Have you ever noticed how great powers suddenly become “humanitarians” when it comes to weapons and methods of war? On paper, it all looks beautiful: “we ban chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons because we are good.” But let’s look at this whole affair without rose-colored glasses. Doesn’t it seem to you that such bans are not at all about concern for humanity, but a clever trick to maintain the global hierarchy? It’s as if the world boxing champion banned all opponents from using their left hand. Why? Because it makes it easier for him to win!
Take, for example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Five countries (USA, Russia, China, France, UK) officially gained the right to possess nuclear arsenals. The others were told: “You can’t! It’s dangerous!” Why? Because when you have an atomic bomb, no one risks touching you. Recall the fate of Libya: Gaddafi abandoned his nuclear program, and then his regime was blown to smithereens. North Korea, in turn, decided to avoid this, and now Kim Jong Un has nuclear weapons, and for some reason, no one is bombing him. Or take chemical weapons. For decades, the USA turned a blind eye to the chemical attacks of Saddam’s ally against Iran, but suddenly remembered these atrocities when Iraq stopped being a friend. It looks like selective amnesia.
But it’s even more interesting with the rules of warfare. According to international laws, rebels are forbidden from hiding among civilians. It seems reasonable: fewer casualties among the civilian population. But what is a poor partisan to do if the enemy has drones, satellites, tanks, and aircraft? Go out into the field with an open visor? That’s a guaranteed one-way ticket. It turns out that the great powers tell the weak: either fight by the rules and be guaranteed to lose, or fight as best you can and you will be declared terrorists.
By the way, it is interesting that “legal terror” is only available to the state. The carpet bombing of Dresden in World War II, the nuclear strike on Hiroshima, NATO missile hits on Belgrade bridges and the television center in 1999—these are not terrorism, but “military necessity.” But one explosion by rebels is already a terrible sin. Of course, no one here is justifying violence against civilians, but why can the state do such things while a rebel cannot?
Let’s also remember humanitarian law in conflicts like Afghanistan or Iraq. Western countries always emphasize that they fight “cleanly” and by the rules. But as soon as the rules get in the way, they are easily forgotten. Remember Abu Ghraib? Torture and abuse of prisoners who were “unlawful combatants.” The rules exist, but we don’t apply them to you because you are “not dressed in uniform.”
And then there are psycho-chemical weapons—substances that are meant to selectively and temporarily affect the brain without causing long-term harm to the enemy’s health. A typical example is the incapacitant BZ, which the USA experimented with during the Vietnam era. Officially, it is a “non-lethal means of suppression,” but in a large dose, it turns a person into a helpless zombie. Or take the opioid hybrids used in 2002 during “Nord-Ost”: hostages were put to sleep with a fentanyl-based aerosol—130 people suffocated, yet formally this is not a “combat toxic agent,” but a special tool. Convenient: when the strong need magic dust, it is an “anti-terrorist gas,” but if the weak try to do the same, they instantly become violators of all conventions.
Supporters of humanitarian law say: “Yes, the rules are imperfect, but at least there are some standards.” But if the rules work only in one direction, the question ultimately arises: could it be that they were created not to protect the weak, but to maintain the balance of power in favor of the strong?!
P.S. When authoritarians call libertarians “free-riders,” suggesting we demand that everyone “for free” agree with our “wants” (observe the NAP), they should realize that non-interference in their nervous system, for example, using drugs for forced reinforcement of the violence inhibitor, is self-restraint and a final attempt to peacefully establish a dialogue, not a technical impossibility!
We are all aware of the existence of international conventions and agreements that limit the development and use of various forms of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Other forms of weaponry and many military practices are also prohibited. This is all justified by ethical reasons—the fact that certain weapons and practices are too lethal, cause immense human suffering, and act non-selectively, meaning a vast number of civilians could easily become victims. This position is quite understandable; however, it is also important to look at it from another perspective.
In today’s high-tech world, the development of weapons of mass destruction may be accessible to many jurisdictions. And such weapons are entirely capable of making them an unattractive victim, even for large and powerful states with millions of soldiers and units of conventional weaponry. Under such conditions, the very essence of the “right of the strongest” changes—the strong is no longer the one who actually possesses the power and ability to inflict harm on the weak with impunity, but the one who can convince the weak of the need to follow certain norms, regulations, and prohibitions.
Of course, this is not being said to justify the actual use of truly inhumane military practices. The point is simply that the goal of prohibiting such practices may well be to place the weak at a disadvantage compared to strong players and in complete dependence on their will. One does not have to look far for examples; one can simply recall the position in which the Budapest Memorandum placed Ukraine, under which it was forced to exchange nuclear weapons for paper guarantees of security.
Small and weak jurisdictions could very well be independent of the will of superpowers if they were allowed to develop and possess the same weapons of mass destruction—not for their use, but simply as a means of deterrence against external aggression. Furthermore, even when discussing the use of such weaponry, not all its forms would be particularly cruel or absolutely unacceptable. For example, with the current level of progress, it is now entirely possible to speak of the development of ethological (behavioral) weapons that would simply make enemy soldiers incapable of committing murder and fighting, without causing them any permanent or serious harm. Such a weapon could be an airborne bio/chemical agent to enhance the human mechanism for inhibiting violence or even to dismantle hierarchy—reducing authoritarianism and obedience to authorities (commanders). Surely, many other variants of similar weaponry could be devised. And there are no reasons to believe why any jurisdiction should not possess such weaponry. Except, again, that it would be disadvantageous for the strong players on the international political arena. It is in their interest to convince everyone else to follow international agreements and thereby limit their potential for defense against their interference.
During the invasion of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine, an incident occurred that could have ended with extremely catastrophic consequences. We are talking about the events at the Zaporizhzhia NPP – the largest power plant in Europe. The details of this event are not so important; the main point here is that military actions were taking place around the nuclear power plant itself. Perhaps the probability of a catastrophe was extremely low, but it was still not zero. And had it happened, tens of millions of lives would have been at risk, as it would have been much worse than the well-known nuclear catastrophe at the Chernobyl NPP. Also, information has now emerged about biolaboratories located on the territory of Ukraine. The WHO recommended that Ukraine destroy dangerous pathogens to prevent their possible leakage.
Should this not demonstrate what the problem is with violence as a method of solving problems and achieving goals, and why we need to fight against it? War or any other violent conflict can lead to a catastrophe if it hits a nuclear plant, a warehouse with dangerous chemicals, or a biolaboratory with samples of deadly viruses, especially those of artificial origin, which were kept for strictly controlled experiments and for which it is unknown what to do if they suddenly break out.
As we can see, it is not even necessary to intentionally use nuclear, chemical, biological, or any other weapon of mass destruction to achieve exactly this mass destruction. In the modern world with a heap of dangerous technologies and means used at various enterprises and facilities, it can become merely an accidental result of even a small armed clash, not to mention a conflict as large-scale as the one currently taking place between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, violence and war are extremely unacceptable; it is necessary to fight against all manifestations of violence immediately and everywhere, throughout the world. Those who are not in the territory of the conflicting countries likely believe they are completely safe. But this is absolutely not the case, for in the modern world, no one is safe as long as any violent conflicts remain possible.
When viruses are considered weapons of mass destruction, many say that this is merely a hypothetical threat, impossible to implement in practice at the moment, unlikely to be implementable in the near future, and certainly never available for recreation by small organizations and ordinary people in home conditions. And since other possible weapons of mass destruction are even more inaccessible for recreation, there is no need to fear such a phenomenon as violence and try to eradicate it completely.
First of all, we need to look at the trends in the development of biotechnology. A great example is provided by an operation such as sequencing (in simpler terms, decoding) the genome. Just 20 years ago, sequencing one full human genome cost 100 million dollars, about 10 years ago – 1 million dollars, and now – 1 thousand dollars. Also, there are already quite cheap DNA/RNA synthesizers; some models can be bought for several tens of thousands of dollars, and it is quite expected that over time and with the development of technology, they will only become cheaper and more accessible. Furthermore, research has recently appeared regarding the use of Artificial Intelligence in solving quantum chemistry equations [1][2]. In the future, this will make it possible to determine the chemical and physical properties of molecules without conducting real tests, but only by virtually modeling their structure. I think it is obvious that this will greatly simplify the design of artificial viruses. And finally, let us not forget that modern vaccination and targeted treatment are based precisely on the introduction of artificial viral agents into humans, which deliver specific genetic material to the required cells and embed it into them. Factually, this is gene therapy, the reality of the technological implementation of which many for some reason also view skeptically and do not see prospects for its development and application in the near future. But do you still believe that the creation of dangerous artificial viruses is merely a hypothetical threat? Well, let’s look at real cases of this.
In 2011, virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka conducted experiments to create a flu vaccine. He tried to recreate the strain of the virus that preceded the 2009-2010 epidemic to see how the virus had changed over 4 years. As a result, he modified it so that it became resistant to human immunity [3]. Naturally, his work began to be criticized, as humanity would have been powerless if this virus had left the laboratory walls. Additionally, the US government imposed a ban on the continuation of this research in 2014 (however, it was lifted in 2019). Moreover, Yoshihiro Kawaoka had previously managed to create a laboratory analog of the well-known Spanish flu, which killed up to 100 million people according to various estimates.
Also in 2018, a group of Canadian researchers published a scientific paper on recreating the causative agent of the horsepox virus – a close relative of smallpox (variola), one of the deadliest diseases in human history [4]. The cost of this project is estimated at approximately 100 thousand dollars. In doing so, the researchers sought to create a new, even safer vaccine against smallpox. However, a significant portion of the scientific community viewed this research critically and began to express indignation as to why the scientific journal PLOS One allowed the publication of such work at all, as this could help terrorists in creating biological weapons.
Along with all this, we should consider cases where viruses accidentally left laboratory walls and what consequences this led to, in order to understand what we will face if someone wants to release a dangerous virus into the wild intentionally. Moreover, this could already be done by some laboratory assistant at any research center that stores and studies samples of such viruses. We have simply been very lucky that none of these lab assistants had violent tendencies, or if they did, something held them back or they did not realize what dangerous weapon was in their hands. We will list 5 such cases [5]:
– In 1977, the H1N1 flu strain managed to escape from a Chinese institution and spread across the world. Fortunately, it caused only a mild illness and led to only a few fatal cases.
– From 1963 to 1978, three escapes of the smallpox virus occurred in the UK from two different laboratories. They were linked to low standards and poorly conducted laboratory practice. The smallpox outbreaks led to at least 80 fatal cases.
– In 1995, 10,000 people in Venezuela and 75,000 people in Colombia fell ill with a VEE strain that escaped from a laboratory. As a result of the outbreak, 311 people died, and neurological complications were found in 3,000 people.
– Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 led to a global epidemic that infected 8,000 people and caused 774 deaths in 29 countries. Since the original epidemic, six escapes of the virus from laboratories have occurred – four in Beijing and one each in Singapore and Taiwan.
– In 2007, 278 animals in the UK were infected with foot-and-mouth disease after the virus escaped from a high-biosafety laboratory. Due to the outbreak, 1,578 animals had to be destroyed. This outbreak undermined agricultural production and exports in the UK and cost approximately 200 million pounds sterling.
Let’s also look at the current viral situation. In 2020-21, we had to deal with the coronavirus (by the way, this is one of the strains of the same SARS that left laboratory walls in 2003). Compared to other viruses, SARS-CoV-2 is not excessively contagious or deadly; to date, about 103 million people have had it, which is 1.3% of the planet’s population; about 2.2 million people died – 2.1% of all infected. Nevertheless, the pandemic led to a large number of social and economic problems.
We should also look at other modern viral threats besides the coronavirus. One such example could be the “Nipah” virus. The disease can be asymptomatic (in which case the person simply becomes a spreader of the infection) or cause serious respiratory problems, encephalitis, cerebral edema, and mortality ranging from 40% to 75%. Furthermore, Dutch researchers claim that a Nipah outbreak could happen at any moment [6]. And what could happen if a sample of such a virus fell into the hands of a person with violent inclinations?
Besides all this, the topic of the viral threat is already being raised by some well-known and authoritative figures, for example, entrepreneur and billionaire Bill Gates [7]. Back in 2015, he predicted a pandemic and warned that the world was not ready for it. He explains this lack of readiness by the fact that large pandemics occur quite rarely, people forget about them and prefer to concentrate their attention on fighting more frequent disasters. A pandemic generally always seems like something that definitely will not happen in the next few years, therefore its threat is ignored. Bill Gates also expressed concern that viruses could be used for violent purposes and estimated the probability of an artificial pandemic to be higher than that of a natural one. Now let’s imagine such a scenario – someone intentionally releases a very contagious and deadly virus into the wild, and humanity is not ready for it at all?
I think there should be no more doubts that the creation of artificial viruses is a real task, which over time is becoming less expensive and more accessible for implementation. It may even not be necessary to create new viruses – it is enough to seize and use samples of already existing ones. Therefore, it is critically important for us to get rid of violence before the moment when someone, in an attempt to protect themselves from attacks, or some terrorist in pursuit of their violent goals, releases a very contagious and deadly virus into the wild, thereby bringing humanity to catastrophe.
It turns out there is a fairly large “sect” of supporters of Boris Boyarshinov, who denies the danger of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He constantly repeats a “mantra” of sorts about the uselessness of nuclear weapons (NW). His background is in physics, so most of his arguments concern NW specifically, but he sometimes says something similar about viruses (I remember Mikhail Svetov asked Boyarshinov directly about the idea of viral WMD, and Boris answered in roughly the same spirit as he did about NW).
The main point of his theory is that none of the currently existing WMDs are capable of destroying humanity or even a specific geographical region. He claims that the scale of destruction from a nuclear explosion grows as the cube root of the charge’s power (i.e., as the number of “megatons” in a bomb increases, the destruction increases very, very slowly), that nuclear winter is a calculation error and will not happen in reality, and that viruses can be contained by a vaccine and are inconvenient to store in a ready-to-use state.
Now, Boyarshinov and his supporters do not understand the very essence of deterrence theory and confuse doomsday weapons (DDW) with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The latter are sometimes called strategic deterrence weapons.
DDW, in the literal sense, is a device capable of completely destroying all of humanity or making the planet uninhabitable.
WMD is a deterrence weapon that operates on a game-theory model of costs and benefits. None of the supporters of nuclear/viral deterrence ever claim that WMD must kill all of humanity in the literal sense, as is understood in the case of DDW. Even at the peak of the Cold War, when the USSR and USA had tens of thousands of thermonuclear charges, experts spoke of inflicting “unacceptable damage,” but never the total destruction of the planet. The concept of M.A.D. (“Mutual Assured Destruction”) is deceptive in its name—it is not total mutual annihilation, as many think, but merely the infliction of unacceptable damage.
Nevertheless, for deterring an aggressor in the form of a state, WMD is entirely sufficient. The example of North Korea’s Kim demonstrates this perfectly; even the most powerful state in the world—the USA—is afraid to attack him. There is no need to even discuss the destructive power of North Korean missiles—as experts say, in the best case, only 1-2 missiles with a simple nuclear warhead would arrive, which would blow up a few blocks of dense housing in a city like New York. There are opposite examples—Gaddafi and Hussein had no WMD, and we all know perfectly well what happened to them.
From animal ethology, we know how the dominance hierarchy is structured in animal species that form them (the very fact that such a hierarchy forms is an evolutionary error [local extremum] arising from a disruption in the uniform balance of violence potential [in animals, this is a lack of innate weaponry]). In such a hierarchy, the dominant (“alpha”) can apply violence to submissive individuals (“omegas”), and the latter are in no way capable of inflicting retaliatory damage. If they are capable, a dominance hierarchy does not arise.
Generally speaking, all states, in relation to both their own citizens and other, weaker states, are capable of applying violence without the risk of receiving retaliatory damage. In making the decision to attack Hussein, the US government considered the risks of a retaliatory strike and, understanding that the most Saddam Hussein was capable of was killing some soldiers sent there voluntarily and ready for the risk, easily decided on aggression.
The situation with North Korea’s Kim is completely different—taking even a weak bomb to New York is unacceptable damage; voters would not understand this, and the US political system would risk spiraling out of control, which the authorities cannot allow.
Now let’s consider the confrontation between a stationary bandit and an individual. As you think—you can even apply this to yourself personally—would society agree to sit in quarantine for 2 weeks to allow the state to apply violence even to the person most unpleasant to you, such as a pedophile maniac? Want to execute one maniac—welcome to a two-week quarantine! I highly doubt you would agree to that.
A state can coerce through violence only when there is no even minimal retaliatory strike using WMD, otherwise “voters will not understand.” Thus, for deterring a modern state, nuclear weapons or Level 4 danger viruses are even excessive. A weak flu virus is enough, which can literally be multiplied “in a garage” using simple, easily accessible materials such as chicken eggs and an incubator, and the virus sample for multiplication can be easily obtained from any hospital. The main thing is the inevitability of a retaliatory strike using such WMD in the event of “impaling” [brutal repression], which can be implemented as a “dead hand system” or an “assassination market.” After a couple of such episodes, the country will quickly return to a state of separate pre-state societies, where the most that could be done to a criminal was ostracism. On this point, the philosopher Steven Pinker said it well: “Revenge is a risky business because if the enemy is dangerous enough to have harmed you, he is unlikely to accept punishment without resistance.” In matters of coercion to obey the orders (“laws”) of a stationary bandit, it is the same (we talked about this in the video “The Non-violent State”). The possession of even the simplest WMD by a potential victim of the state makes the initiation of violence “political suicide” for the authorities. It will come to the point where society, tired of continuous quarantines and overcrowded hospitals, will pressure the state using its own forces to root out aggressive violence (it may be hard to believe now, but life will force it).
