The new chapter of the book on libertarian theory of war turned out to be short; perhaps I will merge it later with the next one—about summing things up. Or maybe I’ll leave it as is. The main idea is simple: one should exit a war as early as possible, but depending on the course of the war, there are some nuances.
To mark the third anniversary of the start of the SMO, I want to reflect on whether it is ultimately beneficial for libertarians for the hostilities between Ukrainian and Russian troops to end immediately, even on terms that are quite unfavorable for the Ukrainian state. From the phrasing used, the reader can already guess that I will be arguing that this is indeed beneficial for libertarians.
Ukraine has always had an abysmal state (confirmed by several Maidans) and a civil society that is developed relative to the RF (confirmed by those same Maidans, as well as the fact that the front is held largely through the efforts of volunteers—both among those fighting and those providing supplies). Civil society has neither piety nor illusions regarding the state. And over these years, Ukrainian civil society has learned to fight very well. But right now it is terribly preoccupied: fighting another state, Russia, in a situational alliance with a treacherous but slightly less dangerous enemy—the state of Ukraine.
What happens if no one on the Ukrainian side concludes peace with Putin? The flow of resources for conducting military operations in favor of the Ukrainian side will weaken, and the tension of the conflict will gradually fade on its own as the warring parties exhaust themselves. When both armies are completely bled dry, peace will happen eventually, and there will not be much benefit in this peace for Ukraine’s civil society, even if the terms for the Ukrainian state are better than those currently offered.
What happens if a ceasefire with the Russian side is reached and turns out to be relatively stable? A huge number of very angry and highly skilled military representatives of Ukrainian civil society will return from the Russian front to within drone-flight distance of Ukrainian officials. How soon will these gluttonous grabbers (I mean the officials, of course, not the veterans) begin to die en masse, playing with grenades or some other stupid way? How soon will the current Ukrainian president join the ranks of the clumsy idiots who ignore safety protocols? Does he really want that? Therefore, Zelensky will do everything possible to delay the moment of concluding peace. He should not be helped in this. One can even support the pressure on him to finally conclude any deal with Putin. One can even support Mikhail Svetov: I do not know his true motivations, his public argumentation is poor, but he pushes for peace—and good for him.
Just as Milei’s victory in Argentina gave libertarians arguments in favor of political methods of shrinking the state, a potential military coup in Ukraine after concluding an agreement with Putin will give libertarians arguments in favor of armed methods of shrinking the state, and my bloodthirsty heart rejoices in anticipation.
A request to readers. If anyone knows of a specific Ukrainian unit conducting its own crowdfunding for modern, high-efficiency tools of warfare applicable also for combat operations against its own state—please provide links to their materials. I want to read, form an opinion, and donate.
Another section of the book on libertarian theory of war has been completed—specifically, on the conduct of war. Surprisingly, it is once again almost entirely dedicated to the final stages of preparation for war and the actual beginning of combat operations. This is because these are the moments when actions can still be planned in advance. After that, either the plans will work, or everything will go wrong, you will get bogged down in a stupid war of attrition, and the next section—on how to get out of the war—will become relevant.
After a very long pause, I am continuing work on the book Libertarian Theory of War (thanks for the inspiration to the Canadian catgirl). The new section Entering the War is dedicated to an overview of the reasons for entering a war and the reasons for not entering one. As usual, spirits frolic on the pages of the book alongside economic analysis.
In the next chapter, in theory, the real meat should begin, as the preparations for the main action have dragged on a bit.
Due to Durov’s arrest, an active discussion continues online.
For us libertarians, the position is simple: states, by their very nature, exercise aggressive violence and therefore have no right to exist. (Private individuals who provide any conceivable services that the state provides or has ever provided, but do so on a voluntary basis, do have a right to exist)
The world, however, does not consist solely of libertarians. There are numerous representatives of ideologies claiming the right of collectives to violate any conceivable rights of individuals for the sake of the benefit of these or those collectives, including such abstract collectives as, for example, “future humanity.” With them, it is sometimes possible to have meaningful discussions on the topic of “exactly how will this specific violation of individual rights help achieve your wonderful collectivist goal, and isn’t it ridiculous for you to throw so many resources at tasks with such a tiny cost-efficiency ratio, when here are far more effective solutions to your own problem with a much lower need to violate individual rights.” As soon as the interlocutor begins to angrily reject such economic analysis, the conversation can be wound up, essentially saying: come back when you’ve grown wiser; until then, there is nothing to talk about.
Finally, there are the realists. They condescendingly explain that values are called such because they have a price. That anyone can be bought. That Durov has already repeatedly made compromises with quite repulsive political regimes. And if these regimes, through threats to the creators of Telegram, easily turn it into a weapon on the side of evil, then it is foolish to demand that less repulsive political regimes not use threats against the creators of Telegram to turn it into a weapon on the side of good (or, if you prefer, the lesser evil). This position was expressed very clearly and consistently by Michael Naki in his video.
He essentially claims that, firstly, even if Durov was indeed arrested and will be accused, in violation of any legal norms, of all the nonsense that is causing so much noise online, it is justified if the result is his active assistance to the anti-Putin coalition in the war on Ukraine’s side. And secondly—that the arrest looks like a staging, and it is far more likely that Durov himself asked for the protection of the West and effectively promised assistance in the war in exchange for protection from pressure by dictatorial regimes, primarily the Putin regime.
As for what this could lead to, Michael himself concludes quite soberly: that later, so he says, Telegram will start to be used against Trump. And he immediately answers this consideration: won’t there be downsides, then? In other words, what can be applied for extraordinary reasons will easily be applied for any reason. War is a continuation of politics, and if Telegram can be brought under control in a total war, why not bring it under control tomorrow to influence the election process—why hesitate, since Trump, in Michael’s opinion, is a fascist and is just as deserving of having a total war declared against him. And the day after tomorrow, the Chinese experience is adopted—and what’s the big deal, since an honest person has nothing to hide. There are so many terrible things in the world worthy of having a total war declared against them: drug trafficking, trafficking… the state, right, Michael? Oh, what, the state isn’t on this list? Strange, strange.
Realists perfectly understand that their position is logically vulnerable because it is inconsistent. They don’t care, because logical constructs are an ideal construction, not a real one. Some momentary desires are declared by them as the highest value, others as meaningless whims; some methods are adopted, while others are only sweetly dreamed of—and the only criterion for justifying such an approach turns out to be the result. It’s fine if the result is declared in advance, but that’s not necessarily the case, as the target can be drawn around the point where the bullet hit.
What can be opposed to the realists? Only a change in reality. We have lived too long in a world of centralized systems, and therefore we are easily captivated by heroes, seeking hope now in Durov, now in Musk. But real hope is brought by another type of hero—the anonymous Satoshi. One who opens a new technology and makes it public property. We have relied on centralized systems for too long because it is fast, cheap, and convenient. And also, they can be broken quickly, cheaply, and conveniently. It is time to realize that we are not rich enough to buy cheap things.
A small centralized system competing on a free market with a million similar systems—why not. But when it comes to the global exchange of values or opinions—let’s forget about centralization. Bitcoin and its extensions—as protocols for transferring value. Nostr or something along those lines—as a protocol for transmitting statements. Some entity that has not yet gained widespread use—as a protocol for legal transactions (this function of the Leviathan must also be replaced by something decentralized). In the new world, there will be fewer heroes, and therefore—fewer possible points of failure. A hell of a lot of responsibility will not hang on one specific person. And therefore, there will be no point in arresting Durov.
But for now—let’s create hype around our hero and demand his release. Why? A strange question. Let’s be realists; it’s so fashionable. States as a means of forced unification of people must be destroyed. What will contribute more to the death of this institution—if Durov is kept in detention until he agrees to the conditions imposed on him—or if, as a result of a pressure campaign, the French state is seriously discredited and forced to release its prisoner? Of course, the latter. But even if pressure does not help the goals of liberation—that is no reason not to press. It is much more pleasant to observe a morally degraded state than a proud and triumphant one.
Mikhail Pozharsky released a video in which he began to justify violence and war as entirely normal human phenomena and tools for solving problems, while insulting opponents of war in every way and accusing their position of being untenable. Of course, it is first and foremost the position of Pozharsky himself that can be called untenable, which we will now examine in more detail.
He started well by criticizing the works of Steven Pinker, who claims that the level of violence has decreased throughout history, and that prehistoric humans suffered from chronic wars that could claim the lives of the majority of the population. Pinker was indeed wrong; he drew conclusions by considering only examples that were convenient for his argumentation. But if one considers all archaeological and anthropological evidence, we see that prehistoric populations did not suffer from wars—only 2% of representatives of past hunter-gatherer tribes died as a result of violence. After the agrarian revolution and the emergence of states, the level of lethal violence rose to 5%, after which it began to decline, amounting to only 3% for the 20th century (and this including the bloody conflicts that occurred within it). As anthropologist Douglas Fry believes, the level of violence in history changed according to an “n-type curve.” Pozharsky does not mention these data at all, and they do not align with his argumentation.
Instead, he decided to talk in detail about the violent nature of chimpanzees and cite primatologist and anthropologist Richard Wrangham, who believes that humans have an innate predisposition to cruelty, which he explains as an evolutionary legacy. But as Robert Sussman and Donna Hart write, the evolutionary paths of humans and chimpanzees diverged 8 million years ago. Meanwhile, the paths between chimpanzees and bonobos diverged only 2.5 million years ago, which did not prevent the latter from being peace-loving creatures. Pozharsky also mentioned bonobos, but spoke only of the aggressiveness of their females, failing to mention that their aggression is predominantly defensive, as well as the fact that they fundamentally do not have killings. Furthermore, many researchers, including anthropologist Brian Ferguson, believe that most violence in chimpanzees is provoked by human interference in their habitat, and that they have no innate predisposition to commit murder, just as humans do not.
Pozharsky also cites the Dani people as an example, among whom wars and killings are quite common. However, one could with equal success cite examples of the Paliyar, Semai, and many other peoples who are complete pacifists. Moreover, as Douglas Fry notes, research data shows that the majority of cultures (376 out of 590 studied) were either absolutely non-warlike or not inclined toward war (participating only in minor military actions). And only a third of the cultures participated significantly in wars, pursuing specific political or economic goals.
Next, Pozharsky provides individual examples of violence in history, which is an approach similar to that of Pinker (using episodes convenient for one’s argumentation while ignoring the full picture), claims that war can be just if a set of rules is adopted to reduce the harm it causes (but only suggests following them, without guaranteeing their execution in reality), and also attacks pacifists, portraying them as literally the worst people in the world by groundlessly attributing to them practices that only promote violence, such as appeasing the aggressor or waging war against a proclaimed “evil” without sparing any effort and ignoring the rules.
Of course, Pozharsky never once mentioned the position of anthropologists who quite reasonably do not consider war to be something natural for humans, or the position of military experts, according to which most healthy people possess a strong internal resistance to committing murder (or as researchers of human psyche and neurophysiology call it—the violence inhibition mechanism), and only a tiny fraction of individuals with high psychopathic predispositions are capable of engaging in such activities easily. All of this was ignored.
Max Stirner
From the proposed positions, it is strange in general to ask questions about whether one can do something. Of course, one can; the only question is the extent of responsibility.
If we are talking about sanctions from the Russian state, then solving the problem comes down to finding sufficiently safe ways of transferring money, publishing propaganda, delivering equipment, and so on.
However, I believe the question is more about whether other right-libertarians and right-individualists, upon learning of such activity, would feel obligated to obstruct you.
The RDK is a semi-autonomous armed formation within the AFU: in some ways it obeys the central command, it depends on it significantly for supplies, and it seems to be quite autonomous in matters of recruiting and the informational coverage of its activities. But there are other units within the AFU that independently conduct recruiting and crowdfunding. How is the RDK so different that the German Stirner asks about the permissibility of helping specifically the RDK, and not some Azov?
Azov was mentioned for a reason. Both this brigade and the Russian Volunteer Corps face numerous accusations that Nazis serve there. Economic theory tells us that values are subjective. Any person has every right to prefer one nation over all others; this in itself does not provide grounds to condemn them. Do the guys from Azov and RDK exterminate representatives of all other nations for the sake of the greatness of the nation they prefer over all others? No, they exterminate people according to a different criterion, and this criterion is no different from the one guided by other military formations within the AFU.
The only remaining difference between the RDK (and a couple of other smaller units) and other parts is that they physically, on foot, crossed the internationally recognized Russian-Ukrainian border to fight the Russian army on Russian territory. And what, does this make them aggressors? No, they are still participants in a defensive war. Just like the drone operators striking refineries deep in the Russian rear.
Ah, yes, they also have Russian passports, or at least they did at the start of the war. And what, does this somehow change their legal status? No, not even under Russian laws. They still remain AFU servicemen, toward whom all sorts of rights and restrictions associated with the laws and customs of war apply—laws which the RF pledged to observe (but does not). But even if there were a law in the RF according to which any RF citizen who joined the ranks of foreign armed forces was subject to execution without trial, what significance would this have for a legal individualist?
However, I assume that the reader with the nickname Max Stirner is a Russian citizen. Therefore, his question can be reformulated more sharply: does libertarian morality justify war against one’s own state? Actually, libertarian morality justifies war against any state. Even against states led by libertarians, such as Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele, or Hans-Adam II. Fighting against one’s own is even more meaningful, because that is where your main grievances lie, it is that state that causes you direct harm, whereas all others are just some predators roaming nearby, who, of course, should also have no place on earth. However, a successful war requires allies. Most of us do not have them. The RDK does. Let us be happy for them.
A substantial piece of text is ready for a book on the theory of war, covering various aspects of war preparation. It took a very long time to write; it is evident that excerpts from different periods differ in style, but I do not want to delay publication; I will still have time to proofread it.
Let us consider this as a substitute for the routine post on the anniversary of the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops, and after all, I promised to speed up after Navalny’s death. So, I am speeding up.
I have finished writing section 1.2 of my new book on libertarian theory of war, where I outlined the objectives it addresses. Also, before that, I inserted a small paragraph on statism into the previous section. It might have turned out a bit tedious, but it doesn’t seem too dragged out. With that, the introductory part of the book is finished, and from here on, things should get more or less concrete.
If the previous book about ancap, which we managed to print on paper for the Montellibero festival last September, ended up being 74 A5 pages, then I hope this one will not be of such monstrous size and will fit into about forty pages. However, we shall see; I might get carried away with epic descriptions of helmet-glinting Hectors or drawing organizational charts of network-centric warfare—due to such off-topic tangents, the size of the book could expand significantly.
As a reminder, I would be very pleased with donations, showing me that my work is not only in demand, but that there are also people who consider it worthy of immediate material gratitude, and who have prudently invested at least part of their savings in bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies.
While I was on a roll, I managed to finish another chapter of the book on the theory of war, which offers the reader a fascinating journey into the world of spirits. The previously planned separate chapter on the principle of methodological subjectivism seems redundant to me for now, as I do not see what could be added separately about this principle, which already operates throughout the text. Perhaps I will decide to insert it over time, but for now, I am removing this item from the table of contents.
The next section is intended to briefly describe the goals of the libertarian theory of war as they apply to its individual stages.
