Тег: Strategy

On Futurism of War: Discussion

Atomic Cherry uploaded a four-part article cycle for his paid subscribers titled “On the Futurology of War”, and he sent me the drafts in Word. There was a brief discussion afterwards, but I’ll have to prepare a short overview of the cycle, where I partially restate the author’s opinion and partially supplement it.

The cycle briefly describes how a professional army, with the invention of nationalism in the 19th century, mutated into mass conscripted armies, and during the Cold War, due to the second demographic shift, there was a renewed trend towards professionalization. It also describes changes in military doctrines, from competition about who can outmaneuver the other, to the idea of a general battle, and then to total war, from which offshoots of information, hybrid wars, etc., later detached themselves.

The key contradiction that led to the crisis of modern wars, the author sees in this dilemma. On one hand, nationalism is still quite strong, and it intensifies even more when an invasion takes place, so it’s relatively easy to mobilize a large, motivated contingent for defense. On the other hand, most countries have already undergone the second demographic shift, have negative demographics, and gathering a motivated army of aggression is difficult. Thus, nationalism inevitably dictates that the aggressor follow the doctrine of total war, but demographics don’t allow them to draw an endless supply of human resources. Moreover, international humanitarian rhetoric forces them to be shy about blatant genocide, if, of course, the war is on the front pages of international media.

In light of this dilemma, the author describes several scenarios.

  • In countries where the second demographic transition has not yet occurred and a lack of industrial power prevents conducting a total war in the manner of the World Wars, low-tech genocide is taking place. Examples are primarily focused on Africa.
  • If the aggressor has overwhelming technological superiority, we have a war in which it destroys the enemy’s military and civilian infrastructure remotely, and the phase of ground operations either follows after complete suppression of resistance or does not occur at all. The most successful example of such a war is the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict, when bombings alone were enough to bring the enemy out of the war and convince it to change its political regime.
  • The aggressor may also solve the problem of a lack of motivated living force by outsourcing military tasks to private companies. This has been actively used in the Middle East and continues to be applied in Africa. However, the loyalty of mercenaries is tied to the economy, and the feasibility of their use is largely determined by the economic tasks they solve, so it often comes down to nothing more than power control over objects generating income.
  • Finally, in a situation where opponents are comparable in strength but cannot ensure a full-scale total war of the scale of Korea, positional confrontation occurs, examples of which are the Iran-Iraq and Ukrainian wars. The latter is particularly interesting because it is a war of states that have already undergone the second demographic transition.

Discussing the articles, I noted that they somehow focus on the fact that total war remains the only way to resolve interethnic conflicts by force, while there is also another way – eliminating the ruling elite of the enemy. To this the author replied that Hamas’s leadership had already been destroyed several times and it didn’t help. It seemed to me, however, that for countries with a negative demographic, such a method should still be relevant. Understandably, he was referring to removing Putin: the regime is quite personalized, the population is sufficiently apathetic, therefore eliminating the first face should, in my opinion, make the regime much more willing to negotiate. Atomic Cherry argued that the Russian regime is not so personalized, and that a no less frozen character will come to Putin’s place, who will continue the same policy, and in the worst case there would be many such frozen characters, they would arrange a full-scale civil war, and then it would be like with the Soviet Union, which calmed down after the citizen and went to seize the world.

Well, of course, then the Maduro takeover happened, a regime that wasn’t particularly personalized – and the country is obviously experiencing depopulation. So we’re both thrilled to observe this natural experiment: will this methodology work or won’t it? Will old-fashioned nationalism prevail, or postmodernism? If the latter, then a total war looks like a viable alternative, and that’s definitely a plus. And the next important precedent in the history of wars will be the forceful elimination of a nuclear dictator. I, of course, am betting that this won’t lead to a nuclear war, and that the world is almost ripe for this revelation.

Montelibero and Argentina

It has been a while since I’ve reviewed what’s happening in Montelibero, but an interesting occasion has arisen: Anton Ekhin, a political scientist, one of the project’s ideologues and author of articles explaining why a free society for Russian emigrants should be built specifically in Montenegro, has released a new article where he now explains why this should be done in Argentina.

In brief.

The pros of Montenegro, as they were seen in 2021: a sparsely populated democratic country without a dominant nation, with access to the sea and prospects of joining the EU.

The cons of Montenegro, as they are seen in 2025: a country that diligently executes any EU directives to tighten the screws regarding Russians, except, so far, requirements to introduce a visa regime. There is also a media and partially police campaign against Montelibero and Anton personally.

The prospects for the Russian libertarian community in Montenegro to facilitate changes toward freedom in this country are not even zero, but negative: the more active the hustle, the harsher the opposition will be under conditions of complete power dominance by the local state. Anton is not particularly interested in agorist ideas on building a counter-economy; it is important to him that all these measures be supported by the official authorities. In hope of this miracle, he first moved from the RF to the DPR, then supported the Montelibero project, and in the last year, finally realized that the miracle is already happening in Argentina, and that the soil there is more fertile for libertarians.

In this regard, Anton intends to cut his losses in Montenegro and focus on creating a libertarian community in Argentina, based on principles tested in Montelibero. The reaction of the Montenegrin part of the community to such ideas was quite unanimous: let him personally go to Argentina and build whatever he wants there, while we have settled in quite well here. This echoes my thesis from last year that the main incentive for a Russian-speaking libertarian to move to Montenegro is that Montelibero already exists here, while such strong libertarian communities have not yet been built elsewhere.

Thus, the main downside of the idea of switching to Argentina is that there aren’t that many Russian libertarians; in Montenegro, they already have a significant network effect from economic and social ties, and switching to a new platform will continue to yield a net negative for quite some time: those remaining in Montenegro will lose out due to the weakening of the local community, and those moving to Argentina will bear the costs of relocation without receiving the benefits of a community, because it hasn’t been created yet.

For those who wish to participate in politics, leaving for Argentina is unambiguously preferable. The reason is banal: it is still realistically possible to obtain citizenship there, along with political rights, in a relatively short period, whereas in Montenegro, Russians have no citizenship and will not have it. Montelibero’s resources tried to put a brave face on a bad situation, claiming that political rights aren’t really needed and that they would influence through locals, but now it seems the illusions have vanished.

However, even those who seriously count on obtaining citizenship in about three years must have something to live on during those three years, and also find a way to stay on their feet after receiving citizenship. Despite a year of libertarian reforms, Argentina is still a regulatory hell, and for immigrants, the situation has rather worsened compared to the pre-Milei times—citizenship and residence permits have become harder to obtain. Besides regulatory difficulties, one must also consider that the cost of living in Argentina has become clearly higher than in Montenegro. The same high import duties known from Montenegro, which Milei is somehow struggling to abolish, are doing their dark work.

Which Russian libertarians should actually go to Argentina?

  1. Those who have the resources to create a medium-scale legal business. In Montenegro, this would be a meaningless burying of money: the business climate is deteriorating, and Russian businesses are subject to serious regulatory pressure, especially informal pressure, where fines and suspension orders are issued more or less arbitrarily. In Argentina, taxes are higher and there are plenty of inspections, but the market is larger, and at a certain scale, this can offset the negatives.
  2. Those who have grounds for rapid acquisition of Argentine citizenship: the ability to invest a large sum in the local economy, confirmed large legal rent, or legal employment in a local company. Having a child born on Argentine territory is a lottery.

In other words, there are grounds to flee to Argentina for those who are already very significant actors in the local community in Montenegro, and the departure of each such person from Montenegro would be a great loss for Montelibero. Therefore, the main recommendation for the Montenegrin part of Montelibero is: value our whales, show them signs of respect, and give them no reason to doubt that they are more needed here.

As for the medium-term perspective, the stratification of the Russian emigrant libertarian community into a wealthy legal Argentine and a poor illegal Montenegrin community could eventually produce some useful effect. However, those who could in principle move to Argentina and create a new community there might have a reasonable question: why there specifically? Why not El Salvador, Prospera, or finally New Hampshire? Everywhere has its downsides, and Argentina has them too. So, as was the case with Montenegro in 2021, first a certain small group of people must take a risk and invest in creating a libertarian community in Argentina, and only when some rooting occurs will the presence of their own homegrown “Argentibero” truly become a significant factor for which it would make sense to move there.

On literate and illiterate actions

After my previous post, I was criticized for inconsistency: on one hand, I claim that the leaders of the Russian opposition acted quite competently, and on the other, I write that the regime’s response was to ban everything in Russia, and that all roads lead to the disposal of the population.

Here I will simply briefly note that when the RF troops attacked Ukraine, the Ukrainian troops also acted quite competently, which did not prevent them from losing a large territory. The actions of the opposition could have been successful if they hadn’t been constantly lagging. But they couldn’t help lagging: you cannot immediately incite people to burn down administrative buildings and engage in individual terror while people, for the most part, believe in legal methods of struggle. Thus, the few extremists from the time when the regime was slightly more herbivorous turned out to be premature, and their impulse went to waste. Now all they have left is to say, “we warned you.”

Similarly, this is all that remains to be said by those who desperately called all their friends and relatives to leave the country, and now they would be glad to leave, but there are traffic jams at all borders, and departure may be banned entirely any moment now.

We do not know what reserves of strength the regime has. Perhaps it will fall like the Soviet one after Afghanistan or the Russian one after the First World War. Or perhaps it will survive, like the Iranian one after the war with Iraq. It is only in our power to nudge it toward collapse through our action or inaction—and, if possible, avoid getting a retaliation from the regime for it. You can flee the country. You can burn down a recruitment office. You can beat up a recruitment officer. You can end up at the front and destroy your tank or commander there, and then successfully surrender into captivity. Or, if you prefer a positive agenda, you can help an immigrant, hide a deserter, persuade a friend not to go to the recruitment office… Ah, yes, that’s some kind of negativity again. Either way, all of these will be competent actions, strategically bringing you closer to the bright goal of the fall of the Russian dictatorship, even if the tactical effect seems negligible.

And what actions would be incompetent? For example, mocking those who have just this moment opened their eyes and demonstrating to them the shimmering whiteness of your own coat. Thoughtlessly approving and trying to justify every single action of regimes hostile to Russia—many of their actions are no less cannibalistic. Paying the regime fines issued to you for participating in peaceful street protests. Wishing the Russian army victory.

The Russian anti-war invasion of Georgia

Not only with a gun, but also with a kind word

My voice is currently forming a funny polyphony with the voice of the Bitarch: he continues to develop the theme that the only justified reason for violence should be self-defense at the immediate moment of the act, while I am rooting for guerrilla warfare, and specifically, I tossed out the idea of intensifying it during election periods, when the enemy’s forces are distracted by this boring show.

And since we are talking about elections, I would like to rely on the opinion of a key Russian opposition political strategist, Leonid Volkov. Who, if not him, should understand how relevant all this guerrilla activity is at the current moment?

So, let’s read his recent interview with Novaya Gazeta, which was recently shut down in the RF. What theses does he convey regarding the issue of interest:

  1. Guerrilla warfare against the Russian regime is cool, right, and patriotic; and if no Stauffenberg is found near the Führer, then it is possible and necessary to hit the regime at least at those levels where it cannot reliably protect potential targets of attack.
  2. Donating to the AFU is like bailing out the ocean with spoons; big predators operate at this level, so let the states dispose of their weapon stockpiles; for private individuals, it only makes sense to plug occasional holes in this area.
  3. Creating organizations for conducting guerrilla warfare in the RF is either stupidity or provocation; one must absolutely not act this way.
  4. Why doesn’t Volkov try to organize guerrilla actions? Because he doesn’t know how, and doesn’t even have a clue how to go about such things. He advocates for the division of labor, where everyone realizes their comparative advantages, just as economic theory suggests to us.

So, the maestro is ready to support the guerrillas informationally, but abstains from more direct participation. In this regard, first I want to speculate on how it actually makes sense to act in order to inflict regular damage on the regime in the rear while maintaining an acceptable level of security.

There are, of course, old known mechanisms like the assassination market, which are designed flawlessly in terms of security, but have a significant drawback: for some reason, they never worked in real life. Why? Primarily because ideas do not exist without carriers. It is not enough to provide a mechanism; you also need to attract people who would start using it.

Therefore, when choosing between security and effectiveness, one always has to sacrifice security in some way. Hence custodial crypto wallets, Telegram instead of encrypted mail, and the creation of firms instead of a total realm of freelancing.

Therefore, as a decent compromise, I want to recommend the article Entry Point. Creating a Cell from the Telegram channel Black Journal — slightly leftist, but that has little effect on the quality of the practical material.

The recent AFU offensive seems to have become a turning point in the Ukrainian military campaign, and while previously I was inclined to recommend the operational scheme “lone wolf commits sabotage – immediately leaves the country,” now optimists can afford schemes like “created a cell – we work in different directions – those who are exposed leave the country, the others continue the work.” A political future may largely lie within such cells of grassroots self-organization, because all the old mechanisms of political participation, such as parties, have long been bankrupt.

The goal of sabotage and terror attacks is not so much the immediate weakening of the enemy, but rather to sow and strengthen defeatist sentiments among the ranks of poorly motivated supporters and hostages of the regime. Essentially: look what the current leadership has brought the country to: its army is being beaten to a pulp at the front, Ukrainian saboteurs roam the rear like they are at home, orders are sabotaged, budgets are plundered; grab a piece of the country for yourself at the end, however much you can, the inevitable collapse will write everything off anyway.

Accordingly, if you absolutely cannot imagine how you would organize any destructive activity, but you know how to whine talentedly, then rejoice: your hour has come! It is precisely talented whining that the country needs most right now. If you don’t sow defeatist sentiments, then who will, other than you? Well, Strelkov is trying too, of course, but you should be able to do no worse. Rebrand yourselves as victims of television propaganda and start spreading gloom: the whole West is against us, everyone is deceiving Putin, everything is lost, the front is collapsing, what the hell is this Donbass for, it’s nothing but problems, and all those refugees — and so on and so forth, depending on who your interlocutor is.

You can do it.

Outdo this whiner!

Well, the time has come for terror too

In the post What to do with Russia from July 1, I wrote:

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotage against war-sustaining infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological nuances; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will end up demotivated, rather than receiving, on the contrary, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is practically an inevitable stage in the gradual escalation of efforts to dismantle the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with it in advance, acquire the necessary competencies in a timely manner, and identify a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely in a while; they have not yet fully crystallized.

After that, I had somewhat forgotten the topic, but just the other day, deep in the enemy’s rear, somewhere near Moscow, Fascism-chan was blown up as a result of a terrorist attack. Exactly who blew her up does not matter, just as it does not matter which of the socialist-revolutionaries in the early 20th century collaborated with the Okhrana. Much more important is exactly who was blown up. Perhaps I should still reflect on the optimal choice of targets for individual terror.

Judging by the hype caused by this attack, the target was chosen very successfully. It was demonstrated that the war is not happening somewhere far away, but can knock on the door of any “sofa-front” fighter at any moment, even a very glamorous one. Perhaps future terrorists should designate such a category of rear rats as “charming cannibals” as a priority target. For example, someone like Girkin and the like; I am not very well-versed in them. The category of “loathsome cannibals”—like a conditional Margarita Simonyan—are second-tier targets. The category of “useful idiots,” like a conditional Yuneman, is the third tier.

Compiling lists is also useful. For instance, a liquidation list, provided with links to the figures’ creative works and justifications as to why the elimination of a particular figure will contribute to demotivation in the pro-war camp and a drain of people from it. Plus, criteria for exiting the list: leaving the Russian Federation, public condemnation of the war, or transferring a significant sum to pro-Ukrainian funds (specifically those dealing with troop supply, not humanitarian aid). The benefit of the list is obvious. Someone on it discovers one fine day that two figures have already died in two weeks, there are ninety figures in total, and if the trend continues, they have a year and a half to live at best, so isn’t it time to run and repent?

And, of course, it would be especially effective to carry out attacks in locations where farewell rites for the bodies of previous victims of terrorist attacks are taking place. The goal is to ensure that not only the people on the lists, but their entire circle of acquaintances, begin to live in the mode of a special operation being conducted right around them.

It would be very useful to focus the terror primarily on Muscovites: it is beneficial to increase the rift between Moscow and the surrounding territories. Let the provincials, on one hand, gloat, and on the other, be wary of drawing fire upon themselves and prefer to distance themselves from the capital and its absurd war.

P.S. Why do I write only about attacks targeting propagandists, those collecting donations for the SVO, and the like? Because the destruction of military personnel during a war, even in the deep rear, is not a terrorist attack, but sabotage. Military personnel are legitimate targets. Propagandists are illegitimate.

P.P.S. And what about the NAP and all that? That’s just how it is. Not armies, but states fight. Combatants are merely the most obvious targets, who are also usually within the reach of the combatants of the second warring party. Non-combatants of a warring state who support the war are exactly the same targets of war. Moreover, non-combatants who do not support the war can also be quite justifiably destroyed by the second warring party if they failed to escape the jurisdiction of their state abroad or into captivity. It is simply that it is most useful to show maximum humanity toward them, but that is a question of tactics, not of law.

What to Do with Russia

From what can be gathered from the news, the situation with Russia is roughly as follows. External political actors want it to suffer a military defeat, but not an overly crushing one, and they certainly want a single statehood to be preserved on the territory of the RF. This is understandable; the status quo always has the advantage of not having to worry about interacting with new entities.

I do not rule out that, given such a touching coincidence of interests, Western politicians may indeed succeed in preventing Russia from collapsing. If, of course, the residents of Russia themselves do not resist this terrible scenario in which Moscow’s power, however criminal it may be, remains legitimate in the eyes of other political sovereigns, which means a carte blanche for any internal repression and squeezing every last drop out of the citizens.

It is clear that a scenario in which the entire population simply leaves Russia is extremely unlikely, and the departure of even ten percent doesn’t really change the overall situation, as the examples of Venezuela or, for instance, Ukraine show us. The state continues to stumble along despite general hopelessness and degradation.

Those remaining in the RF now have to actively work themselves to ensure the country loses the war as quickly as possible. It is difficult to say which specific sabotages are currently being carried out by locals and which by Ukrainian saboteurs, but one hopes that the local share is quite large.

I primarily draw information about what is happening on this strange front and what sentiments are gradually forming in this environment from the Telegram channel Anarchy+. The channel is occupied with attempts to theoretically conceptualize what is happening; reflections on the most appropriate tactics are constantly presented, and while peaceful protest was discussed there before, the channel is now rapidly radicalizing.

I would like some more serious involvement of my own in the process of the RF’s collapse, but it is hard to understand where I would fit in. Sabotage is a maximally secretive and decentralized process, and for me, the most obvious role is providing communication and coverage of what has happened. So, for example, I could receive reports of certain actions unilaterally and promote them on my platform, so that the actions would gain publicity, but this would not help in reaching the organizers.

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotaging war-support infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological points; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will are demotivated, rather than receiving, conversely, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is an almost inevitable stage in the gradual increase of efforts to bring down the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with this in advance, acquire the necessary competencies ahead of time, and look over a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely after some time; they are not yet fully formed.

Libertarianism and Social Experiments

In a recent Montelibero news post, I mentioned that among the project participants, there are surprisingly few—not to mention active members—of either of the two Libertarian parties of Russia, or even people somehow connected to them. Perhaps this thought is worth expanding upon.

Of course, at the start of the project, no one could say exactly what it would turn into over time. One founder saw it as a center for agorism. Another as a platform for the future transformation of Montenegro along libertarian lines. For me, it was a platform for the evacuation of Russian political activists from the Putin regime. As a result, we do indeed have a center for agorism, and the strategic goal of transforming Montenegro is written in our project description, although we haven’t made much progress in that direction. As for the evacuation platform—we indeed became one, but more and more people joining us are not political activists, but ordinary libertarians who aren’t interested in any such politics.

And, you know, it seems that this is actually a good thing. Judging by what reached me during the period when I was still relatively close with political libertarians, the bulk of their party activity boiled down to bickering over the charter and dividing power within the party (which happened to be splitting in two at the time). Here, frictions occasionally arise regarding the coordination of joint activities, but there is none of this endless expelling of people from the movement. You approve of the market, you don’t approve of state intervention, you don’t practice coercion—well, great, we are on the same path, and you can get acquainted with the smart books in your spare time, if you get around to it.

I was recently asked what, exactly, distinguishes our community from any other hangout, since here in Montenegro, there are several other emigrant groups that likewise do not practice violence and fully approve of freedom. I had to think about it, and as a result of my reflections, I found the only fundamental difference: we have tokenomics. That is, essentially, we simply actively practice the formalization of our market relations and obligations in an explicit form, and it is precisely this that gives us the opportunity to develop very actively.

The question arises: what if some other community manages to implement tokenomics for themselves, how will they differ from us? And here I note with surprise that, in essence, they won’t. Tokenomics (unlike cryptocurrencies) operates on trust, because linking tokens to real-world objects is impossible without trust. And trust among community members is possible only because they share a common value, such as a love for the market—specifically, for voluntary transactions. Any inclinations toward ideas that it’s useful to deceive “suckers” will be immediately rejected by the community (along with the carriers of such ideas), because our mutual obligations are not secured by any state violence, and deploying the tools of private violence is expensive and troublesome, and just not worth it. If some other community manages to reproduce similar relations within itself, we can boldly recognize them as our equals, and at the same time recognize their tokens. Thus, a completely seemingly auxiliary tool unnoticedly turns out to be a unique feature and almost the basis of identity.

As for political methods of solving problems, it’s truly better to leave them to the parties. And for them, we are apparently doomed to remain a completely non-political project, whether for selling land or some other politically meaningless activity. Let’s wish these guys luck in their mission, but if any party member wants to move from politics to economics—our doors are open.

Do you accept EURMTL?

A Positive Agenda for International Politics

Let’s talk about something good.

The international community has managed to cause the Russian economy great pain in a very short time. In principle, this is quite enough to bury the current regime in the RF, should it decide to keep playing out an already lost war. But this will a) take a long time, b) bring enormous losses to all states and private companies that joined the sanctions against the RF, c) in no way help a fundamental solution to the problem of aggression by a nuclear power against a non-nuclear one (the PRC can wait until the governments that so joyfully implemented sanctions against the RF are swept away by an opposition promising a return to normalcy—and immediately after that move to restore its own territorial integrity across the strait).

How to solve the problem faster, cheaper, and more reliably? Simply use not only the stick, but also the carrot. You are already trying to apply this method by offering Russian pilots rewards for flying military aircraft abroad, but, agree, this is small-scale; act on a larger scale. Declare that your sanctions are only against the RF. If any territorial entity declares its separation from the RF, states that it does not support the RF’s invasion of Ukraine, and joins the sanctions against the RF, promise to immediately recognize the sovereignty of this new state, admit it to the UN, recognize its nuclear status if nuclear warheads are located on its territory—and, since this state is not the RF, no sanctions will apply to it.

For decades, the leadership of the RF has told its population that the collective West dreams of dismembering Mother Russia. So, bring this nightmare to life! Let Vladimir, the gatherer of Russian lands, go down in history as the one who left Russia as a principality the size of the Moscow region. It would be elegant. It would be instructive. It would put the PRC in its place.

A compact state, whose activity mostly consists of ensuring the operation of infrastructure and legal frameworks, is something that even libertarians agree to tolerate with some distaste. Yes, it is an outdated interface, but perhaps it is worth preserving temporarily for reasons of backward compatibility until the last statists die out naturally. However, vast empires are a dark past that belonged in the dustbin of history a hundred years ago, and there is simply no reason to preserve the RF (or the PRC) within its existing borders. If even the Ukrainian crisis does not push these empires toward collapse, it is frightening to imagine how great a crisis these empires will cause next time.

State 2.0

In a friendly project Libertarian State (formerly called Anti-State, which sort of hints at the evolution of thought), a translation of Aviezer Tucker’s article Panarchy: State 2.0 has been released. The article is not particularly remarkable, as it outlines the main ideas in defense of panarchy established by the originator of the term, Émile du Châtelet.

Following this, Wed Neuman, who actually runs this channel, released his own article on state 2.0, where he begins with a critique of Tucker and then develops his own theoretical constructs, moving from the original ideas of panarchy to the concept of charter cities.

To start, Wed redefines the concept of the state. Instead of the representation of the state as a monopolist of legitimate violence, which repels libertarians, he proposes to define the state as a stably maintained infrastructure for human habitation on a certain, not necessarily strictly fixed, territory. This is a far more “herbivorous” understanding of the subject, which brackets out all sorts of discussions about stationary bandits and other journalistic rhetoric, focusing instead on the actual organization of life.

The main prediction of the article is that as charter cities spread, state 1.0 will increasingly be reduced to the role of a concierge, receiving a fixed payment for this.

Regarding strategy, Wed still sees Paul Romer’s approach as the most optimal: on clean, uninhabited territory, from scratch, preceding construction by obtaining firm guarantees from the state, and detailing their own charter, on the basis of which further interaction between state 2.0 and its citizens will be built.

It is not hard to see that we, in Montelibero, are acting suboptimally according to Wed: we haven’t officially notified the state that we are conducting political experiments on its territory, but instead try to seep through stealthily and, if necessary, legalize ourselves only after we have developed. I don’t know, it seems to me that this is actually more reliable: it is much easier to gain factual recognition than prior permission. Imagine if Satoshi-sensei had asked someone if he could launch Bitcoin…

Exit from Sausage Libertarianism

A certain Belarusian libertarian, known in narrow circles and who changes nicknames frequently enough that there is no point in remembering them, recently posted a solid article on the subject on Telegraph.

A brief list of the article’s key takes from the author himself (what a clever boy, he took care of everything):

1) There are ethical libertarians and “sausage” libertarians

2) Sausage libertarians are useless or harmful to libertarianism and are prone to drifting toward other political views

3) The opposite of a sausage libertarian is an ethical libertarian

4) An ethical libertarian differs from a sausage one by possessing a libertarian mindset and a libertarian framework

5) Most libertarian activity in attracting new members is focused on attracting sausage libertarians and building a libertarian framework, as well as transferring it to ethical libertarians

6) A libertarian mindset is determined at a young age, and to increase the number of ethical libertarians, one should create it in other people’s children through specific practices.

7) Our enemies deal with the mindsets of other people’s children, while libertarians do not

8) And they should

In other words, the author suggests that we stop denying the insinuations that libertarians supposedly love children and, moreover, have a huge interest specifically in other people’s children—and instead, start confirming these insinuations, but in their own libertarian way. Like: everyone thought that “teaching” was a euphemism for “fucking,” but he actually makes children libertarians.

If, after reading the article, you share its conclusions, I await an influx of libertarians into children’s sports sections and creative studios (well, not state schools, for heaven’s sake), the organization of children’s libertarian hiking trips, the hiring of children for part-time jobs, and other useful practices.