The proposal to allocate a column for Miss Liberty on my channel split opinions almost down the middle, with an unusually high proportion of readers participating in the vote—usually, not many people bother to like or dislike. Therefore, she decided not to unsettle the audience with off-topic posts and started her own Telegram channel Right Libertarian Feminism.
Stop by, read the introductory article, subscribe if you feel like it, and invite your friends to subscribe if you think they would be interested.
Don’t know where to start promoting libertarian ideas to your mother or a friend? I’ll be blunt, because I’ve tried it myself more than once: don’t talk about the advantages of the free market, the absence of taxes, and regulations. Firstly, your interlocutor is unlikely to understand anything. Secondly, you must know the theory perfectly and avoid mistakes, as everyone has Google in their pocket now. You shouldn’t talk about personal freedom right away either, because a person’s views on drugs and gambling may not be libertarian at all.
What should you talk about then? The Stationary Bandit Theory (SBT). Your story should begin with the phrase “The state is a stationary bandit.” You need to instill in your interlocutor a sense of guilt for supporting the stationary bandit, as if they themselves are an accomplice to state violence and therefore a “complete maniac.” Turn them into a modern German, who feels guilt not just for themselves, but for ancestors who died long ago. The “state” structure exists only in the head; it is a quasi-religion (meaning the belief that people belonging to this structure have a “legitimate” right to initiate violence, while others are not allowed to). If a person feels guilt for supporting aggression, they will change their behavior, the state will begin to weaken and eventually lose its territorial monopoly, which is exactly what we are striving for.
If you haven’t read our article on SBT, I advise you to do so and give it to everyone to whom you are promoting ideas of freedom.
Although, it is quite possible that a slightly simplified but emotionally charged explanation of SBT will be more effective:
“States are organizations that unjustifiably appropriated supreme power over a certain territory through conquest, placing its population in direct subordination to themselves. The state arose not from freedom of association, but through a violation of the non-aggression principle.
You do not question the state’s right to kill, carry out confiscations, or arrest. Yet, if private individuals do this—you would call them murderers, thieves, and bandits. Don’t you find this hypocritical?
States are highly organized criminal organizations, like gangs that “racketeer” a particular territory, imposing their rules on its residents, collecting tribute (protection money) from them, and occasionally fighting other gangs for spheres of influence. The state has the same basis as any organized crime group—the violent imposition of its rules on captured territory. And today, there is nowhere to run from these gangs. They have divided the entire Earth among themselves.
How does the “Islamic State” group fundamentally differ from the states of “Saudi Arabia” and “Iran”? After all, their laws are roughly the same. The only difference is that IS is not recognized by other states. International recognition—that is the difference between a “legitimate” gang and an “illegitimate” one.
The main grievance against bandits is that they are bandits and take land or other goods from their victims through aggressive violence. These same bandits then write laws to create the feeling among others that what was looted belongs to them by right.
If people came to a wild land and began to develop it—they are colonists.
If they came to a land where other people lived and took it from them by force—they are bandits.
If they hold other people on their land by force—they are bandits, even if they refer to a “law” that they wrote themselves.
When you tell people that the state is a stationary bandit, it is quite possible that you will be asked one of the following questions. Be ready to answer them.
1) There is a “social contract” between citizens and the state. How can it be a bandit if it happens with the consent of the citizens?
If such a contract exists, show me the text! The Constitution is not a “social contract,” but one of the “laws” (which are actually orders, i.e., the arbitrary will of the stationary bandit); it’s not for nothing that it’s often called the “basic law.” Even if just one person in the country did not agree to this constitution, it cannot be considered a contract (which, by definition, requires the voluntary consent of all parties).
2) People are not protesting, which means they are satisfied with the status quo. Can’t the “social contract” be implicit?
Suppose a girl is raped by a maniac, and she is unable to put up a proper fight. Will you say that everything between them happened “by mutual consent” too?!
3) The state is not necessarily a “stationary bandit,” since there are examples in history of the emergence of proto-states—entities with a territorial monopoly not through violence (conquest), for example, like some poleis in Ancient Greece?
Such entities occupied in total no more than 0.1% of the Earth’s surface; the remaining 99.9% were seized by stationary bandits. Even if we assume that poleis, as voluntary associations, did indeed exist, this does not justify modern states with extensive borders that appeared through violence according to SBT. If we accept a hypothetical situation where stationary bandits never existed, we would now have, for example, 1% of the planet’s territory with voluntary territorial monopoly and 99% without it, with extraterritorial status (like international waters). Agree that this is far better than 100% of the planet under stationary bandits, which we have now. Libertarianism does not forbid the creation of voluntary communities and private cities with territorial monopoly, but this should not happen through violence, and people must retain the right to leave, and owners—to withdraw their land from such jurisdiction. This model is promoted, for example, by Mikhail Svetov.
4) At the moment when the bandits seized a certain territory, there were no laws prohibiting this, so what grievances can there be against them?
At the moment when millions of Jews were sent to gas chambers and burned in the ovens of Auschwitz, there were also no laws prohibiting this—that is exactly what the defendants said at the Nuremberg trials. As a result, they ended their lives with a noose around their necks, as befits any maniac and rapist who rejects the fundamental principles of morality and does not recognize the natural right of every person to life.
5) Yes, I agree, but what do you propose instead? Anarchy?
You can’t just simply abolish the state entirely in one or two steps. This would lead to the creation of a new and more cruel state, which would be an unmasked stationary bandit, as usually happens in a failed state situation. But you can make current states extraterritorial with competition between multiple jurisdictions in one territory. Then the current state will become just one of such jurisdictions (meaning you could choose another jurisdiction for yourself without flying to Alpha Centauri, but while continuing to live in your home in Russia). Such a system is called panarchy.
6) This will cause chaos. Without a monopoly on violence, a war of all against all will begin.
Diplomats for some reason don’t fight, haven’t you noticed? Although they have extraterritorial status (they obey the laws of their own state, not that of the territory they are on). Perhaps people fight among themselves in European cities like Basel and Geneva, where jurisdictional borders run right through houses? I haven’t noticed anything.
7) Personally, I feel more comfortable living in a familiar state with a territorial monopoly; I am a conservative and fear abrupt changes.
Currently, many libertarians would be quite satisfied with the non-interference of state supporters in the creation of new jurisdictions. People would gladly occupy unclaimed lands, experiment there with social orders convenient specifically for them, and not immediately attack capitals. This is a very moderate agenda, from which no one should experience discomfort. Various practices of social organization in these territories could be evolutionarily refined and gradually reach large cities in a mature form, without causing upheavals.
But you must also clearly understand that by opposing such a model, you directly initiate aggression against peaceful people through your support of the stationary bandit. If being a maniac does not cause you remorse, then be prepared for oceans of blood, the destruction of the economy, and the habitual way of life already in the city where you live.
8) Move to another country and build your Ancapistan there.
Why should I move anywhere?! I love my country and I hate the stationary bandit, who forcibly seized the territory and considers it, and everything on it, his property. But can a subject who acquired a thing using violence be considered a legitimate owner of anything? For example, a robber who took your phone on the street? By all principles of law—definitely not!
Comment from Ancap-chan
Everyone has their own experience of offline preaching; some find it more convenient to appeal to the Stationary Bandit Theory, and this text is for them. My practice shows that people usually understand anyway that the state is a stationary bandit, but for them, this means that it is “their own” and already tamed. And if it were removed, nomadic ones would swarm back, like in the nineties, and would act lawlessly. So one should seek an individual approach to the interlocutor, finding out beforehand what they fear.
Hello, give me a minute of your time, and I will tell you how the stationary bandit crucified our Lord Jesus; by the way, happy birthday to him!
On the left-anarchist channel Prometheus, the analysis of an overview article on libertarianism from the LPR website continues. Once again, the focus is on the non-aggression principle. The article under discussion simply explains what this principle is and indicates that it pertains to ethics. It is implied that the mechanisms for implementing this ethical principle are also ethical, meaning reputational. Naturally, the opponent notes that an ethical principle is an extremely shaky foundation for building a society.
Next, there are many reflections on how, in the author’s opinion, a libertarian society should ensure compliance with the aforementioned principle. Naturally, private military companies are mentioned—heaven forbid—and it is then quite logically pointed out that if they are hired by end clients for aggressive operations against competitors, everything will degenerate into the right of the strongest, and subsequently into the reinstallment of the state. Logistic problems are also pointed out, as a result of which each territory would be “protected” by its own security forces, and deploying security forces from a foreign territory would prove to be a costly endeavor.
What nuances did the author fail to consider?
Firstly, for some reason, he considers a situation in which certain private military companies have a monopoly on violence and contrasts them with classical anarchy, based on universal armament and voluntary territorial militias. But under free market conditions, anyone who wishes has the right to arm themselves, not just licensed companies, so potential lawlessness will be countered not by a powerless crowd, but by armed people.
Secondly, the insurance principle of the functioning of any rights enforcement companies is completely ignored. A situation in which a person hires thug-bodyguards is marginal. Much more often, a person simply buys insurance, and if they are attacked and suffer damage, it is an insurance event, and they can expect a payout from the company. This removes logistic problems (the insurance company has its own agreements with various local security groups for rapid response to serious insurance events, and for minor ones, it simply pays out the insurance and doesn’t sweat it). I won’t recount the script of my video on ancap; I just recommend watching it.
However, the fact that all these questions surfaced during the analysis of the article on libertarianism can safely be attributed to the article’s shortcomings. I hope someone from the LPR editorial staff considers this high-quality feedback from an ideologically kindred organization and uses it to improve the material.
Taking this opportunity, I will also announce that our next video will be entirely dedicated to the non-aggression principle. The video is currently being filmed. I hope we will also be able to resolve some of the left-wing audience’s questions regarding this principle.
Regarding yesterday’s note on comparing Bitcoin with low-inflation fiat, I received a detailed response. In short, it postulates the importance of stable prices when using a currency as a medium of exchange. To ensure this, a decentralized cryptocurrency fiat is proposed: a crypto whose emission parameters are set by a vote of the currency holders.
To this, I can briefly respond: if anything is a fundamental property of prices, it is their variability. Price carries information about the relative need for goods for specific buyers at a specific moment. If you want the price of a specific good, expressed in a specific currency, to remain unchanged, your only option is to peg the exchange rate of that currency to the value of that good—effectively backing the currency with the commodity. There is no problem with creating a Bitcoin sidechain, freezing a certain amount of Bitcoins, and pegging the tokens issued against them, for example, to oil. That’s it; now one barrel of, say, Brent costs one token. Always. You just have to monitor the collateral size, because if oil becomes significantly more expensive in Bitcoins, the collateral will have to be increased. At the same time, when buying some aluminum or grain with “oilcoins,” you will inevitably encounter price changes.
But all of this has nothing to do with direct democracy, because you can never predict in advance what emission parameters the holders of your crypto-fiat will set. Perhaps they won’t want stable prices for some basket of consumer goods, but will simply take advantage of the fact that the emitter always profits from emission—and issue more tokens to quickly buy up Bitcoins with them. Or do you intend to build a managed democracy and prevent holders from acting so unsightly?
After logically poking at the boundary conditions of the two principles (if a person belongs to themselves, they should be entitled to sell themselves, and may also be stripped of themselves by court decision; as for the application of the non-aggression principle, everything boils down to the definition of aggression, which is subjective, and one cannot build stable orders on such a shaky foundation), they point out that left-anarchism has a solution. As a solution, that same direct democracy is proposed: all orders are established by all members of society.
Here I can only point out that a society of total direct democracy would require some criteria for who to include in the set of voters for each specific issue. Where is the line that, once crossed, a person loses the right to vote on a certain topic because it does not concern them? If there is no such line, we get a society where everyone is obliged to ask everyone’s permission for everything—a legal absurdity worse than the city of Morlow from Interstate 60. I hope to see an answer in the following parts of the review (in the article I analyzed, there is no such answer).
The image of legal absurdity—may it haunt you as well
Not a day goes by without me coming across phrases like “ancap is a utopia,” “a fantasy world,” or “pink ponies.” Those who write this (usually authoritarian-right conservatives and traditionalists) apparently assume that by doing so, they are protecting stability. In reality, they are only ensuring that inevitable changes occur according to the harshest possible scenario for themselves.
Let’s look at history. What was said about the idea of a federal republic and the separation of powers in the early 18th century? It’s a utopia, a federal republic is impossible, and how dare you insult the king! What about the unacceptability of slavery and serfdom in the early 19th century? It is the nature of things; you are utopians! And what about women’s suffrage in the mid-19th century? It’s a utopia; where would a woman get a political position? She will vote however her husband tells her. Was it different with the rights of Black people and LGBTQ individuals in the 1950s? Have you eaten too many mushrooms, seeing a fantasy world with rainbows?! You don’t see it—people of different colors—so why on earth would a Black person be served in a whites-only bar?
Every time a new social ideology emerged, conservatives refused to recognize it until the very end. Society would reach a breaking point where enduring the status quo was no longer possible, after which necessary reforms were implemented haphazardly, by force, across the entire country at once. This inevitably caused excesses, enormous casualties and suffering, economic damage, and led to the creation of privileges for the previously oppressed group (now, conservatives in first-world countries complain that they are persecuted for criticizing LGBTQ people, but this is merely a natural response to their own previous lawlessness; the ashes of Alan Turing echo in the hearts of queer activists). In the end, conservatives each time received what they hate most—radical change, chaos, and repression. Yet they could have had peaceful development…
How does this relate to libertarianism? Currently, many libertarians would be quite satisfied with the non-interference of protectors in local self-government. People would willingly occupy unclaimed lands, experiment there with social orders that suited them specifically, and would not immediately aim for the capitals. This is a very moderate agenda that should cause no direct inconvenience to anyone. Various practices of social organization in these territories could be evolutionarily refined and gradually reach large cities in a mature form, without causing upheavals.
But no, these vigilantes stay alert, suppressing any independent initiative—from non-traditional sexual practices and immoral music to informal businesses and self-organizing communities—and they will eventually wait until they are beaten in the streets, until the state collapses with a default on social obligations, GDP drops several times over, impoverishment occurs, and gangster “roofs” appear, which, as Laxi Catal predicts, will become the prototype of the ECU. There is a well-known joke that Nicholas II should be posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin for his heroic efforts in bringing society to a revolutionary situation. Now, conservatives, as they did a century ago, are making the same mistake that cost the country tens of millions of lives, starting with their own.
Following a tip from the Antistate channel, I watched a video from the MGIMO political club, where all the main currents of libertarianism are explained in just over six minutes. For me, six minutes was taken up by the description of agorism alone (by the way, there will soon be one about ancap, and that will likely be even longer — I can’t help myself, I get carried away, and every new video ends up longer than the previous one).
Overall, it turned out to be a rather strange “Everything About Elephants”; I don’t quite understand the target audience of the video. For political science students — it’s too condensed. For grandmothers — it’s too saturated with terms. For school children — it’s not memey enough. It feels like they worked for a grade, although, in theory, the political club should be optional for students.
If you think I’m wrong, please let me know in the comments or in the chat. Perhaps I should make the presentation in my own videos more concise? After all, the younger political club channel has a thousand subscribers with only three released videos, while Libertarian Band has only eight hundred, so it wouldn’t be a sin to learn from colleagues, if I can figure out the trick)))
Here he is, the Naked Devil, the famous Estonian dismembering executioner!
Last time, I enjoyed responding not with one large text to a single question, but with short answers to a series of questions. A number of such topics that do not require detailed answers have accumulated in the queue.
Ancap-chi, it seems to me that it is better to promote the term “polystate” rather than “panarchy,” because the latter sounds too much like “anarchy,” and ordinary folks, as I think you know, are very triggered by that word.
It’s a matter of habit. Legend has it that the first libertarians in Russia were often mistaken for vegetarians. Minarchists, naturally, are mistakenly read by many as monarchists. As for the possibility of confusing panarchists with anarchists, at least that is not offensive, because panarchy is one of the paths to anarchy. It seems to me that terms like polystate make sense to be used as auxiliary for now. For example, “I am a panarchist, meaning I advocate for a polystate, or more accurately, for multiple governments within one country” (as Alexey Shustov correctly notes in one of his interviews, in the Russian language, the state is a subject, not a system, which creates inconvenience in political discussions, and it is better to use “country,” “government,” or “regime” depending on the context instead of the overly vague “state”).
I saw an ad for agorists here; they have an article about obtaining an anonymous debit card by forging appearance and a passport. Apparently, there is only administrative liability and a fine of up to 80 thousand for this, but perhaps you know better ways to remain anonymous when making purchases in fiat?
This refers to this post, where at the end I referred to an article from the Cryptoagora channel. By the way, in the post, describing crypto-ATMs, I wrote that they work only in one direction: buying bitcoins with fiat. Later, in Georgia, I verified that the reverse is also possible; there, I actually had to sell bitcoins. I just want to note that for greater anonymity, when approaching a crypto-ATM, you should wear dark glasses, pull something with a wide brim over your head, raise your collar—in short, hide your face as much as possible to shield yourself from cameras. Cameras can be located both in the crypto-ATM itself and around it. Also, of course, when you go to a crypto-ATM, it makes sense to take a phone with a “left” SIM card. All these paranoid measures are intended to complicate operational-investigative actions if you suddenly become their target for some reason.
Is it true that under anarcho-capitalism, intellectual property is not provided for?
Maxim
Any person has the right to monetize any of their intangible assets by any non-violent means. They have the right to use violence only in the case when they are attempted to be deprived of this asset entirely, but not when some information they possess is copied. Even if someone copies the private key to their bitcoin wallet, that is not yet theft. Theft is the use of the key to move bitcoins out of that wallet.
I just cannot understand who will act as the guarantor of compliance with the rules? What happens if some hypothetical Ramzan Akhmatovich in the role of a night watchman decides not just to guard the peace, but to start explaining a bit how people should live?
Noob
Any gatekeeper is inclined to increase their significance at the expense of those they are supposed to serve, i.e., the residents of the guarded facility. The only argument that can bring them to reason is the threat of monetary sanctions, and ultimately, dismissal. For the threat of dismissal to be real, there must be Ivan Petrovich, Ravshan Jamshutovich, Jet Li, and Sigurd Olafson standing behind the gates waiting to be hired. That is exactly why panarchism looks like a more sane idea than minarchism in terms of the possibilities of limiting power.
Civil society in Russia has been trying to rock the boat and change the government for something more human-like for quite some time now, in order to stop the country’s slide into an authoritarian hole. Alexei Navalny has long and firmly been the frontman of the Russian protest.
The core of Navalny’s agenda is the exploitation of the public demand for justice. Lawlessness, corruption, and the looting of the state budget—covering all these topics ensured Navalny’s well-deserved popularity. Nationalists tried to speak out against the infringement of the rights of the Russian-speaking population, but this aspect of justice proved not to be particularly in demand among the masses. Old-regime democrats peddled the theme of Russian foreign policy aggression, the tightening of civil liberties, and the escalation of political repression—but they only earned the label of “demshiza” (democratic crazies). Libertarians protested against increased regulation and higher taxes—they were completely ignored. Everything flowed in its own way until Svetov arrived.
In the eyes of the average citizen, Navalny’s agenda boiled down to the idea that once he comes to power, he will imprison all the crooks and thieves, thereby restoring justice. Svetov increased the level of populism even further, adding: those we don’t imprison, we will fire without severance pay and strip of their political rights. Such a demand for revenge, due to the use of the sophisticated word “Lustration,” did not resonate with people immediately, but aggressive advertising did its job. The Libertarian Party received a huge influx of fresh blood and rightfully took its place in the protest pantheon to the right of Navalny himself.
An interesting situation emerged where the theme of freedom practically vanished from the public discourse of the LPR, replaced by that very theme of justice, since this rhetoric brings more political points. The main task of the LPR now, judging by the rhetoric, is to overthrow the regime together with its allies; after that, they can distance themselves from Navalny and other fellow travelers and begin advocating for their own specific agenda of reforms. To what extent the Libertarian Party will preserve libertarian values within itself by that time is not yet very clear; however, it is becoming obvious that libertarianism is much broader than what the party does (and what is generally appropriate for a political party to do).
Previously, the activities of the LPR consisted not so much of politics as of education; now the situation has changed, and politics has come to the forefront. This is wonderful, as the division of labor usually contributes to greater efficiency of that very labor. At the same time, of course, it should be expected that those who are not interested in political activity at all, and who were members specifically for the sake of education, or who viewed it as a hobby club, will leave the party. This is logical, since many ancaps fundamentally believe that engaging in politics is pointless, and it would be far more appropriate, for example, to promote a libertarian lifestyle.
I believe that minarchists and panarchists may also receive some indirect profit from the spread of ancap ideas among the apolitical masses, and ancaps are unlikely to lose from having a conditionally friendly political representation—after all, they have nothing against using the state’s weak points to weaken it. Therefore, I urge you not to interfere with libertarians getting into politics, not to quarrel with LPR members, but also not to believe that this party is the only beacon of hope, and that any libertarian activity must be somehow coordinated with this political organization.
However, entering politics under libertarian slogans outside of the LPR is already a serious claim that the libertarian market niche is large and capable of accommodating more than one libertarian party. Perhaps this is true, but here you will have to be ready for fierce competition, which may prove counterproductive, as it diverts resources away from competing with pro-government organizations.
Libertarians in Navalny’s right hand, and coffee in his left. That is how we shall conquer!
Hooray, we did it! The most anticipated video of this summer has been released on the Libertarian Band channel, where I tried to explain panarchy in the simplest terms possible.
Panarchy for Grandmothers
In my opinion, this is the most successful of my scripts so far, and all the other project participants did a great job.
A bit of behind-the-scenes
In the spring, the team from this channel, with whom I had previously had sporadic experience collaborating, approached me with a request to write a script for a video so they could hold auditions for a new host. I decided that since all sorts of people would be auditioning, the text should be as simple as possible and aimed at the widest audience—an introduction to libertarianism. That’s how the script for “Libertarianism for Grandmothers” came about. During the auditions, they went through about five people, and as a result, the channel got a wonderful new face—Anton. Of course, it’s a bit a pity that the girl didn’t pass the casting; it would have been easier for me to prepare scripts for her, but I really like how it turned out.
Libertarianism for Grandmothers
The video spread quite well across various public pages and has received over 1,700 views to date, which already exceeds the audience of my own Telegram channel.
Then Bitarch approached me and suggested creating something equally accessible, but about panarchy. I had to disappoint him and reply that I wanted to create a cycle linked by the internal logic of the narrative, and the next one would be a description of minarchism. The video was released relatively recently, but for a reason I don’t understand, it wasn’t received as favorably by the audience. This is a bit strange because, on one hand, the entire agenda of the Libertarian Party in our country today is based on a minarchist platform, and on the other hand, the LP has never once explained its platform in video format, so the video on minarchism is almost the first of its kind. Please share it if you find it useful.
Minarchism for Grandmothers
Now the long-awaited panarchy is out. Following panarchy, there should be a “for grandmothers” description of such an interesting strategy as agorism. The text is already ready; all that’s left is to film and edit. There are many other interesting things planned, so please subscribe to Libertarian Band and recommend the channel to your friends.
Yes, a panarchist structure of power will most likely be freer than a centralized one. But the ideas of panarchy resemble a tool for state or social organization more. There is nothing in them about traditional libertarian self-ownership, and nothing is clear even regarding the freedom to exit a jurisdiction. Most academic articles acknowledge the need for an additional jurisdiction that ensures the legal capacity of people and their freedom from the oppression of panarchist jurisdictions. Panarchism as a tool could well be used by a quasi-statist regime: transforming the power of oligarchs into actual serfdom jurisdictions where corporate slaves have no right to exit. This results in the classic cyberpunk scenario that sci-fi writers warned about. For real freedom, we still need classic libertarian works: the concept of self-ownership, the NAP, and their political implementation, whether it be ancap or minarchism. And only then, if people need FOCJs, the market will decide. In short, there is no guarantee that panarchy leads to libertarianism, and I see no libertarian value in the idea of FOCJs itself.
One condition is fundamental for the correct functioning of FOCJs: the guarantee of political and economic competition. This means the openness and freedom of markets, specified in the “four freedoms”—the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital—all of which must be protected. At the same time, the political markets of FOCJs must be competitive, meaning that human rights and basic democratic rights must be guaranteed. This includes the right of people to use direct democracy as a tool. Like states, FOCJs will by nature strive to undermine any competition, following their commercial interests by attempting to build cartels or monopolies. This requires the existence of a “competition oversight board” responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules. This body will also regulate the limits of fees for entry contributions and exit penalties.
In other words, this article explicitly acknowledges that what they call “jurisdictions” must exist within a single legal regime. What the authors call “jurisdictions” looks less like jurisdictions in a political-legal sense and more like providers of certain services; their jurisdictional nature lies only in the fact that they obtain the right to “collect taxes.” A libertarian minimal state does not solve the problems the authors propose handing over to FOCJs, but rather the problems that allow FOCJs to exist and function.
Restricting trade is locally beneficial, which is why historically, people who gained power over a jurisdiction began introducing various fees, penalties, fines, and so on. One could say this was only possible because there was no exit from jurisdictions (and there wasn’t). The thing is, every jurisdiction will be interested in restricting exit, which is exactly what is discussed in the area of the FOCJ article excerpt I quoted above. That is why the authors themselves introduce some minarchist or ancap—it doesn’t matter which—body that stands above and before the FOCJ. And this is exactly what libertarians propose to implement. As for the FOCJs—let the free market decide.
Answer from Ancap-chan
You correctly noted the main shortcomings of the idea of functional overlapping competing jurisdictions proposed by Eichenberger and Frey: it is a certain optimization of existing government functionality without eliminating the key flaws of the state and without guarantees that a management system reformed in this way will not revert over time to a level of oppression as high as it is now. The internal protection against abuse in the FOCJ system is not much higher than in modern states.
The advantage of the FOCJ system is not that it offers the best solution, but that it offers a solution implementable within the specific framework of the European Union. In conditions where, due to flaws inherent in this political Frankenstein, one of the largest European economies is already separating from it, a political force that raises FOCJs on its banners has some chance of success. Moreover, FOCJs can be implemented locally first, and only then can the experience be extended to wider territories.
FOCJ is not panarchy. “Competing,” although it starts with the same letter as “contractual,” is not necessarily contractual, meaning there is no talk of voluntary entry into one jurisdiction or another. As a control mechanism, the authors propose good old representative democracy, which forms the corresponding bodies, as well as direct democracy, allowing local decisions to be made at the level of a particular FOCJ. I have written about the flaws of democracy, so I will not repeat myself.
You suggest the option: “first pure ancap, and then let the market decide if FOCJs are needed.” This brings us closer to Nozick’s speculations: let’s imagine we have pure ancap, and now I will demonstrate to you how it will over time transform into an ultra-minimal state without contradicting libertarian principles. Similarly, based on certain assumptions about human nature and what is just, one could probably derive that pure ancap will inevitably mutate over time into panarchy, i.e., a system of FOCJs.
Either way, for such reasoning to become relevant, one must first achieve pure ancap. Meanwhile, both minarchism and panarchy are ways of reducing state oppression that may or may not lead to pure ancap, and putting the cart before the horse here makes sense only as a thought experiment to determine how stable pure ancap is.
The remaining question is whether the FOCJ system can turn into panarchy over time, and whether that would then turn into ancap. If yes, then it makes sense to support it. If not, then it is a dead end, and FOCJ is as much an obstacle for a true ancap as a regular big state.
Here, as with any forecasts, I step onto the shaky ground of conjecture. My conjecture is that it is easier to bring sparkling cleanliness where it isn’t already heavily soiled, than where the initial cleaning requires bringing the waters of Alpheus and Peneus to the Augean stables. Switzerland, Singapore, North Korea, and Somalia are all far from ancap. For pure ancap to appear there, one must, first, abolish the state, and, second, ensure non-state institutions for the protection of private property. Of course, in Somalia it is easier to abolish the state, and in Switzerland it is easier to ensure the protection of private property, so choosing which of these countries is easier to establish ancap in may prove difficult. But comparing North Korea and Singapore, it is quite obvious that building ancap is easier in Singapore: the state is slightly weaker there, and property is much better protected. Likewise, it is sufficiently obvious that building ancap is easier in a Europe built on the basis of FOCJs than in the current European Union.
So I would wish the esteemed authors of the article on FOCJs a swift adoption of their ideas by European politicians. Even if FOCJ is not libertarianism, with FOCJ, libertarianism has a better chance.
Let Reiner and Bruno dig the canal, and we will come through with the broom afterward.
