Тег: Nozik

Conflict between protective organizations is a false argument against ancap

Bitarkh’s Column

Original publication on VKontakte

Critics of ancap constantly cite the well-known argument from Robert Nozick’s 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia regarding the impossibility of ancap. Its essence is that different protection agencies may reach contradictory decisions regarding a particular case, enter into an armed conflict when attempting to execute them, and ultimately, one strongest agency will remain, becoming an ordinary mini-state with a territorial monopoly. In his work on the conditions for the stability of anarchy, Jack Hirschleifer demonstrated the conditions under which this occurs, leading to a war for hegemony instead of a state of anarchy.

But this argument applies exclusively to models of a stateless society where the use of violence is still permissible for certain purposes (enforcement of contracts, collection of compensation). For example, this position is partially held by Murray Rothbard and fully by David Friedman (the book The Machinery of Freedom). For a fully voluntarist society, the problem of conflict between protection agencies, as well as the determination of a higher court instance (which makes the final decision), is completely absent.

In any model of a voluntarist society, conditions are created where the initiation of violence is impossible or instantly extinguished (there is a uniform balance of violence potential (BVP) “everyone has weapons” and a deterrence doctrine (DD), i.e., the readiness of the majority of society to use counter-violence to stop aggression). Counter-violence can only be applied during a direct attack, but one cannot start a war to “punish a violator” or “collect compensation.” An offender, if they are not initiating violence at that moment, can only be boycotted—that is, no business is conducted with them. By the way, this is standard behavior between all subject players with BVP, such as stationary bandits (SB, “states”) in their relations with each other.

Under ancap, a trial (as is currently the case in relations between SB) can occur only by the mutual consent of both parties. The parties also agree in advance on the conditions for appealing the court’s decision if it does not satisfy them. And what if one party does not want to go to court? In a voluntarist society with BVP, no one can force them to go, but the refusal may be viewed as an admission of guilt, leading to a demand for compensation for the plaintiff, and in case of refusal—a decrease in reputation and possible ostracism. If the violator does this constantly, the severity of the ostracism will increase; eventually, they will simply stop being provided with utility services and sold goods in most stores, and they will be forced either to agree to cooperate or to move far away, to where their reputation is not taken so close to heart. Although with a ruined reputation, entry into all more or less decent jurisdictions will be closed to them.

As we can see, there is absolutely no room for the conflict described by Nozick.

Commentary by Ancap-chan

Nozick shows how a system of competing protection agencies can turn into a system of minimal states without violating the gentlemanly principle of compensating damage to clients affected by their activities, as well as to third parties. Bitarkh shows that if we take away from protection agencies this convenient pretext to coerce anyone for their own good, the problem of the state’s renaissance is resolved. Then the question arises, “well, how do we actually coerce if we really want to,” and to this Stefan Molinier answers. Which scenario is less realistic—the emergence of ultra-minimal states based on protection agencies or the emergence of a voluntarist society based on universal armament and readiness to actively counteract violence directed at oneself—we leave for the reader to judge.

The difference between a minarchist and a liberal

I’ve become a bit obsessed, and I want to resolve this contradiction in my head relatively quickly 😀 What is the difference between a minarchist and a liberal (besides the prohibition of aggressive violence in the case of the former)? After all, not every liberal, for example, is “for” state social support, or views the state itself absolutely positively. In general, I would be glad to hear a coherent answer.

анонимный вопрос

Generally speaking, of course, if you want to get an answer relatively quickly, the most reliable way is to accompany the question with a donation)

Minarchism is the result of the continuous development of classical liberal ideas, so it is difficult to draw a clear line between them that all proponents of liberal discourse would agree upon. I would approach the distinction from the standpoint of which basic values guide the person we are trying to label.

If the focus is primarily on the protection of private property and the social contract, through which a government is created to protect the institution of private property, then we are dealing with a classical liberal. They tend to evaluate the state precisely by the criterion of whether it effectively protects private property or not, and they are willing to pay some minimal, reasonable, and fair taxes (don’t ask!) provided that the work of protecting property is performed conscientiously. Otherwise, if a long series of abuses by the government leads them to assume that it has become a tyranny, they reserve the right to overthrow and reconstitute that government.

However, if a person primarily emphasizes non-aggression and the voluntary nature of forming a complex of government services—where the actions of private individuals may be forcibly regulated, but only on the condition of compensation for inconveniences, and where the government clearly positions itself as a service—then the person is guided not by Locke and the Founding Fathers, but by Robert Nozick, and in that case, they are more likely a minarchist.

Finally, a person may fundamentally deny the state, no matter how minimal it is, but believe that a number of social guarantees are necessary to maintain civil peace, and that reasonable people are quite capable of funding them on a voluntary basis because it is ultimately in their interest. In that case, this is a left-market anarchist; such people exist too.

From left to right: Rawls, Nozick, Locke

Doesn’t it seem to you that it is much simpler to keep a minimal state apparatus within limits than to force everyone to comply with the NAP (the boundaries of which are very fuzzy, by the way)

…And justice for all

NAP is not a non-aggression pact, as the well-known video blogger Mikhail Svetov likes to point out. It is not a norm handed down from above, like a single commandment from a libertarian deity. It is a purely analytically derived principle. If the principle “no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity” is generally observed in a given society, it means that there is—as engineers would put it—negative feedback operating there, which dampens manifestations of violence. Society becomes free from institutionalized coercion, which always leads to an explosive growth in prosperity.

Since the non-aggression principle is not established from above, naturally, no one imposes specific boundaries on everyone—for instance, claiming that a dirty look does not violate the NAP, but stepping on a foot already does. Such specifics are derived from practice, and this boundary can certainly change as customs evolve. The only thing clearly defined in the non-aggression principle is the absence of certain privileged groups who, for some reason, have the right to initiate violence with impunity.

The feedback loop works because the use of violence against an aggressor, whoever they may be, is precisely legitimate. In general, anyone can apply such retaliatory violence; the limitations here are purely technical: first, there must be the physical capability to do so, and second, reliable information about who applied what violence to whom.

The idea of limited government is to delegate the identification of aggressors and the application of counter-violence against them to one specific organization. This relieves the majority of society from such a burdensome duty. However, first, we have no right to forbid people from exercising counter-violence directly, without delegating it to anyone. And second, we have no right to forbid people from delegating rights to counter-violence to any other organization besides the one called the government. The attempt to forbid this is itself a violation of the NAP, which should entail counter-violence against whoever attempted to impose such a ban on people using force.

Thus, the only way for a limited government not to violate the NAP is to be a market monopoly—that is, to serve its clients based on voluntary contracts, and to do so so cheaply and qualitatively that it is simply unprofitable for competitors to enter this market, and the vast majority of people prefer to entrust counter-violence to the government rather than practice it themselves. Robert Nozick advocates approximately this point of view in his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”.