Until recently, a fairly significant source of income for my channel was my Boosty page, a service that allows for the collection of recurring payments. To be fair, Boosty is a way to earn from premium content, but since my premium content is free, I simply posted diary-like snippets there—not that I believed they were worth the money, but that’s just how Boosty works: you have to offer different content for different subscription levels.
Either way, that story is in the past because almost all of my ruble-based tools have been blocked, and I wouldn’t want to gift your donations to the bank once my last card is blocked. So, I started looking for a replacement, and I found one.
I have added instructions on how to use this new tool to the donations page. Donations are sent in Bitcoin using the Lightning and the trendy Nostr protocols. I borrowed the idea from the 21 Idea project, and as a trial, I set up a daily payment of 100 satoshis for it. So far, the first hundred has been deducted; we’ll see how it goes from here and how well the parameter editing works—I want to play around more with the frequency and amount of the payments.
Overall, however, I have no reason to believe that anything is seriously glitching, so you don’t have to wait until I’m done experimenting and can set up recurring donations right now. It’s currently the low season at my main job, so I have more free time, and I could devote much more attention to my channel if it gave me a way to earn.
Currently, the Bitcoin blockchain is heavily congested, so if it weren’t for Lightning, very little would be moving at all. I recommend getting some satoshis for fast Bitcoin payments as soon as possible; their popularity will clearly continue to grow rapidly. Moreover, payments on Lightning are more private than on-chain.
Did it turn out that way? Is it easier to explain to liberals with remnants of religious consciousness? Are there some non-obvious pitfalls with liberties that aren’t present in an explanation through rights?
Λ (taken from the chat)
Freedom is the natural state of a human being outside of society. Robinson is free on a deserted island until Friday appears, and he has no rights, because there is no one to whom he can make claims, and no one to whom he must yield. When society emerges, it means the restriction of liberties and the appearance of rights. Since the book on ancap is dedicated specifically to life in society, it discusses rights rather, as they are generated by society itself.
A free person before the emergence of the need for ancap
It is known that a high level of psychopathic traits in a person is associated with a risk of violent behavior. This is not surprising, as psychopathy is expressed by a decrease, or even a complete suppression, of a person’s natural internal resistance to causing harm to others. However, few know how psychopathic traits are distributed in the general population and how strong the link is between them and the capacity to commit acts of violence. Some may be surprised, but as numerous studies demonstrate, the majority of people do not possess even the slightest psychopathic traits.
A study of 638 individuals from England, Wales, and Scotland demonstrated that 70.8% of them exhibited a zero level of psychopathy according to the PCL:SV test (scale from 0 to 24). The average psychopathy value was 1.52 for men and 0.63 for women. Only 2.3% of people had a psychopathy level of 11 and above, and only 0.6% had 13 and above, which indicates potential or subclinical psychopathy. However, a level of 18 would be a trait of definitive psychopathy, which only one person in the entire sample reached. A semi-normal distribution of psychopathic traits for the general population can be observed, in which a zero score is the mean for the distribution [1].
A similar American study examining 514 people living in the same county demonstrated that more than half of the people had a level of 0 or 1, and two-thirds had 0, 1, or 2. The average level was 2.67 (3.53 for men, 2.16 for women, 1.70 for whites, and 3.86 for African Americans). A level of 13 and above was obtained by only 1.2% of people (1% of men, 1.2% of women, 1.9% of African Americans, and about 1% of whites) [2]. Among American managers and company executives (sample of 203 people), the vast majority (80%) had a level from 0 to 3 on the PCL-R test (scale from 0 to 40). Only 9 people (4.4%) had a level of 25 and above (potential psychopathy), 8 of whom (3.9%) had a level of 30 and above (definitive psychopathy). The average level was 3.64 [3].
A completely different situation is observed among violent people. In one study, 98 men undergoing forensic psychiatric examination and accused of violent crimes showed an average level of psychopathic traits on the PCL-R equal to 21.4. And only 9 people (9.2%) had a psychopathy level below 10 [4]. A similar Swedish study with 43 men, 74.4% of whom were accused of violent crimes, demonstrated an average psychopathy level equal to 23.08 [5]. There is also a current study of murderers sentenced to death in California. For them, the average psychopathy level was 23.31. Only 15% of the individuals considered had a level of 10 and below. Among them were those who had not committed crimes previously, repented for their actions, and behaved in accordance with judicial norms. Individuals with higher psychopathy scores behaved much worse. And 5 people who scored a maximum of 40 points were the most brutal criminals—serial sexual murderers [6].
Additionally, one study provides a meta-analysis of 22 studies with 29 unique samples of murderers from 6 countries: USA, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Germany, and Brazil. It determined that the average level of psychopathic traits in murderers according to the PCL-R test is 21.1. At the same time, it is noted that for people who do not commit crimes, it is only 5.1 [7].
As the authors of the studies note, in the vast majority of people, psychopathic traits are completely absent or expressed to a small degree. Violence and murder have a strong link to them, and the higher the level of these traits, the more brutal violence can be expected from a person. This once again confirms that the commission of acts of violence is pathological behavior, the result of a failure in the correct functioning of the violence inhibition mechanism, which leads to the emergence of psychopathic traits. Everyone should understand that violence is a disease.
Mikhail Svetov has released another introductory video about libertarianism.
Apparently, the very first video on the SVTV channel, “Five Minutes About Libertarianism,” through which many people indeed first learned about this ideology, had ceased to satisfy him in some way.
Let’s compare what has changed.
The old video is a tongue-twister of tightly edited libertarian talking points, weakly linked into a single logical line. Key points: libertarianism is about the fact that the end does not justify the means, about the victim’s right to protection from violence, and about the right to love and hate. Libertarianism is a moral compass. The video contains mentions of Mikhail’s personal tastes, which are unrelated to the topic.
The new video is read in the measured tone of a storyteller, equipped with simple but quite captivating animation, and is far more logically precise.
I, of course, do not like the very beginning of the video, where self-ownership is presented as something inherent and given by someone unknown, while the non-aggression principle is for some reason called a contract. Why not the other way around: a contract on self-ownership and an inherent natural right to resist violence? This is, in general, important, because according to Mikhail, violating the non-aggression contract removes a person from the legal field, and here the question arises: what exactly is the legal field?
By the way, the visuals in this part directly contradict the text. An aggressor threatens violence, thereby supposedly exiting the legal field; an external defender appears, and what does the aggressor do? He drops the knife and surrenders. That is, he resorts to a legal procedure! He demonstrates that he is no longer an aggressor, and that shooting him from all barrels is no longer so attractive in the eyes of an outside observer. In other words, the aggressor does not exit any legal field. Or rather, he exits it precisely at the moment of aggression, when it is permissible to pump him full of lead. At least, that is how it can be understood from the video.
In short, Svetov has never been distinguished by the rigor of his conceptual framework, but for a politician, this is an excessive requirement; his job is to attract an audience. The video should presumably handle this quite well, and I can boldly recommend it for distribution.
On April 30, the Kakha Bendukidze Forum took place in Tbilisi — organized by the same committee that previously held the Adam Smith Readings in Moscow. Judging by the photos, about a hundred people attended, but it seems that such a modest number was due to the room’s capacity limit; there likely could have been more. The broadcast was of very poor technical quality, with the sound dropping out periodically. The 26 people who gathered to listen to the broadcast in Budva, I assume, had the opportunity to fill this tedious silence by discussing what they had managed to hear. I hope a normal recording, without glitches, will appear soon.
Eight reports were presented, of which two were of the greatest interest to me: an overview of Russian economic trends by Natalia Zubarevich (in short — don’t hope, at this rate it won’t collapse on its own for a long time, this fat one will take a long time to wither) and an overview of private city development trends by Vera Kichanova (in short — it’s too early to bury Prospera, and there is also a project called Montellibero). I don’t even know why I’m highlighting these two reports specifically — let’s just call it sexism.
Also around the same time in Montenegro near Tivat, at a two-month event with the strange name Zuzalu, Montellibero was presented by one of our project’s activists. One of the event’s sections was entirely dedicated to charter cities and network states. There was a broadcast, but I found out about it after the fact. The recording hasn’t been uploaded to the archive yet, so I’ll have to wait. Once I do, I’ll try to make a brief overview of the interesting things Titus Gebel, Patri Friedman, and other less-known guys managed to tell — of whom I only happened to chat with Peter Young at the Montellibero club.
Meanwhile, in Russia, there is complete stability: recently, the police snatched two members of the LPR; one was robbed and put in a cellar for 12 days, and nothing is known about the second one at all. I continue to consider the position of the LPR leadership a crime. Instead of organizing the evacuation of libertarians from Russia, they continue to hang around there pointlessly and at risk to their lives, and recently even decided to hold another party congress in September. I urge my readers remaining in the RF to leave these idiots in their hopelessly miserable state and finally complete their relocation to where libertarians are much more needed. After all, the conquest of the world is in full swing here.
I have translated another chapter of Eric Mack’s book Libertarianism. Here, the author briefly (well, as far as the word “briefly” applies to Eric Mack) explains that when Rawls tries to explain why libertarians are wrong by denying the need for a certain basic structure introduced by Rawls—which would impose uniform rules and procedures on everyone in the name of justice—he cannot simultaneously claim that this structure will be white and fluffy, introducing clear and reasonable rules according to which one can pay taxes and sleep soundly. No, according to Rawls, taxes will need to be paid, but that will not give you the right to sleep soundly: after the fact, your income may still be deemed unfair, and you will be forced to shell out more in the name of justice.
By the way, speaking of shelling out. My access to my Qiwi wallet was blocked, and when I tried to recover it, I discovered that with all my moves, I had long since lost the Russian SIM card it was linked to. I managed to withdraw the money, but I no longer consider this channel of receiving funds reliable. Thus, you no longer have the option to donate to me in state-regulated fiat instruments (and all posts in the private channel on Boosty are now open—you are unlikely to find much interesting there). For one-time donations, only various types of cryptocurrencies remain at your service (I especially recommend tokens circulating within the Montelibero project). Cryptocurrency wallets are usually not designed for regular donations; that requires custodial storage. So, as a temporary workaround, you can simply set a monthly reminder for yourself to “donate to Ancap-chan”.
As we know, some naturally occurring agents, such as herbal extracts and their mixtures, are potentially capable of producing a strong and yet selective anti-aggressive effect, arising from the activation of a neurophysiological mechanism of violence inhibition. If someone is not yet familiar with this topic, I suggest reading our material on it. However, such an idea may face some criticism, doubts regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of the approach. And to eliminate misunderstandings, it is important to examine it.
This does not resemble homeopathy or untested folk medicine. For example, one of the potentially effective anti-aggressive agents we are considering, a mixture of 10 herbs called Kamishoyosan, is an officially approved medicinal product in China and Taiwan; in the latter, it is one of the most prescribed agents for stomach and breast cancer. Additionally, in Asian countries, Kamishoyosan is often used for insomnia, irritability, mood swings, including psychological problems during menopause in women, and many other neurophysiological issues. Of course, studies confirm the effectiveness of this agent and describe its impact on the nervous system in detail.
Research and development in this direction are much more accessible than the creation of synthetic anti-aggressive agents. All the natural means necessary for this typically cost pennies, and even purchasing additional equipment if herbal extracts are needed (although in practice, it is almost always possible to do without it, simply by making decoctions or tinctures or buying ready-made extracts) is still far more accessible than creating a full-fledged chemical laboratory. The bioactive substances of these agents are already well described, or at least simply known. Moreover, some of them exhibit properties very similar to analogous synthetic drugs; for example, the effect of the substance emodin from certain herbs is compared to the effect of the synthetic substance CP-94253, which experimentally demonstrated a selective anti-aggressive effect.
Such agents cannot be banned. Even if you have a laboratory and the ability to synthesize substances that could potentially be much more effective than bioactive substances from natural agents, your activity will be quickly stopped if for some reason it displeases government authorities. The agents we are considering, however, are too widespread; it is simply physically impossible to ban them, and many experiments on them and their preparation for use can be easily conducted at home, relying only on information from the Internet.
The idea of using these agents is very easy to spread. If one of the herbs or herbal mixtures becomes known for its selective anti-aggressive effect, it will quickly be used by everyone, for example, in treating the violence of their loved ones. And it is unlikely that anyone will doubt or consider the idea of its use risky, since unknown synthetic pills are one thing, and decoctions, tinctures, and herbal extracts already long used by many people are quite another.
The topic of using natural agents to treat certain pathologies, including the pathology of violent behavior, is often underestimated; however, it is actually very promising for a number of the reasons we have listed. Therefore, in the matter of solving the problem of violence, we should direct part of our attention to this approach, as there is a significant chance that it will yield substantial results. At the very least, it will allow for the confirmation of the idea itself: therapy for violent behavior through the influence on the violence inhibitor.
Nothing is good or bad in itself; everything depends on the circumstances. Let’s look at what our circumstances are.
First of all—both you and I, and the “Z-supporters” you mentioned, are emigrants.
There is a conflict between us and the Z-supporters. That is, we intend to use the same object for different, mutually exclusive purposes. What is this object of conflict? It is public opinion among the citizens of the state receiving us, namely Montenegro.
We plan to use it so that Montenegrins believe: all Russians who have moved to Montenegro are against Putin and Putin’s aggression; they are peaceful, civilized European people just like the Montenegrins themselves, and they should be welcomed in the country with the same readiness as Ukrainian refugees, or at least on general grounds, like some Germans.
The Z-supporters require a completely different public opinion—that Montenegrins know: all Russians support Putin, he is waging a just war against NATO, which attacked Russia in Ukraine, Russia has always been a friend and an elder brother to all the brotherly Balkan peoples, and now, when Russia drives NATO out of Ukraine, it will come and drive NATO out of Montenegro too, because this malicious Anglo-Saxon organization, generally speaking, bombed Montenegro, so let it get out. And in general—Crna Gora je Srbija. The Montenegrin brothers are doing great; look, they’ve elected a pro-Serbian president, let them keep going in the same vein.
It would seem that we and the Z-supporters have the same desire—to have good relations with the locals. However, we are appealing to different groups of locals. They appeal to those suffering from Great Serbian ressentiment. We appeal to those who consider wars of aggression unacceptable. In other words, both we and the Z-supporters are exploiting the local political divide. Where could this lead? To a situation where Russian citizens start being expelled from the country—simply for interfering in local politics, since this is a private fight, and both high-fighting parties do not wish for escalation.
That is exactly why we don’t run through the streets with FSB flags and shout that Putin is a dick. Running through the streets with flags is a privilege of Ukrainians; no one will expel them from the country.
So, of course, we are interested in making sure that Z-supporters don’t run through the streets of Montenegro. However, punching them in the face right away is still not “kosher.” First, a Z-supporter might actually be a Serb, and to avoid awkwardness, it makes sense to find this out before punching them in the face. Second, a Z-supporter, even if they are Russian, might simply not understand the reasoning laid out above and view running around with Z-symbolism simply as supporting a favorite sports team.
In short, in our situation, it is better to approach them and start a conversation. And if it’s a Russian, then argue reasonably to make them understand that Russians should not wave their political orientation in the street—it’s against “spiritual staples.” But if they start getting aggressive about it—then, of course, they should be provoked—and then punch them in the face within the framework of self-defense, as the great and terrible principle of non-aggression teaches us.
I looked at the poll results regarding the reasons why my readers are staying in Russia.
What pleases me most is that the smallest category is currently under a direct travel ban. For the vast majority, the path of retreat is at least not under fire.
I am equally pleased by the agorists who managed to find an excuse to avoid mobilization. I hope it is a good, high-quality excuse.
Those who are already packing their bags have surely studied the issue well and know where to go. There is plenty of material on emigration; while waiting for a foreign passport and other papers, one can study it inside and out.
Partisans, I am proud of you. You already have over a year of combat experience, and you certainly have no need for my advice. From time to time, something in Russia mysteriously burns or explodes, certain unpleasant individuals run into trouble, including fatal outcomes, secret information doesn’t stay within the narrow circle of authorized holders for long, the morale of the troops is low, state-sponsored patriots are eating each other, and so on. If any of you had a hand in any of this, or in something not covered by my imagination—I don’t want to know anything about it until the war ends or your evacuation is complete.
Now a few words of consolation for the lazy and those bound by insurmountable domestic difficulties. It is very unlikely that the rate of producing corpses and cripples on the front among Russians will exceed three hundred thousand people per year. Thus, even if the mobilization potential of the RF is only thirty million, the state will consume only one percent of those liable for military service per year. So, out of the hundred or so who answered that they intend to remain in the RF, only one or two people will die or be crippled in the war in a year. This is a good chance for survival, enough to keep from shaking with fear. I would shake with disgust, but that is a matter of habit. Nevertheless, I recommend buying bitcoins at every opportunity: if the rate skyrockets, perhaps you will reconsider your ambitions and finally head abroad.
Of course, the main reason not to go anywhere is the fear of the unknown. How to legalize oneself, how to live, how much will have to be spent, how to get money, how long one will have to live in such a suspended state—this worries many even more than they want to show.
I’ll try to share my experience.
It is believed that it is easiest for remote IT workers to emigrate. This is true. I am still sincerely surprised why even one IT worker remained in the RF. These gluttonous creatures have driven apartment rental prices into the sky and still dare to grumble that the level of service abroad is somehow worse than in Moscow. Even if another hundred thousand of them crowd into tiny Montenegro and prices double again from current levels—even then they will be able to live in comfort, denying themselves very little, while all other immigrants will have to pack their bags and migrate to Africa, or wherever else is relatively cheap.
Without IT skills, I was lucky enough to find a remote job requiring only basic computer literacy. ChatGPT cannot replace me, but a well-designed dispatch program could; however, it is easier to pay me 700 euros a month than an entire team of developers for such a program, so I don’t have to worry about my employment. Nevertheless, there isn’t much work of this sort, and without it, I would have to work offline and with my hands, which, however, is not a great tragedy. If you are not an IT worker, it is better to orient yourself toward such an outcome from the start.
To make ends meet, many immigrants rent apartments as a group of friends. This is very sensible. Concerns about privacy and domestic frictions take a back seat compared to the savings achieved. In the RF, I never lived with any one person for more than six months—tensions built up, and we gradually drifted apart. Here I have already broken that record: I have no time for petty whims, you know. Those who have experience living in a dormitory already have a head start.
There is another obvious pattern. On one hand, the further away, the more obstacles await new immigrants. This includes a higher cost of living and the increasing complexity of legalization in a new country. On the other hand, the further away, the fewer resources the average new immigrant has: Russia is getting poorer, it is becoming harder to sell property there for a good price before leaving, and so on. Therefore, the fact that the flow of refugees from the RF does not dwindle is only because the Russian state makes staying in the RF unbearable at a rate even higher than the rate of citizens’ impoverishment. Conclusion: if you leave now, it will be easier for you than if you leave in six months. Second conclusion: at some point, it will become almost impossible to leave the RF, even if you want to very badly.
In 2021, I went to Montenegro simply because an interesting project came up—let’s, they said, build a libertarian community here and create a kind of European New Hampshire (in American New Hampshire, as I recently heard, a former member of the LPR is sitting in the state congress). And the weakness of COVID restrictions also played a part (remember, there was this COVID, under whose pretext all states competed in who could ruin their subjects’ lives in the most absurd way). I rented the cheapest studio for 120 euros a month and received a residence permit just two months after arriving—actually two weeks later than established by government regulations, about which I even had the audacity to grumble. Now this same studio is rented to someone else for 200. After applying for a residence permit extension in June, I received the new document only in November, and I still haven’t been able to open a bank account for the company I acquired—I am literally not being given the opportunity to pay taxes, damn it. Those who arrive right now simply cannot physically apply for a residence permit—the queue starts at nine in the evening the night before; few can endure such a thing.
If I were deciding right now which country to flee to from Russia with my background and current job, I would probably settle on Kyrgyzstan, because Montenegro is already too lavish and too much of a headache. Kyrgyzstan also has mountains, also a sea (of possibilities), also plenty of Russian speakers, also meat cuisine, also people friendly to immigrants, also an unstable government—but at the same time, life is cheaper, and it seems slightly easier with the bureaucratic red tape.
And if I decided to go specifically to Montenegro right now—since there is no Montelibero in Kyrgyzstan—I would no longer count on any residence permit, but would simply do visa-runs every month—to Albania in the summer, to Serbia in the winter. Or maybe I’d just forget about it and live as an illegal. As long as you don’t try to cross the border, no one cares about the legality of your residence status. And when you try, and they pick on you—the maximum risk is a fine and a six-month ban on entry.
Forgive the awkwardly long and rambling post; I just wanted to vent. I simply believe it is important to support my readers, wherever they are stuck right now, and whatever status they hold. Even if you didn’t escape and ended up at the front—well, shoot something off of yourself, something not too vital for life, but necessary to fight. There is always a way out.
Regarding the question of who typically holds political power, there is a vast difference between a healthy average individual, who feels aversion to harming others, empathy, and other social feelings, and a minority of “degenerates” who do not care about the well-being of others and are ready to realize their ambitions even at the cost of numerous victims. Obviously, individuals belonging to the first category simply do not strive for political power, preferring to build social connections based on voluntary agreements. And this clearly demonstrates the very essence of the institution of statehood, proving once again that states are simply stationary bandits.
I think everyone agrees that power is very often held by psychopathic personalities. This state of affairs could be explained by their high manipulative abilities. But that is not the only essence—in the struggle for power, such individuals simply face no serious competition. Healthy people do not need power supported by coercive force, nor are they likely to be able to utilize it to its full extent, even if they occupy a high political post. At the same time, a psychopath craves power and is always capable of using all its tools, including those for destroying potential competitors. Furthermore, upon taking power, they attract other similar personalities who also crave a high position. And fair and empathetic people are left with nothing but to step aside, otherwise state repression may be applied to them.
We can discuss for a long time the problems that the abuse of power leads to. But it would be better to see that such abuse is simply unavoidable. For the reasons already mentioned, a psychopath, or at least an individual who, while not completely ill, is nonetheless more insensitive, will always have an advantage in obtaining political power. Any “monopoly on violence” over time becomes a pathocracy—a regime where power belongs to people with mental disorders. And here it would be appropriate to ask the etatists—do you really want to live in a social system that will, at some point, guaranteedly hand your life over to the disposal of mentally ill individuals?
People studying the problem of pathocracies usually propose mandatory psychological evaluation for all potential candidates for political posts as a solution. Of course, if we analyze such an approach in more detail, we will realize that it is unlikely to avoid the problem of corruption. But if it worked, we would quickly obtain a government that is at least incapable of effectively resorting to repressive and violent tools. And this would make it easier to achieve a free, non-violent society.
Therefore, it is still important to develop methods of social pressure that would not allow psychopaths to achieve any success. Any individual who demonstrates signs of psychopathy, and even more so one who has committed violence in the past, should be subject to serious ostracism (especially in the sphere of electoral rights) and pushed toward therapeutic procedures aimed at treating their mental disorder. After all, to guaranteedly dismantle “monopolies on violence” and “stationary bandits,” we must first make the emergence of pathocracies absolutely impossible, i.e., solve the problem of the presence of violent psychopathic individuals in society. If there are none, no one will need any political power.
