Libertarian theory of war, section 3.2.3 completed.

Finished chapter 3.2, which describes waging war in the event that a group attacks. The most interesting scenario is analyzed — when a group attacks a state.

For the sake of brevity, I preferred to limit myself to considering the situation where you are in the attacking group, rather than when some outsiders are trying to destroy your beloved state. Perhaps I will still need to write this subsection later, but I will try to do without it.

Things are either feast or famine for me: new posts are coming out quite frequently in November, and poor Bitark doesn’t even have a chance to get a word in. Another article from the old archives is on the way, as well as one answer to a subscriber’s question.

Libertarian Theory of War, chapter 3.2 started.

The book on libertarian theory of war is steadily moving toward completion. Having previously analyzed wars initiated by an individual, I am now describing situations in which a group starts the war. So far, the sections on a group attacking an individual and group on group have been completed. The “group versus state” scenario is on the way.

The process of writing the book is bringing me unexpected discoveries. For instance, at the very beginning, I had to deviate from strict methodological individualism and introduce collective subjects. Now, I have come to the point where I am encroaching on the holy of holies, asserting that when analyzing group-on-group war, there is no practical sense in determining who is the aggressor and who is the victim. In short, read it, and I will be glad to receive your comments.

What is the point of inhibitor weapons and what makes them better than classic lethal ones?

Unfortunately, our skeptics still may not understand the fundamental point of the idea about developing combat means to enhance the violence inhibitor. They suggest “don’t waste time,” develop a classical army and invest in traditional lethal weapons. But let’s break it down – why they are wrong.

1) Increasing mobilization potential by several orders of magnitude – unlike what is typically observed with soldiers armed with lethal weapons, drones with this means in the sky will not be shot at, even by those possessing a strong variant of violence inhibitor from birth! And this is even more relevant to opposition forces than armies of states, because among anti-authoritarian people there will be fewer psychopaths willing to kill easily than in the security structures protecting the status quo.

2) Greater public support and less outrage about brutality from sympathizers, which is especially important for a weaker side.

3) The possibility of using inhibitor means in civilian life against domestic abusers, unlike the complete uselessness of classical weapons like tanks and artillery during peacetime (billions are spent on their production, maintenance, and crew training annually from taxes, and this does not benefit society at all, and it is particularly burdensome for more free societies compared to authoritarian ones).

4) Safety of manufacture for the manufacturers themselves – inhibitor drugs cannot accidentally explode during manufacturing, transport or storage; even accidental exposure to workers will do them no harm.

5) Even cluster munitions (CMWs) can be humane. Replicable (“contagious”) vector vaccines have already been tested on animals and their effectiveness was recognized, meaning there are no technological barriers for developing “contagious” gene therapy to enhance the violence inhibitor. Of course, this is a very risky solution, but believe me, anyone would rather catch a “new cold” than be defeated by classical CMW types like nuclear or VX gas.

6) Extremely low cost and simplicity of production of the dose of the inhibitor drug. Of course, developing the first dose may cost billions and require complex equipment, but the cost of reproducing each subsequent one will be on the level of the current cost of doses of popular vector vaccines. The need for equipment and materials to reproduce is not comparable to the equipment needed to produce classical weapons (the equipment easily fits in an apartment, while factories producing artillery shells or tanks occupy square kilometers and are easily vulnerable to air strikes).

7) Extremely small weight of the “combat part” and little energy is required for successful defeat (it’s enough to pierce the skin anywhere on the body). In theory, it’s possible to create a drone the size of a bee, which is already a real technology – not science fiction!

8) Humane mines with no demining problems – after the war, classic mines can remain dangerous for civilian populations for many decades, while inhibitors in traps are quickly neutralized by environmental factors.

As a final note – why not tranquilizers to temporarily sedate the enemy? Indeed, science fiction often features plots where instead of lethal weapons, darts with tranquilizers are used. However, in real life and especially in combat conditions, this is difficult to implement because even a small dose of any tranquilizer won’t have an effect, while too large a dose will be fatal, and the dose needs to be calculated for each person individually, primarily taking into account their body weight. On the other hand, for most inhibitory drugs, the therapeutic window (a “dynamic range” when the dosage already gives an effect but is not yet lethal) will be extremely wide, and one dosage can be boldly applied to any person.

VoluntaristBitarch

Libertarian Theory of War, chapter 3.1 completed.

In chapter 3.1 of the book on libertarian theory of war, the sections “Individual vs. Group” and “Individual vs. State” have been completed. The next two chapters will follow a similar pattern, so I hope they will go more smoothly.

I’ve somehow lost interest in the idea of illustrating the book in the style of red-figure Greek vases; I’ll put that plan on hold for now and see how it goes.

Libertarian Theory of War, Section 3.1.1.

I have started writing the third part of the book on libertarian war theory. So far, not even a full chapter is ready, but only one section, and the style has mutated somewhat compared to the first two parts, so I would like your opinion on how well it harmonizes with the content. Plus, I finally gave in to the current trend and am now illustrating texts with neural networks. This book will be filled with illustrations in the style of red-figure Hellenic vase painting. Gradually, I will add images to other chapters as well.

Your opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

To be more specific, do you agree with the opinion that in modern history Israel defended itself against the aggression of its neighbors and was more of a victim than an aggressor (insofar as a state can be considered a victim at all)? What is the most optimal and politically feasible solution capable of stopping the conflict in the region, and what prevents its implementation?

Question from Zigoter

Having started writing a book on the libertarian theory of war, I realized with some bewilderment that, despite all my methodological individualism, I cannot construct correct descriptions without operating with fictitious entities such as collective subjects. These speculative subjects were named by me as spirits.

The Jewish people are very ancient and managed to survive over millennia because they possessed and diligently preserved a very strong spirit of the people’s divine election. Nothing could shake the Jews’ loyalty to their spirit, but the 19th century brought them a strong temptation: the spirits of nationalism were born—a phenomenon known as the Spring of Nations. From the connection between the spirit of divine election and the spirit of nationalism, the spirit of Zionism was born. Those possessed by this spirit made efforts to create a national Jewish state that could become a home for any representative of the divinely elected Jewish people.

In the early period of its existence, the State of Israel represented a very peculiar combination on the spiritual plane: the old Jewish spirit of divine election, the new Jewish spirit of Zionism, the new global spirit of socialism, the mature European spirit of individual freedom, and additionally, the spirit of a victim-people born during the Holocaust. These spirits supported each other in some ways, but in many ways they were at odds. The result was a dynamic, expansive state that not only habitually survived in a hostile environment, as the Jewish people had survived in a hostile environment for many centuries, but also actively expanded its borders, creating a zone of quite decent security within the assimilated space.

Currently in Israel, the spirit of the victim-people has completely exhausted its potential, and the positions of the spirit of socialism have weakened somewhat; otherwise, the picture remains the same. As long as Israel’s environment remains hostile, abandoning expansion is fraught with destruction for it: passive defense in conditions of technological progress does not allow for the effective containment of enemies.

And why, exactly, is Israel’s environment so hostile to it? Initially, Israel faced the spirits of nationalism, and these are quite weak in the Arab world. Therefore, it was sufficient for Israel to achieve a decisive military victory over one coalition of states or another for the situation to calm down noticeably. It was only the spirit of Islam, which gained significant strength at the end of the 20th century, that made the situation truly complex, because this spirit has strong grassroots support, which is precisely what makes it a real spirit and not a propaganda facade, like Orthodoxy in the RF.

Having finished with history, let us move to libertarian recipes. First of all, the rhetoric of “we are launching preemptive strikes because otherwise we will be destroyed” is already being received with difficulty by consumers of propaganda, even if it is true. On the other hand, it is precisely now that the rhetoric of “freedom is coming” is on the rise; it would be a sin not to take advantage of it. Externally, Israel needs to appeal not to the spirit of its divine election—it will only work on the Jewish diaspora, and even then poorly. Nor to the Holocaust, which as a news hook no longer sells (now October 7th must be used instead). And certainly not to socialism; it is sinful to be proud of one’s internal illnesses. However, the slogan “We are expanding the space of freedom” is not only dignified but also effective. “We are not destroying terrorist regimes in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran because they are against Israel, but because they are terrorist regimes. They are directed against all free people, whether inside the countries they control or outside. Islam is not a religion of slavery. It is quite compatible with the ideas of free trade. And those political regimes that are ready for trade rather than war, and in which their own citizens enjoy freedom, are welcomed by Israel.”

Of course, one should not confuse freedom with democracy; this mistake cost the USA dearly, there is no need to repeat it. What matters is not how a political leader took office, or if there even is one, but how free people are within that political regime, period. But, of course, such rhetoric imposes restrictions on Israel’s internal policy as well, which, however, is only for the better.

War under ancap

I recently came across an interview of Evgeny Volnov by Mark Solonin.

Briefly: it describes the organization of a business process for the decentralized volunteer production of consumables to supply the army. Toward the end, Solonin inevitably reflects on libertarianism, so it’s worth me reflecting a bit as well.

The question that concerns me is: can an ancap community already provide all the necessary ingredients for conducting a full-scale war?

Volunteers are capable of mass-purchasing everything necessary for logistics, nutrition, and daily living on the free market and delivering it to the combat zone. The production of small arms and explosives are developed civilian industries. In the absence of government orders, they will not wither away, and in conditions where the state is not getting in the way, they are capable of responding to increased demand by increasing production. Distributed production, similar to what was described in the interview, is capable of saturating the army with light combat mechanisms. Heavier specialized mechanisms can also be produced by volunteers; it’s just that 3D printers on a balcony will no longer suffice—small workshops will be needed instead. The Ukrainian war demonstrates to us that this is also not a problem. Such mechanisms also include long-range drones, including high-speed ones.

Private entities already know how to provide communications and satellite intelligence data excellently.

What about people? Volunteer units are performing excellently at the front and, compared to their state counterparts, demonstrate far fewer problems finding people willing to join them. The better the unit’s reputation, the higher the competition.

Coordination between units is also showing results at least as good as state chains of command, and authoritative commanders are capable of rapidly expanding their sphere of influence, taking responsibility for increasingly larger areas of work.

What private suppliers are not ready to provide today is manned combat aviation. However, today a combat aircraft is de facto a platform to lift a radar and missiles into the sky, and then to ensure that the pilot sees the radar data and launches missiles accordingly. A pilot is no longer needed to perform high-level aerobatics during an aerial dogfight between planes. Given a stable communication channel, the pilot can actually be on the ground, and a stable communication channel can be ensured if there are many planes in the air forming a relay network. A plane’s radar is something comparable in complexity to a Starlink terminal—it also needs to track multiple satellites and somehow make sense of a jumble of signals. That is, a private entity can produce it without an exorbitant price tag. Consequently, under ancap, a combat aircraft looks like a plump propeller-driven carrier of several missiles and many drones, flying in swarms that hover in the air around the clock, analyze the situation a couple of hundred kilometers from the swarm’s perimeter, and clear out everything interesting they find—and as fuel and/or ammunition are exhausted, they fly back to base in automatic mode, calling for a replacement in advance. However, this is still an unrealized fantasy.

Two questions remain.

First, motivation. States are breeding grounds for patriotism, and patriots are precisely the fuel of war. Will an ancap community be patriotic enough to organize large-scale resistance against a state? The example of the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine shows that the chances are quite high: the primary resistance to the sudden attack in areas where hostilities had not occurred since 2014 was mainly volunteer-based, and at the very least, it thwarted the blitzkrieg.

Second, economic sanctions. Sanctions are an insult to the element of the free market. They are imposed by states, and states monitor their compliance, while the market ensures that sanctions work poorly. It can be stated with considerable confidence that sanctions as a tool for influencing an opponent under ancap will have an extremely weak effect, representing isolated examples of refusing deals for moral reasons. Simply put, some will be actively donated to and worked for out of conviction, while others will be provided services only for good money. Since each side may have a quite diverse composition, there will be both volunteers and mercenaries on both sides. And victory will go to the side that is more effective in this resource confrontation. But in the long run, efficiency will be determined by how many ideological and talented people work for the victory of one side or another. And this, in turn, will depend on whose side the majority believes justice lies.

How would private military companies act under anarcho-capitalism?

Mauser

Anarcho-capitalism is a free market plus the decentralization of power. A private military company under ancap is a company operating in a free market to solve military tasks—that is, tasks arising from conflicts where people are willing to kill.

It is very easy to imagine the activities of private military companies during a society’s war of liberation against the state. Something similar to how this looks could be observed in the initial stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in those areas where the state was practically inactive, yet defense tasks were nonetheless being solved. What is characteristic of such a war? The emergence and decentralized coordination of numerous startups focused on three types of tasks: direct combat operations, supplying those on the front line, and crowdfunding to finance the first two. If the war drags on, the supply task becomes more complex, and a separate industry emerges for the development of new means of warfare.

But once ancap dominates the world, all this flourishing complexity is a heroic past. The grandfathers fought their wars. Military tasks become much more local; the duration and frequency of military conflicts decrease. Thus, private military companies under ancap will operate in survival mode. They will have to exert significant marketing efforts just to justify why they still exist at all, and many will prefer to liquidate instead, since there are many peaceful tasks on the market that will bring a much more significant income with far less effort.

Believe me, you wouldn’t want to work as a PMC employee under ancap. No romanticism, no heroism, very few actual tasks, existing merely as a formality, in conditions where people look at you askance and wonder why you even exist, and if you wouldn’t accidentally like to create a new state, because you seem kind of aggressive—maybe you need a little injection. So, I fully admit that almost no military companies will remain at all under ancap. There will be gamers. There will be reenactors. There will be some kind of brutal sport. There will be fans organizing into teams to vent aggression on one another under the pretext of supporting sports teams. There will be various book theorists imagining what war could be like under current material and technical conditions.

The production of specialized military equipment will inevitably be shut down. Old stocks will be gradually disposed of, and those that make no sense to dispose of will eventually become obsolete anyway. Cheap mass-market items for the civilian market can be adapted for war using blue electrical tape if necessary, but engaging in this—and especially starting to produce more serious military tools—will only happen in the event of a real war whose duration exceeds at least a couple of months. And where would this real war come from?

A mass war under ancap would require a combination of two factors. First, the appearance of a sufficient number of sweet summer children convinced that war is a fun festival of courage. Is this possible under ancap? Of course it is, and it is even inevitable. And second, a talented psychopath is needed who can convince them that the world is rotten to the core, society has lost its purpose, and it is time to shake up these bloated pigs so they scream in terror. Is this possible under ancap? Of course it is; you can’t assign a Bitarch to every psychopath.

As for what happens next, that is also generally clear. There will be bewilderment. There will be distrust of news channels, claiming they are creating hype out of nothing. There will be helpless attempts to counteract this by service agencies involved in maintaining order and security. Then, more and more people will begin to realize that they are actually being fought against. Mostly, they will simply flee far away from the danger zone after receiving insurance payouts (if policies still imply coverage for civil unrest risks). But entrepreneurs will emerge who begin to solve the arising problem. And then the market will do its work, and it will be the hour of glory for private military companies. They will emerge from nowhere, attract all the necessary resources, deal with the war, and disappear again.

Such a boring story.

Libertarian Theory of War. Chapter 2.5. Summing Up the War.

Writing a new chapter of my book about war happened to coincide by pure chance with another anniversary of the end of the European phase of World War II, as well as with the vibes in the air regarding the conclusion of the current Russian-Ukrainian one. The chapter turned out to be somewhat pensive and lyrical. Also, while creating it, I was occasionally plagued by imposter syndrome: what right do I have to write about such matters without having military experience? May those who do have it forgive me, or better yet—comment on my amateur fantasies from their expert perspective.

This concludes the main, theoretical, second part of the book. The third part is expected to feature the practical applications of the theory.

What is the guarantee of freedom of speech under libertarianism?

Fyodor Svetlov

In short: the guarantees of freedom of speech under libertarianism are the same as under liberalism.

Now, in more detail.

Originally, the concept of “freedom of speech” is a liberal doctrine implying that citizens deny the state the right to prosecute its citizens for their utterances. Usually, freedom of speech is promoted in conjunction with freedom of religion, the press, and so on, because citizens, understanding that the state will inevitably find loopholes in a general prohibition, separately specify spheres where the state is not just forbidden, but completely prohibited from prosecuting citizens. What guarantees freedom of speech according to liberal doctrines? Of course, the separation of powers. The executive branch encroaches on freedom of speech, the legislative branch describes exactly what limitations the executive has, and the judicial branch interprets what the legislative branch has dreamt up; as a result, the branches of power trip over each other, and if they suddenly start marching in step, citizens have the right to rebellion, interpreted as the right to reconstitute the government if the previous one, through a long series of abuses, has completely discredited itself as a bearer of liberal values.

Libertarianism implies that the only permissible function of government is the protection of private property rights (since not everyone believes that private property rights can also be effectively protected in a decentralized manner without any government at all).

Can a libertarian government prosecute its citizens for their utterances? Yes, easily. For example, a certain citizen slanders another citizen, and the latter suffers losses because of it. There is a loss—there is a reason to sue. The court may award compensation to the victim of slander at the expense of the slanderer, and this, certainly, can be interpreted as a violation of freedom of speech. Another example is fraud. No slander here; on the contrary, the product is praised so much that it makes your mouth water, but the real qualities of the product fall far short of the description. Could a court consider this statement a violation of private property rights if the transaction took place and is subsequently contested? It could.

Finally, there are countless examples where freedom of speech is not entirely correctly understood by people as the right to make any statements without punishment on any private platform, provided that the platform is fundamentally intended for making statements. Can the owner of the platform ban someone who prevents them from developing their business? Of course, it is their private property. Will a libertarian government support such an encroachment on freedom of speech? It is obliged to support it. But what if the platform belongs to a member of the government? Here we have a clear legal conflict.

What follows from all these arguments? Yes, a libertarian government has fewer powers than a liberal one. But it does have the power to encroach on freedom of speech. Could it begin to abuse these powers? It could. What is left for citizens as a last resort? The same sacred right to rebellion.

Don’t forget to water the garden bed with oil.

The tomatoes, grandson, might wither, but the machine gun won’t rust