Тег: Negotiations

Porridge from an axe

or
He who says he hates the state simply doesn’t know how to cook it

Thanks to Bitarkh for the idea of the article

There is a fairly common negotiation strategy that I know as the Napoleon principle: ask for the impossible, and you will get the maximum. I can’t speak for Napoleon, but today it is practiced, for example, by Trump, and it is also loved by various terrorists who have taken hostages. This strategy is good, but it has one small flaw: it only works when applied from a position of strength. Therefore, when some political activist comes forward with maximalist demands addressed to the state, the first thing I do is calculate what they can threaten if the demands are not met, and usually, I immediately get bored. Empty demands are ignored at best, and punished at worst.

If your negotiating position is weak, it is far more appropriate to apply the opposite strategy, which could be called the “porridge from an axe” strategy, because it is well illustrated by this fairy tale:

A soldier was returning home from war and asked an old woman for a place to stay for the night. She let him in. He asked for something to eat, and she replied that she had nothing herself. Seeing an axe, he said: light the stove, bring the pot, we are going to cook porridge from an axe. She was surprised and did as requested. The water boiled, the soldier tasted the water and asked for salt. Then for grains. In different versions, there were other requests for ingredients; finally, the porridge was enriched with butter, served on the table, and eaten with appetite. As for the axe, the soldier either took it with him to finish cooking and eating, or left it with the old woman along with similar instructions.

If the Napoleonic strategy is used by terrorists who have taken hostages, then “porridge from an axe” is used, conversely, by the negotiators who talk those terrorists into submission. The strategy boils down to gradually wheedling out small concessions, and it is based on the assumption that the second party will incur costs not only from fulfilling the request, but also from refusing it. Another assumption is that the second party must have a larger goal and must believe that a series of small deals leads them toward that goal. If the soldier had not lured her with the promise of porridge from an axe, but simply asked for access to the stove, firewood, water, a pot, salt, and so on, he would have received a firm refusal somewhere at the salt stage, as in, “boiling water is enough for you.” Similarly, a terrorist will release hostages bit by bit if he is convinced that this advances him toward his stated goal, and not simply because he was asked.

In negotiations with representatives of the state, it makes sense for libertarians to use exactly this strategy. That is, one needs to find out what goal a specific official is pursuing, and then begin offering them small steps that should lead them toward that goal in exchange for giving up positions on some things that are not principled for them.

We will develop this topic in the next article.

Let’s assume that I dyed the soldier’s hair black and his forelock gold)))

On tangled court cases

Let’s imagine the following situation arising in an imaginary ancap society. In my opinion, someone has caused damage to my property, but in the opinion of that someone, he caused me no damage. And the circumstances of this case are such that it is very, very controversial; it is difficult for an objective party to determine who is right. As a result, this leads to a situation where, across a large sample of different courts, half of them side with me, and the other half side with the party I am accusing. To my suggestions to pay at least a portion of the compensation demanded by me (and by the courts that sided with me), the opponent categorically brushes them off, because, in his opinion, he did not cause damage to my property, and therefore does not owe me a single penny.

Under the conditions of a state, such a problem is reliably solved by a hierarchy of courts. Yes, someone will remain dissatisfied, but that is the whole essence of the institution of the court. In the conditions of ancap, however, we arrive at a complex conflict where my bailiffs and my opponent’s security must, in effect, start fighting each other, since both conflicting parties are equally right. What solution does ancap offer for such situations? And how should I personally behave in such a situation?

SK (the question is accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00088285btc)

The function of a court is to help the parties resolve their conflict. The only way to do this is for both parties to the conflict to recognize the jurisdiction of a particular court in a specific case. If the case is complex and convoluted, we cannot know in advance the position of any specific pre-designated court until it completes the proceedings. Therefore, all the parties to the conflict need to do is find a court that has a good enough reputation, is acceptable in price, and is willing to take on the case. Then, both parties enter into an agreement with the court that they are ready to execute its verdict in this case, and only after that does the court even begin to delve into the subject.

Since the case is so murky, the final court decision will likely be quite a compromise, such as one party receiving partial satisfaction of their claims while paying some compensation to the other party. But, however, we cannot know this in advance.

Naturally, each party to the conflict will be interested in the impartiality of the court; therefore, they will probably consider it important to include a clause in the contract stating that they reserve the right to withdraw from the process before the end of the proceedings if they can demonstrate the court’s interest in a particular outcome.

If one of the parties refuses in advance to recognize any verdict other than one that completely relieves them of obligations, they are thereby refusing the court as such, which means they intend to continue an open conflict with the second party. In this case, the party that agrees to the court can wave this readiness around, saying, “I am not the one starting a war here, I am merely defending myself,” and thereby gain new allies while gradually stifling the aggressor with sanctions, forcing them into peaceful negotiations.

By the way, peaceful negotiations, without any external arbitrator, are also a way of resolving a conflict, so a court is not a mandatory procedure for this at all.

As has been noted repeatedly by many, the state of affairs in international politics very much resembles ancap