David Friedman. Legal Systems Strongly Differing from Ours. The Amish.

After a long break, Vladimir Zolotorev has published another chapter of the translation of David Friedman’s book Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own. In total, four chapters have been translated out of order as of today. Today’s is dedicated to the legal system of the Amish, who are beloved by Mikhail Svetov.

From the text, it is evident that these downshifters are sympathetic not only to many Americans, but also to Friedman himself. I wonder if they are currently facing problems because of their support for Trump…

The English original was posted on my website around the end of August. The same fate awaits the translation as it is published on mises.in.ua. Usually, corrections of minor flaws are made to the translation, but overall there is not much difference whether to read it on my site or Vladimir’s.

Can you fix what wasn’t broken?

I read Vladimir Zolotorev’s book Can something that wasn’t broken be fixed? In it, Vladimir develops his cycle of previously published articles on the nature of the state, shows that it works perfectly in its normal mode, performing exactly what it was created for, and reflects on realistic options for its reduction or abolition.

In effect, he has created something like Rothbard’s For a New Liberty, but using a different conceptual apparatus: Rothbard analyzed the state primarily from legal positions, while Zolotorev does so from the perspective of praxeology, spontaneous orders, and social evolution.

A fairly large section of the book is devoted to explaining how society works (one might not even need to add the adjective “stateless” to it, because that is its natural state; rather, for the current state of affairs, it would be more appropriate to speak of “society with a state”).

The last part of the book presents considerations on the abolition of the state. The key to this is to stop viewing the state as an organization. From this, it becomes clear why political methods of fighting the state do not yield results under normal conditions; rather, they strengthen it, making it more efficient. Ridance of the state in its modern form lies more in the sphere of losing social consent for legalized robbery. At this moment, power is lost, and the state disappears de facto.

Next, a small window of opportunity opens for political methods that allow for the reformatting of the political process itself. This can be done in two directions.

First, the subject of political bargaining can be shifted from budget expenditures to budget collections, that is, turning taxes into fees. Alexander Rozov writes extensively about this in a colorful fictional form in his Meganesian cycle.

Second, the state can be turned into a joint-stock company, not in a figurative, but in a literal sense. Subsequently, the management of this newly formed JSC will optimize the company’s structure within a market paradigm and will join the ranks of all other existing corporations in the world.

All the material and specific recipes are given using the example of Ukraine, so the book should not be perceived as a completely literal manual for action in Russian realities, but it is still more relevant material than recipes based on American material.

Zolotorev’s work was released as part of a collection of works by three different authors. I am posting it in full, but if someone extracts only Zolotorev’s part from the general PDF and translates it, for example, into epub, I would be very grateful, as it would be more convenient to read.

What to do if an ancap society that has successfully formed in some territory begins to be squeezed by neighbors? For example, if they are a religious state, and its citizens, possessing some kind of superiority (or the support of their state), buy land, move in, but do not want to observe the NAP?

anonymous question

The topic of direct military conflict was best explored by Vladimir Zolotorev, whom I have mentioned repeatedly, in the series of articles “Insurance Company ‘Sonechko’ versus the Tsardom of Muscovy”.
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Most likely, this volume of material will be sufficient for you to address both the question you asked and several related ones.

But I will still make a small clarification regarding one of the models of creeping expansion you mentioned. Buying up all the land is very unrealistic, because the less unsold land remains, the more expensive it becomes, and the happy sellers of land receive more and more resources, which they can invest in assets that seem more profitable to them than the land they have just sold.

At the same time, the fact that a certain NAP violator is a landowner does not protect them in any way. They violated it — a conflict arose, now they either pay a penalty or they are fought against. In a state, the law may protect a NAP violator, but for ancaps, dealing with such problems is much simpler.

Sonechko