I have finished writing section 1.2 of my new book on libertarian theory of war, where I outlined the objectives it addresses. Also, before that, I inserted a small paragraph on statism into the previous section. It might have turned out a bit tedious, but it doesn’t seem too dragged out. With that, the introductory part of the book is finished, and from here on, things should get more or less concrete.
If the previous book about ancap, which we managed to print on paper for the Montellibero festival last September, ended up being 74 A5 pages, then I hope this one will not be of such monstrous size and will fit into about forty pages. However, we shall see; I might get carried away with epic descriptions of helmet-glinting Hectors or drawing organizational charts of network-centric warfare—due to such off-topic tangents, the size of the book could expand significantly.
As a reminder, I would be very pleased with donations, showing me that my work is not only in demand, but that there are also people who consider it worthy of immediate material gratitude, and who have prudently invested at least part of their savings in bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies.
As usual, I note that I am unable to follow my own plans. Books I started translating earlier are still not finished, my own book on ancap has still not been recorded, but instead, I’ve started translating a new one about the Network State, and writing my own new one about libertarian theory of war.
The Telegram channel is not developing much: there are slightly more subscribers, slightly fewer publications and views, and citations have decreased slightly. Overall, this is logical: the project is mature, there is no aggressive advertising, free time is becoming scarcer; we simply continue to run the channel because how could we not?
Things are quite interesting with Montelibero. This year, the project continued to increase its systemic complexity, and now it can be confidently said: no single person knows how many people are in the movement or how the movement is doing as a whole, because one cannot embrace the infinite. Nor is there any need to. Therefore, certain major milestones are well-known to everyone (MTL-fest, moving into MTL-City), and alongside them are many small local achievements that look like breakthroughs to some and cause bewilderment to others. This is why I haven’t released Montelibero news for a long time; instead, I will most likely choose a segment that interests me and start covering it directly on the movement’s general channel.
In general, segmentation has become the main trend for Montelibero, and this is generally healthy: people try not to waste effort on things that interest them little and focus on what is important. At the same time, various companies interpenetrate somehow and are united only by these loose communications, similar value systems, and a set of approaches to working with reality. Such a Montelibero is not tied to any state borders at all, although, of course, most of the circles in the movement are geographically localized. I expect that next year this trend will become more institutionally shaped, the network nodes will take on a more explicit form, and their activities will receive diverse and more decentralized coverage.
Nothing interesting happened in Montenegro, except for a new government, a new president, the tightening of screws, and a census. In the RF, also nothing interesting, except for a failed coup. On the other hand, Argentina unexpectedly appeared on the scene. Now one can observe with joyful curiosity how etatists are fought with etatist methods, and add individual cases to the collection.
In the New Year, I want to wish my readers two of the most important things: a sense of self-worth and purposefulness. Do not tolerate shit neither in yourself nor around you, and move consistently toward a world where there is less of it.
I am settling my pre-New Year’s debt and posting the translation of another chapter of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State. It is absolutely monstrous in size, but at the same time, in my opinion, quite interesting. There are plenty of fresh thoughts scattered throughout this chapter, but the key point is that leftists and rightists are not some kind of static groups, but simply the tactics of a particular community in relation to power. There is a left-wing tactic — to overthrow the existing power. And there is a right-wing one — to preserve the existing power. And the practitioners of these tactics constantly replace one another: former leftists, upon coming to power, become rightists.
The author logically does not count libertarians as either left or right, but in his opinion, they have their own cycle: from a startup to a bureaucratized corporation, and then to the departure of the most free-thinking employees to found a new startup. He provides no recipes for counter-cyclical policy in this chapter; we shall see what happens next.
Alcohol consumption is often linked to the manifestation of increased aggression in a person. Every third crime is committed in a state of alcohol intoxication, and in the case of violent crimes, such as domestic violence and murder, this figure can even reach 80%. It would seem that the link between alcohol and violence is quite direct. However, in this matter, as in many others, one should not make the survivor’s bias mistake—considering only the clearly observable results while ignoring those that we had no opportunity to observe. Not all people become more aggressive from alcohol. Of course, some of them may become angry under its influence, and we notice this well. But at the same time, others will begin to feel sad or exhibit some other emotions. And a very important role in what behavior can be expected from alcohol consumption is played by the person’s neurophysiology.
As studies on primates have revealed, differences in the functioning of the serotonin system and the negative influence of the environment are important factors in alcohol-induced aggression. In rhesus macaques, stressful circumstances, such as separation from parents and social isolation at an early age, led to the suppression of the serotonin system’s work, increased aggressiveness, and excessive alcohol consumption when it was freely available. However, it is very important to specify that the negative influence did not have such an effect on all monkeys—only carriers of the short allele of the serotonin transporter gene were susceptible to it. At the same time, carriers of the long allele were more resilient and did not experience the negative consequences of such influence. It can be concluded that a genetic predisposition to greater sensitivity to stressful circumstances, which causes disruptions in the functioning of the serotonin system, leads to increased alcohol consumption and aggression.
Increased alcohol consumption was observed also in mutant mice lacking the serotonin 1B receptor gene, while stimulation of the serotonin 1A receptor can lead to a decrease in its consumption. Additionally, studies on mice confirmed that not all individuals become aggressive from alcohol consumption. Increased aggression was observed only in individuals who had significantly reduced (by 49-76%) levels of mRNA of all serotonin receptors (except 3A) in the prefrontal cortex of the brain and some other abnormalities in serotonin function.
It is also worth highlighting that empathy is an important mediating factor in this matter. Thus, men (but not women) with low levels of empathy exhibit increased aggression from alcohol consumption. Furthermore, in two samples (a clinical sample consisting of 703 psychiatric institution patients, and a community sample consisting of 870 students), it was shown that the level of psychopathic traits mediates the influence of alcohol dependence on the commission of violence against romantic partners. At the same time, alcohol dependence on its own, separate from psychopathic traits, showed an insufficient link with violence to be considered a predicting factor. As noted, research on violence against romantic partners should take into account the potential role of psychopathy, especially if the influence of alcohol consumption is being studied.
Of course, consuming large quantities of alcohol entails many negative consequences for a person. However, in the case where a person exhibits violent behavior under alcohol intoxication, we cannot place all the blame solely on alcohol. It is merely another provoking factor, not the cause of the violence, for which the therapeutic solution must be sought. The root of the problem of violent behavior and the increase in the level of psychopathic traits in an individual lies in the disruption of the violence inhibition mechanism, the functioning of which is handled by the serotonin system. In the case of violence, it is the dysfunction of this mechanism that primarily requires therapy.
While I was on a roll, I managed to finish another chapter of the book on the theory of war, which offers the reader a fascinating journey into the world of spirits. The previously planned separate chapter on the principle of methodological subjectivism seems redundant to me for now, as I do not see what could be added separately about this principle, which already operates throughout the text. Perhaps I will decide to insert it over time, but for now, I am removing this item from the table of contents.
The next section is intended to briefly describe the goals of the libertarian theory of war as they apply to its individual stages.
The book is still coming along slowly — I’m finding my style, plus there is a lot of other work. The chapter on the definition of war and why I use this specific one is ready. For those who read the book on ancap, my definition has long been no secret, but it was somewhat cumbersome; now a short form has been added: war is a conflict in which people are ready to kill.
For now, the relationships between individual subjects are being detailed, but in the next chapter, I will move on to collective theoretical subjects, which are far more familiar to us when it comes to war.
The main advantage of the book is still intended to be its size: it will be short.
The post turned out poorly. As a mitigating circumstance, I can only cite a lingering respiratory infection, because of which everything is running, and it is somewhat distracting.
It was a mistake to mention some debates and takes from those debates, because readers naturally tried to understand how they related to the content of the post—and the connection there is quite weak. The thing is, I am not very interested in the topic of survival under a state; otherwise, the topics of my posts would mainly concern tactics for standing in line for various state social perks, roughly speaking, for the slop. The post concerned specifically the ethical aspects of concluding contracts under ancap, and the fact that positive law in conditions of decentralization works very limitedly, and therefore not every document that says “Contract” and is signed by the parties actually possesses the properties one would expect from a contract. That is, it is not a fact that the mutual promises described in it will actually be fulfilled by the parties, were planned to be fulfilled by the parties, or can be forcibly realized in reality by the efforts of one of the parties.
Is it ethical to sign a contract that you do not want to fulfill? Yes, if the alternative involves significant costs. Is it ethical not to fulfill a signed contract afterwards? Yes, or to fulfill it partially. Is it ethical not to make it clear in advance that you do not like the contract? Yes, if this type of feedback is punishable. Is it ethical to abuse deceits of this sort? Of course not; on the contrary, it is ethical to strive to avoid situations where such deception is required.
By the way, the presented ethical approach simultaneously completely closes the meme topic of contractual slavery under ancap.
I had a debate yesterday. My opponent was pushing popular takes about how the state is no different from those contract jurisdictions of yours, and that obtaining a passport is like signing a contract. Where is the text of the contract? Right here, the body of laws. Much arguing followed, during which I formulated for myself why contracts are needed and how to view them.
A contract is merely a mutual promise. Promises are made, revised, disavowed, and broken; their violation may have certain consequences. The vast majority of contracts are not smart contracts. They cannot execute themselves; they must be executed by people. My interlocutor asks: if you ancaps reserve the right to break any contract in advance, and even explicitly state that you reserve the right to try to avoid harmful consequences of its breach—then why are contracts needed at all? How does a world with contracts differ from the state of nature, where nobody owes anyone anything?
Contracts are needed to make the world simpler, more predictable, and more understandable, providing the ability to make longer-term plans by relying on other people. But if a contract does not execute itself, then simply relying by default on the fact that it will be executed by other people is fraught with erroneous planning. And here there are two paths, both valid and not contradictory. One can invest in contract enforcement mechanisms. Or one can try to enter into contracts that the counterparty will want to fulfill.
For example, the traffic rule “in this area, it is customary to keep to the right side of the road” is a good rule. It is far better than its absence because it increases the predictability of traffic. It is cheap to follow, because what difference does it make which side you drive on; you can drive on the right. And it is expensive to ignore. There is no need to specifically enforce this rule; it is enough that everyone knows about it, and if they happen not to know, they quickly find out by observing the flow of traffic. And since those who love to stretch the truth tend to call the relationship between a citizen and the state a contract—implicitly concluded on the principle of a public offer—then this traffic rule is a good example of a healthy person’s social contract.
Now let’s imagine a situation. A person enters a certain territory. At the checkpoint, they are offered twelve volumes of rules of conduct on this territory—and a place to sign this contract, which will give them the right of entry. Since the person will not read these volumes, the procedure for them boils down to the following: you ask for a signature to let me in. Here is the signature, let me in. The contract on my part is fulfilled. And any further appeal to the contents of the sixth volume of the tomes gathering dust at the checkpoint will be perceived by them as lawlessness, and pointing out that you signed the contract will be perceived as mockery. Such contracts do not make the world simpler or more predictable. They are needed by self-proclaimed enforcers to have a reason to nitpick a violation, while the party who signed them for the right of entry will constantly violate them without any ulterior motive; therefore, one cannot rely on the existence of such-and-such a contract and people’s adherence to it in their planning. This means that under ancap, the natural emergence of a practice to accompany stay on a territory by imposing a voluminous code of rules is unlikely to take hold. More precisely, the maximum volume of rules acting on a territory will be proportional to the exclusivity of access to it and the ease of enforcement. An expensive, elite, closed club can afford complex norms of behavior. A public park cannot.
Of course, there are contracts where complexity is due to the complexity of the subject of the deal. For example, the merger of large joint-stock companies. But there, the contract is prepared by professionals from both sides, not provided by one party in a ready-made form without the right to make edits. So the complexity will be voluntary. And it is precisely this that will ensure the desire to fulfill everything exactly as written.
And finally, there are contracts where the subject of the deal is complex, but the text is standard. For example, a bank loan agreement. But for the bank’s client, this text essentially boils down to a short explication: you give me this much now, I give you this much monthly for this many years. As for what exactly should be done if something goes wrong—here, the presumption of the bank’s good faith applies. The client believes that the bank provides fair procedures for such scenarios and is not against following them specifically, because he did not think them through himself. But when it comes down to it, his opinion may change sharply. This is where the bank discovers that all these procedures, from the client’s point of view, are not sacred tablets. It is not a contract at all. These are the bank’s wish-lists. And the client has their own. And the more the bank insists on the observance of its wish-lists, the more dissatisfied the client will be, and the more costs he will try to create for the bank. Therefore, the more highly competitive the loan market will be under conditions of decentralized law, the more customer-oriented the contracts there will be.
The same applies to our ordinary life—most of the rules that others insist on observing are not contracts, but wish-lists. Some we respect, some we don’t, we resolve our conflicts ourselves—and it’s fine, we live. Quite peacefully and happily.
A wise guy who knows which wish-lists are worth voicing and which are not
It is generally believed that purely human phenomena, such as culture, traditions, and social norms, are necessary to make cooperation between different societies possible. At the same time, animals that lack such phenomena are typically considered social only in relation to their own group and hostile toward members of other groups. Of course, the importance of these phenomena should not be underestimated, but they may well be unnecessary for the emergence of cooperation between groups.
As demonstrated by research on pygmy chimpanzees, or bonobos—humans’ closest genetic relatives—they exhibit high levels of tolerance between members of different groups. They can travel, rest, and feed together. Resource exchange between groups is not uncommon among bonobos. Moreover, it has been noted that individuals who exhibited more pro-social behavior within their own group were also more pro-social toward members of other groups. At the same time, such cooperation does not arise under the influence of any culture or social norms. One could say that this is simply a natural state for bonobos.
It is also worth comparing bonobos with common chimpanzees. The latter are quite hostile to strangers; in their case, intergroup clashes can even end in lethal violence. Why does such a difference arise? If one compares the neurophysiology of common and pygmy chimpanzees, the latter are found to have twice the density of serotonergic neurons in the amygdala of the brain. Additionally, it is worth noting the relationship regarding aggression between serotonin, oxytocin (a hormone that promotes only intra-group pro-sociality, or so-called parochial altruism), and testosterone (a sex hormone). Common chimpanzees exhibit high testosterone reactivity, which reduces their tolerance and provokes a drive to fight for higher status. And as is known from studies, the function of the serotonergic system (which is more pronounced in bonobos) includes inhibiting the pro-aggressive influence of testosterone. Pro-sociality is also stimulated by oxytocin, and it should be noted that the serotonergic system can exert an influence on its release.
It should also not be forgotten that cooperative-communicative skills, which emerged in the early stages of human evolution, were key to the emergence of various forms of human cultural cognition, including language. Therefore, it is entirely possible to assume that pro-sociality and cooperation arise not simply because of culture. Rather, all these phenomena have common evolutionary roots. The basis for their emergence may well be the development of a violence inhibition mechanism and the strengthening of serotonergic function during evolution. Such adaptation is necessary for peaceful coexistence and the prevention of lethal violence, which in many circumstances is extremely detrimental to the entire population. Furthermore, the observation of such adaptation in an extremely strong form in bonobos indicates that “constant wars between neighboring groups are not necessarily a legacy of humanity and do not seem evolutionarily inevitable.”
Praxeology is indeed simply a set of deductive inferences from the axiom of action: “humans set goals and choose means to achieve them.” To the extent that real people satisfy this axiom, praxeology works for them. Similarly, for example, Euclidean geometry is a set of deductive inferences from five axioms, and to the extent that real physical space and the objects within it correspond to these ideal geometric shapes, this geometry will work for them. Replace the axioms—and you get, for example, Riemannian geometry, which will differ from Euclidean geometry and be better suited for describing real objects in a space with different properties.
Similarly, if we replace the axiom of action, for example, with “man is an instrument for the realization of divine will,” then we would have to derive a different praxeology for it, and to the extent that real people satisfy this new axiom, the praxeology we derived will work for them. Although, of course, given such starting data, a researcher would find it far more interesting to study theology rather than praxeology.
We can conventionally say that the leftists (more precisely, proponents of social engineering) build their praxeology on something like “human action is a phenomenon of the influence of the forces of the material world upon them, obeying the objective laws of physics and biology.” Deductive inferences from this axiom form the set of approaches that the left apply to people. And this also works in some way.
Thus, praxeology indeed does not rely on empiricism. It is verified by empiricism. I hope this clarified things.