Libertarian Band has launched a new section called “Question to Bitarch,” where the channel host answers on behalf of Bitarch. Naturally, all answers concern only the topic of fighting violence, which is being actively developed by Bitarch, and this is a respectable level of determination.
For my part, I should note that I am not particularly fond of Lorenz’s concept of aggression, which treats it as a kind of tension that accumulates and eventually bursts. I still prefer the version that aggression is one of the types of reaction to a stimulus (the desire to destroy the source of irritation), along with flight (the desire to avoid the stimulus) and patience (the desire to adapt to the stimulus while minimizing costs). If we proceed from the version of aggression as tension, then widespread armament can only contain this tension for a short time until it accumulates and breaks out in a bloodbath, so it is somewhat strange to me that Bitarch adopts this idea so uncritically.
As for the ways to eradicate violence, I am closer to the approach of Alexander Elesev from the Dobroum channel, who argues that there will be far fewer prerequisites for violence if people do not have experience with violence in the family. Not that everything works so straightforwardly, but it would be an important component of success. And the second component of success in eliminating systematic violence is the cultivation of intolerance toward it. Someone who steps in to break up a fight is always a good person, regardless of whether they might get hit by both sides; they are within their rights. If you want to fight, surround this ritual with rules, conduct it in the presence of witnesses, determine the criteria for victory, accept defeat if the rules require it, and fulfill the conditions you committed to in case of defeat. If you are not ready for such complexities, do not pick a fight.
I understand that these theses seem very raw, but this is not my field of expertise. I am glad that Bitarch continues to systematize his ideas while receiving feedback from readers. Perhaps I will receive some response from him regarding the considerations outlined above.
Between different jurisdictions, there has always been the question of maintaining strategic parity—that is, an equality of chances of emerging victorious in the event of a military conflict. Without this, it is impossible to either deter a potential aggressive attack or repel it should it occur. But what strategic parity can there be in the case of an excessive difference in power potential? And the problem here consists not only in the quantitative and qualitative difference in weaponry, but also in the difference in violent tendencies among people. However, a solution exists even for absolutely pacifist societies, which we will now discuss.
Imagine Scandinavia, where although violence has not been completely eradicated, certain social factors have clearly reinforced low violent tendencies in the vast majority of the population over time. Even among state security agents, violent tendencies there are relatively low; at the very least, they are not even close to the violent tendencies of similar agents from other countries, such as Russia. If we assume that a military conflict arises between the Scandinavian states and Russia, the latter would be able to seize them almost without a fight. Even weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons or a class 4 pathogenic virus, would not help if they suddenly came into the possession of the Scandinavians, for because of their pacifism, they would hardly dare to actually use them. And given a similarly pacifist army and the lack of a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population), for security forces highly prone to violence—those who previously toured actively in Donbas and Syria—it would be no problem at all to march across the entire territory of Scandinavia and easily deal with any possible resistance in their path.
This same problem can be transferred to a potential free stateless society in which different contractual jurisdictions exist. Imagine that in such a society there is a jurisdiction of pacifists, in which violence is completely eradicated, and any offenses are punished by non-violent methods (ostracism or financial sanctions). But alongside this, there exists a violent jurisdiction, in which all problems are solved by brute force and cruel physical punishments (such a jurisdiction might be created, for example, by some conservatives). Obviously, there is no strategic parity here either; the order of the second society will lead to the reinforcement of violent tendencies in its participants, whereas in the case of the first society, these tendencies will be maximally suppressed (reinforcing a strong version of Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism). I think it is easy to understand who would win in the event of a direct military conflict.
An excellent solution to the problem of maintaining strategic parity on the part of more pacifist jurisdictions and societies is the creation of gene therapy against violence. It could be implemented in the form of a drug delivered to attacking agents via a fired dart. In an extreme case, implementation as a pandemic virus is possible (we do not approve of this option). Of course, the latter faces many risks, including the fact that bystanders would be affected, some of whom might die (even with the highest quality vaccination, not everyone tolerates it). However, such a “non-violence virus” is not a traditional weapon of mass destruction in terms of the physical destruction of the attackers; it is intended only for the forced eradication of violence in the aggressor’s army and is therefore the best possible solution within the framework of the classical MAD doctrine (Mutual Assured Destruction) that can be imagined if there is no chance of stopping the aggressor through immediate resistance.
Both darts with the drug and a pandemic “non-violence virus” (personally, I do not approve of this option, but the opinions of others regarding the admissibility of such a “weapon” may differ) could be used even by fierce pacifists, given that such a “weapon” does not initiate violence in the biological sense, and even a person with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism would be able to apply it. They would allow for the deterrence of potential aggressors, as they would fear losing their violent tendencies as a result of attacking pacifists. But if someone still decides to attack, then we will arrive at the following scenarios:
1) Security agents sent to the front by the aggressor will come under fire from darts with gene therapy. And these darts will reach their target far more often than bullets do now, because soldiers, for the most part, are not rapists or violent criminals; they most often try to simulate activity at the front, avoid shooting, and if they do shoot, it is not at people on the other side of the front, but into the air, again, merely to create the illusion of performing some activity. There are quite few actual violent criminals in war, and this is confirmed by research, which you can find here. But anyone can fire a dart. And if the darts accurately hit the soldiers on the other side of the front, including those actually prone to violence, then the aggressor will soon find themselves completely without people capable of pushing the war further.
2) It is impossible to stop the attack; even darts with gene therapy are not enough to deter the overwhelming forces of the aggressor. In such a case, a pandemic “non-violence virus” is deployed across the front. After this, a few weeks may be enough for the aggressor’s forces to be completely disorganized and the soldiers to turn into pacifists incapable of attack. The war ends quite quickly.
Do you see now what an effective means of deterrence and ending war gene therapy against violence is? In principle, this is the only possible salvation for peaceful and non-violent societies from attack by violent aggressors. Moreover, compared to the weapons of mass destruction that are currently suggested as means of deterring aggressive attacks, this solution is extremely humane.
By the way, this solution is an excellent answer to the question of how a free society can protect itself from aggression by surrounding states in the event of a local rather than global achievement. It is also very useful in the very process of achieving a free society—the same darts with gene therapy can be successfully launched at security agents who beat and arrest peaceful protesters. Ensuring a balance of violence potential (general armament of the population) to achieve a state of affairs where any aggressor can be eliminated upon immediate attack can be a quite difficult task, but it is not necessary to provide everyone with darts with gene therapy—a small number of activists ready to fire them upon seeing another security officer in case of need will suffice (this is especially effective if security officers are deanonymized, as is currently done in Belarus; then they can be caught even in everyday life). And activists will be able to do this even while being less violent people than the security officers, or even absolute pacifists, because, again, this is not a means of inflicting physical harm or killing another person, but merely a means of depriving them of their violent tendencies.
As we can see, for the sake of maintaining strategic parity on the part of pacifist societies and for the sake of ensuring an effective struggle of peaceful protesters against the security agents of the state, it is very advantageous to develop gene therapy against violence. What is very important for us is that this is advantageous even to many modern governments, for example, in Scandinavia, and it is quite likely that they will want to help us. This would be the best and most humane solution to these problems that could possibly be imagined.
As a critique of Lorenz’s theory, I am often sent images where an enraged bear or lion inflicts fatal injuries on another member of its species. But how can this be, since they are heavily armed species, and Lorenz’s mechanism, which inhibits intraspecific violence, is weakly expressed in them? Does this not mean that in reality, violence does not threaten the survival of any species, and the Lorenz mechanism is merely a fiction? Let us examine this question much more deeply than those who make such claims have done.
In this argument, the second premise—the pressure of natural selection to strengthen the Lorenz mechanism—is always overlooked. This is the impossibility of escaping in the event of an attack, or the inherent inability of certain species to avoid situations that lead to violence. In the case of solitary species, such as bears or jaguars, it is very easy to see where an escape occurs—they basically do not contact other members of their species outside of the mating season or the process of raising offspring. Of course, the presence of an intraspecific violence inhibitor is not that necessary for them, as they very rarely find themselves in a situation that makes the commission of violence possible.
As for lions, one should look at their social life. In natural conditions, male lions, upon reaching a certain age, leave their natal pride in search of a new one or to create their own. There are usually no more than three adult males in one pride. The low concentration of violence-prone individuals within specific social units also reduces the risks of violence, and they become far less threatening; thus, no evolutionary pressure arises to develop a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism. If you show me a lion tearing another apart, then that is exactly the case where the concentration of violence-prone individuals became too high. In artificial parks or enclosures, dozens of adult male lions are often in one society, so the probability of a fatal fight increases significantly.
In addition to this premise, I would also like to recall the argument that animals are sometimes prone to killing and eating the offspring of others, or even their own, in case of food shortages or under stress. Obviously, the activation of the Lorenz mechanism could not have developed here because juvenile individuals do not yet have developed weaponry; therefore, an adult individual committing an act of violence against them does not risk dying and thus never fails to pass on its weak version of the violence-inhibiting mechanism. When there are insufficient resources to support its own offspring, a mother’s decision to kill them in no way affects the survival of the species as a whole. And the inhibition of killing the offspring of others is sufficiently handled by the innate weaponry of their own mothers.
One could try to provide many examples of why the Lorenz mechanism does not work, but if you dig deeper, there will always be an explanation that fits the premises necessary for its development. Simply try to analyze each such case in more detail, and you will see it for yourself.
The development of biotechnology is bringing us closer to a moment when it will be possible to create gene therapy capable of activating the violence-inhibiting mechanism in humans that Konrad Lorenz wrote about. However, along with this comes the risk of the emergence of a completely opposite gene therapy aimed specifically at eliminating any inhibitors of violence in a person. Therefore, some may consider the idea of creating gene therapy against violence to be useless, since if it can be made, then gene therapy to unleash violent potential can also be made. Demand for it may be found among some psychopaths, maniacs, and people who overly value their violent nature, consider it the meaning of their life, and are unwilling to part with it because of some dart with a drug fired at them during another attack. Additionally, some groups of people (supporters of authoritarian power) may consider it important to achieve certain goals by force, meaning that the security personnel executing these orders must be protected from the risk of losing their capacity for violence.
Of course, the vast majority of scientists are against violence, and it is unlikely that any of them would engage in such developments. But what will happen if there is someone among them who decides to help violent degenerates? Let’s go through it step by step:
1) There is a possibility of the uncontrolled spread of a drug that disables the Lorenz mechanism, and if this happens, the entire world will sink into violence and wars, and the survival of humanity will become impossible (practically repeating a typical scenario from a zombie movie).
2) This risk will lead to the necessity of creating updated gene therapy against violence. It may be capable of preventing the disabling of the Lorenz mechanism by any means; however, if this cannot be guaranteed, the only remaining option will be to ensure that a person dies from an attempt to remove their own restrictions on violent behavior. Allowing the survival of people striving for violence in such a situation is simply impossible; otherwise, the previously mentioned scenario will occur.
3) After this, a fairly rapid equalization of the balance of violent potential will occur, and absolute universal armament will be achieved (it will become clear to every average person that weapons in such a world are the only guarantee of survival). The new status quo will be maintained by the fact that a minority of sadists will be afraid to deactivate the Lorenz mechanism to attack the majority of non-violent people, who are capable of destroying them at the first attempt to initiate violence.
4) The stationary bandit (the state) will survive neither the appearance of gene therapy against violence, as it would then lose the ability to impose its order by force, nor the appearance of a blocker for the violence-inhibiting mechanism, because in that case, the security forces working for it would receive Molotov cocktails, bottles of sulfuric acid, infectious agents, bursts of automatic gunfire, etc., instead of peaceful protests, from the very people who removed their restrictions on violence and will manifest it toward everyone, including them. Zombie movies, although pure fiction, nevertheless quite accurately convey what would happen to the state in such a scenario.
As a result, it turns out that creating a drug to disable violence-inhibiting mechanisms will also lead to the elimination of the stationary bandit, whom supporters of authoritarian power and force-based measures love so much and consider the best mechanism for achieving any goals. They do not understand this, but even worse, they do not understand the catastrophic scenario that the creation of such a drug would lead to if gene therapy against violence is not updated in time according to the parameters in the second point, or at least if the balance of violent potential is not equalized so that all resulting rapists/violent offenders can be liquidated during their attack.
People who consider Konrad Lorenz’s conclusions regarding the nature of violence and his concerns about the risks it entails to be unfounded often refer to or use arguments from a piece titled “The Lorenzian Theory of Aggression and Peace Research: A Critique“. To avoid any misconceptions about the phenomenon of violence, let us examine what is wrong with this critique.
At the very beginning, an argument is made that Lorenz defines aggression as a combat instinct implemented toward members of one’s own species and is genetically innate, inherited from biological ancestors. However, according to the critics, this definition strips the term aggression of its meaning. In general, when discussing aggression and violence, the question of what we actually mean by “aggression” and “violence” almost always arises. In this context, it is reasonable to reduce these terms specifically to innate tendencies toward intraspecific violence in the form of inflicting physical harm (or the threat of inflicting it), as this is the object of study. Everything else, for example, the fact that aggression is subjectively defined differently by different people (for some, even an impolite greeting would be aggression), we do not take into account.
Based on the critique, such an understanding of aggression does not correlate with activities manifested not directly, but through social institutions developed by humans. Firstly, all institutions that apply coercive measures always work through coercive agents. You might say that if a person becomes a politician, they can sit in an office and issue inhumane orders, thereby committing acts of violence without actually performing any corresponding physical activity. However, these orders are worthless without the coercive agents who execute them directly; therefore, one must look specifically at them and their propensity for violence. Secondly, other social aspects, such as wealth, status, and skills (which were mentioned in the critique), do not provide such an opportunity on their own without methods of directly inflicting physical harm on a person, for example, using the same security forces. We cannot speak of violence where there has been no such direct impact. Of course, a person may attempt to harm another person through indirect influence via a chain of many instances; however, this chain will sooner or later encounter the need to apply a coercive measure. For example, some might say that a monopolist in the market can turn people into slaves using purely economic methods and even drive them to starve to death by unilaterally setting the cost of labor and products. However, to be a monopolist, one must have coercive agents (one’s own, or an agreement with the agents of an existing monopoly, such as the state) ready to destroy all competitors in the market through direct violence, especially those who refuse to make concessions and negotiate peacefully.
After this, Lorenz is criticized for mixing the behavioral models of quite different animal species and humans, arguing that the justification of a common origin of species is insufficient for this. However, it should not be forgotten that the unbreakable basis of the behavioral model of any living creature is always the biological processes occurring in its organism. It would be foolish to believe, for example, that by mere desire, due to some social factors or with the help of some supernatural forces, a highly developed primate, including a human, could ignore the action of hormones and receptors of the nervous system. And biological processes, in turn, are determined by genetics. Of course, one should not forget the gene-environment link—certain genes are activated in a certain environment. But this fact only confirms our correctness, if we consider two factors: humans share a large part of the genome with animals due to the same common origin, and Lorenz observed the same behavioral mechanisms regarding the manifestation of violent behavior in very different animal species. According to the critique, it is wrong to extrapolate observations of animals to humans, even if these observations coincide for a very wide range of species. Of course, I agree that Lorenz’s works may lack observations of specifically human behavior; however, based on the two factors described above (common genetic heritage and the observation of identical behavioral patterns in different species), it can be boldly presumed that his conclusions regarding the nature of violence are very likely true for humans as well. And referring to the social sciences, psychology, etc., which was also mentioned in the critique, makes no sense, as we are considering the biological and genetic component, which is more fundamental—these sciences cannot contradict biology or make changes to it. In the end, if someone still continues to deny these conclusions, it would be better to criticize them with observations of human behavior, corresponding systematization, and comparison with Lorenz’s conclusions, rather than simply pointing to the incorrectness of the fact of extrapolation.
The critique also addresses Lorenz’s instinctive-hydraulic model. It explains the phenomenon of instinctive reactions triggering in the absence of a specific stimulus by the accumulation over time of a certain specific potential, which lowers the threshold necessary to trigger the reaction; this also explains spontaneous acts of aggression. This model is criticized due to the lack of neurophysiological evidence for its correctness. However, firstly, it has not been refuted, and secondly, Lorenz himself acknowledged the limitations of this model and the fact that it possesses a number of flaws; that is, in fact, he did not propose it as an absolutely correct and final solution.
Next, the influence of intraspecific aggression on the survival of species is criticized, especially in the case of humans. Statistics are provided as an example, showing that wars between different groups of people (including modern wars starting from the 19th century) have had a very insignificant effect on the survival of humanity. I will not argue that this conclusion is correct at the moment. However, here, Lorenz’s fears regarding the threat of violence to the survival of humanity should be linked to scientific and technical progress. After all, humans have become the most heavily armed species on the planet; they have already faced nuclear threats more than once, and every day the threats become more serious, as dangerous means become increasingly accessible for acquisition and reproduction by small groups of people and even individual individuals. In fact, the destructive potential of small groups and individual individuals is increasing every day. For example, viruses are a very accessible means of mass destruction, although other things could be devised. It is hard to argue with Lorenz’s fears here!
Another point in the critique caught my attention because it only confirms Lorenz’s theory rather than refuting it. But first, we need to remember something. As we know, Lorenz’s observations show that species with strong innate weaponry do not use it in intraspecific clashes. This primarily concerns hedgehogs, porcupines, venomous snakes, and insects; Lorenz also mentioned wolves, which do not bite their fellows in vulnerable places such as the belly or neck, and ravens, which in fights do not even try to peck out each other’s eyes with their very sharp beaks. The emergence of such mechanisms during evolution is quite logical; otherwise, representatives of these species would simply exterminate each other. As for poorly armed species, this mechanism manifests to a lesser extent, since either their representatives are unable to inflict serious harm on their fellows, or the latter can escape from the attack—meaning violence does not threaten them as much. For example, when Lorenz put two turtle doves—seemingly peaceful birds of the pigeon family—in one cage, the dislike of one bird for the other led to it severely maiming and almost killing the other during Lorenz’s absence. All because there was nowhere to run in this case.
In the case of humans, this mechanism also does not manifest very strongly, as their natural weaponry is quite weak. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that humans have inherited this mechanism to a certain extent; moreover, we can confirm this with observations regarding war, which the critique itself refers to, again, to prove the insignificance of the influence of violence on the survival of humanity. In many armies, more than half of the soldiers who were supposed to shoot simply could not pull the trigger. There is also mention of a refusal by one of the US army brigades to obey orders during the Vietnam War. Cases such as the mass killing in My Lai are a great exception and an abnormality for modern wars. In general, most soldiers considered the Vietnam War meaningless, and throughout its duration, a typical soldier spent only a few hours in combat. Also, a social study conducted by the information and education department of the US Department of Defense shows that during World War II, most soldiers actually tried to pretend they were busy with something rather than actually engaging in military affairs.
Based on this, it can be concluded that humans possess Lorenz’s violence-inhibiting mechanism. Although it is expressed in a weaker form than in heavily armed species, it nonetheless provides the prerequisites for solving the problem of violence, which concerned Lorenz so deeply and, in principle, is a cause for concern for any sane person. And, by the way, in the material we are considering, an attempt to criticize this specific theory is not even undertaken.
I constantly hear criticism regarding the idea of eliminating aggressive violence from society using biotechnologies (the development of gene therapy). Skeptics argue that the propensity for violence is very complex, determined by many genes, and that identifying them is impossible. In reality, this is true, but only if one looks specifically for “violence propensity” genes, although this is absolutely unnecessary to solve the task at hand. Lorenz’s research describes the evolutionary path through which many animal species developed an “innate morality” of non-aggression toward members of their own species (in fact, this is not morality in the usual philosophical sense, but a behavioral instinct). For some reason, many have overlooked this, but Konrad Lorenz clearly indicates in his works that species with innate morality experience a strong feeling of aversion (i.e., a certain aggression-inhibiting mechanism is triggered) when they intend to cause harm to the body of a conspecific (for simplicity, we will henceforth call this the “Lorenz mechanism” after the discoverer). This contrasts sharply with the layman’s understanding of “propensity for violence.” For example, hedgehogs are quite aggressive in the conventional sense (since they are predators), but are incapable of causing physical harm to their own kind.
Although Lorenz himself wrote that in humans “innate morality” is very weak, nevertheless, its presence can be noticed in a significant part of society, perhaps even in the majority. You have probably noticed scenes in movies where someone wanted to take revenge for some offense, picked up a weapon, approached the unarmed offender, pointed the gun at them, but suddenly the attacker’s hands began to shake, they felt ill, and they could not fire. This is the behavioral pattern of species with a strong version of the Lorenz mechanism, but in humans, it is quite variable (unlike, for example, hedgehogs and snakes, where all individuals in the population have a strong version of this mechanism due to the pressure of natural selection). Accordingly, this trait is determined by alleles of one or several genes (different forms of the same gene located in the same sections of chromosomes). Given the high degree of variability of the strong/weak version of the Lorenz mechanism in different people, identifying the specific genes and the correct (desired) alleles is quite simple, even at the current technological level.
A rough research plan can be outlined. Activists openly demonstrate provocative behavior, for example, by showing their commitment to LGBT in places where homophobes are usually present, insulting them, but, importantly, not using any physical violence against them. If it is evident that a person is deeply offended by the insult, but nevertheless simply walks away (the ideal version is that they intended to strike but ultimately could not), we inform them that it was a scientific experiment, tell them they did well to restrain themselves, and take a DNA sample from them, marking it as “peaceful.” If, however, they attempt to hit the activist, we immediately stop the attack using pepper spray and take a DNA sample, marking it as “aggressor.” We repeat this numerous times to create samples of sufficient size.
Next, we send the collected materials to a laboratory for DNA decoding (sequencing). It could be to Silicon Valley — some of the numerous biotech startups there will surely be happy to receive the samples we have collected, as they cannot collect DNA samples in such an “aggressive” manner within California itself. Based on the comparison of the two samples, the specific genes responsible for the strength of the Lorenz mechanism and the required alleles (encoding the strong version) are identified. Once identified, it would be possible, for example, to create gene therapy for adults and a genetic test for pregnant women (which would make the woman seriously consider whether it is worth continuing the pregnancy).
I recently read the chapter “Morality and Weaponry” from one of the works of ethologist Konrad Lorenz. He made some quite interesting observations about how various animal species behave in intra-species clashes. From these, important conclusions about violence can be drawn, which will be relevant to other materials I publish on my channel. Bitarch has posted the full text of the chapter; you can read it by following this link. For now, I will briefly describe its essence to you.
Usually, the violent tendencies of animals are judged based on inter-species relationships. Analogies are often drawn between how a predator, such as a fox, catches and kills a hare, and how one human kills another. Although this comparison is completely disproportionate, it is far more accurate to compare a predator’s hunt for other animals with a human’s hunt for animals. However, if one looks at how animals behave in intra-species clashes, a fairly high level of restraint in their behavior can be noticed.
Of course, if we take poorly armed species, such restraint is not as strongly expressed. Once, Lorenz left two collared doves (a variety of pigeons) in one cage and left until the next day. He did not expect anything bad from this decision; even though these individuals did not get along, it was unlikely that particular ferocity could be expected from pigeons. However, upon returning, he found one of the individuals finishing off the other. The problem was simply that the second individual had nowhere to run. Previously, Lorenz had observed a clash between hares and logically assumed that it could end the same way if it took place in a cage rather than in an open meadow. Poorly armed species are often quite ferocious in their manifestation of violence, but this usually does not lead to bad consequences, as they cannot quickly and effectively inflict damage on their fellow species, and the latter, in turn, always have the opportunity to escape. But if they are so ferocious, what can be expected from more armed species? One might assume even more terrible and bloody clashes, but that was not the case.
Observations of wolves and dogs showed that during clashes they do not inflict fatal injuries on one another. When one side loses, instead of continuing to defend itself with all its might, it does the opposite—it exposes vulnerable areas, such as the neck, a single bite to which would be enough to kill it. However, the other side cannot do this; they are stopped by certain internal inhibitors. Similarly, birds capable of inflicting severe damage with their beaks do not use their full potential in clashes. There is a proverb that a crow will not peck out another crow’s eye, and this proverb is absolutely true. Even when crows fight, for example over food, it never occurs to them to eliminate their opponent in the most effective way, which would most likely lead to their subsequent death—by pecking out an eye with one precise strike. Furthermore, birds are very careful when cleaning the feathers of their fellow species, especially near areas such as the eyes; they do not use their beaks with the same force as they do when feeding. Why such inhibitors developed is, of course, because otherwise, representatives of these species would have torn each other’s throats out, pecked out eyes, and all gone extinct together.
In this regard, humans are closer to doves and hares than to wolves and crows. By nature, humans are poorly armed. But over time, they became the most armed creatures in the world. This happened quite quickly; there was no time to develop natural inhibitors. And, considering that the survival of the species is impossible if its representatives destroy their own kind, an important question arises, which Lorenz formulated in these words:
The day will come when two warring camps find themselves face to face, before the danger of mutual destruction. A day may come when all of humanity is split into two such camps. How will we behave in this case—like doves or like wolves? The fate of humanity will depend on how people answer this question. We must be vigilant!
As I promised in the announcement for the previous video, the new cycle on the Libertarian Band channel will be entirely dedicated to the NAP. While we previously viewed the non-aggression principle as a kind of spontaneous order that characterizes sufficiently viable societies, the new cycle describes the exact opposite approach instead of spontaneous orders: the artificial imposition of the non-aggression principle.
The introductory video explains that leaving social morals to natural selection is too rash, and conscious measures are needed to instill a culture of non-aggression. The next video will be devoted to answering a strange question: what exactly is wrong with aggressive violence, since it is an excellent tool—why be squeamish about it?
An interesting study by biologist Konrad Lorenz shows how natural “armament” in animals leads to the emergence of morality against aggressive violence. Similarly, restoring the balance of violence potential (BVP) in human society will lead to the adoption of the non-aggression principle (NAP).
There are many species whose armament is so devastating and whose methods of application are so lightning-fast that a real combat clash between rivals would end with the death of one of them, or even both. Take, for example, venomous insects and snakes. Therefore, it is not surprising that natural selection develops a prohibition against using weapons in intra-species clashes for such species. Ethologists, following Lorenz, call this system of instinctive prohibitions that limit animal behavior “natural morality.” It is stronger the more powerfully the animal is armed by nature. During a territorial clash, venomous snakes exaggerate their size by stretching out to see who can stand taller, swaying, and pushing each other, but they never bite, nor do they even demonstrate their weapons. Some species even threaten each other with their heads turned away. It is no wonder that not only ordinary people but also many zoologists mistook the tournament battles of snakes for mating dances.
Well-armed animals can threaten each other for a long time, and when one of them grows tired, it abruptly changes posture, exposing its most vulnerable spot to the opponent for a decisive combat strike. The moral prohibition acts on the winner like an electric shock: all their angry fervor evaporates, they turn away from the opponent and hide their weapon. Similarly, a proud boy, feeling that he will lose a fight, suddenly puts his hands behind his back, lifts his face to the victor and shouts: “Go on, hit me!” Unlike a wolf or a snake, a human may actually strike in response.
After analyzing many species, Lorenz reached a conclusion of stunning simplicity more than 50 years ago: a strong animal has strong morality, while a weak one has weak morality. In terms of its natural history, a human is a very poorly armed animal; unlike monkeys, humans cannot even bite properly. Therefore, humans initially have weak instinctive prohibitions and weak natural morality. An unarmed man cannot cause significant damage to another in a clash: one will tire of hitting, and the other can always run away. Innate prohibitions in humans correspond to this. But subsequently, humans began to create and improve weapons and became the most armed species on Earth. Morality, however, has hardly changed.
Shareholder Viktor Rafaelevich “Ethological Excursions to the Forbidden Gardens of the Humanities”
