The Strugatsky brothers were Soviet sci-fi writers who, due to the distortions typical of a planned economy, were published by the Soviet state in much smaller print runs than the actual demand. Consequently, during the transition to a market economy, this deferred demand began to be actively satisfied, and my parents had a complete collection of their works on their shelf. I assume that the current generation of fifty-year-olds knows these books much better than those who are now twenty-five. As for me, I somehow jumped straight from childhood history encyclopedias to fantasy, then to popular science, while the Strugatskys’ collected works just gathered dust on my parents’ shelf.
Actually, I was prompted to write this post by a mention from Mikhail Svetov in a stream about how, as a child, he read authors in their entire collected works. I am not that tedious, and in the case of the Strugatskys, I ended up reading three books at different times.
The first was “Hard to Be a God”, a story about a communist “popadanets” (time-traveler/portal-jumper) in the Middle Ages. It was impossible not to read it because it is memetic, and I wanted to understand the origins of all those tales about how the “greys” are replaced by the “blacks,” and why a noble don should not see the reasons for not doing something. At the time, there was no mass literature about “popadantsy,” so the writers used another planet as a setting, but all the problematic themes perfectly align with the popadanets genre. What gives the work its originality is that the traveler failed miserably at imposing his values on a medieval society, and the mission ended in failure. Modern writers churn out more optimistic things, but here they managed to make a bestseller without a happy end; I respect that.
The second turned out to be the novella “The Predators”; here I owe thanks to Alexander Rozov, who wrote an interesting review of it. The book is about a communist who ends up in a prosperous capitalist consumer society, is horrified, and begins to make plans about what can be done with these unfortunate lost people who want to live happily and do not want to storm Mars in tight ranks. The communists faced a dilemma: either bring assault columns into the country and drive the population into the gulag, or start a multi-year brainwashing campaign. The protagonist humanely adhered to the second strategy, considering the first a failure, and for that, we can be grateful.
Finally, the third novella is “The Distant Rainbow”, which I read quite recently at the dacha when I had a free evening—a book from that very collected works happened to be next to my chair. The story tells of a planetary catastrophe that occurred due to the peculiarities of the communist system of organizing fundamental research, as well as the fact that in a planned economy there are no prices, and therefore economic calculation is impossible. The latter is illustrated with rich material. Rare instruments were brought from the metropolis, and the scientists resort to various tricks to try to obtain them out of turn, through connections (“blat”), or simply by stealing them. The option to “buy” simply does not exist for the poor souls. Energy is needed for experiments, and the scientists steal it from the local power system because the energy issued by coupons has already been spent. The option to “buy” simply does not exist for the poor souls. Another experiment ends in catastrophe (I don’t rule out that it was also caused by a competing laboratory stealing some rare controller right from the test rig, but the reasons for the tragedy remain off-screen), and it turns out that no evacuation means were provided on the planet (what safety regulations, it’s communism). To top it all off, the question of who exactly and what values should be saved first is also solved completely arbitrarily, and not by a legitimate governing body, but by the captain of the only spaceship, who decided for himself who lives and who dies, as if the ship were his private property. And it is exactly this approach, where the “Red Director” is king and god at his enterprise, that is positioned as the most morally justified. And so, back in the distant sixties, the sci-fi writers were already describing the outlines of the “Red Belt” of the nineties.
I once had to answer a question about which books are worth reading. I suggested first ensuring a frame of perception for oneself, and then you can read anything, and the result will invariably please you. Here you go: a libertarian reading of communist propaganda. Try reading all sorts of things; it’s interesting. And yes, the Strugatskys are stylistically simply wonderful, and I perfectly understand the nature of their popularity. If I have more time, I’ll read something else by them.
He calls her a “syslib” and effectively accuses her of justifying the regime. What do you think about syslibs in general?
анонимный вопрос
We are talking about last year’s posts (first and second) in Illarionov’s blog, which no one would have remembered if he hadn’t referenced them recently.
I find Illarionov’s meticulousness extremely useful when it comes to the scrupulous comparison of numerous eyewitness accounts of a large-scale event, based on which a consistent picture of what happened is constructed. For example, I was greatly impressed by his investigation into the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. However, when he turns his talent toward analyzing the nuances of one person’s word usage during a live broadcast, it starts to feel like a certain bias—much like vulgar Freudianism, where there is no room for cucumbers or cigars because there are only phalluses.
Illarionov, if I understand correctly, is the creator of the term “syslib,” and he defines it as a person who uses liberal rhetoric to strengthen a non-liberal political regime and justify non-liberal political practices. Like Chubais’s “bow down to the oligarchs; they pulled the country out of poverty.”
What is he incriminating Ekaterina for?
Cossacks dispersing a rally in Moscow do not look as organic as they would in Krasnodar. Aha, so it’s okay to disperse them in Krasnodar. Syslib.
The army in Turkey is ceasing to be a modernization institution. Aha, so Erdogan, then, is becoming a modernization institution. Syslib.
There are many other minor nitpicks, and finally, the most important one. There is a correlation: the less bloody the removal of an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization. Aha, so the people on the Maidan are to blame for being shot. Syslib.
I have a feeling that Illarionov confuses the approach of a political scientist-researcher with that of a publicist, and every time he sees a statement about certain patterns, he immediately imagines what a person would mean by that phrase if they were a propagandist for the ruling regime.
Now, if Ekaterina were to state directly, for example, that the sovereignty of the individual is impossible or undesirable, and that only the sovereignty of some group entity, like a nation, is possible or desirable, then I myself would decide that this Shulman has gone bad; bring me a new one. But for now, she merely states that without a well-organized state, people feel somehow uncomfortable, which means the state is necessary. But preferably a liberal one, recognizing that very sovereignty of the individual. And as for the fact that this is an internally contradictory construction—well, what can you do, the world is complex, interests need to be reconciled somehow, so let’s build the institutions that allow us to do that.
In general, I would advise avoiding excessive purism. Let Lenin be the one to decisively distance himself before forcibly uniting everyone, while smart people are indeed better off practicing how to coordinate their interests and align them with their values. Ekaterina Mikhailovna is valuable above all as an inexhaustible source of political science memes. My personal favorite is her “all power to—nobody!”
The syslib is looking at you like you’re the system
If you look threatening enough, people will not dare to attack you. This simple consideration gives rise to rather complex spontaneous orders. We see them in the behavior not only of humans but of many other biological species. Even plants try to portray themselves as something very dangerous that is better left untouched. Similarly, libertarians tend to put animals on their banners that have succeeded in applying the doctrine of deterrence, such as the rattlesnake or the porcupine.
A vivid demonstration of the doctrine of deterrence in the animal kingdom
In military theory, the doctrine of deterrence began to gain popularity in the 19th century and became the dominant view after the appearance of nuclear weapons. The original reasoning was simple. It was necessary to ensure that waging war would be inherently disadvantageous. Since the goal of war, according to Clausewitz, is a peace that is better than the pre-war state, then the means of waging war must be made as horrific and large-scale as possible, so that no one would even think that a country could obtain an economic gain as a result of war. True, a contrary consideration was voiced in parallel: that war, first, would divert many working hands to the front, and second, would provide industry with military orders, which means that workers would receive a sharp increase in wages—thus, they have every reason to desire a great war. And although the First World War showed that, for some reason, famine and poverty began instead of an increase in well-being, this did not prevent Keynes from appearing shortly after with his ideas that during a crisis one must spend more, as this is the best way to achieve wealth.
During the interwar period, the Douhet doctrine spread, suggesting that an opponent’s will to resist could be easily broken by indiscriminate strategic bombing of production facilities in the rear—again, military theorists harbored the thought of how obvious economic senselessness of a confrontation could prevent the start of a slaughter. But the Second World War vividly demonstrated that losses only contribute to cohesion, and a total war begins far beyond any pre-war rational calculations.
After the end of the Second World War, humanity immediately began preparing for a new war, this time a nuclear one. Nuclear powers conducted active tests of new weapons and delivery systems, developed doctrines for their use, and built bunkers to shelter government bodies and headquarters. And then, finally, the most important event of the 20th century, in my view, occurred: the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the first time in human history, two powers, fully equipped for war, having launched their propaganda machines at full throttle, having mobilized troops, and having irreconcilable contradictions in their development doctrines implying the complete defeat of the opponent—did not dare to start a war and launched de-escalation. What happened? The governments of both countries clearly realized that if war began, they would become the first targets and would be destroyed with almost complete certainty. This realization proved to be enough.
It became clear exactly what should be the basis of the doctrine of deterrence. Not an economic blockade and sanctions, not the readiness to bomb a country back to the Stone Age, but only the guarantee of the destruction of the leadership. As long as the head of state can sacrifice his subordinates, he will be ready to fight. As soon as he himself becomes a piece on this chessboard, his motivation for war decreases sharply.
As is known, a new, previously non-existent product usually first becomes an object of fabulous luxury, but gradually, thanks to its attractiveness and the super-profits generated by its production, it attracts investment, becomes increasingly mass-market, and its price drops. Eventually, the product becomes virtually accessible to everyone.
The product “deterring the opponent through the guaranteed destruction of its leaders” was very expensive, and initially only superpowers could afford it. However, over time, on one hand, the circle of nuclear powers expanded, the cost of nuclear weapons decreased, and their consumer qualities grew; on the other hand, people’s tolerance for military losses decreased.
A good illustration of this trend was the last conventional war between civilized countries—the Falklands conflict. It is interesting because during the war, both sides more or less carefully observed the norms of international law relating to the laws and customs of war, and the conflict itself was clearly geographically localized around the disputed zone. In other words, the parties could no longer afford a total war, were forced to exercise restraint, and quickly transitioned from the hot phase of the conflict to diplomacy.
When high-precision weapons appeared, the great powers began using them to eliminate the leaders of opponents in underdeveloped countries. However, this, on the other hand, further lowered the entry threshold into the circle of countries that could afford a doctrine of deterrence through threats to leaders, since this no longer even required bypassing IAEA restrictions, as Israel did in its time, according to unofficial information.
However, progress in the relevant technologies does not stand still; high-precision weapons continue to become cheaper, and now we are frightened by something like this:
It is obvious that sooner or later, cheap, long-range, high-precision, anonymous weapons will be available to a very wide circle of subjects, including private individuals. And this means that humanity has come very close to the libertarian dream—to ensure guarantees of non-aggression from the state.
In February 2019, the first act of full-scale seasteading in history took place. A couple of bitcoiners, American Chad Elwartowski and Thai Nadia Tepdet, established a small residential platform 15 nautical miles off the coast of Thailand—that is, outside territorial waters, but within the two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone. In April, the Royal Thai Navy destroyed the platform, which according to maritime law constitutes military action against a sovereign power. Thus, states once again demonstrated that maritime law works only between sovereign subjects, which are only states, and not people.
Now let’s fantasize. Seasteaders continue to mind their own business peacefully: Chad continues to please the public with statements like “I hope my lawyer will be able to reach a reasonable agreement with the Thai government,” Nadia is waiting for political asylum in the USA. Meanwhile, a small drone drops a bomb on King Rama X, after which an entry left by an unknown person appears on the bitcoin blockchain, stating that any head of state who dares to prevent free people from settling outside the jurisdiction of the state will be destroyed in the same way. A few months after the Thai crisis, the seasteading institute announces its intention to establish a residential platform 15 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam…
Not every state is ready to trade a king for a party-goer
I think not much time will pass before people realize that placing platforms in neutral waters is already boring—look how many have been stuck there—and they will start announcing the secession of their own land-based territories, predicting, in case their sovereignty is not recognized, a sobering retribution against the head of their state by anonymous well-wishers who are simply close to the ideas of freedom and are therefore ready to defend them throughout the world…
Then more. People realize that sovereign territory is an atavism, that sovereignty can be extraterritorial—and they will begin to declare their independence from the state, without even bothering to leave its borders. Get insurance from an anonymous fund for sobering up etatists—and live your life, without taxes and repressions. A tax agent arrives—you show him your insurance policy, his face changes, he apologizes and leaves. Everything is orderly, peaceful, ancap-style.
What is needed for such fantasies to become a reality?
A clear understanding that states begin to speak the language of law only with those behind whom they see power.
Decentralized asymmetric defense. It is impossible to protect a territory from the state; it is not even worth trying. One can only create a threat to the decision-makers on the opponent’s side—the higher the better. Of course, moral pressure should also be exerted on the executors, but making them bitter is extremely harmful: they should not see you as a deadly enemy, otherwise you risk arriving at a total war instead of deterrence. A bitter enemy no longer needs propaganda; he hates you personally and is ready to rip your throat out.
A strike against key state figures should come not from those attacked by the state, but as anonymously as possible.
Exactly what means are used for deterrence is, for the most part, unimportant, as long as the restrictions are met: the weapon must provide minimal risk of collateral damage, have decent range, be as accurate as possible, and be as cheap as possible. It does not even have to be lethal; an educational effect can be achieved without such radical measures as killing. This could be the disclosure of critical personal data, such as a family’s home address, the draining of money from bank cards, slashed tires, or a bag of feces on the head instead of a bomb—after all, many analogs to the porcupine’s needle can be imagined in the modern world!
Widespread advertising is needed. Actions within the doctrine of deterrence should be vividly highlighted, skillfully directed, and ideally place the targets of influence in the most idiotic position. It is public shame that works most effectively both against public elected figures and against dictators swelling with a sense of their own importance.
Modern democracies actively use the blurring of responsibility, where certain non-legal laws are passed by collective bodies. However, here lies not only strength but also weakness. It is relatively easy to protect one supreme commander-in-chief, but try constantly guarding an entire battalion of parliamentarians! The doctrine of deterrence opposes collective decisions with collective responsibility.
Of course, the doctrine of deterrence will not work with everyone; there may always be a particularly stubborn functionary who is indifferent to all your warnings. The same tactic as for public campaigns will work here: you simply need to switch to a superior, so that he will order the overzealous subordinate to stand down. In general, when constructing a strategy for deterring an opponent, all developments in conducting public campaigns can be adopted almost in full.
Yulia Latynina likes to repeat that society is structured just like an army, and one influences the other. An unintended consequence of exactly how civil society will deter an institutional aggressor will be certain changes in the structure of society itself. A maximally decentralized principle of coordination and a strive to achieve goals through indirect means will inevitably foster in society a system of those very extraterritorial contractual insurance jurisdictions that I have already talked your ears off about here on my channel. That is exactly how spontaneous orders work.
The most weighty objection against the doctrine of deterrence is as follows: Yes, of course, society can terrorize poor, frightened bureaucrats in the wet dreams of European hipsters. But these hipsters will sing a different tune when conditional “collectivos” start killing them at night—the state has a much richer arsenal of means not only for legal prosecution but also for proxy violence.
Yes, indeed, the state can very easily raise the stakes in this game, and soft “deterrence by denial” with its bags of feces and other attempts to ensure reputational damage will stop working (if the opponent’s leader cannot win beautifully, he may retreat, or he may decide “to hell with it, I will win ugly”), after which civil society will eventually have to adopt hardcore “deterrence by punishment” and use lethal means. But here it is important not to slide into total war, to conduct purely pinpoint actions and actively broadcast to the outside world through the voices of uninvolved parties: “What are you doing? Why are you driving these poor people to despair? Do you find it hard to make insignificant concessions? Why do you need this war?”
The whole point of the doctrine of deterrence is for the opponent to decide: the game is not worth the candle. Even in the most neglected cases, this is a perfectly solvable task.
In the absence of a state, the very existence of orphanages is quite unlikely — it is hard to imagine a person who would need so many children. Few families decide to have more than a dozen. The need to mass-place a huge number of homeless children arises only after major wars, but ancap guarantees that if anything, there will certainly be no major wars — there are no opportunities for such a concentration of forces; it is economically pointless. Under normal conditions, the demand for children exceeds the supply — and if the state does not put a spoke in the wheels, children who are not wanted by some adults quickly end up with other adults ready to take care of them.
Under ancap, things should also generally be better for people with disabilities than under a state. Judge for yourself. Since there are no mandatory fiat currencies, a person is fully capable, without possessing specific investment skills, of saving for old age simply by putting money aside, preferably deflationary ones like bitcoins. Then disability occurs, and even if for some reason they were not insured, all that remains is to open the piggy bank.
Of course, there are children with disabilities, and not every one of them is as talented as Sanya from Dagestan. But, as is easy to see, the state is not intending to care for them anyway. As for society, in the absence of centralized robbery, it has far more opportunities to ensure a decent life even for expensive children with disabilities. There are too few of them for it to truly strain people inclined toward spontaneous acts of kindness.
After all, you have no guarantee that the pseudonym Ancap-chan does not hide a similarly disabled person. You send me money not for what I lack, but for what I give you: interesting reflections expressed in a decent style. Thanks to the fact that I do not have to pay taxes on your donations, they are spent entirely on good deeds. Thank you for not abandoning me.
But how then should we view Google, Facebook, and YouTube, which are monopolists in their respective spheres: search engines, social networks, and video platforms? Yes, there are Russian analogues like VK or Yandex, but that is all local, and overall, the world still uses these three monopolists, and their imminent decline is not yet expected.
Howard Roark
Indeed, there are tools that have a massive network effect; in other words, the more people who use them, the more beneficial it is for them to use them. This applies to money, language, as well as other communication tools such as social networks.
Many entrepreneurs try to guess exactly which offer will be so in demand by users that they will be willing to pay for it. Some guess better than others. The creators of Facebook guessed that some people are willing to pay to show their own content to a crowd, while others will gladly pay for information on user preferences. The creators of YouTube guessed that some people are willing to pay to show commercials in other people’s videos, and others — to watch videos without ads. The creators of Google guessed that people would more readily buy targeted advertising rather than the kind that blasts areas indiscriminately.
We do not know which consumer needs people will be willing to pay for tomorrow. Neither do the owners of the internet giants. Today, the YouTube administration assumes that blocking accounts with information unpleasant to advertisers is a good idea, but tomorrow it may turn out that people are more willing to pay for freedom of expression. Today, Facebook is developing the trade of big data, and tomorrow it will find that people pay more for privacy. Today, Google is satisfied with its ad targeting algorithms, and tomorrow it will turn out that an outsider has come up with something better, and for some reason, this startup does not wish to be bought out.
In a free market, there can be the dominance of certain standards, and for us consumers, this is very convenient. And when it starts to feel restrictive, some Durov inevitably appears and whispers: why do you need these social networks, switch from the needle of publicity to an anonymous messenger. Come on, you answer Durov, how can one live without VK? And a year later, it turns out that you even brush your teeth via Telegram. That is how it works; this is creative destruction.
I have already posted an article here dedicated to the practical application of the trendy Lightning technology for sending me micro-donations — small amounts, but frequently, or for using this wonderful tool for other purposes. Some inaccuracies were found in the article, and someday I will get around to fixing them, but today I want to talk about something else.
I was contacted by Anton Kovalenko, who informed me that he has launched a Telegram bot that can do one single thing — cash out your bitcoins into Qiwi rubles. However, it does this flawlessly, in full accordance with the detailed instructions prepared by Anton. I tested the bot myself, and withdrawing bitcoins into fiat took only a few seconds.
And while I’m at it, I recommend checking out his Lightning manual of a more general nature. Perhaps you will be able to understand more from it than I did. The technology is developing very rapidly, but the interfaces are only just beginning to show any hints of possible user-friendliness. We shall see, as one popular Telegram blogger puts it.
Yesterday I published an article by Bitarch “Minarchism is a Marginal Ideology”. In it, the author criticizes the minarchist approach, arguing that minarchists are unable to come to power through democratic means if they run openly on a minarchist platform.
Indeed, this thesis does not contradict history. The USA was formed as a result of a revolution, Georgian reforms happened after a revolution, Chilean reforms after a coup; in Singapore and New Zealand, minarchist reformers came to power through deception, broadcasting a social-democratic agenda before the elections. Only Margaret Thatcher was honestly elected under the banner of shrinking the state, and indeed honestly pursued it, but she failed to achieve stable success in this matter, and today statist reaction reigns supreme in Great Britain.
Bitarch concludes that minarchists, understanding their marginality, will gravitate toward violent methods of imposing their ideology, which gives him reason to state that from the perspective of the average person, minarchist politicians are liberal fascists. Naturally, such a loud thesis could not fail to provoke a sharp reaction.
Alex Kotov, host of the Crypto-Libertarian channel, published an article with objections today. Due to the somewhat disjointed nature of the article, it is difficult to comment on, so I will touch upon just a couple of theses.
Bitarch writes that a minarchist state assumes the unity of laws throughout the entire territory, meaning that conditional leftists will miss their leftist laws. Thus, they will simply vote against the minarchist party and keep their labor code, minimum wage, veteran benefits, and other achievements of the welfare state. Panarchy, however, assumes a peaceful separation, where each interest club has its own rules, including those regarding the organization of social security and the resolution of labor disputes.
Alex responds that the forced redistribution of income contradicts libertarianism, and therefore panarchy is not a variety of libertarianism, and accordingly, the article criticizes not only minarchism but libertarianism as a whole.
This is a slightly strange thesis, since within the framework of contractual relations, a subscription fee for an agreed package of services can be stipulated. Another matter is that any contract can be terminated at any moment; otherwise, it is already slavery. So it is not surprising that another of Alex’s theses — “minarchists leave only the function of ensuring the fulfillment of contracts to the state, regardless of the content of the contract” — will logically be perceived by any anarchist (and even a supporter of panarchy) as a very bad sign. It happens that people sign oppressive contracts because at that moment they see no other way to make ends meet. When circumstances change, they leave these oppressive relationships with a sense of deep satisfaction, and, of course, a court of a minarchist state that decides to demand compliance with the original terms of the contract at that moment will be perceived as a violation of justice. A well-known ancap like Mikhail Svetov speaks quite extensively and in detail about the importance of the fact that any contract can be refused.
Now, another argument against panarchy seemed quite interesting to me. Supporters of panarchy claim that free competition between contractual jurisdictions will lead to the victory of the most free in the competitive race, so that leftists will gradually dissipate on their own. However, in the real world, the opposite is observed. Free competition between states with different laws leads to the fact that freedoms are curtailed everywhere, and governments are happy to adopt each other’s experience specifically in curtailing freedoms. Thus, competition alone is not enough; a moral compass is needed. Therefore, natural law rules, and contractual law sucks.
Overall, this is a fairly strong argument, but I want to draw attention to a very important difference between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdictions. It is much easier for extraterritorial ones to expand. Take such a wonderful liberal territorial jurisdiction as Hong Kong. People are practically climbing over each other there, so great is the desire of residents of neighboring China to live under liberalism. If this jurisdiction were extraterritorial, there would be no need to go huddle on an island; you simply sign a contract and live under Hong Kong law, pay Hong Kong taxes, and receive Hong Kong social services. And if you want handouts in your old age, you enter into a contract with some leftist jurisdiction where you are entitled to a basic income. What will the competition between such jurisdictions lead to? Either leftist jurisdictions will begin to impose entry restrictions, admitting only the young and healthy, or they will break under the weight of the social burden.
So, progress in social mores occurs not by ethics alone, but also by the competition of economic systems.
In conclusion, I want to announce an article where I intend to bring ancap, minarchism, panarchy, and agorism into a more or less coherent picture. I hope to release it within a week and count on the fact that there will be fewer such disputes after that.
While reading Aleksei Shustov’s book “After the State”, I came across an interesting thought:
“Such ‘choices’ [the choice of ECU], obviously, provide a fundamentally different level of freedom and ensure real justice compared to choices in a majority democracy. The latter does not take into account individual differences and forces everyone to live by the rules of the majority. After all, if one person feels great in a system with broad independence and high responsibility, while another prefers social security and is ready for high taxes, then either one or the other will inevitably be oppressed in their self-realization.”
The author of this book cannot be called a libertarian in any way. Perhaps he had not even heard the word when he wrote his book. He arrived at the idea of panarchy purely from an understanding of the destructiveness of the “majority democracy” model, which has now become synonymous with the word “state.” Accordingly, he looks at the world impartially. Unlike many libertarian authors, Shustov takes into account the demands of broad layers of the population, whom some ideological libertarians contemptuously call “lefties.”
Be realistic — such people are the majority even in Switzerland, which is “ideal” for many libertarians. Active attempts to promote minarchist ideas did not yield tangible results even with full freedom of choice and huge funding. Let alone Russia, with its paternalistic mentality and impoverished population.
As can be seen from the quote from the book, a “lefty” will feel oppressed under minarchism and will offer the maximum possible resistance to the ruling party (most likely, simply not allowing the libertarian party to come to power). From the perspective of a conditional “average Joe,” minarchism is a certain form of “liberal fascism” — where liberal values are forcibly imposed on people who wish to live under paternalism (since under minarchism, courts hold a territorial monopoly, and laws are mandatory throughout the state’s territory).
It turns out that in the eyes of voters, minarchists will look exactly as “lefties” look in the eyes of libertarians. As a libertarian, would you vote for a “lefty” proposing to impose ideas of social justice on the whole society? I don’t think so. And will a “lefty,” seeing that you propose to impose the exact opposite on the whole society, vote for you? I don’t think so either. Given that the majority of society supports at least some form of social support, the electoral chances of minarchists tend toward zero. Many of them do not want to acknowledge this fact and begin to hint at the usefulness of applying physical violence against their opponents (“Pinochet’s helicopter tours”), showing that in their methods of struggling for power, they will not be inferior even to their extreme ideological opponents — the Stalinists.
To achieve electoral success, any libertarian party must either become a kind of “people’s party,” attracting people from as wide a spectrum of views as possible, or form a bloc with a left-wing party based on a shared agenda, which is somewhat harder to imagine. Perhaps the LPR should discard the idea of imposing liberal values and change its program from minarchist to panarchist? As history shows, the chances of success for such a program are very high (with it, Abraham Kuyper won the elections in the Netherlands — read the article on pillarization).
NAP is not a non-aggression pact, as the well-known video blogger Mikhail Svetov likes to point out. It is not a norm handed down from above, like a single commandment from a libertarian deity. It is a purely analytically derived principle. If the principle “no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity” is generally observed in a given society, it means that there is—as engineers would put it—negative feedback operating there, which dampens manifestations of violence. Society becomes free from institutionalized coercion, which always leads to an explosive growth in prosperity.
Since the non-aggression principle is not established from above, naturally, no one imposes specific boundaries on everyone—for instance, claiming that a dirty look does not violate the NAP, but stepping on a foot already does. Such specifics are derived from practice, and this boundary can certainly change as customs evolve. The only thing clearly defined in the non-aggression principle is the absence of certain privileged groups who, for some reason, have the right to initiate violence with impunity.
The feedback loop works because the use of violence against an aggressor, whoever they may be, is precisely legitimate. In general, anyone can apply such retaliatory violence; the limitations here are purely technical: first, there must be the physical capability to do so, and second, reliable information about who applied what violence to whom.
The idea of limited government is to delegate the identification of aggressors and the application of counter-violence against them to one specific organization. This relieves the majority of society from such a burdensome duty. However, first, we have no right to forbid people from exercising counter-violence directly, without delegating it to anyone. And second, we have no right to forbid people from delegating rights to counter-violence to any other organization besides the one called the government. The attempt to forbid this is itself a violation of the NAP, which should entail counter-violence against whoever attempted to impose such a ban on people using force.
Thus, the only way for a limited government not to violate the NAP is to be a market monopoly—that is, to serve its clients based on voluntary contracts, and to do so so cheaply and qualitatively that it is simply unprofitable for competitors to enter this market, and the vast majority of people prefer to entrust counter-violence to the government rather than practice it themselves. Robert Nozick advocates approximately this point of view in his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”.
As I understand it, the point is that in the article about the targeted offer of libertarianism, 14 groups were listed, including conservatives, who were told that the state is a poor ally against evil homosexuals, but homosexuals were not included, so it is unclear how to reach their hearts, and this point should be clarified. Very well, here it comes.
1. Any private discrimination pales in comparison to the horrors of state discrimination, not to mention such madness as court-ordered stoning or extrajudicial family executions to wash away the shame of the lineage.
2. Private attempts to use violence against you because of your non-violent sexual habits in a libertarian society can be resisted with weapons in hand, and most people will support you.
3. It is the conservatives in a libertarian society who will have to move to some separate territorial community if your very sight irritates them. You, however, will have every right to live wherever is most convenient and behave as you please, as long as you do not initiate violence.
4. But you will still have to tolerate all that “you just haven’t had a normal man/woman,” depending on whatever your gender is. So in that regard, it won’t get better, but it won’t get worse either.
