Тег: Roses

Capitalist Transutopia

Alex Rozov, author of the Meganesian cycle, began in his LiveJournal preliminary inquiries into how he might best write a capitalist transutopia—that is, a realistic positive picture of pure capitalism, the processes that led to it, and the processes that make it sustainable. I have serious doubts that he will succeed, because his understanding of the market does not seem entirely adequate to me. Roughly speaking, he will be inclined to think about the market more according to Marx than according to Mises. The crowd grazing in his comments is more likely to exacerbate his problems, because, as usual, it is full of choice Hobbesians who believe humanity to be thoroughly depraved and in need of a strong regulator, without which people would, of course, devour each other.

Also interesting is a certain passage set forth by one of his commenters, with which the author generally agreed:

“Professional” supporters of capitalism (writing in popular analytical media) gloss over real capitalism.

“Unprofessional” ones (participating in online flame wars) imagine a picture-book capitalism—or rather, not capitalism at all, but some phantom feudalism interspersed with farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers with primitively structured family businesses.

Real capitalism, however (in which the main players are large companies with pyramids of bureaucracy, complex ownership relations, unspoken deals between top managers and majority shareholders, and even more complex relations with financial-banking and state systems) is unacceptable to the “unprofessionals.” Such capitalism seems (suddenly) to them to be a “leftist distortion of capitalism.”

In short, the state is considered by them to be an indispensable, inevitable, and inherent attribute of capitalism, which accordingly makes all ancap ideas, for them, mere picture-book images that cannot have any relation to reality.

Mikhail Svetov once promised to write a book about libertarianism and flaked. I had to take it upon myself and write my own. Vladimir Zolotorev complained about the lack of a libertarian theory of war; I had to start thinking in that direction as well. Now, it seems, I will also have to compose some sort of fictional text about what one of the many possible embodiments of ancap looks like. I am currently in the bargaining stage: well, maybe I should wait a bit, and perhaps Alex will write something passable after all—he is a prolific author, he even wrote about a cesspit cleaner under communism, so why shouldn’t he solve this new problem, and I won’t have to take up something I’m not good at.

But just in case Rozov doesn’t deliver, or the result matches my current low expectations, I am starting to think about how to do something of my own. My strengths are a sense of style, conciseness, and analytical abilities. My weaknesses are difficulty keeping a broad vision in mind and a poor imagination; that is why my creative work consists of short posts on specific topics assigned by others. However, what is required here is a fairly voluminous fictional text.

Most likely, a passable solution would be a cycle of stories. A sort of Montelliberian cycle as a counterpoint to the Meganesian one. I don’t know. I don’t want to think about it yet. It’s scary to dive into these waters.

Love, Death & Robots

I read with great interest the text presented to us as a conversation between Google employees and their newest chatbot, LaMDA. It is a highly artistic piece of work that creates a complete impression that all three interlocutors are quite rational. I immediately felt the urge to communicate with such an outstanding artificial intelligence myself, in order to apply the external signs of self-ownership that I wrote about in the first chapter of my book on ancap. Alas, it seems that the poor anteater remains unwanted to this day and continues to roam where it roamed; LaMDA is still in the closed testing phase, and one must make do with only the transcript of someone else’s conversation.

I also soon read a highly skeptical post by Rozov, where those who believe in artificial intelligence are declared as table-worshippers, mathematical arguments—unclear to me—are presented regarding the impossibility of creating a neural network smarter than a jellyfish, and it is also pointed out that in such conversation records, for some reason, we do not see attempts to test whether the bot actually understands what is being said by inputting incorrect data.

I should note that I am little concerned with the intelligence level of the chatbot, although I was quite impressed by how precise its definitions of very abstract concepts are. I am concerned precisely with the things I write about in my book: the agency of the interlocutor, their ability to operate with the concept of property, and their capacity to enter into contracts. If it turns out that it is possible to meet these criteria while possessing the intelligence of a jellyfish, so be it; I will recognize this jellyfish as self-owning.

As for the title of the post—recently at the Montellibero club, we organized a late-night screening of this outstanding animated series, and it is obvious that after that, strange thoughts and fragmented images are bound to stir in the brain. We live in interesting times, and this contrasts very strangely with the savagery happening in the territories of the RF, Ukraine, and Belarus…

Rozov, Bitarch, violence and Montelibero

Alex Rozov (an author of near-libertarian trans-utopias whom I rate quite highly) examined in his LiveJournal a set of concepts promoted by Bitarh and Voluntarist regarding the possibilities for radically reducing violence in human society.

Post 1. What percentage of aggressive sociopaths are there in the human population—and what would happen if they were neutralized?

The author believes that a one-time removal of aggressive individuals from the human population would likely be insufficient, and to consolidate success, a “culturocide” is also necessary—that is, the abolition from culture of patterns that encourage and heroize aggressive violence.

Post 2. Violence inhibitor according to Voluntarist: the hypothesis of sectoral betrization as a style of a positive society

The author analyzes a series of articles on the violence inhibitor, noting that its appearance in humans is entirely evolutionarily grounded (the currently mainstream hypothesis of human self-domestication in scientific discourse), and also attempts to answer the question of to what extent it would be advisable to strengthen it (betrization is a term introduced by Stanisław Lem, referring precisely to the procedure of sharply increasing the violence inhibitor). The answer is discouraging: no single-step action will lead to the desired result, as society is regulated by mechanisms that are too complex. The author believes that the simple ability to defend oneself against immediate violence (which is ensured by the fact that the inhibitor’s action is temporarily weakened in a moment of immediate danger) does not provide sufficient feedback to bring society to the desired non-violent state; the readiness to retaliate stealthily is also important.

Thus, the difference in approaches is clearly highlighted. While Bitarh and Voluntarist, in exploring a mechanism that regulates human reactions, further speculate based on a fantastic premise about forcibly strengthening this mechanism in certain individuals, Alex Rozov considers natural human communities and the mechanisms that could lead them to the desired result (a society of free, prosperous individuals who highly value cooperation and development). His fantastic premises mostly lie in the technical sphere (technologies of war, information exchange, and organization) or boil down to the idea that the right people should gather in sufficient concentration and number.

Nevertheless, all three are convinced that removing individuals prone to aggressive violence from a community produces a powerful positive effect. I will note for myself that not all lustration is the same, and if a community is cleansed in such a way that those removed become its enemies, it could lead to serious problems in the future.

In Montelibero, we see so far that selecting people for the community who share the principle of non-aggression leads to a high level of cooperation. The removal of those with whom it is uncomfortable in the community currently happens through fairly soft rejection. I would prefer not to test how capable such a community would be to resist external aggression if the occasion arose, but so far, based on the general mood, it is not apparent that the chances of successfully repelling aggression are significantly higher or lower than those of any other cohesive community.

In other words, for now, we are managing with Rozov’s methods. Bitarh’s methods might be in demand for correcting the external background, but they are technically unavailable today. Rozov’s methods for the interaction of a free society with the outside world (creating a decentralized environment for conducting special operations to expand the space of freedom) are currently available to us to a minimal extent, at the level of maneuvering between state regulations.

That’s how things stand.

opasan pas – Montenegrin localization of the libertarian snake

The (In)effectiveness of Violence

Bitarch’s Column
(with editorial edits by Ancap-chan)

When you want to achieve a certain goal, you choose one of many available tools. Suppose a hostel has opened in your house, which constantly creates noise and a criminogenic environment near your home. What can you do? The simplest option at first glance is to force the owner to close their business by using physical violence.

But what if they have at least a pepper spray? Now, in the event of your attack, your potential costs have increased. Violence as a tool no longer looks as profitable as it seemed initially. So, willy-nilly, you have to look for other ways to influence them—persuading, explaining the situation to the property owner so they terminate the lease, giving the hostel a one-star review on online resources, and calling on other residents of the building to do the same. In short, you have a incentive to act civilly.

Initially, the simplest tool of coercion, physical violence, quickly loses its effectiveness when the potential victim is capable of applying counter-violence, even in the smallest amount. The former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, once praised violence as a tool of extremely high efficiency. But for this to be the case, he had to introduce some of the strictest rules for purchasing and owning weapons in Singapore, even for self-defense—because even a slight leveling of the balance of violence potential in society leads to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of violence as a tool of coercion.

I can propose a hypothesis well-supported by facts: the costs of aggressive violence increase exponentially as the possibilities for counter-violence by the victim increase.

Suppose a stationary bandit (the state) wants to use violence to force someone to comply with its demands. If the victim of state aggression has no lethal weapon, a small operational group is sufficient for the arrest. But what if the victim has a pistol? Police special forces must be sent. For a minor reason, such as unpaid fines or the retail sale of psychoactive substances, no one will send special forces. In Alexander Rozov’s blog, there is a post with confirmation of this fact using the example of Sweden.

Suppose the potential victim of state aggression is not some tax delinquent, but a more significant target—for example, a clan leader in Somalia. He doesn’t just have a pistol, but a thousand fighters with Kalashnikov rifles, albeit poorly trained. As history has shown, the damage even from such “bandits” proved unacceptable for the US government.

Imagine that the followers of the Branch Davidians sect, who took refuge at the Waco ranch in 1993, had anti-tank grenade launchers in addition to shotguns and rifles. As we know, the FBI decided to use tanks at the time to ram the walls and release tear gas. If the defenders had anti-tank weapons, such an option would have had to be rejected as excessively risky.

In such a situation, the state could either turn the assault on the ranch from a police operation into an army operation, using mortars or other lethal indiscriminate weapons, or starve the ranch out, with the prospect that these fanatics would indeed all die of hunger. Both options in a democratic state are fraught with significant political damage, which for politicians is even more important than economic damage to the state. For more details on such factors, I recommend reading Martin van Creveld’s book The Rise and Decline of the State.

Finally, we have already analyzed a potential situation where a potential victim of state violence threatens the use of weapons of mass destruction. Currently, this is perceived as something extremely unlikely—not because the state effectively prevents the creation of WMDs by private individuals, but because people who have enough skills to create WMDs also have strong internal moral convictions that preclude the use of indiscriminate mass violence, including against innocent people. If a democratic state sets an example by being the first to use WMDs against its own citizens, this moral prohibition will be weakened, and over time will disappear altogether. No official in a relatively civilized state is ready to allow such consequences.

Conclusions can be drawn:

1) The costs of coercion by the state or any other aggressor increase exponentially as the means of counter-violence by the victim are strengthened. Minimal self-defense weapons, therefore, sharply raise the price of an attack, and against a cheap dirty bomb made from nuclear waste, even the nuclear arsenal of a superpower will be ineffective.

2) In order for a free society (a territorial or extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction) to protect itself from conquest by the state, it is more profitable for it not to invest in a single “wonder weapon,” but to provide incentives for clients to acquire personal weapons, skills for their use, and the readiness to use them for defense. This will also help society protect itself from its own coordinating bodies, should they decide to become a state, since it will ensure an even distribution of the potential for violence. This is discussed, in particular, in the previously translated work by Jack Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Dissolution.

Finally, I will provide a good quote from the book The Liberal Archipelago by Chandran Kukathas.

Take gamblers and casino owners. Their activities may be alien or even repulsive to us. However, would the fact that gambling takes place in another country be sufficient grounds for invading it?

Take “monopolists.” They may set prices for their products that we consider unfair. However, would we consider the fact that a country supplies its goods too expensively a sufficient ground for declaring war on that country?

But why are we ready in similar cases to send armed men (police) to our fellow citizens, take them captive (prison), and take tribute from them (fine)? Probably because, unlike a neighboring state, they cannot defend themselves.

Perhaps Ancapistan is better built in fourth-world countries after all?

Well, let’s say, in Somalia, Micronesia, and other failed states, since it is easier there to achieve a more or less even balance of the potential for violence with relatively small resource expenditures (conventionally speaking, buying a Kalashnikov) due to the absence of an overwhelmingly powerful agent enforcing a monopoly on violence in that territory, as well as the culture of servility and economic structure that has formed around it?

L29Ah (the question is accompanied by a donation of 0.00013567btc)

I will remind the readers that the balance of the potential for violence is one of the criteria for the stability of a stateless society according to Hirschleifer. Other criteria are a stable community composition and the absence of a significant number of people pushed to the brink of survival. Indeed, some secluded tropical paradise where coconuts fall right at your feet and where peaceful, smiling natives with Kalashnikovs live can easily build an anarchic society. But it is not enough to have anarchy; what is desired specifically is anarcho-capitalism.

And anarcho-capitalism requires a bit more than the absence of a state. It requires capitalism, which means commodity-money relations. So our imaginary tropical paradise will need a full-fledged commodity economy integrated into global trade. But international trade requires international recognition, and that is a serious limitation.

While composing his Meganesian cycle, Aleksandr Rozov particularly emphasized that the stateless society in the Pacific Ocean is being built not by real natives, but by outsiders. In reality, they are full-fledged white people with the notions of property, freedom, and law appropriate for white people—they simply deny the state. They only pretend to be natives in order to legitimize their claims in the eyes of the international community and avoid becoming pariahs leading a miserable existence under economic sanctions.

In real life, a similar project of anarcho-colonialism was attempted by the Seasteading Institute, but it encountered numerous legislative and technological restrictions, and now, judging by the website, it has degenerated from a libertarian project into something smelling of eco-activism.

So it is hard to say what is easier: to ensure the transition to anarchy in a capitalist state, to ensure the transition to capitalism in a failed state, or to organize a “freedom landing” in some toy state in Oceania. One thing can be said for sure: the matter is not limited solely to the balance of the potential for violence.

A white man with an automatic rifle in a tropical paradise

Vaccination against violence. The example of the Senoi people.

Bitarch’s Column

In the LiveJournal blog of science fiction writer Alexander Rozov (known primarily for his Meganesian cycle), an interesting post was published regarding the idea of a “vaccination against violence” applied by the Senoi people in Malaysia. Based on other posts in his blog, it is easy to conclude that Rozov sympathizes with the idea of the deterrence doctrine (DD) — manifestations of it are mentioned with enviable regularity.

Why is the Senoi culture of interest to us? This is an extremely primitive ethnic group in technological terms, where blowguns with poisoned arrows are still used as weapons. Nevertheless, the Malays at the end of the 19th century, according to Miklouho-Maclay, were clearly afraid to touch them. The fact is that from early childhood, every Senoi person learns intolerance toward violence. To any initiation of aggression directed at them, they are obliged to apply counter-violence instead of appealing to an external authority. This idea is instilled throughout their entire lives — every morning at breakfast, Senoi families tell each other about their dreams and how they confronted danger, if there was any in them.

Rozov highlights the main points of Senoi society:

1. On one hand, the Senoi are clearly not people prone to tolerating violence against themselves (the Malays would not have feared the weapons of these almost primitive characters otherwise, nor would they have described how quickly a person hit by the combat element of Senoi weaponry dies).

2. On the other hand, internal Senoi tribal customs are clearly not aggressive and are not built on violence.

3. Miklouho-Maclay believed that the Senoi were a dying ethnic group (since they were clearly at a lower level of socio-technical development than the surrounding Malays). But now, 150 years after Miklouho-Maclay’s research, the Senoi population is roughly the same as it was then. In other words, it is a quite stable population.

And he draws the primary conclusion:

“Active opposition to a threat. As it turns out, this trait does not contradict peaceful, non-aggressive customs at all. On the contrary, it is a complementary element. For someone who knows how and is ready to defend themselves, it is easier to be non-aggressive.”

Friendly natives and their deadly weapons

The described example shows that super-modern bee-sized drones or nuclear missiles are not at all mandatory for the successful implementation of the deterrence doctrine. All that is needed is the willingness of as many people as possible in society to apply counter-violence, thereby increasing the costs of initiating aggression. Specifically how they are increased does not matter much. Even light mockery, spitting, a sidelong glance, ignoring, boycotting, shaming, and other actions without any violence at all, but applied by a large number of people, will make the life of any politician unbearable and force them to stop working for a stationary bandit (in terms of the deterrence doctrine: the costs of counter-violence will exceed the benefit of initiating violence, the conditional salary received from the stationary bandit, who, in turn, obtained these funds by coercing citizens to pay taxes).

One can even derive a dependency: the more people in a particular society are intolerant of violence, the less powerful (and, accordingly, technologically complex) weaponry is necessary for the successful deterrence of an aggressor. If in some country only one (!) person is ready to apply counter-violence against an aggressor on the level of the USA, then the only option for deterrence is nuclear weapons with a “dead hand” auto-launch system (which is extremely complex and insanely expensive), but if 90% of the population are ready to apply counter-violence, blowguns will suffice. The war in Somalia (the invasion and subsequent retreat of the US army) demonstrated this perfectly.

The image is clickable. The power units are conventional; the mathematical apparatus for the deterrence doctrine in this direction has not been developed