Why is the right to property a freedom, and not a restriction on the freedoms of others?

Anonymous question

Of course, the right to property is precisely a limitation on the freedoms of others. The right to property is a claim to dispose of a certain object and to prevent others from disposing of it. Their freedom to dispose of a privatized object will logically decrease.

At the same time, of course, completely different procedures for exercising such claims may be practiced in different societies, including in relation to different classes of objects. These could be procedures such as “if you want to use it — take it, use it, then put it back so that others can take it.” There could be procedures like “if you want to use it — take it, but provide others with a replacement that they will not object to.” Or “you may take it as long as there are enough objects of the same quality left for others.”

But still, we speak of property when the order of using objects is determined by more exclusive rules, such as those outlined in my book in the corresponding chapter. Of course, even in this case, it is not at all necessary that any object acquired as property ends up in the full and undivided disposal of the acquirer. Practices such as using one’s property to the detriment of others will still encounter quite natural resistance.

The question arises: if property rights are nothing but limitations on freedoms, then why do we suddenly claim that a society where they are observed is a free one? Free from what? First and foremost, of course, from the war of all against all. Knowing that you have the right to this item, and others respect it, you will not spend a vast amount of resources on second-by-second readiness to defend your power over the item in a struggle with other claimants; this frees up resources for more pleasant activities, thus increasing freedom. Knowing that you do not have the right to this item because it belongs to another, you will not seek ways to seize it directly, but will focus on increasing your opportunities for market exchange. This increases the wealth of possibilities, which, again, means freedom.

A more convoluted but detailed explanation of how property rights ensure freedom in society can always be read in David Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom, in the chapter In Defense of Property.

branilac slobode

Using the concept of the implicit contract against statisticians

Voluntarist, Bitarch

You are likely familiar with the argument that the mere use of some benefit supposedly implies agreement with the rules established for it, even if such agreement was not explicitly confirmed. For example, being in a certain territory automatically obligates a person to follow its rules. If they disagree with the rules, they should not visit this territory; otherwise, they can absolutely reasonably expect the punishment established for committing such a violation. This works similarly with any use of material goods and interaction with other people. And some, referring to copyright, may even claim that such a rule applies even to intangible benefits. For example, by simply using a certain program, you automatically agree to follow the rules established by its developer and copyright law itself (“clickwrap”).

Statists—supporters of coercive state power—often resort to such an argument. With its help, they can justify any obligations arising from various state laws as a kind of implicit consent to the norms they establish. Very often they claim that the mere presence of a person within the territory of the state already obligates them to complete submission to all state laws. Well, then they should not be surprised that this argument can be turned against them.

The main tool of the statist in imposing the arbitrariness of the stationary bandit (“legislation”) is coercion through the threat of violence. After all, would a statist be able to force you personally to do or not do something without threatening violence? Of course, it can be initiated only against a specific person who, based on the concept of the implicit contract, has nothing preventing them from simply setting their own terms for interaction.

I warn that if someone wants to commit violence against me, then by interacting with me in such a way, they will enter into an agreement consenting to an euthanasia procedure as part of my self-defense. Having been warned and acquainted with my rule, the choice now lies with the person wishing to commit violence. Deciding to do so, they thereby implicitly sign the contract established by me and accept the conditions specified therein.

Understanding this, the statist is left with only two possible options for how to further regard the concept of the implicit contract. They can either continue to adhere to it, thereby recognizing the right of other people to unlimited self-defense against any attempts to commit violence against them, or throw out this untenable and unfounded concept from the list of their arguments in defense of violent power.

ISIS as the ECU

ISIS holds territories in various (not only adjacent) countries of the world, successfully defends them against global armies thanks to mass armament, couldn’t care less about non-recognition, does not hinder the sale of drugs, and has many supporters worldwide. Of course, its internal structure is far from progressive ideas (especially for women), but on the other hand, joining it is relatively voluntary. Can ISIS be considered a successful simple example of an ETJ? Could something similar arise with more acceptable ideas, but just as strong in terms of self-defense and readiness for expansion?

Nezaputka

The Islamic State, of course, is not entirely an ETJ. People join the ranks of its army voluntarily, but the civilian population can easily come under this jurisdiction through direct territorial seizures or mechanisms like racketeering. It is more like a lucky nomadic bandit who attempted to become stationary.

The Islamic State has two main factors for success: a passionary ideology and a huge support base. Libertarians can boast only the first, but not the second. Moreover, an ideology glorifying market success is unlikely to demonstrate greater ruthlessness among its adepts than an ideology glorifying war with all infidels.

A radical ideology on its own, without broad support, is inherently unable to provide success; therefore, the fact of wide acceptance of the idea around which an extraterritorial contractual jurisdiction is built is precisely what is important. Libertarians still have a long way to go to popularize their ideas to the level of Islam, of course.

On the other hand, the whole point of the ETJ idea is not to impose one’s ideology on everyone and anyone, but simply to push for freedom of association: Islamists do their Islamist thing, feminists do their feminist thing, and at most they scoff at each other, but do not engage in armed clashes. How realistic is it to ensure mass public support for the very idea of peaceful demarcation? In principle, there is currently a global trend toward the collapse of empires, an increase in the number of recognized states, a multiplication of unrecognized states, the appearance of various strange gray zones, and so on.

The idea of successful self-defense of a community of like-minded people is very attractive, and in conditions where empires demonstrate serious military inefficiency, it practically begs to be implemented. So I really do not rule out that in the muddy waters of current wars, numerous groups will appear ready to defend the right to live by their own rules. But they will have to act very unobtrusively, without loud political declarations, by demonstrating to state representatives that it is better not to notice such guys—it is more beneficial for both health and prosperity.

In short, I believe more in mafia methods in the service of market interests than in direct war and more than in peaceful lobbying of laws, as in some Honduras. Strictly speaking, I have no certainty that market ETJs do not already exist today. They quite possibly could, and even be quite numerous, but those not involved in the process do not need to know about it.

No threat to the state, just cutting a melon

A book about ancap: problems around us

I held back for a very long time, and now, finally, as late as the third part of the book, I mention that there is, you know, such a thing as the state.

If last time I analyzed the main problem within us hindering the transition to ancap, then now it has come down to the primary problem around us.

Next, the plan is to cover the main approaches to overcoming these problems. Libertarian Band has a video series on this, created based on my script, but let’s see if these topics can be presented more clearly in the book.

I still want more feedback.

The problem of violence cannot be solved partially; it can only be dealt with completely

Voluntarist, Bitarch

When violence is divided into categories such as unacceptable, acceptable, or even necessary, a gross error is made in this division. It consists of the assumption that it is possible to fight only unacceptable violence without affecting other categories. The initiation of violence is supposedly useful in certain situations, and therefore this “useful” violence should be preserved.

However, dividing violence into different categories based on the indicator of acceptability and unacceptability is simply an absurd undertaking. Violence is indivisible; there are no people capable of committing one type of violent attack while being incapable of committing another. A person is either capable or incapable of committing a violent attack in general. You will be able to easily convince yourself of the truth of this statement after a brief explanation of the very nature of violent behavior and one interesting fact.

Violence is not a purely rational act to which a person resorts whenever it is profitable and does not carry serious risks. The manifestation of violence does not depend exclusively on social checks and balances. Regardless of the incentives, most people have never committed and will never commit an act of violence, at least not in its serious forms, such as causing significant physical harm to another person or murder. Throughout human history and in all circumstances, such as wars and genocides, fewer than 2% of people have committed such actions.

As a rule, humans possess natural deterrents to aggression—a violence inhibitor that causes a feeling of repulsion when attempting to commit an act of violence. This mechanism also plays an important role in the development of empathy, which is also inherent in most people. The ability of the average person to cause real physical harm to others is limited only to self-defense in the presence of an immediate threat to life.

Now it is worth mentioning one very important and interesting fact. As domestic violence statistics in the US show, it occurs up to 4 times more often in police families than on average in all American families. And these are only the cases that police officers reported themselves in anonymous surveys; surely many of them did not even admit to their violence in that way.

By preserving even one category of violence, it is inevitable that all other categories are also preserved. For a society to have police, soldiers, and even more so some kind of special services and “executioners” who carry out orders to eliminate someone, it is absolutely necessary for there to be a certain percentage of people in society who are capable of violence in general. Otherwise, there would simply be no place to get such employees. But if such a state of affairs is maintained, then private violent crime will never disappear. And the employees themselves will be a source of private violence. By day, someone is a highly successful employee, always ready to carry out any violent detention on command, and in the evening he returns home and beats his wife and children. Judging by the statistics, this is exactly what should be expected from a person who, in general, does not feel as strong a repulsion toward committing violence as other people do.

An attempt to merely limit, rather than eradicate, violence from people capable of committing it simply will not work. One can effectively fight only against all violence and all violent offenders at once. Violence cannot be divided into categories of acceptability and unacceptability (and even more so necessity), otherwise this problem will not go away, and that small percentage of people capable of committing it at any moment and in any form will continue to remain in society.

StandardSats

A small IT conference took place at the Montelibero club on June 25. I suggest those interested watch the recording of the most interesting presentation – Anton Gusha talked about how the Lightning Network works and what interesting tools can be built on its basis.

Specifically, he created a startup called StandardSats, which allows anyone to download a specialized Lightning wallet application where the balance in satoshis is floating and pegged to the exchange rate of a particular asset. For example, here in Montenegro, we use the Euro rate as a peg, and thus we can settle payments between each other in fiat without having to convert Bitcoin to Euros first.

I wanted to write about this in the third part of the series on Montelibero tokenomics, but while I was pondering how to present it, the project author came to Montenegro himself and gave a presentation, making my task easier.

What to Do with Russia

From what can be gathered from the news, the situation with Russia is roughly as follows. External political actors want it to suffer a military defeat, but not an overly crushing one, and they certainly want a single statehood to be preserved on the territory of the RF. This is understandable; the status quo always has the advantage of not having to worry about interacting with new entities.

I do not rule out that, given such a touching coincidence of interests, Western politicians may indeed succeed in preventing Russia from collapsing. If, of course, the residents of Russia themselves do not resist this terrible scenario in which Moscow’s power, however criminal it may be, remains legitimate in the eyes of other political sovereigns, which means a carte blanche for any internal repression and squeezing every last drop out of the citizens.

It is clear that a scenario in which the entire population simply leaves Russia is extremely unlikely, and the departure of even ten percent doesn’t really change the overall situation, as the examples of Venezuela or, for instance, Ukraine show us. The state continues to stumble along despite general hopelessness and degradation.

Those remaining in the RF now have to actively work themselves to ensure the country loses the war as quickly as possible. It is difficult to say which specific sabotages are currently being carried out by locals and which by Ukrainian saboteurs, but one hopes that the local share is quite large.

I primarily draw information about what is happening on this strange front and what sentiments are gradually forming in this environment from the Telegram channel Anarchy+. The channel is occupied with attempts to theoretically conceptualize what is happening; reflections on the most appropriate tactics are constantly presented, and while peaceful protest was discussed there before, the channel is now rapidly radicalizing.

I would like some more serious involvement of my own in the process of the RF’s collapse, but it is hard to understand where I would fit in. Sabotage is a maximally secretive and decentralized process, and for me, the most obvious role is providing communication and coverage of what has happened. So, for example, I could receive reports of certain actions unilaterally and promote them on my platform, so that the actions would gain publicity, but this would not help in reaching the organizers.

I am currently reflecting on how justified it would be at this stage to move from sabotaging war-support infrastructure to individual terror. This is a topic full of subtle psychological points; it is important that, as a result, the executors of the sovereign’s will are demotivated, rather than receiving, conversely, an impulse to unite against internal enemies. Nevertheless, individual terror is an almost inevitable stage in the gradual increase of efforts to bring down the regime; there is no escaping it, and it is advisable to come to terms with this in advance, acquire the necessary competencies ahead of time, and look over a list of targets. I will try to formulate my thoughts on this topic more concretely after some time; they are not yet fully formed.

Stefan Molyneux. Practical Anarchy. Editing of chapters 13-15.

I am posting the edits of three more chapters of The Practical Anarchist by Stephan Molneux.

Anarchy, Violence, and the State – this section analyzes the economic incentives for violence (which in some ways echoes a chapter from Friedman’s The Machinery of Freedom about the economics of vice and virtue) and shows that the best way to exponentially increase the amount of violence is to establish a state, because it is precisely the state that most successfully combats the economic factors that prevent the widespread use of violence in private life.

War, Profit, and the State – here the thesis is further sharpened, and explanations are provided as to why involving the state is the only way to make modern warfare profitable; a private individual has no chance of waging war effectively and remaining in the black.

Successful Operation (Dead Patient) – here the author discusses the tragedy of the commons and how, in most cases, it is perfectly resolved through privatization rather than the regulation of public goods. But even if one assumes that in some cases the tragedy of the commons cannot be cured by privatization, the state in any event cannot be the remedy, since it is itself the clearest example of that very tragedy.

Violence attracts too much attention

Voluntarist, Bitarch

It is often claimed that the commission of brutal violence by humans, up to and including murder, is natural, based on supposed endless observation of human society. Not a day in history has passed without murders or some form of armed conflict, and this continues in the modern world. This implies that humans are extremely cruel and violent.

But such claims are based on a purely subjective perception of events occurring in the world. For example, 69% of Americans believe that domestic violence is widespread among American football players. This belief is fueled by media scandals surrounding players who actually commit such acts. However, if one relies on statistics rather than subjective perceptions, it turns out that domestic violence occurs nearly twice as rarely in the families of players than in American families on average. At the same time, in police families, it occurs up to 4 times more often than average. But American media are unlikely to talk about bad cops unless the case is either extremely scandalous or somehow beneficial to the government. Moreover, police officers are covered up in their violence. For instance, reports of domestic violence are often not considered at all if the accused is a police officer.

This is precisely how myths about violence are formed. Incomplete data can also be misleading. When the conversation turns to a certain number of dead in some genocide or war, it is often assumed that there were approximately as many killers. But this proves to be absolutely wrong if we look at cases where the number of killers was actually known. For example, the genocide of up to 2 million people in Cambodia was orchestrated by only 55-70 thousand Khmer Rouge.

Relative to all people, violence is committed by a very small percentage of them. Only subjective assessments, based on incomplete data or common misconceptions, may suggest otherwise. If you observe violence every day, it absolutely does not mean that violence is committed by a large number of people. It is simply that a minority commits it quite frequently, and violence itself attracts too much attention compared to other events.

Book about ancap: third part started

I have started writing the third part of the book, about how exactly to build an ancap state, given the current state of affairs at the start. Naturally, I am beginning with an overview of the difficulties. So far we have a brief introduction and a chapter about our inner paternalist. I thought about writing a bit more right off the bat, but I got stuck for some reason, so I’m posting what I have.

I won’t nag about donations this time, as I successfully sold my debt tokens for exactly the amount I was counting on.