And tell us about the mercantilists in plain language

And why do many believe that such state economic policy leads to an increase in citizens’ welfare? And why are they actually mistaken?

Top Kripto #FreeNavalny

I’m being nudged here to speak out on the Ukrainian issue, but I’d rather answer this one instead.

Mercantilism is any policy based on the idea that free trade is unacceptable and should be regulated. In the past, one of the justifications for such a policy was the notion that trade is a war where one party loses and the other profits, and if the profiteering trader is not kept in check, he will rot everyone else while gorging himself on the people’s blood. This strange view of trade was accompanied by a belief in the harm of competition: supposedly, under competition, a merchant or craftsman cannot concentrate on one assigned area of activity, and due to meaningless fighting among themselves, there will be complete chaos in production and trade. Finally, this was accompanied by the idea that low prices for goods are harmful, just as high prices for labor are harmful—because there are “fair prices,” and every producer or trader is obliged to observe them.

It is no surprise that where such notions were strictly followed, humanity had little chance of becoming wealthy or developing technology. But this was also accompanied by the postulate of the benefit of poverty for the salvation of the soul, so no problem was seen in this.

Finally, mercantilism implied that it was extremely foolish for a ruler to allow people to buy foreign goods with money, because it was far more useful to accumulate money in the treasury—it would always come in handy for buying luxury items, but most importantly, for paying for wars. And this meant that trade should be subject to the highest possible tariffs.

A more or less systematic explanation of the errors of mercantilist views was provided by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations, which Pushkin reported to us when describing education in the early 19th century: he scolded Homer and Theocritus, but read Adam Smith and was a deep economist, that is, he knew how to judge how a state becomes wealthy, and what it lives by, and why it does not need gold when it has simple products. The ground was finally pulled from under mercantilism during the marginalist revolution (a conference honoring the 150th anniversary of this event was recently held in Moscow), when the pricing mechanism was explained through subjective preferences rather than cost, which finally made it clear why a voluntary transaction improves the position of both parties involved.

https://youtu.be/Z59nPehJBSE

Why then, 246 years after the publication of The Wealth of Nations and 150 years after the marginalist revolution, is mercantilism still alive in people’s heads and actively applied in politics?

Because politics is war. It is a zero-sum game where those who gain power diminish the power of others. But fighting hot wars has become a faux pas, and instead, trade wars are actively used. Want to tell another regime “to hell with you”—introduce trade sanctions against it.

Politics is not only external but also internal. Fighting hot internal wars is even more of a faux pas, but representatives of certain industries can lobby for trade preferences for themselves and restrictions for their competitors, both inside the country and abroad. The slogan of protecting the domestic producer is as effective as the slogan of protecting the homeland, and it leads to the same consequences: the domestic consumer becomes poorer.

Moreover, take even the quite libertarian Montelibero project. We also primarily try to hire project participants rather than freelancers for the project’s work. Mercantilism is psychologically comfortable: you give up a bit of personal gain, but you do a good deed for a neighbor from whom you buy a more expensive product, ignoring cheaper analogues from those you dislike. Similarly, agorists may fundamentally trade only with those who do not pay taxes, even if the effect of scale and the cost of security measures would make it cheaper to deal with taxpayers. But then the state won’t get a single agorist penny.

So what is the difference? Why do libertarians consider their own behavior moral, but state regulations criminal? Of course, it’s a matter of voluntariness. You personally have every right to sacrifice profit for the sake of moral superiority. But to demand the same from others by force—that’s a no-no!

What if a monopoly has a larger economic cushion and can operate at a loss for several years?

How do you plan to fight it? How will small companies, even those with large investors, be able to withstand a giant, and will investors even take such risks by investing money in small companies? Yes, I know the arguments that monopolies cannot arise, but what if it happens anyway, and moreover, I understand that ancap is not planned to be built from scratch, but on an existing market where large producers already exist.

Anonymous question

A monopoly is the desired and most comfortable state for any business. Under the conditions of centralized political power, large businesses are economically motivated to engage in lobbying to ensure a privileged position in the market through regulatory capture. Small businesses are economically motivated to create associations and engage in lobbying through them. In a country with a sufficiently diversified economy, this creates a situation where most entrepreneurs, one way or another, feed politicians, regulations become more complex, exceptions to the rules multiply, and business, having spent a lot of effort acquiring the regulator’s favor, in the best case remains where it started. If strategic industries are singled out in a state, then all is lost: this means the guaranteed infringement of other industries.

And so, according to the problem’s conditions, we have managed to gradually move from this depressing situation to a free market, primarily free from political power. Let’s assume this happened quite quickly, and we inherited a skewed market where some enterprises are disproportionately large, even up to monopolies in certain industries. What does this mean? If they are larger than is economically feasible, it means they produce their goods with higher costs than if they were smaller. At the same time, they have serious reserves and prevent the emergence of small competitors by supplying their goods at a loss. This only means that some small (and therefore more economically efficient than the monopoly monster) entrepreneurs will constantly try to enter this market, thereby creating pressure on the monopolist, preventing it from relaxing and raising prices to a comfortable level. Speculators will stockpile its goods by buying them cheaply, and as soon as the monopolist raises the price, the stockpiles will be sold for a profit, forcing the monopolist to lower the price again. This will continue until the monopolist’s shareholders replace the directors with more sensible ones, because they want stock growth and dividends, not all of this.

The small players, who all this time were simply doing something else where there was no monopoly, will then breathe a sigh of relief and flood the newly opened market. And the consumer, all the time while the goods were sold at a loss, was happy and had no reason to be outraged by the monopolist’s behavior. So why fight a dumping monopolist? He is doing great; this is what socially responsible business looks like under ancap.

What will happen to abandoned buildings under ancap?

1) Youth often sneak into an abandoned building, which displeases many city dwellers: you never know what might happen. Can they, and in what way, organize its security, fence it off, or demolish it entirely? Would the installation of a fence by a concerned public be a restriction of the freedom of urban exploration enthusiasts?
2) A group of squatters has settled in an empty cinema, arranged their own electricity (finding people on the free market who agreed to connect them), and lives there, organizing non-conformist concerts right in the cinema hall and inviting hitchhikers for overnight stays. Some believe this negatively affects property values in the area. Can anything be done about them?
3) A developer saw an unfinished business center and wanted to complete it and put it into operation. The last owner of the unfinished building is either unknown, unresponsive, or has already been dissolved as a legal entity. What should the developer do?
4) An initiative group of citizens wants to demolish an abandoned building and create a park in its place; many district residents have signed in support of the idea. However, the squatters living there do not want to move. They appeal to the right of the property they have acquired and the lack of rights to it by outside citizens, while the activists appeal to the illegality of the squatters’ settlement and their lack of any rights to such housing. Who is right and what is to be done?

Stalker

So, we have a city, which is a fairly dense settlement where the rights of its inhabitants to certain spatial objects are complex, mutually conditional, mutually overlapping, and constantly enter into minor collisions, and this is perceived as the norm. A person pays for developed infrastructure not only with money, but also by the fact that they are constantly bothered to some extent by their neighbors. Sometimes collisions become significant, and then they require a resolution.

Let me remind you of the principles of legitimate acquisition of property rights under ancap: homesteading, exchange, restitution, production. How can sufficiently clear property rights to an abandoned building be acquired in the complex conditions described above? Squatters quite logically apply the first method and occupy an empty building simply because no one before them used this method. What will protect them from indignant neighbors appearing on their doorstep tomorrow, waving the Lockean proviso? Only the other three methods of acquiring property rights.

  1. Voluntary exchange. Squatters can agree with other city residents on what specific benefits they will provide in exchange for the recognition of their right to the squat. For example, organizing those very concerts, providing shelter for the homeless, maintaining the neat appearance of the building, or paying utility bills.
  2. Restitution. Squatters could stand on the threshold of their new property with guns and declare that those who contest their ownership can only take it from their cold dead bodies. The willingness to bear the costs of war to protect one’s property has always been a very strong argument in favor of recognizing property rights, provided that someone else’s rights do not appear more compelling (and in the case of an abandoned building, no one has more compelling rights than the squatters). Squatters could also announce that as restitution for seizing the property (and thus for taking away the right to seize the same property from other potential claimants), they are ready to donate a certain amount to a city improvement fund. Agreement to accept the money would mean recognition of the legitimacy of the squatting.
  3. Production. Squatters can begin converting the seized building for their own needs, and then anyone who might claim an alternative use for the abandoned building will calculate that if they had, for example, forcibly evicted them a month ago when they first moved in, and the squatters had sued, they would have received at most the price of a hostel rental for a couple of nights. But today, they would already be demanding reimbursement for all the effort and resources invested in the squat.

I have outlined what the squatters should do. But what should the citizens do if they really do not want abandoned buildings to end up in the hands of just anyone? Simply avoid their formation whenever possible. For example, utility service contracts could include a clause stating that if the owner of the serviced object loses their right without terminating the service agreement, then until a new owner takes possession, the provider continues service at the latest applicable rates as a loan secured by the object. Thus, squatters find themselves in a situation: this house belongs to no one; it is collateral for the companies providing water, electricity, internet, sewer services, and waste removal. If any one of these companies needs the house, it will squat it itself (but it will have to negotiate a buyout with the others). And if none of them need it, they will all be happy with anyone willing to take the building on their balance sheet and pay off the utility debts.

I have provided only one possible mechanism, but there could be any others, including a city fund for abandoned buildings, to which citizens donate funds so that it can be the first to squat abandoned buildings, create groups for discussing their best use, search for investors, and so on. And if people who do not inspire enthusiasm among the citizens have already moved into a particular abandoned building, this same fund could act as a negotiator to change the format of the squat’s use or pay the squatters a buyout to move out.

What matters is not what people strive for, but how they do it

Voluntarist, Bitarch

The fundamental difference between the idea of a free society and any statist ideology is not which specific model of social organization their proponents strive for, but the methods they use to realize these aspirations. If the difference consisted only of end goals, there would be no fundamental difference at all. Indeed, any model of socio-economic organization and system of relationships between subjects can be implemented in a free society based on the principle of non-violence, voluntary agreements, and within the framework of free associations. In contrast, political ideologies always propose one specific social model that must be mandatorily implemented for all people, including through violent coercion.

When people encounter an idea of social organization that is unfamiliar to them, they almost always start asking questions such as “how will such-and-such a problem be solved within the framework of this idea.” Such an approach to understanding ideas is not surprising, as most of them offer a specific and single solution for everyone. People are used to the idea that a universal goal must be chosen, mandatory for everyone under threat of violence. However, if one tries to explain the ideas of freedom within these boundaries, it will likely fail—the listener will evaluate your answer based on their own preferences and conceptions of possible solutions, which may not coincide with your positions at all. Obviously, in their eyes, this will make the ideas of freedom appear unattractive, or even completely untenable.

Of course, modeling possible solutions is important, and the resulting answer can still serve as a convincing argument; however, it cannot be anything more than a supplement to the main argumentation. And the main argumentation itself must show people what was mentioned in the previous paragraph—that a specific and mandatory solution does not exist!

But how, then, will a particular problem be solved? Very simply—in the way the person themselves wants, based on their own preferences and views. In whatever way each person approaches the solution to their problems, that is how they will be solved. As for questions and problems common to many people, they will be solved based on how people agree to solve them. Each person can unite in associations with other people to create their own social order, which extends to the members of that association.

Therefore, it is necessary to ask the listener how they themselves would solve a particular problem if the ability to make the decision were in their own hands, and if the implementation extended to those who have corresponding agreements with them or participate in the same association. Their answer to your question will also be an answer to their own question. Only in this way can the idea of a free society be explained most accurately and attractively. Only then can it be conveyed that it consists of a method—freedom of activity, agreement, and association, as well as non-violent coexistence—while the goals themselves can be completely different.

Of course, this will not sound convincing to those who unconditionally believe that the realization of their personal aspirations, or the aspirations of some association sharing their views, requires the violent coercion of other people to accept their ideals. In such a situation, it is likely necessary to use arguments demonstrating the negative externalities of violence and discrediting it as a phenomenon as a whole. But if even this does not sound convincing, then all that remains is to end the conversation. After all, explaining something to people who have strong violent convictions (or even tendencies toward committing violence) is simply pointless; they can only be pressured by condemnation, ostracism, and various sanctions, and one should prepare to defend oneself from them, for they will seek to force you into submission by power at the first opportunity.

Montelibero Tokenomics. Part 1, theoretical.

Everything related to “crypto” is a hype topic, and moreover, a source of endless disputes between adherents of different development paths for the fashionable crypto industry. I would like to bring a bit more clarity to how this is organized here in Montelibero, so that you can make informed decisions about whether it is worth investing in us, and if so, exactly what to invest in.

What is tokenomics? It is the economics of tokens, that is, the structure of the market in which they circulate, the rules, traditions, and (importantly) the purpose of their circulation.

What are tokens? Applied to our situation, these are information objects that circulate instead of the real objects that the tokens symbolize. A company share is a token of ownership in a company. A futures contract for a barrel of oil is a token for the obligation to deliver a barrel of oil. The British pound was a token for a pound of silver. More accurately, it used to be, but then it scammed, and now it continues to circulate without its previous commodity backing.

Tokens are not cryptocurrencies. We will not even try to define what cryptocurrencies are here, because people tend to understand this as too broad a class of objects. Therefore, we simply state that there are some cryptocurrencies on the basis of which it is convenient to issue one’s own tokens. For the tokenomics of Montelibero, the Stellar blockchain was initially chosen, in which its own cryptocurrency called Lumen circulates. There were exclusively technical reasons for this:

  • transactions are very cheap
  • the transaction language is quite advanced
  • there is a decent set of tools for managing tokenomics based on Stellar
  • among the participants of the Montelibero project, there are people who understand these tools

Why did we decide to create tokenomics around Montelibero? In principle, there are precedents for the creation of collective projects where there is simply an initiative group that does the work, volunteers can join them, and donations can be made to them. You can also buy the product of their activity or futures for it.

But this is all a rather opaque story. If you buy from us a promise for a piece of land, and the record of this is stored somewhere in the history of our correspondence or on our website, you will reasonably fear that tomorrow this record may disappear, and you will have no way to prove it was there. If the tokens of all our public promises lie on a blockchain that we do not control, we cannot pretend they do not exist, although nothing still prevents us from reneging on the promises, despite the undeniable fact of their existence. Unfortunately, not even insurance companies provide a hundred percent guarantee, and here you (and we) will have to rely primarily on the institution of reputation.

The goal of the Montelibero project is the wide implementation of libertarian practices in Montenegro. For this, we need many successful libertarians to appear in Montenegro, acting in accordance with their principles. To achieve this, we need to ensure this very success for the libertarians relocating to Montenegro.

Therefore, the key token in the tokenomics of Montelibero is the token of the eponymous investment fund, called MTL. The funds raised from the issuance of these tokens are invested by us in the development of the infrastructure necessary for the settlers, invested in their business, as well as invested in the business of libertarians outside Montenegro, if we expect to receive income from this. Or we simply save it for future targeted investments. Buyers of MTL tokens, accordingly, receive the right to regular dividends, the size of which is not fixed and is determined solely by the profit received from the fund’s investments.

In what are the dividends paid? Allow me to introduce the second key token of the system – the stablecoin EURMTL… Stop. Now I need to speak in more detail about stablecoins.

Stablecoins are private money with stable purchasing power, usually pegged to certain state currencies. Why money should be private, and how the stability of the exchange rate will be ensured, can be read briefly in Friedman’s Free to Choose in the chapter The Market for Money. Many stablecoins circulate in the world, but mostly they are pegged to the dollar, while the euro is used in Montenegro. Therefore, we made our own and issued it on the same blockchain as all our other tokens. Now it is the main unit of account for our entire tokenomics, for which any asset traded within the project can be acquired. But not only that.

Furthermore, EURMTL can be exchanged 1:1 for cash euros with any of our guarantors in Montenegro. Therefore, those of us who have already relocated to Montenegro use EURMTL among ourselves as cashless euros, for example, in situations where it is necessary to split a check in a coffee shop. This is much more convenient than transfers between bank accounts. We hope that over time the network of users of our stablecoin will expand enough to begin significantly influencing the economy of Montenegro, and this competition will spur local clumsy banks to improve the quality of their services.

And if you do not live in Montenegro yet, but participate in our tokenomics, we also guarantee you the possibility to exchange EURMTL for Lumens at the current exchange rate of the euro (for this, we keep open orders to buy EURMTL for Lumens on the Stellar exchange built into the system, automatically recalculating the rate according to the fluctuations of the euro price). Then, with the Lumens received, you can go to any exchange you trust and change them into state money of your choice (including the money of the state of El Salvador, i.e., Bitcoins).

What does the fund primarily invest in? Since we are preparing infrastructure for settlers, the fund has acquired a hectare of land and is now improving it. This hectare was also tokenized, so the third important token in our tokenomics is MTLCITY. Some of these tokens were bought by settlers or those planning to move to Montenegro in the near future. In accordance with their share in the total mass of MTLCITY tokens, their owners will receive ownership of their land plots when the land is prepared for privatization. This token is no longer traded on the primary market and is only used for accounting as to who is entitled to what area of land. Immediately before privatization, we will conduct a final offsetting, when those whose number of tokens is excessive for the real plot they claim will sell them at par to those whose number of tokens is insufficient.

Another important direction of the fund’s investments is the GPA tokens – the business of one of our first settlers, specializing in offline trade directly in Montenegro, as well as the MTLBR tokens – a construction company that is currently engaged in the improvement of the land acquired by the fund, but plans to enter a wider market over time.

I will not list all the tokens in the Montelibero system in this article – at the very least, I don’t know them all. Generally speaking, anyone can issue their own token; the other matter is to ensure its circulation. For example, I also have a token ANCAPCHAN, but, as you can see, its liquidity cannot be called outstanding. With its help, I merely recorded my debt to the fund, which spent money on my naturalization in Montenegro, and then after some time repaid it.

In the next article, I intend to give practical instructions for those who decide to dive into all this machinery, and I want to dedicate the third article to the latest promising developments at the intersection of tokenomics and cryptocurrencies, which I will not even pretend to fully understand myself.

Legal systems that differ greatly from ours. Translation of the chapter on Jewish law.

Having had my fun with Iceland: The Age of Sagas, I continued the translation of Friedman’s book on legal systems that differ greatly from our own, proceeding in order, so the fourth chapter is next. It is perhaps the longest in the entire book, as it is dedicated to the law of the chosen people, who have accumulated an absolute abyss of various legislative material throughout their long history.

As usual, I will deal with the translation of the footnotes and the final formatting of this chapter for e-books later; for now, I want to present what I have to your attention as is, without polishing it. As usual, I am transparently hinting that it would be nice to donate.

Next up is Islamic law, and I am curious in advance what place well-known practices, such as apologizing without trousers, hold within it.

Can a “monopoly on violence” and “legitimate violence” even exist?

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In their ideas, proponents of coercive state power refer to so-called permissible (or even allegedly necessary) or “legitimate” violence, the commission of which should be a monopoly of a single agent (the state) in society. However, as a rule, no clear definition is given as to exactly what violence can be considered permissible, necessary, or legitimate, and in whose hands it should be. Everything comes down to goals: whatever goals a particular etatist adheres to—within those frameworks, violence is justified for them, and the “monopoly” on violence should belong to them and/or those who share their specific views. This is not changed even by an adherence to democracy, since a democrat would want the monopoly on violence to belong specifically to the proponents of democracy; they simply do not consider it important what their views on other issues may be.

For this reason, there can be no talk of any specific legitimacy of violence. For instance, an authoritarian conservative must understand that, in the opinion of an authoritarian communist, his place is two meters underground, and vice versa. Every proponent of violence has their own understanding of its legitimacy, which cannot be agreed upon.

A monopoly on violence cannot exist at all as a model implemented in practice. A stationary bandit’s “monopoly” on violence is lost as soon as other people, even within the same state, take power into their own hands. There are no eternal governments; sooner or later, there is either a change in power or a change in the views of some members of the current power (who, of course, eliminate from political life their very own colleagues of yesterday who held the previous views). And with the help of violence in new hands, and violence whose legitimacy is now justified differently, the achievements of those who previously considered violence legitimate only within the framework of their own views and monopolistically belonging only to their own hands are destroyed.

Moreover, the monopoly on violence is quite often violated by those who commit it in a private capacity. As long as there are people in society capable of committing violence under certain circumstances, statements about possessing a monopoly right to it will be an exaggeration. After all, “illegitimate” perpetrators of violence may even attempt to stage a coup. Would proponents of monarchy or democracy consider the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the applicability of violence to be legitimate? No. But in practice, that would change nothing.

In reality, the state can possess only a “comparative advantage in the application of violence,” which is what Max Weber wrote in his definition of the state itself. But this formulation was misunderstood by many or simply misreported, which led to the concept of a “monopoly on violence,” which does not exist in reality. And possessing only a comparative advantage in violence, rather than a fictitious monopoly over it, the statist cannot in any way guarantee that violence will work in their favor—someday this tool will be taken from them and used with full force against them, their supporters, and their ideas. And this once again speaks to why the tool of free activity and voluntary agreement is better compared to the tool of force.

Ancap and the Imperfect World

Summarized the first section of the second part of my book about ancap: in the first two chapters, I covered the problems caused by the imperfection of the world, and now I’ve added a chapter about how ancap overcomes this family of problems. The chapter is short, but I’ve packed into it the main approaches from Friedman’s talmud The Machinery of Freedom, which first required me to tackle said talmud—something I suggest you do as well, as it’s far more interesting than my work.

Further, I plan to proceed in a similar manner with the family of problems caused by the imperfection of humans and the imperfection of human society.

Georgia is closing

Two and a half years ago, I seriously considered Georgia as a suitable country to settle in and build a pleasant local ancap community around myself. All the sadder I am now to realize that Anton Epikhin was right when he conducted an analysis of where it would be easiest to start building a libertarian community, and ruled out Georgia.

Long ago, under the president before the last one, Georgia responded to Russian sanctions by opening its doors even wider for Russians, offering them the freedom to arrive, settle, purchase property, and start businesses. Now it is beginning to restrict political immigration, and even simple temporary entry into the country for those who publicly declare principles slightly more liberal than those of the current Georgian government.

Going to a country where a former president, who nominally stood on the side of freedom, is in prison is a stranger decision than going to a country where the president is in opposition to the prime minister, and both are desperately barking at each other, but there is no talk of imprisonments. Going to a country that does not allow political emigrants from Russia is a stranger decision than going to a country that does not extradite them to Russia. In essence, all that Georgia and Montenegro have in common today are the mountains, the sea, and the lack of direct flights from the RF.

I hope that those Russian libertarians who have already moved to Georgia manage to get out of the country before they suddenly decide to deport them to the RF. There are too few of us to waste people.

For my part, I can only promise that I will continue to build a convenient platform for receiving those who will come to us in Montelibero.

And yet, it was nice there…

Montelibero project news, issue 9

The previous issue began with a description of the drainage work on the road leading to the future Monte Libero settlement. Over the past month, the drainage has been seriously improved. First, at the very beginning of the road, the area near the spring was completely concreted, and the overflow from the basin was routed into a pipe under this concrete platform.

Secondly, further up the road, wherever there is a risk of erosion, even a small drainage ditch has been added. In general, the road definitely won’t wash away now. Please forgive me for highlighting such minor details, but with the treacherous weather here, you learn to appreciate exactly those details.

While filling in the internal roads of the settlement, serious drainage was required in one particular spot. Upon closer inspection, it was discovered that groundwater runs close to the surface in this area, and for now, water is seeping directly onto the road. This means we have solved the water supply problem! Or rather, we’ve found an approach to the solution. Now the plan is to lead this water aside along the road across the entire width of the aquifer and collect it in a storage basin, from where it can then be used. In short, to do roughly the same thing as we did down there where we concreted the platform. For now, of course, it looks unsightly:

And besides water supply and drainage, the settlement will also need sewage. We decided to make one common septic tank, and it is already practically ready; all that’s left is to dig a drainage ditch away from it (is that too much drainage in one post?), and then sewage pipes will need to be laid throughout the settlement.

We invited a surveyor, and with his help, we divided all the land into separate plots, which are intended to be privatized. My plot is roughly in the center of this image, with an area of 202 sq.m. I hope that in some time I will be able to delight you in my Instagram with images from my own personal construction.

But actually, besides these two large pieces of land, we were also sold an exclave as an add-on—a piece slightly smaller than seven hundred square meters, to which we have no way of bringing a road except through the neighbors.

We have finally cleared it of thick brush as well. It turned out that it is even terraced, which will save some money on its development.

With all these chores, I haven’t yet had the chance to mount a few solar panels on the roof of the hut (there is a stupid regulation here forbidding the placement of panels on the ground, intended to limit solar generation strictly to domestic needs) and check whether all this is capable of powering a miner. But we hope to get to this soon.

Of course, activity within the project is not limited to construction. We have gradually formed a team for creating various targeted promotional content. They released a video with an annual report on the entire project,

as well as a separate video in the local dialect describing unconditional basic income.

There is an opinion that libertarians are social Darwinists who would happily watch the weak die off and clear the field. In practice, however, mutual aid is quite developed in our small community, and project participants from the outside world have decided to support those who have already moved, regularly chipping in money, from which an unconditional income is paid weekly to all libertarians who moved to Montenegro as part of the Monte Libero project—simply the contents of the piggy bank are divided equally among everyone. This is roughly how social welfare works under ancap, without any taxes. For now, it comes to about two and a half euros per person per week, meaning about ten a month. This amount could increase if more people want to fill the pot, or decrease if more people move in while contributions remain the same. Overall, it is an interesting experiment, and it is still waiting for its team of sociologists for a correct description.

Another social program within the project is bike rentals. For about a month, a couple stayed with us, who during that time rode and explored the entire area, for which they bought a pair of bikes. Now this transport has been handed over to the project, and it can be borrowed for donations.

Another subtle but important area of activity in the project is the improvement of tokenomics—the cryptocurrency engine on which everything revolves. The financial reporting of the Monte Libero fund is becoming clearer, signing transactions with multi-sig, and most importantly, reading them before signing, is becoming more convenient (which means more mindful participation in fund management), and our IT specialists have big plans for implementing various new features. Thus, a branch of the fund in Liquid—a Bitcoin sidechain—is gradually being polished. For now, all tokenomics run on the Stellar blockchain, which means hardcore Bitcoiners simply won’t join us because alts are “cringe.” If it’s possible to implement the necessary functionality within the toolkit available in the older and more venerable currency, it could potentially add more investors.

Recently, news flickered that the Slovenian visa center in Montenegro has closed for quarantine, and this is worrying because it was the easiest way to get a Schengen visa here in Montenegro. The thing is, we want to take a Monte Libero delegation at the end of April to a large libertarian convention in Prague, however, COVID and bureaucracy are capable of seriously complicating this task. So, not everything is smooth, but it’s okay, we’ll push through.