Libertarian Theory of War, starting to write a book

I think it’s enough throwing unstructured notes at you; it’s time to get started on the book itself.

The current version of the book will be available on my website at a fixed location at https://ancapchan.info/war/. Currently, there is a rough table of contents available there, which gives an idea of how I envision the structure of the future text. And to get things started, I am immediately posting a short preface.

The scale of the task scares me a little. Moreover, I don’t want to drag out the writing process for over a year, as happened with the basic book on ancap, but rather manage it a bit faster. Wish me luck, cheer me up with donations, criticize the text as it appears — let’s together expand the horizon of human conceptions of the world a little (well, okay, in our case, not so much about the world as about war).

The Typical Politician is a Psychopath

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is known that more than half of people will not score higher than 2 out of 24 on Robert Hare’s PCL:SV test. And only 1–2% of individuals will score 13 or higher, indicating a high level of psychopathy. But it is interesting to wonder how a “typical” politician would fare on this test? Based on the article “On Politics and Psychopathy,” let us conduct a thought experiment and assign a score from 0 to 2 points for each trait of psychopathy to his personality.

Let’s start with the first factor of psychopathy, which assesses an individual’s selfishness, callousness, and ruthlessness.
– Does a typical politician possess superficial charm? Of course, it is very important for him to present himself well in public. It should also be noted that he tends to pretend to be someone he is not and simulate emotions. On this point, he can certainly be given 1 point, and possibly 2 points.
– Does he consider himself better than everyone else, i.e., someone worthy of ruling others? He wants power, so he certainly gets 1 point, and possibly 2 points.
– Is he deceitful, insincere, manipulative, unscrupulous, and dishonest? Needless to say, 2 points.
– Does he lack empathy, sensitivity, and respect for other people? And we are speaking specifically about people as individual persons; we are not interested in his feelings toward a certain nation or political course, since empathy can only be felt toward individuals. Of course, he actually doesn’t care about individual people, except perhaps his friends and family members, so we confidently give 2 points.
– Does the politician evade responsibility for his actions? Naturally, he will cover up his wrongdoings and will only take responsibility if it brings him even more power, wealth, or fame, so we can confidently give 1 point, or even 2 points.
– Does the politician lack guilt and remorse, and is he cold toward others? Is he completely indifferent to the pain and suffering of the victims of his actions? Yes, he passes laws that cause people inconvenience, make them poorer, or violate their rights, so we confidently give 2 points.

Now let’s move to the second factor of psychopathy, which assesses how antisocial an individual’s lifestyle is.
– Is the politician impulsive, reckless, rash, and unpredictable? Not always, however, from time to time he may support extremely risky decisions, so we give 1 point.
– Is he impatient, unrestrained, and irritable? Also not always, but politicians often allow themselves sharp, “alarmist” appeals, so we also give 1 point.
– Is his lifestyle parasitic, does he have no long-term goals for the future? Of course he has goals, but these goals consist of achieving power, wealth, and popularity by worsening the situation of others. Also, a politician lives on taxes forcibly collected from people, so he is a parasite who receives 1 point.
– Is he irresponsible, unreliable, and fails to meet his obligations? A confident 2 points.
However, as for antisocial behavior in adolescence and adulthood, this is not typical for a politician, and if he did behave this way at some point, it would be hidden from the public, so a confident score cannot be given here.

In the end, a typical politician receives 9 to 12 points for Factor 1 (which is the maximum result) and 5 points for Factor 2. His total score is 14 to 17 points. It turns out that he confidently falls into the worst 1–2% of the population. He is not someone we would want to associate ourselves with, let alone vote for. And in a properly organized human society, he would simply be exiled; he would not receive the slightest share of power.

I would also like to add a comparison of a typical politician with war criminals. As research demonstrates, ordinary violent criminals have high total scores, but fairly balanced scores across the two factors of psychopathy, whereas war criminals, while having similar total scores, have higher scores on Factor 1 and lower scores on Factor 2. They are not overly antisocial personalities. At the same time, they are excessively cruel and callous, just like a typical politician.

Network State, Chapter 2.7. Fragmentation. Frontier. The Fourth Turn. The future is our past.

The translation of another chapter of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State is ready. While the previous chapter seemed overly long to me, oversaturated with facts and undersaturated with ideas, here the balance has more or less leveled out.

The author points out that since the world will soon stop revolving around the USA, it makes sense to prepare for this in advance, starting with the dissemination of new narratives and concepts that explain the state of affairs. After which he rolls out as many as four—here they are, from left to right, in the header.

Some of them, such as the frontier thesis, were more or less familiar to me; some considerations turned out to be quite new despite their simplicity—for example, the thesis that the future, in terms of the general level of centralization, will mirror the past in the coming years.

I simply cannot find the time to translate another chapter of Eric Mack’s book, and I really should, because a small donation came in for its translation. But The Network State is an urgent order, and I’m already struggling to maintain the agreed pace. So I feel slight pangs of guilt, but I’ll have to endure them for a while longer.

Libertarian Band, a video about FSP

The Libertarian Band team, with whom I collaborated a long time ago on creating videos with an introduction to libertarianism (this experience later proved useful to me when writing the book), has after a long break produced an excellent video about the Free State Project.

This is their second video dedicated to libertarian communities (the first, released at the end of 2021, was about Monte libero.

The screenwriter who replaced me works in a completely different style: where I preferred my own, as original as possible, reflections, his focus is on much richer factual detail. In my opinion, it turned out quite entertaining; it’s great that the guys are still active and continue to deliver the basics.

Now, of course, a video about Liberland is overdue; I hope it won’t be more than a year before they enrich their playlist with a corresponding episode.

Sketches on Libertarian War Theory. Part 2, on why the NAP is a poor criterion.

When I was writing the book on ancap, you could observe the results of the creative search process in real-time. After publication, the material was restructured; as a result of discussions in the comments, personal communication, and simply rereading the text, serious revisions to the wording were introduced, and a couple of chapters were discarded entirely, after which the second part of the book started over in a different vein. And this was while I was navigating relatively familiar territory: libertarian doctrine has long been and repeatedly laid out, and all that was required of me was its reimagining and a brief retelling.

As for the libertarian theory of war, this is uncharted territory, so I am not attempting to write a book right away, but am simply recording separate considerations for now. The only support I currently have are the questions laid out in the first part of the sketches that a libertarian theory of war should answer. These are the points I will go through.

How to determine when it is worth starting a war?

As a reminder, I define war as a class of conflicts in which, for at least one side, the survival of the opponent is not a deterrent factor. That is, to be strictly precise, the party to a conflict that is prepared to kill is waging war, while the party to a conflict that is not prepared to kill is not waging war, even if they are currently being attempted to be killed. Thus, even if someone is attacked with the intent to kill, they do not automatically find themselves in a state of war, but are free to choose for themselves whether to wage war or to evade it in some way.

Evasion can be direct: using passive defense, fleeing, hiding—something along those lines. Or it can be indirect: resorting to someone else’s protection. This immediately raises the problem of fuzzy boundaries. On one hand, even if a subject feeds and equips their protector, as well as pays them a salary and promises to recognize their ownership of captured trophies, they themselves are still not directly fighting. On the other hand, take a drone operator: they might be sitting a thousand kilometers from the target, sipping coffee and having nothing against the target of liquidation in general: should this operator be considered the one waging war—or their client, who feels enough antipathy toward the target of liquidation to shell out for the hire of an operator? How, fundamentally, does a drone operator differ from the drone itself? By the fact that they make the decision to kill? And what if the drone is controlled by AI and makes that decision itself?

In short, in conditions where there is a deep division of labor everywhere, finding someone who wages war completely independently is as easy as finding someone who lives entirely on subsistence farming.

By the way, this circumstance also complicates the precise determination of who started the war and, consequently, who the aggressor—that is, the initiator of violence—is. Parties can spend a long time inventively doing nasty things to each other, primarily through other people’s hands, and then some particular nasty act, for some reason, begins to be interpreted by observers as the start of a war and a legitimate reason to respond to aggression with all their military power.

What is my point in all this? That in the libertarian theory of war, it is not enough to simply say “NAP.” This is an abstract principle that can be applied to any interpersonal interaction to decide: in this specific elementary action, Vasya is the aggressor and Petya is the victim of aggression. And before that was an action in which Petya was the aggressor and Vasya the victim. And even earlier… and so on, until one grows tired. The aggressive IDF bombs Hamas. Well, yes, it bombs. If we take October 8, 2023, as the starting point, then the IDF is the aggressor. If October 7, 2023, then Hamas is the aggressor. Let’s wind further back into the past—and we slide into questions about land property rights, the content of sacred texts, and so on. In other words, the NAP as a criterion for when to start a war is inapplicable, at least in its pure form. At least when it comes to collective conflicts, rather than elementary situations like “you are just walking, someone lunges at you with a knife, and how to determine at what moment to shoot the attacker.”

With that, I conclude the second part of the notes; I didn’t even manage to fully analyze the first question, but it is better for me to post small notes more often, as the overall speed of work will be higher. In addition to sequential numbering and links to previous pieces of text, I will also use the tag LTV (libertarian theory of war) for these notes.

Milei

My Monday began with the news of Javier Milei’s victory in the presidential elections in Argentina. There happened to be a little prosecco left in the bottle on the table, enough for a symbolic toast to commemorate a bright future. And that is why I want to say a few words about the future.

Some look at Milei with hope: they say that Argentina is about to dismantle a significant part of the state, Argentines will start living like human beings, and then, perhaps, others will want the same, and maybe we will get something too.

Others look at him with suspicion: they say that a populist has finally grabbed power; Zelensky also called himself a libertarian, and now he is preparing to become a military dictator, so this one won’t do anything meaningful in the economy, will only ban abortions, and will discredit our beloved libertarianism before the broad masses of the people.

Both points of view focus excessively on Argentina itself. Meanwhile, for most of us, Argentina is a distant fairytale land in another hemisphere, and the libertarians there will either succeed or screw up on their own, without our participation. We, at least those who intend to maintain their own agency, must not only follow the news from across the ocean as if it were a sports match, but also analyze it, draw lessons for ourselves, and popularize the experience being developed by the Argentines—in short, we need to take full advantage of such a gift of fate as the appearance of libertarianism, in its most radical anarcho-capitalist form, on the big political stage.

Of course, it is clear that libertarian reforms are only taken up as a banner by the majority when the state has managed to fail completely, and the utter hopelessness of further attempts to rigidly steer society is resolutely visible to everyone. Therefore, even in the most favorable scenario, Argentines will in the near future only be crawling out of the poverty and chaos into which the previous regime drove them. When society becomes more prosperous, ideas of active redistribution of wealth as a vital state function will emerge from the shadows again. Therefore, it is very important that many other peoples manage to catch the Argentine spirit and embrace the ideas of reducing the state. And for this, we will have to work quite hard.

Treating the Incurable: A Single Case of a Psychopathic Patient Undergoing Therapy

Voluntarist, Bitarch

Since the first conceptualization of psychopathy in modern psychiatry, this condition has been considered practically incurable. However, there is an experimental approach that may refute such a view. Schema therapy is a psychotherapy for the treatment of personality disorders that has performed well in the therapy of borderline personality disorder, but has also been adapted for patients with other problems, including those with high levels of psychopathy.

There is a case study of schema therapy for psychopathy in a 25-year-old rapist. His father was a cruel man who subjected him to beatings and authoritarian upbringing. From the age of 8, the patient exhibited serious behavioral problems; at 17, he was first convicted of assault causing grievous bodily harm, and at 19, together with an accomplice, he committed rape, after which he tried to shift all the blame onto the victim (calling her a prostitute and claiming she had consented) and the accomplice (saying that he had forced him into it).

First, the patient took the PCL-R test. He scored 4 out of 8 on the interpersonal component (dishonesty, manipulativeness, etc.), 7 out of 8 on the affective component (lack of empathy, guilt, other emotions, and failure to take responsibility for his actions), 6 out of 10 on impulsivity, and 8 out of 10 on antisociality (history of behavioral problems and criminality). Considering additional traits outside the components (sexual promiscuity and a tendency toward multiple short-term relationships), he scored 28 out of 40—a high level of psychopathy.

The therapy lasted 4 years. In the first year, the therapist earned the patient’s trust and worked on his control over impulsive aggression. He also discussed his early behavioral problems and encouraged him to evaluate his emotions. Initially, the patient had difficulty with this and did not want to admit guilt for his actions. However, later, a sense of guilt was successfully evoked in him. He burst into tears, admitted responsibility, regretted that he could not restrain himself, and said that he deserved to pay for this act for the rest of his life. After a year, the therapist managed to establish a close emotional bond with the patient by employing empathic confrontation (convincing the patient of the sincerity of his intentions).

In the second year, the patient decided to make peace with his past. Additionally, he entered a relationship with a girl (who often accompanied his mother when visiting the clinic), after which he began to have conversations with the therapist about friendship and love. Although the relationship was later broken off due to the girl’s infidelity, he still wanted to build a healthy relationship.

In the last two years, the patient underwent imagery exercises in which he imagined, described, and worked through memories of his father’s cruel acts. After this, he was allowed to leave the clinic, he started a new relationship, and underwent resocialization. At the end of the 4 years of therapy, he was released, found a job, had a child, and no longer participated in criminal activities.

For another 3 years, he was monitored by the therapist and took the PCL-R test again. Now he scored only 1 out of 8 on the interpersonal component, 1 out of 8 on the affective component, and 3 out of 10 on impulsivity. Of course, the antisocial component remained unchanged, but this was primarily due to its historical nature. In total, he scored 14 out of 40, which is no longer a high indicator of psychopathy.

Of course, such an approach is very long. The creation and application of pharmacological agents to correct the dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism—due to which the interpersonal and affective components of psychopathy and the lack of certain emotions in a person manifest—could potentially yield a faster and more reliable result. But at the very least, it shatters the myth of the incurability of psychopathy and violent behavior, which gives us huge prospects in eradicating the problem of violence in human society. It should also be noted that congenital predispositions to weak violence inhibition tend to manifest in practice due to the negative influence of the environment, which is why proper psychological work with children is very important.

Network State, chapter 2.6: If even the news is fake, then what can be said about history?

The translation of another chapter of Balaji Srinivasan’s book The Network State is ready. The translation process was very, very tedious. After all, this tradition of meticulously chewing over the material is somewhat foreign to me. There is too much factual detail and too few thoughts in the text; I would have packed such things into appendices, as that is where factual detail belongs.

One might assume the problem is that the facts here are American, and much of what is mentioned is not particularly close to us. But no, if he were to chew over Chinese or Russian material, it’s unlikely I would find it any more interesting.

In general, the summary of this chapter is fully exhausted by its title, but your tastes may differ from mine. After all, from time to time, I am also asked to tell specific historical anecdotes to support my thoughts, so I fully admit that many people need exactly such anecdotes to be convinced. There are some here.

Sketches on Libertarian Theory of War. Part 1, Statement of the Problem.

Not long ago, I was listening to one of Vladimir Zolotorev’s Saturday sermons on the Libertarian.site channel (I’m too lazy to search for the specific sermon—the channel’s navigation is very mediocre), and he noted that the theory of war is poorly developed within libertarianism. This observation seemed fair to me, which means it is worth thinking in this direction.

War is a type of conflict in which the necessity of the opponent’s survival is not a deterrent factor for at least one party. If one of the parties to the conflict is destroyed, it means that the conflict, for all intents and purposes, has been resolved. Granted, this may give rise to new conflicts—with those who consider such a manner of resolving conflicts by the winner as a reason to assert claims against them.

To minimize such claims, humanity has developed certain customs of war. For instance, if a reliable casus belli is presented before entering a war, and collateral damage is minimized during the war by attempting to destroy only legitimate military targets, then according to these customs, such a manner of conducting war should not entail any sanctions, and may even help in acquiring allies.

However, this is all empiricism operating with collective subjects such as states, armies, peoples, and so on. Libertarianism, on the other hand, is about methodological subjectivism and individual responsibility. The fact that some collective imaginary entities are in a state of war does not create any moral obligations for a specific person to enter the war on either side. At the same time, libertarian morality suggests entering conflicts on the just side, which means that libertarians may not be foreign to wars, even those where they are not the party subjected to a direct attack.

Vladimir Zolotorev proposes using the standard legal approach of peacetime to describe war within libertarianism: a lawsuit is filed against the party that caused the damage; in the case of collective actions, the lawsuit extends to the entire collective proportionally to their contribution; courts make decisions, the assets of the party that caused the damage are seized and sold on the market, and the proceeds are transferred to the plaintiff—and so on. Unfortunately, this model, which would have worked perfectly for a tribal society from the Icelandic sagas or, adjusted for capitalist realities, in some conditional Wild West, begins to stall heavily in a society where the system of kinship ties and personal obligations has been replaced by a system of formal hierarchy and various group identities, such as religion or nation.

Obviously, in this situation, an obvious solution suggests itself to a libertarian—to simplify the task. In other words, let’s abolish states and all other imaginary collective entities, and then the analysis of conflicts will elegantly be reduced to a simple and clear basis of property disputes. Abolishing these mental parasites in reality is, undoubtedly, a boon for all humanity; however, if we close our eyes to their existence right now and analyze reality as if these entities did not exist, they will not instantly disappear because of it.

This was simply a pointer to some difficulties in considering such a phenomenon as war; naturally, it is far from exhaustive.

A viable theory of war in libertarianism must answer several diverse questions:

  1. How to determine when it is worth starting a war?
  2. How to determine the just side in a war?
  3. How to determine the appropriate degree of one’s own participation in a war?
  4. How to determine that a war is being waged against you?
  5. How to determine who is waging war against you?
  6. How to determine what collateral damage is permissible?
  7. How to determine appropriate compensation for direct and collateral damage?
  8. How to determine when it is time to end the war?
  9. How to determine on what terms the war should be ended?

I do not yet have the sought-after theory; I want to think about the necessary formulations in my spare time. Your comments may prove to be very useful. I hope to be able to share the results of these reflections soon.

Some points regarding the self-domestication of humans and how they became friendlier

Voluntarist, Bitarch

As is known from the theory of human self-domestication, humans possess certain traits similar to those observed in domesticated animals. This includes brain development and behavioral aspects. In this context, it is worth highlighting some points regarding the development of a tendency toward non-aggressive behavior toward unfamiliar members of one’s own species, which will allow us to better understand why a normal human possesses a strongly expressed violence inhibition mechanism.

In one study, domesticated animals such as pigs, rabbits, or guinea pigs, as well as animals characterized by cooperative breeding, such as the red fox and some primates, were found to possess a significantly larger amygdala volume and higher neuronal density within it compared to many other animal species. This is also true for humans, whom this study classifies as a cooperatively breeding species. During the Pleistocene (Ice Age), it became critically necessary for human survival for children to be cared for not only by their biological mothers but also by other group members. This led to the emergence of corresponding adaptations, including a reduction in children’s fear of close contact with other people and a reduction in mothers’ fear of other people approaching and caring for their children. Furthermore, prosociality, replacing aggressiveness, was extremely necessary for the evolution of all forms of human cultural cognition, including language.

Such an adaptation is fully consistent with the theory of the violence inhibition mechanism, according to which an unconditional reflex is triggered in humans when observing distress signals in others, such as expressions of fear or sadness, which deters them from causing harm by evoking negative feelings. The development of the amygdala led to better recognition and understanding of other people’s fear, which helps prevent a person from behaving aggressively toward them due to their own fear. This part of the brain plays a primary role in regulating aggressive behavior, which also aligns with the concept of a violence inhibitor. In many animals, this works similarly toward members of their own species.

Let’s look at another example of self-domestication: the pygmy chimpanzee (bonobo). Their females prefer to breed with non-aggressive males and jointly defend themselves against aggressive ones, which also steers their selection toward non-aggressiveness. Compared to common chimpanzees, the serotonin neuron density in the amygdala of bonobos is twice as high. This can generally be observed in species that do not typically exhibit aggressive behavior due to social frustration. And as we already know, the serotonergic system is a key regulator of aggressive behavior in animals and humans; the activation of certain serotonin receptors can completely eliminate attacking aggressive behavior toward conspecifics, replacing it, as a rule, with non-aggressive prosocial behavior (while this process does not suppress defensive behavior if a conspecific decides to attack first).

All these data prove once again that a healthy person is characterized by the inhibition of violence due to certain evolutionary adaptations, and that it relies on the full functioning of the amygdala and the serotonergic system. These data are extremely important for the search and development of therapeutic methods aimed at correcting dysfunction of the violence inhibitor in people who exhibit violent behavior and psychopathic predispositions.

Sources:
Cerrito, P., Burkart, J.M. (2023). Human Amygdala Volumetric Patterns Convergently Evolved in Cooperatively Breeding and Domesticated Species. Hum Nat. doi:10.1007/s12110-023-09461-3;
Hare, B. (2017). Survival of the Friendliest: Homo sapiens Evolved via Selection for Prosociality. Annual Review of Psychology, 68(1), 155–186. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044201.