against other people’s children.

Libertarian morality dictates intervening in conflicts on the just side. Justice is the feeling of proportionality between the value of the subject of the conflict and the damage caused during the conflict. Therefore, the first thing to do when seeing a conflict is to quickly determine by eye what the subject of the conflict is, compare it with the damage suffered by the parties involved, and then make a decision for oneself whether to intervene or not.

However, in the case of children, the situation is complicated by the fact that a child is not fully a legal subject and is under the jurisdiction of the parent, and damn strong grounds are required to invade someone else’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the best tactic our hypothetical libertarian can adhere to is to attract a sufficiently substantial support group to their side. These could be other neighbors (a neighbor can most easily justify why this conflict concerns them at all—they hear it, see it, and feel irritation), but one can also attract simply outsiders, as long as they are ready to express their independent opinion about what is happening.

In some ways, this process is similar to bitcoin mining. In conditions of conflicting chains, the one backed by the most accumulated hash rate is considered true. Similarly, in our case—the parent provides justifications for their correctness and attracts supporters of their position—and the neighbor, opposing the violence against the child, provides their own arguments and attracts their own supporters. Each supporter acts as a node in the network with their own hash rate, that is, the ability to impose costs on the opposing side. If those who speak out against domestic violence are able to cause serious problems, this becomes a strong argument to stop the violence or avoid the problems some other way, for example, by moving.

Of course, the clash of positions will not necessarily be so harsh; it is quite likely that the parties will reach a compromise. For example, an agreement may be reached that on payday the child goes to stay overnight with a neighbor, and then the parents can drink to their heart’s content while the child is safe. Or the neighbors might propose a system of non-violent penalties for the child if they are indeed prone to causing serious damage to those around them.

Nevertheless, it is always useful to keep the scenario of possible escalation in mind, so as to intervene in others’ conflicts with a view to one’s own capabilities. And to upgrade those capabilities in advance.

Libertarianism, weapons, and the presumption of trust

Mikhail Pozharsky released a very good video with an incorrect title: Why we are afraid of weapons.

It would have been more correct to call it “Why they are afraid of weapons.” Or even better, “Why we are not afraid of weapons.” I am talking about us, libertarians, or, to be less broad, about the people of Montellibero, regarding whom I am absolutely certain about their attitude toward weapons, and it is indeed as Mikhail describes.

Indeed, by recognizing the right of one’s neighbor to be armed, we thereby show trust in them. The best gift for a child is a knife. What kind of child is without a knife? In all classical children’s literature, all children have knives. Well, alright, the male half.

I didn’t have a knife in my childhood. But my first boyfriend won me over by offering to show me, right from the start, the nagayka whip he had made for himself. He was the one who gave me my first knife; how could I not melt from such trust?

And although he was from some leftist sect, and we broke up after a couple of months, this episode played its important role. Every time I hear this “you want to give weapons to everyone so that they all kill each other,” I am sincerely surprised: first of all, why “give away” suddenly? Let them buy them themselves, or accept them as gifts from people who care for them; and secondly, why would they suddenly kill each other? Are they stupid or something?

This basic presumption of trust in people is very characteristic of libertarians. If a person is convinced that people are a gathering of vices, then they cannot become anything other than an etatist, hoping for someone’s firm hand to bring everyone to heel. They say there are also religious libertarians who, considering man a vessel of sin, rely on the Lord and imagine themselves as His instrument, but that is some overseas heresy that I cannot judge with certainty; I only know that it is not characteristic of the people of Montellibero.

In general, thanks to Mikhail for the good formulations; the video is food for thought.

There was also something there about psychopathy, but let Bitarch and Voluntarist reflect on that; it’s their theme.

Another introductory video about libertarianism from Svetov

Mikhail Svetov has released another introductory video about libertarianism.

Apparently, the very first video on the SVTV channel, “Five Minutes About Libertarianism,” through which many people indeed first learned about this ideology, had ceased to satisfy him in some way.

Let’s compare what has changed.

The old video is a tongue-twister of tightly edited libertarian talking points, weakly linked into a single logical line. Key points: libertarianism is about the fact that the end does not justify the means, about the victim’s right to protection from violence, and about the right to love and hate. Libertarianism is a moral compass. The video contains mentions of Mikhail’s personal tastes, which are unrelated to the topic.

The new video is read in the measured tone of a storyteller, equipped with simple but quite captivating animation, and is far more logically precise.

I, of course, do not like the very beginning of the video, where self-ownership is presented as something inherent and given by someone unknown, while the non-aggression principle is for some reason called a contract. Why not the other way around: a contract on self-ownership and an inherent natural right to resist violence? This is, in general, important, because according to Mikhail, violating the non-aggression contract removes a person from the legal field, and here the question arises: what exactly is the legal field?

By the way, the visuals in this part directly contradict the text. An aggressor threatens violence, thereby supposedly exiting the legal field; an external defender appears, and what does the aggressor do? He drops the knife and surrenders. That is, he resorts to a legal procedure! He demonstrates that he is no longer an aggressor, and that shooting him from all barrels is no longer so attractive in the eyes of an outside observer. In other words, the aggressor does not exit any legal field. Or rather, he exits it precisely at the moment of aggression, when it is permissible to pump him full of lead. At least, that is how it can be understood from the video.

In short, Svetov has never been distinguished by the rigor of his conceptual framework, but for a politician, this is an excessive requirement; his job is to attract an audience. The video should presumably handle this quite well, and I can boldly recommend it for distribution.

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. The chapter in which the author analyzes Rawls’s critique of libertarianism.

I have translated another chapter of Eric Mack’s book Libertarianism. Here, the author briefly (well, as far as the word “briefly” applies to Eric Mack) explains that when Rawls tries to explain why libertarians are wrong by denying the need for a certain basic structure introduced by Rawls—which would impose uniform rules and procedures on everyone in the name of justice—he cannot simultaneously claim that this structure will be white and fluffy, introducing clear and reasonable rules according to which one can pay taxes and sleep soundly. No, according to Rawls, taxes will need to be paid, but that will not give you the right to sleep soundly: after the fact, your income may still be deemed unfair, and you will be forced to shell out more in the name of justice.

By the way, speaking of shelling out. My access to my Qiwi wallet was blocked, and when I tried to recover it, I discovered that with all my moves, I had long since lost the Russian SIM card it was linked to. I managed to withdraw the money, but I no longer consider this channel of receiving funds reliable. Thus, you no longer have the option to donate to me in state-regulated fiat instruments (and all posts in the private channel on Boosty are now open—you are unlikely to find much interesting there). For one-time donations, only various types of cryptocurrencies remain at your service (I especially recommend tokens circulating within the Montelibero project). Cryptocurrency wallets are usually not designed for regular donations; that requires custodial storage. So, as a temporary workaround, you can simply set a monthly reminder for yourself to “donate to Ancap-chan”.

Why is it forbidden to sell children into slavery? And how will private police maintain order if it is more profitable to steal?

Anonymous question

The second question is quite simple, so I will answer it first. For a private security guard, it is also more profitable to steal products from the store than to ensure others do not steal. But only in the short term; afterwards, he is fired, with more or less of a scandal. It is important not to give him powers beyond those strictly required to perform his job duties; otherwise, he will not only steal but also intimidate other staff to cover up the theft by creating fictitious reports for the owners. I do not exclude that such schemes do arise in some places due to the negligence of store owners, but usually, there is a system of incentives that makes such behavior unlikely and prevents it from going too far.

Now let’s talk about children.

To begin with, I will note that even now, under the state, children are quite readily sold into slavery. And I am not even talking about state slavery, such as the forced labor of Uzbek schoolchildren collecting cotton, but about private slavery, which is forbidden by that very same state. Nevertheless, it is precisely under the state that the incentive system for the police, as highlighted in the answer to the first question, is such that it may be more profitable for the police to sell children into slavery themselves or to protect such trade. Private child labor slavery is more characteristic of some part of Sub-Saharan Africa with its rather primitive mining industry. In wealthier countries, sexual slavery is more prevalent.

The question is, why does all this hardly concern the authors of questions about child slavery under ancap? It is easy to answer. Under the state, private child slavery is considered marginal; it takes place somewhere far away and does not catch the eye. The authors of the questions are concerned specifically about a potential situation where such slavery is respectable. When you encounter it on the street and in the information space at every step, and therefore have to put up with the existence of this phenomenon, and if you try to fight it with means of moral pressure, you yourself find yourself in the skin of a marginal who prevents decent people from behaving in their usual way.

Could child slavery become a respectable practice in the ancap community? Of course, it could. According to the principles of libertarianism, restitution is a perfectly legitimate way of acquiring property, and if, for example, a child damaged some expensive property (which children sometimes do), then it is perfectly permissible to demand compensation from the child and even collect it by force, since the child possesses self-ownership, and at what age full legal capacity is assigned is a matter of convention. Restitution is perfectly permissible not only in monetary but also in-kind form; there you have the prerequisite for slavery.

Thus, practices where a child works off a broken neighbor’s window by mowing the neighbor’s lawn are more than likely under ancap, as they do not cause moral repulsion. What could prevent the development of harsher practices, where, for example, something is demanded from a child as restitution that an adult would find humiliating for themselves, such as filming in a BDSM video? It is that very moral repulsion that will prevent it. Too many people would be found who, applying the situation to themselves, would state that they would not agree to this for any amount of money, and therefore, to them personally, such restitution seems unfair (the subject of the conflict is valued as disproportionately less significant than the damage caused during restitution). Libertarian morality requires intervening in conflicts on the just side, so a child in such a situation would easily find defenders.

Well, if that is the case, then the authors of questions about child slavery under ancap can breathe a sigh of relief: it will certainly not get worse than under the state. They can continue to boycott manufacturers of clothing made using forced child labor and leave the ancaps alone.

Eric Mac. Libertarianism. The chapter in which the author first brushes against ancap.

In the chapter Anarchy, the minimal state without taxation and the minimal state with taxation, Eric Mack first touches upon the topic of ancap, which he had previously disdainfully neglected. It is amusing that the section where this topic arises is the final one in the book, concerning not even the exposition of libertarian doctrines, but rather the critique thereof. Well, what can you expect from academic philosophers.

Thanks to Alex Dvoretsky for the donation that motivated me to translate. In full accordance with the economic mainstream, the funding of public goods such as publishing things in open access should be underfunded, and yet your donations consistently feed me, although not to satiety.

There are only three chapters left to translate in the book. Usually, this means the process should speed up, because everyone is curious whether there will be a happy ending and if the main characters will get married. We shall see.

Correcting Libertarianism

As it happens, Carl Franco’s recent article Rethinking Libertarianism resonates strongly with the recent chapter I published lately from the nearly completed ancap handbook.

The author quickly sketches his own set of basic libertarian principles, then declares that advanced state redistribution and regulation can be perfectly derived from these principles, and if a typical libertarian for some reason refuses to follow these conclusions, then something is clearly wrong with them.

Next, it is demonstrated that if libertarians threw away their silly ideals of freedom and instead adopted the far more popular ideals of order, purity, reverence for authority, care, and other wonderful things, they would, of course, manage to make this new reshaped doctrine more popular than the current loser sect of freedom-worshippers.

There is a lot of quite valid criticism in the article; I won’t recount it all. I can only recommend rereading the chapter Anarchist Politics: On the Libertarian Party from Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom. I see no point in adding anything more to the grandfather’s words; he showed the direction of the evolution of libertarian politicians’ views and how to relate to it long ago.

Ancap-chan

I answer questions on ancap, libertarianism, economics, politics, ethics, law and occasionally on abstract topics.

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