Do you think it is possible in the future for technologies to emerge that will divide humanity into superhumans and serfs, for whom this will not be accessible?

For example, through gene editing, mind uploading, immortality-granting drugs, etc. Where will this lead? Does libertarianism have any original answer to this?

Will such technologies spell the end of the ideas of freedom?

For instance, Mises believes that tyranny collapses precisely because, due to nepotism, the mediocrely capable oligarchs are replaced by their untalented children, leading to such inefficiency that the state becomes unable to perform even the role of a bandit. How do we fight tyrannies in the future if imperfect mortal bandits are replaced by perfect and immortal ones?

Nenavision

Suppose that our technology provides only individual, non-heritable non-aging, and no other superpowers. Simply, there is now an option for an insane amount of money to ensure the absence of age-related degradation of the body.

Let us also assume that access to non-aging is granted only by money. If there were some actor capable of denying access to the technology, one could speculate about a ban on immortality for dictators.

Finally, let us assume there is some factor that prevents the technology from becoming significantly cheaper over time—meaning the proportion of non-aging people in the population will grow very slowly. Otherwise, we would have to consider a rather short transition period before moving to a completely immortal humanity, but the question is about something else entirely.

So, we have a non-aging Putin, and a hundred non-aging billionaires across the rest of the RF. Will much change in the style of governing the country? No. The degradation of politics, and subsequently the economy in the RF, is caused not by Putin’s physical degradation, nor by the shortening of his planning horizons, but on the contrary, by the consolidation of his power and the centralization of all decision-making processes in himself. A dictator may rise on a wave of fighting a certain crisis for which he is most competent, and may even beneficially influence the situation in the country, but other crises require other competencies, and without the rotation of power, the state will quickly lose the early achievements of the dictatorship. Well, except perhaps that the dictator will not lose his passion for feasts and harems over time, so he might become less interested in playing tank games and reading Ilyin.

The same applies to business empires. Will Buffett suddenly understand the power of Bitcoin if he physically strengthens and no longer fears death from old age? No, he will still have his set of time-tested criteria for asset evaluation. Business empires will practically cease to be inherited—well, that means the children of their creators will immediately look for themselves in something else. Perhaps this will even be for the better if the son of a successful investor becomes a talented musician rather than an unsuccessful investor.

In general, I assume that the appearance of such technology will lead to the division of humanity not into superhumans and serfs, but into societies where there is political dynamics and societies where there is none. This division already exists, but currently the border between them fluctuates actively: yesterday’s dictatorship democratizes, yesterday’s democracy slides into shitty putinism. It will become more static: Putin’s Russia or Saudi Arabia will remain stable abscesses, while political regimes with a rotation of power will value their rotation much more.

The same goes for ancaps. A conditional Mikhail Svetov, upon achieving immortality, will not become a more effective conduit for libertarianism; he will inherit all the qualities that limit his effectiveness already now. The attractiveness of libertarianism as a system of views will not change much just because a few chosen ones are able to ensure their immortality. Although, perhaps, ambitious guys might become more intolerant of left-wing ideas because of this, because the more the state takes away, the further away that coveted immortality becomes. Therefore, the attractiveness of economic growth and the investment climate may increase relative to the attractiveness of egalitarian ideas.

Now, if we endow our immortal being with a bunch of other superpowers, then, of course, the changes will be far more serious

Who benefits from regulations and what threat they may lead to

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Who is always the first to demand the introduction of new taxes? And who demands the introduction of new laws regarding the regulation of the economy and the market? Etatists will say that ordinary citizens are primarily interested in this for the sake of protecting their interests, ensuring security, and providing social benefits. But such an answer would be foolish, because the correct answer is large corporations, which are literally “in bed” with the state.

Why did Jeff Bezos—founder of Amazon, a company that writes off its profits as expenses to avoid paying taxes—support the increase of corporate taxes in the USA? To any sane person, it will be obvious that this is necessary to eliminate competitors in the market. But that is an old story; there is a more current example—well-known corporations and billionaires, such as Elon Musk and Microsoft, are actively calling for the regulation and limitation of the development of Artificial Intelligence. All of this, of course, they justify by the alleged need to ensure safety, since AI is so far a technology that is not fully understood, including in terms of risks. But such words sound like a fabricated excuse; moreover, why would major market players limit a technology upon which they can make money? Obviously, the point is to prevent private developments in the field of AI from entering the market; many small companies simply will not be able to afford the regulations, whereas large corporations will easily handle them. It is especially worth noting that those calling for the regulation of this field are themselves extremely active in its development.

The drive toward market monopolization is clear, as are the results of this process. Due to the lack of competition, everyone will only become poorer, and technological progress will be stunted. But the problem is not only this; there is a far more terrifying scenario. If AI technology truly carries some danger, then it would be extremely foolish to try to limit it, especially in developed Western societies where law-abiding citizens, who do not seek to harm anyone, will indeed follow the regulations. However, those who wish to use AI to cause harm will not follow the regulations. This applies to government authorities and their various structures. And it especially applies to those structures that are not under the control of Western jurisdictions at all. Some hackers from North Korea, already famous for hacking and stealing funds from crypto exchanges, persecuting people, and attempting to breach the defense networks of other countries, spit on Western bans; they will actively develop and use AI to cause harm to others. And military structures everywhere will certainly use AI, and even if the West bans its own military from doing so (and even that is a doubtful scenario, as the military usually has a completely free hand in such matters), jurisdictions hostile to the West will engage in it. In the end, only the civilian sector and the development of AI tools that could be used to counter AI threats will suffer from the bans and regulations.

The ability of large corporations and monopolists linked to the state to promote favorable regulations through it not only harms everyone economically, but can also jeopardize the very security for which all of this is allegedly being done. And will anyone still justify the very existence of stationary bandits and their ability to impose bans on everyone after this?

Preventing nuclear war under ancap

Hi! I really dislike your answers regarding the prevention of nuclear war. You say that ancaps will shift the costs onto the nomenklatura, but these answers are far from reality. A bounty of 11 million euros was placed on Lukashenko’s head, yet there weren’t even any attempts to eliminate him.

Suppose there is a nomenklatura sitting in a very deep bunker under a densely populated city. They are protected by loyal security services.
What will libertarians do if this nomenklatura starts a nuclear war against Ancapistan (=what do they threaten with to prevent it)? It would be preferable to provide some specific military measures.

Nenavision

Okay, let’s imagine such a picture. Zelensky arrives at the front to hand out another box of medals, and there he is suddenly kidnapped by an enemy sabotage and reconnaissance group and taken to the RF. Next, they push a peace treaty on him, which he agrees to sign publicly. At the solemn signing ceremony, he inevitably gets within handshake distance of Putin, after which he clenches his jaw, breaks a fake tooth—in short, some trash in the spirit of Frank Herbert happens, only Vladimir Putin turns out not to be as lucky as Vladimir Harkonnen, and also dies.

In the RF, power is seized by a club of angry patriots, who move into a bunker under Moscow, surround themselves with loyal security services, and give the order for an immediate general mobilization, as well as bring the Strategic Missile Forces to a state of highest combat readiness.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the central government is paralyzed by another Maidan; control over the supply of the front, as well as other state functions, are taken over by volunteers; the Maidan declares the complete abolition of taxes and complete freedom of private initiative, as well as general armament—in short, literally a month after the incident with the kidnapping of Zelensky, Ukraine becomes an ancap society in a first approximation.

Great, a minimally plausible picture of a deadly deadlock between a fanatic dictator and an ancap society with clear territorial borders has been established. How do the ancaps defend themselves against Girkin? They have no nuclear bomb, no medium-range missiles, no strategic aviation, no unified command, and no time to waste.

The ancaps react to the threat in their favorite manner: everyone does what they are best at. For the most part, this means occupying themselves with matters far more important than war. For example, importing goods from the EU into Ukraine duty-free, and also exporting them duty-free through the leaky Russian border in the area of a conditional Shebekino, and selling them there for bitcoins.

The front gradually collapses because the mobilized realize that there will be no criminal prosecution for desertion, provided their own don’t shoot them in the back immediately. Armaments and ammunition from warehouses gradually and mysteriously disappear into someone’s private stores. Several highly motivated groups prepare for partisan warfare, while the less flexible prepare to stand to the death on their tiny section of the front, but for some reason the enemy prefers to attack where they are not.

Girkin realizes that he no longer needs general mobilization, and that he can do without nuclear weapons as well. He focuses on organizing an effective occupation administration, plus he is forced to pay more and more attention to the internal agenda. He has to climb out of the bunker more and more often, travel through the regions, solve purely civilian issues—and after three months he is finally killed by Ukrainian partisans, somewhere on the way from Vladivostok airport to the city. The first car hits a mine, then the motorcade is shelled by mortars, and then the survivors are cleaned up with small arms. This episode becomes the occasion for previously scattered attacks on representatives of Girkin’s occupation administration to turn into a full-scale hunt.

Power in Russia is taken by Sobyanin, who orders an immediate retreat to the 2014 borders and begins bargaining with the international community for the lifting of sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Crimea as well, replacing them with UN peacekeepers. Along the way, he releases Navalny, stating that he would be happy to see his former opponent in the post of Moscow mayor, as he is not in doubt that this time he will definitely win the election. But that is a completely different story.

A column of light armored vehicles is an easy target

Why punishments for crimes are becoming increasingly humane

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In the distant past, it was absolutely normal to use physical punishments, such as whipping or beating with a stick, even for minor offenses. Theft, insults, or leading a lifestyle that did not conform to accepted norms could even lead a person to the death penalty. Over time, punishments became less violent, and the death penalty remained only for the most brutal crimes. But even this is not the limit; in many countries, the death penalty has been banned, and in some (for example, Norway), even imprisonment has become an extremely mild form of punishment, where a person is only deprived of their liberty, but is provided with access to all the benefits necessary to lead a full life.

Reflecting on the topic of why punishments are becoming more humane, one can come to various conclusions. However, a very good explanation is provided by an article on the function and regulation of aggression by psychologist Seymour Feshbach, written back in 1964. It describes the concept of empathic inhibition, the presence of which deters a person from causing harm to others. This concept can be called an early prototype of the later proposed theory of the violence inhibition mechanism, which examines the psychology of violence in more detail and depth.

As Feshbach claims, a physical attack brings psychological discomfort to the person. This, among other things, becomes a major problem and barrier in the application of physical punishments. Other forms of punishment, which do not require the direct infliction of pain and harm, are far less uncomfortable for those executing them and cause them fewer negative psychological consequences.

An example can be drawn from what the landowner A. S. Zeleny wrote about corporal punishment in 1857: “One of the most unpleasant and heavy duties of our patriarchal landlord management (and for me—yes, probably not for me alone—the most unpleasant and heavy) is the necessity of subjecting our people to corporal punishment (birching) from time to time… corporal punishment has something repulsive about it… life becomes somehow coarsened; everything feels awkward in the soul… although one realizes that the act of punishment committed is only the fulfillment of a duty and that this evil is for now necessary.”

Of course, one can always find a degenerate who feels nothing wrong at all about causing harm to other people. Moreover, a system of imprisonment instead of physical punishments requires orders of magnitude more funds for its maintenance and places a heavy burden on society as a whole. At first glance, beating a petty criminal with a stick and executing a major criminal is a far more profitable strategy than imprisoning them. But when the issue is the widespread application of punishments for crimes, it is unlikely that enough degenerates could be found to effectively apply physical punishments to everyone who has committed even the slightest offense.

The violence inhibition inherent in humans makes direct physical punishments involving pain and harm an extremely limited and non-scalable tool. Therefore, instead of these, more indirect punishments are used, in which there is no need to engage in the direct infliction of pain, even if they are more costly from an economic point of view. Of course, established bandits may still set their most degenerate agents upon particularly unacceptable prisoners, for example for political reasons, and punish them brutally, up to the organization of staged “suicides.” But this does not concern the vast majority of criminals in most places of detention. And this once again confirms the concept of the violence inhibitor.

Montellibero’s criticism from bitcoiners

A podcast was released on the Hype Coin News channel, for which two bitcoiners wanted to invite our Soz from Montelibero to tell them about Montelibero. However, the guys failed to account for the Montenegrin polako — Soz was late, and the entire podcast took place without him. As a result, it became a conversation between a person who knows something about Montelibero and a person who knows nothing but is trying to understand.

The main question that concerned the interlocutors for most of the podcast was “why are they using some shitcoin, what’s it called, Stellar, when there is a normal, orthodox Bitcoin?”

I have two answers to this question.

The first is usability. For instance, I cannot provide a link to a post from the Hype Coin News channel, nor to the channel itself, because it is private. As for how to subscribe to it — God knows; I subscribed somehow a long time ago and no longer remember how (which is why I am simply posting the podcast right here). It is roughly the same situation with attempts to operate tokens on the Liquid Bitcoin sidechain. Yes, the MTL fund has a Bitcoin sub-fund there, but all I managed to do there was buy L-MTL tokens with Bitcoin and occasionally nudge the head Bitcoin guru manually so that he would manually transfer the dividends to my Lightning wallet. This is not a full-fledged tokenomics, but rather a reservation for Bitcoin maximalists.

But if one sets a goal, it is possible to write a custom wallet (such an attempt is discussed in the podcast) with decent usability, and the first answer would become irrelevant. So, I have prepared a second, more fundamental answer.

What do our bitcoiners see as the main advantage of Bitcoin as a platform for tokenomics? That by issuing tokens, you provably freeze Bitcoins as collateral. But if an investment fund freezes all receipts, it turns out that it is investing in Bitcoin, and only in Bitcoin. However, the MTL fund needs to invest money into one business or another. Thus, its tokens will ultimately be backed not by the original carrier of value transferred to the fund, but by obligations. It doesn’t matter what entered the system. Some bought MTL tokens with Bitcoin, some with rubles, some even with the god-forsaken Lumens. Most of these funds were then converted into euros, and those euros were used for purchases on the external market. And entries appeared on the fund’s balance sheet regarding which assets it acquired. More precisely — tokens of the assets acquired by the fund. The fund does not have a single euro — neither in bank accounts nor in cash — because such entities cannot be put into a blockchain. Instead, it has tokenized euros (which the fund’s treasurers are obliged to exchange for cash upon first request, and these are specific people, and as many as needed can be brought in). Plus tokenized businesses that bring dividends. Plus tokenized investments that one hopes will increase in price — for example, land or Bitcoin itself.

If we used tokenomics based on a Bitcoin sidechain, it would be absurd. I freeze my Bitcoin in the sidechain and receive an MTL token. Then, for the fund to invest the funds, it would need to find someone who will accept this Bitcoin frozen in the sidechain and give euros for it. And where can you find such a person?

It is clear that bitcoiners would like to see something like the Bitcoin Beach project, where there is a large local economy, and everyone within this economy keeps records and makes settlements in Bitcoin. Need land — buy it with Bitcoin. Need a tractor — buy it with Bitcoin. Need to pay taxes to the damn state — pay with Bitcoin.

Yes, in such a world, tokenomics could be based on Bitcoin. What stopped us from doing something similar? Nothing, it is simply a completely parallel task. When the Bitcoin Beach franchise comes to Montenegro, we will be able to fit into it. But for now, it is more convenient for us to use another solution, one that is cheaper and simpler.

Tokenomics is perpendicular to Bitcoin. Bitcoin is about the ability to store and transfer value without trust. Tokenomics is about the ability to monetize trust. One does not hinder the other.

As a dessert, I suggest refreshing your memory with a couple of my texts on tokenomics: part 1, part 2.

Montelibero Project News, Issue 15

Exactly two months have passed since the previous issue, let’s go through the news.

On May 24, a libertarian flag was raised over MTL-city. I hope this is not just a morale-boosting action, but also a declaration of intent to protect the territory from state encroachments; otherwise, the Montelibero flag should have been raised instead of the Gadsden flag with the snake.

I wrote that in MTL-city they promised to deliver the first apartments by summer. Well, we can conditionally consider the promise fulfilled: on May 28, the first apartment owner in MTL-city moved into their home. He worked on the construction site himself, including finishing his own apartment, which is why he moved in first, even before the full formal completion of the work.

In the last issue, I lamented that with current construction prices, I wouldn’t have enough money, and now I am forced to put my small plot of land up for sale.

The plot of 202 sq.m is conveniently located right in the geometric center of MTL-city. Communications are brought in from below, which means greater convenience for connection to the sewage system. The main road runs along the plot, which facilitates access—no need to maneuver through narrow internal paths. There are two oak trees on the plot that create extensive shade (very relevant in summer), and if there is a desire to build on a large scale, they can be cut down and sold for firewood. The plot is also burdened with a debt of 2,055 euros for the payment of general infrastructure construction. Price: 8,000 euros (including the encumbrance, it will be 10,055). Installments are possible. Contact via DM.

Montelibero was presented at two major conferences: Zuzalu (a posh gathering in Luštica Bay, with honorary citizen of Montenegro Vitalik Buterin, Dritan Abazović, who is spending his final days as the Prime Minister of Montenegro, and other famous guys like Titus Gebel) and Edcon (a two-day cryptocurrency conference, also with Buterin and various Ethereum startups). As a result, we have a number of business contacts plus an increased probability that MTL-city will have fewer problems with the legalization of buildings.

The Montelibero Wallet, which is a Telegram bot, has made significant progress in its functionality. It already supports multi-accounting, trading is possible through it (though Lobstr still has a more convenient interface for this), it is equipped with special tools for MTL fund shareholders, but most conveniently—it is now possible to deposit/withdraw funds in USDT (TRC20) or Bitcoin (Lightning) through it. That is, if before I deposited bitcoins on-chain to the fund’s wallet, and then the fund officially issued BTCMTL tokens against them, processing the decision via multi-sig, and this took a day—now the entire procedure of depositing Lightning in exchange for SATMTL tokens takes about five minutes, without involving live people in the exchange, and without commissions.

In anticipation of the yachting season, a yacht club was launched by Montelibero participants. Participants meet on Saturdays either in the first Montelibero club or in the Bar marina, and have the opportunity to order a yacht trip at discounted prices or undergo skipper training. EURMTL is accepted as payment.

The Montelibero podcast channel has become active; it currently features conversations about individual interesting employment cases in Montenegro (there are episodes about a chef and an electronics technician so far) and weekly reviews of the project’s news.

Justification and normalization of violence are signs of psychopathy

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When discussing the topic of violence, you may encounter people who see nothing wrong with this phenomenon. Of course, they will most likely condemn certain forms of violence, but at the same time, they will call it an absolutely normal tool—for example, like a knife, which can be used for good in the kitchen or for harm in an attack on a person. Just as a knife does not become “bad” because of how it is used, they claim the same is true for violence. For example, they may often justify state violence, reprisals for violations of norms that are important to the interlocutor, or someone may justify violent “punishments” toward children for “disobedience” and other forms of violence that seem rationally beneficial or necessary to some people.

If a person resorts to such argumentation, it is worth asking them whether they themselves could commit violence in the same situations where they justify its use, and whether they would consider such an act justified and rational. The fact is that at least two items from different versions of Robert Hare’s “Psychopathy Checklist” examine the issue of justifying violence. One assesses the lack of remorse and guilt regarding causing pain and suffering to others, as well as the tendency to believe that the victim of violence deserves it. The second assesses the unwillingness to take responsibility for causing harm, shifting it onto the victim or circumstances, the rationalization of violence, and the denial of the seriousness of its consequences for the victim. Both items also belong to the affective component of psychopathy, which is directly linked to the dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism in a person.

Furthermore, it should be noted that in people with low levels of psychopathic traits, aggressive behavior, if present, is reactive in nature. Such behavior depends on a specific situation (for example, provocation, conflict, or threat), is not planned in advance, and does not involve the intentional pursuit of a goal. At the same time, the aggressive behavior of people with high levels of psychopathy is more proactive—meaning planned, intentional, and purposeful. But as research demonstrates, these people tend to present their proactive aggressive acts as reactive, and the victim as the culprit who provoked the act of violence (this behavior is better known as “victim blaming”). Additionally, specifically in men, high levels of affective psychopathy (but not other components) are associated with a tendency to believe that in the case of rape, the woman may be to blame herself and that there is not that much harm to the victim in such an act. Again, people who justify violence tend to blame the victim.

Of course, not everyone who justifies violence is actually a psychopathic personality with a dysfunction of the violence inhibitor. However, resorting to such argumentation significantly increases the risk that you are speaking with exactly such a person. And there is no point in talking to mentally ill violent individuals and taking their arguments even slightly seriously—they are formed due to a distortion of perception created by the disorder they suffer from. Always remind them that a position justifying violence is very similar to how a psychopath would express it, especially if the person has also expressed their own ability and willingness to commit an act of “justified” violence. This can leave a proponent of violence bewildered and discredit them in the eyes of others. And do not fear that such an argument resembles an appeal to the person (ad hominem), because in this case, it is based not on a logical trick, but on the statement of a scientifically proven fact about the link between a person’s psychopathy and their tendency to justify violent acts.

Nostr, first impressions

After the release of the post about regular automatic payments via Lightning using the Nostr protocol, it was quite logical to try and understand what this protocol is, what it can be used for, and what its prospects are.

To start, I familiarized myself with a selection of materials from Tony and the official description on GitHub from the protocol’s author. In short: Nostr is a protocol for the decentralized exchange of small texts (more precisely, scripts in JSON format).

  • Any server owner can run their own relay, which will receive such messages, store them, and forward them.
  • Any developer can write their own client that connects to one or more such relays, receives messages from them, filters and beautifies them if desired before showing them to the user (for example, loading media where there were links to it in the message), and sends the user’s messages to the relay.
  • Any user can download a client, configure which relays it connects to (if the client allows), and enjoy life.

On GitHub, it is easy to find Nostr libraries for several languages, clients (one could make a fork adapted for Montelibero), and relays (again, one can run their own relay for Montelibero’s needs).

To set up a Nostr account, it is sufficient to generate a pair of private and public keys; after that, the private key is stored, and the public one can be shared far and wide (here is mine: npub1jj4xxj47j9yjthhrd2kwklx5vl9j45ruvhl0ftdfamf7v6nx799ssf45q3), just as the creators of asymmetric encryption intended. Keys can be generated directly within a particular Nostr client (I generated mine in the Alby browser extension), via a special service, or for security, one can use a completely custom script if they have the expertise (I do not). However, I managed to link my Nostr public key to the name ancapchan@getalby.com (so-called NIP5 verification), create my own Lightning address ⚡ancapchan2018@gmail.com (which masks the address ⚡ancapchan@getalby.com), as well as link this browser extension to my website, so now, if you have it installed, its icon on the ancapchan.info website changes from yellow to blue, and when you click it, you will see an invitation to send a donation:

In general, Lightning is natively integrated into the Nostr protocol as a means of transferring value. For instance, social network clients based on Nostr offer “zaps” instead of likes, which are accompanied by the sending of a small amount of satoshis. In addition, money in the system can be used for paid relays that offer additional functionality, such as spam filters.

Overall, the protocol seems promising to me. I hope it will soon acquire a sufficiently convenient infrastructure, more people will join, and it will gradually be able to draw the attention away from current centralized solutions. I also hope that the collective intelligence of the developers participating in the Montelibero project will be enough to create their own Nostr-based solutions: their own relay, a bridge to Telegram, and much more that hasn’t even occurred to me yet.

What is the libertarian response to a claim along the lines of: “In a free market, you will be sold into slavery?”

Mr. Coupon

That’s correct, they can indeed be sold. For this to happen, slaves must be perceived as a commodity:

  • by the seller
  • by the buyer
  • by those around them.

If you are enslaved, but all potential buyers do not perceive slaves as a commodity, then congratulations, you will not be sold; you will remain a slave to whoever enslaved you. For example, the state.

If you are enslaved, but the enslaver themselves does not perceive slaves as a commodity — congratulations, you won’t be sold either; you will remain a slave to whoever enslaved you, meaning, for example, the state.

If you are enslaved, they want to sell you, a potential buyer is ready to buy, but all those around do not consider slaves to be a commodity — congratulations, a free market for slaves will not emerge, the transaction is unlikely to take place because it will be considered illegitimate, and you, again, will remain in slavery to whoever enslaved you, for example, the state.

But if everyone around considers not only the purchase and sale of slaves to be illegitimate, but the very acts of enslavement themselves — well, then — alas for you — you will not only not be sold, but you are unlikely to be enslaved at all; you will somehow survive without a master.

There is no one to enslave the poor fellow: feed him, give him a bunk, provide him with work. Even Navalny was given a bunk! And free housing!

How the state nudges people to become more “illegal”

Voluntarist, Bitarch

You are likely already aware that recently the Russian authorities decided to issue summonses in electronic form and consider them received by conscripts simply by the fact of their appearance in the database. And if a conscript does not come to the military recruitment office on their own, various sanctions await them: a ban on leaving the country, registering an individual entrepreneurship or housing, driving a car, refusal of loans, and others. What will such measures lead to in practice?

Obviously, they will push people to move from the legal framework into relations that are more illegal from the state’s point of view. There are millions of potential conscripts, and far from every one of them will risk appearing at the military recruitment office of their own free will, regardless of the threatening sanctions. But at the same time, they are unlikely to give up leading a life that is at least somewhat full. Therefore, people will increasingly engage in the conscious violation of a number of state laws. In turn, this will create an overload of law enforcement agencies, as they will lack the time, strength, and resources to effectively deal with all the violations due to their excessive number, and will also contribute to the development of grey and black markets operating beyond the reach of the state and its regulations. The stationary bandit, as we see, is digging his own grave with such measures.

It is also worth noting that the Russian state authorities have so far only announced a number of sanctions against a conscript in case of failure to appear following an electronic summons. However, given that a summons will now be considered delivered after its placement in the database, and repeated failure to appear for delivered summonses is grounds for criminal prosecution, those same millions of potential conscripts could end up as “illegal” people, which would only increase the consequences described in the previous paragraph by orders of magnitude. However, most likely the stationary bandit will not create such a large problem for himself. If serious punishments follow, they will be selective and exemplary, but not mass.

Although, just in case, one should expect anything from the stationary bandit for the sake of one’s own safety. However, the good news is that the stationary bandit will only destroy himself further if he decides to do this. And an alternative to him will always be found, especially if millions of people need it and the stationary bandit proves too overloaded to control and suppress everything. This could lead to the flowering of agorism—a voluntary free market existing outside state interference—and in the case of stronger pressure on millions of “military-obligated” persons, the emergence of so-called “unregistered people,” who simply do not exist legally from the state’s point of view.