Left-libertarianism

Russia is considered a fairly left-wing country; however, for some reason, the phenomenon of left-libertarianism has not taken root there very well.

What makes it interesting? For a classical libertarian, the values of freedom and, consequently, voluntary interaction with other members of society have absolute priority, and if someone chooses social Darwinism, that is their right. For left-libertarians, the desire to ensure that other people do not end up in a desperate situation is a powerful moral imperative. Yes, it contradicts the values of total freedom, but there is no problem with having moral imperatives that occasionally conflict with one another (by the way, I will mention this in passing in my new video—stay tuned for announcements). Realizing that their legitimate pursuit of self-actualization might significantly hinder someone else, a left-libertarian will limit their own freedom and will not even consider it some extraordinary feat. After all, when healthy young people voluntarily self-isolate for the safety of the elderly, that is precisely an example of the behavior of a normal left-libertarian.

So why is this school of thought doing so poorly in Russia? Quite simply, we are a very poor and over-regulated country, and in order to sacrifice something, you first need to have that something. Russians mostly suffer from a critical shortage of both money and freedom.

Mikhail Pozharsky began introducing us to the doctrines of left-libertarianism in Russian, but for him, this is a side activity, as it is for me. Therefore, I would like to recommend several specialized Russian-language resources for those wishing to explore this topic more closely.

  1. Alliance of Left-Libertarians. A tiny Telegram channel (40 subscribers at the time of my publication) with a grand description listing the movements it unites—and the list is so long that it feels as though there is only one person from each movement. Nevertheless, they have developed a very productive activity and translated a vast number of articles on the subject, so you should not only subscribe to the channel but also thoroughly scour its history; there is a lot of interesting material there.
  2. Libertarian Social Justice. These are the most poignant leftists among all libertarians, supporters of UBI and other redistributive extravaganzas. Consume with caution. Knowledge of this discourse is especially useful in debates with communists—determined communists will find migrating here quite comfortable. The channel has 41 subscribers at the time of my publication.
  3. The Agorist’s Cookbook. A slightly less tiny channel (68 subscribers at the time of my publication) dedicated to agorism—a branch of libertarianism that, for some mysterious reason, is classified as left-wing but stands completely on its own. I intend to dig deep into agorism myself—the next cycle of Libertarian Band videos will be dedicated specifically to it. So, I wholeheartedly recommend subscribing.

All three channels partially overlap in content and possibly in editorial staff, but they prefer to maintain autonomy, which is completely natural and convenient for libertarians.

Rules for Success for Libertarian Organizations. An Overview.

The host of the channel Right Argument for 14.88 rubles asked to criticize 12 points published on his channel: Part 1. Part 2.

Point No. 1: An idea needs only 10% convinced supporters to convert the remaining 90% of society to its side.

According to Taleb, 4% will be enough; there are studies suggesting even less is needed. If there is an active radical minority, its ideas begin to be taken into account. However, a society may end up with two such radical minorities. This is fraught with civil war. Is this a reason to abandon one’s idea? No, but it is worth considering this point.

Point No. 2: Ideology must intersect with the mainstream.

It is suggested to broadcast simple and clear slogans outwardly, leaving the sophisticated studies for the inner circle; otherwise, agitation will be easily countered by stupid memes about courts under ancap.

Point No. 3: If a movement consists of more intellectuals, then the ideology and culture within the movement will be more developed and attractive.

This is an antithesis to point 2. Without intellectuals, a movement to transform the world degenerates into a gathering of rowdy schoolkids, rejecting anyone remotely adequate. Upon receiving a complex question, an agitator must answer at the appropriate level, or admit that it is better to consult so-and-so.

Point No. 4: Arguments over axioms and cornerstones of theory between libertarians and leftists/etatists are a waste of time.

Unless it is a public dispute to win over the public’s sympathy or training debates to hone rhetorical skills.

Point No. 5: Internal enemies are a thousand times more dangerous than external ones.

When an organization begins to fight internal enemies, it means that the external ones have won without a fight. In general, one should not confuse the competition of ideas with the machinations of enemies.

Point No. 6: Watch your appearance.

One should not fall into the opposite extreme, or it will turn into a Putin-style lineup of technocrat governors.

Point No. 7: Stay away from people who are too old.

The largest audience is forty-year-old women; without their approval, you won’t get far. Thus, you need mature people who have a track record of success, and they are the ones who should be put in the storefront, while the task of the youth is active movement.

Point No. 8: Stay away from Russian social networks, but actively use foreign ones.

Every social network has its own pitfalls. Facebook and YouTube have censorship. VK has arrests. It is important to understand where the target audience is, how to speak with them, and what precautions to take.

Point No. 9: Convince people of other political views and inexperienced newcomers of the consistency and viability of libertarianism.

There is no need to obsess over trying to absolutely convert opponents to your teaching. It is more important to create a reputation for libertarians by your own example as people who are capable of agreement and consistent, with whom one can cooperate on specific issues. Then, an ideological drift in your direction becomes inevitable.

Point No. 10: We do not have good media resources, and those that exist are terrible in terms of effectively promoting ideas to the masses (this applies to this channel as well).

It is unclear what this point is doing in the list; it does not form a positive assertion.

Point No. 11: Track progress.

In the authors’ understanding, this refers to progress in metrics: number of subscribers, views, likes, and so on. I would suggest understanding this point in a more general way.

Point No. 12: We do not have very much time to realize our ambitions.

This is a demonstration of the authors’ high time preference. An ordinary young activist quickly burns out if they do not achieve significant success, after which they switch to what does bring success—usually a business career and family life. But social change is a longer process than the evolution of a specific activist’s priorities. A movement that does not take this into account can only win by chance.

Nonviolent State

or a realistic scenario for the transition to a free society

Bitarch’s Column

The text has been substantially revised by me with the author’s permission. The original publication is in Bitarch’s public page.

After reading the headline, you probably can’t immediately tell if it’s a joke. The phrase looks like an oxymoron! A stationary bandit (the state) exercises its power through violent coercion, so how can there even be such a thing as a non-violent state?! In reality, such a form of social organization could very well exist as a transitional stage toward a completely stateless society. To understand the idea, one must separate the state’s tools for physical coercion from everything else (legislation, courts, property registries, infrastructure, roads, medicine, and so on) and remove the former.

How could such a hybrid emerge at all? In short, as a result of society adopting the idea that aggressive physical violence is unacceptable. While non-aggression is a necessary condition for creating a free (libertarian/voluntarist) society, it could very well be achieved by activists who have no connection to libertarianism whatsoever. For example, in the Scandinavian countries, an unambiguous consensus on the ban of violence against children has been reached for half a century, and this was done by non-libertarians. Nothing prevents the launch of a public campaign to promote the universal principle of non-aggression, for example, by motivating it with the threat of strong negative externalities of aggressive violence for society as a whole (this argument has already proven its effectiveness in banning violence against children and even animals, leading to its eradication in most developed countries) or even the self-destruction of humanity. With a fairly high probability, this campaign will be carried out by activists who do not even know the meaning of the word “libertarianism,” although, by doing so, they will open the way to a world where libertarianism can be implemented in practice.

A rough scenario of how events might unfold:

1) A new (or even the same) “Greta Thunberg” actively promotes the idea of the unacceptability and danger of aggressive violence. These ideas gain viral distribution, quickly reaching the masses. Perhaps some of the activists even become “Person of the Year” according to Time magazine.

2) Pressure on officials and security forces increases. Even neighbors begin to tell them, “You’re a new Hitler, get out,” friends stop communicating with them, and they are no longer allowed into bars and clubs. An increasing number of security officers refuse to handle the enforcement of victimless “crimes,” such as speeding, because they fear subsequent shaming. For officials, terrorizing businesses, especially small ones, also begins to mean political death.

3) People who desire firm order and discipline, and who are used to reporting their neighbors to the police, are, of course, outraged. The police no longer throw anyone in the slammer, but instead arrive and gently persuade people to behave decently—this works worse, and it causes moral indignation: why the hell are they pandering to these scoundrels using our taxes, instead of taking decisive measures.

4) Inevitable changes occur at the legislative level—primarily, of course, in parliamentary democracies. Anyone who advocates for maintaining the status quo will simply lose the election, as if they were advocating for the legalization of DDT or leaded gasoline. Responding to the voters’ demand, parliamentarians are forced to invent measures of coercion that do not involve the use of violence. At this stage, deputies likely won’t even consider issues so familiar in libertarian discussions (how to transition to private roads, schools, hospitals, pensions, the legal standing of children, legalization of drugs, etc.).

5) Thus, parliaments begin to pass laws abolishing restrictive measures and punishments such as imprisonment, and banning the use of weapons by the police; at the same time, of course, they make it harder for private individuals to acquire weapons—but the state will not be able to enforce this particular ban effectively, since it has renounced violent coercion itself. Defense funding is reduced, the army stops training in hotspots around the world, and is limited to peaceful exercises.

6) All other functions of the state (except for forceful coercion) continue to operate as before: educational and medical institutions, issuance of documents, courts, traffic regulation, and even the tax service. After all, when many European countries began talking about banning internal combustion engine (ICE) cars, no one suggested getting rid of the habitual “automobile” lifestyle entirely. ICE fuel is much more convenient than a bulky battery, but it becomes a victim of the fight for ecology, even if that fight contains only 10% common sense and 90% hysteria. It is similar with violence—for the state, it is a very convenient tool, but since it is considered unacceptable, an alternative must be found. Nevertheless, the law-abiding majority, who hardly encounter state violence even now, will at first not even notice that something has changed.

7) In international politics, the mechanism of economic sanctions has long been used instead of military coercion. Most likely, this same method will now be applied to citizens instead of direct police violence. This tool, despite its deceptive softness, is quite powerful, especially in a welfare state where all sorts of payments and the acquisition of countless permits for activities depend on the state.

8) People caught in the steamroller of state economic sanctions will be forced to look for ways to survive independently. Informal mutual aid associations will emerge, which will gradually provide their participants—who have de facto exited state jurisdiction—with more or less acceptable living conditions. In fact, these are the contractual jurisdictions we have long studied theoretically.

Thus gradually, thanks to political pressure making the use of violence unacceptable, classic territorial states will turn into panarchies. Only some of the contractual jurisdictions will be libertarian, but converting humanity to libertarianism entirely is a completely redundant task. It is quite enough that the choice of orders under which a person lives occurs voluntarily.

On the difficulties of mutual understanding with communists

Imagine the following situation. You are the director of the “Ancapistan” insurance company, which governs a certain territory. I am the speaker for the “Ancomistan” commune (we have no leader, but I am usually entrusted with conducting meetings and going on diplomatic trips on behalf of the commune), which also owns a certain territory. We share a common water border on a lake. Ancapistan is on the right bank of the lake, and Ancomistan is on the left. Almost the entire coastline of Ancapistan, except for a single shipping port, belongs to one private individual who uses the water for his chemical plants. You supply us with fertilizers and complex machinery, and we supply you with agricultural products, timber, and metals.

Then, at one fine moment, the aforementioned private individual begins to delay the replacement of filters, and many toxic substances enter the water. Since we share a common lake, several dozen people in Ancomistan (the lake is our only external water resource, whereas you also have a river on your territory) drink water from this lake, and all of them perish. And here is where it gets interesting. In Ancomistan, negligence resulting in grave consequences is punished by 15-20 years of hard labor for the benefit of the commune or by death by hanging. In Ancapistan, it is punished only by compensating the victims for damages. I hold a meeting where I raise the question of how to assess the damages for compensation. 5% of the communards suggest taking money and placing it in the commune’s account at the bank for international trade, 10% suggest sending the private individual to 15-20 years of hard labor, and 85% suggest the gallows, given the cynicism of valuing lives in money. In the end, the commune issues a death sentence and instructs me to send an extradition request. You offer to compensate for the damages, but I show you the paper with the commune’s resolution and continue to insist on extradition. Upon receiving a refusal, I state that in this case, the commune will completely stop supplying resources to Ancapistan and stop buying from it. If we sever trade relations, Ancapistan will lose one of its markets for selling and buying resources. Besides Ancomistan, the only other raw material territories nearby are in Anprimistan. You can sell finished products to them, but due to their poverty, they will not buy your products at the high price we pay. Also, due to the higher complexity of resource extraction, they will not sell you resources at the low price Ancomistan provides.

Ancomistan itself will simply drill water wells and sign a trade contract with Transgumistan, which sells and buys products at almost the same price but is located slightly further away than Ancapistan. As a result, you will have an economic crisis, while our standard of living will practically remain unchanged. Question: will you extradite the private individual to Ancomistan and thereby violate the NAP regarding him, or will you lose one of your markets for buying and selling resources and find yourself in a deep crisis?

Ancom-kun (question accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00023397 BTC)

Thank you for this long and interesting story, which demonstrates the problems a territorial commune may face. Fortunately, Ancapistan is merely an insurance company. We insure lives, real estate, transport, risks of industrial disasters, and so on. The fact that an insured enterprise failed to change filters on time and we did not find out about it (although non-compliance with technical regulations by the insured party is grounds for terminating the contract or revising the premium size due to increased risk) means only one thing: our employee was negligent or was bribed by the insured enterprise. Naturally, this means we fire our agent and revise our own regulations to prevent this from happening again. We also refuse to pay insurance to the insured company and sue it for fraud—they did not perform the procedures required by the regulations but did not inform us, thereby saving on insurance premiums. If other clients approach us for insurance due to the lake pollution (for example, fishermen or travel agencies whose activities are affected), we will have to pay them premiums, after which we will file claims against the enterprise for reimbursement of our losses.

Additionally, it seems we insured the life of the enterprise owner. This contract remains in effect, and we are obliged to prevent attempts on his life within the limit of expenses agreed upon by the insurance premium. So, we either take him under protection or provide him with a comfortable shelter and give him the opportunity to safely negotiate with Ancomistan to settle the claims.

Furthermore, Ancomistan takes a principled stand and insists on executing the businessman who offended them, refusing all his offers of financial compensation, even the transfer of the plant to the commune’s ownership. Therefore, the businessman continues to stay in the shelter and manage the plant from there. When the time comes to renew the insurance contract, we face a dilemma: either refuse the renewal or set an exorbitant price, because we are effectively acting not as an insurer, but as a security company. In the end, we reach an agreement: he continues to pay the bills, and we continue to protect him.

After this, Ancomistan begins to blackmail our other clients, threatening them with the termination of contracts if we do not hand over the criminal. We realize that further protection is impractical and finally terminate the contract with him. The former client, not being a fool, immediately signs a contract with another security company operating in the middle of nowhere, and they organize his evacuation. Then, being physically several thousand kilometers away from the vengeful commune, he continues negotiations with them, because he does not wish to wake up one fine day with an ice pick in his head. But his negotiating position becomes stronger, as it is more difficult for the commune in this situation to pressure his new security company. Therefore, most likely, after some time, you will reach some compromise with him.

The question of your sanctions against my insurance company remains. We protected our client within the framework of the contract, and as for what “extradition” is, we don’t understand it at all, because in our language it is called “kidnapping.” Refusing to protect is one thing, but kidnapping a person and handing them over to some bandits for subsequent execution is something entirely different. Nevertheless, we bear part of the responsibility to the commune because we poorly monitored our agent who was tasked with overseeing the compliance of technical regulations for our client. We offer Ancomistan compensation, and since there is no question of direct guilt in this case, we will most likely reach an agreement. After this, I have a claim against our former employee, but that is a completely different story.

Someone here is asking for trouble…

Domestic violence

The artificial isolation of citizens in their apartments has already led to a surge in domestic violence. And while this is happening haphazardly and spontaneously worldwide—one cohabitant beating another—in Russia, the state is taking over the organization of domestic violence; it is seriously intent on defending its monopoly on violence, as it understands it.

For example, it recently organized armed robberies with breaking and entering targeting several members of the “Association of People’s Resistance,” as well as Vladimir Vorontsov, the lead of the Telegram channel Police Ombudsman. The former were released after being robbed and beaten. The latter was kidnapped and is still being held. The criminals chose an opportune time, while the entire country is locked in their homes and people cannot provide serious mutual support—aside from informing each other of danger and providing situational assistance in dealing with the aftermath.

However, classic non-state domestic violence has not disappeared either, and here civil society has slightly more opportunities, provided, of course, that the state does not throw a wrench in the works, as it loves to do. The Civil Society movement announced the launch of the Fortress project, under which it will provide temporary shelter for victims of domestic violence (alas, not from the cops), and the Open Russia movement announced that it would provide Fortress with organizational and legal assistance (which would include protection from the cops).

I very much hope it takes off.

Registration of property rights under ancap

What will the registration of property rights for assets (land, real estate, enterprises, securities, files(?)) look like in the absence of a monopoly registrar (USRN and others)? Will it be mandatory? And what about bundles of rights under ancap?

Free Reader

Bundles of rights are simply an analytical tool for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon we commonly call ownership. Any relationship between a subject and an object can be described through bundles of rights, regardless of whether it is ancap or socialism. It is simply that under socialism, a certain property, for example, does not grant the right to derive profit from it, while under ancap it does. Also, for instance, rights to a plot of land may imply the right to prohibit boundary violations, or they may be encumbered by an easement requiring the provision of, say, free passage. All these bundles of rights are formed both as a result of concluding direct contracts and simply by virtue of established traditions. Any right is a claim that is tolerated, and if a certain claim is contested, it means that specific right is under threat.

For those who struggle to understand what the previous paragraph is about, I recommend watching Boris Yurovsky’s video, which is titled: Property as a Bundle of Rights.

Now let’s move on to the registration of property rights. A title of ownership for any object that can be uniquely identified is very easily stored in one registry or another. These could be objects such as “a plot of land with such-and-such boundaries” or “a smartphone with such-and-such a serial number” or “a file with such-and-such a checksum.”

How do titles of ownership get into registries? They are entered there by the owners of the property assets to inform everyone of their ownership right, which is primarily necessary to confirm that this right exists. Maintaining a registry requires resources, so those who decide to engage in this will have to think through a monetization scheme for the service. One could charge money for placing information about a property asset in the registry. This risks the registry being incomplete. One could charge for obtaining information from the registry. This risks people obtaining information through cheaper means. One could establish a fund, feed it for some time, and once the registry begins to demonstrate its utility to a wide circle of people, the fund could quite possibly develop the registry through donations.

The alternative to registries is the archaeology of property titles, where, wanting to ensure that the property being purchased actually belongs to the seller, a potential buyer examines the document recording the acquisition of the property, for example, a purchase and sale agreement, then turns to the previous owner, finds out how they acquired the object, and so on until their paranoia is satisfied. In effect, this is the same methodology as blockchain analysis—just without the blockchain. Additionally, if we are talking about a plot of land, for example, one can ask the neighbors whether they truly know the seller as the owner of the plot or if he is an impostor.

But this will be of little help in a situation where the owner of a property asset sells it to several people simultaneously, takes money from each, and then leaves them to figure it out however they want. This is the very “double spend” against which, in the case of bitcoin transactions, it is recommended to wait for several confirmations before considering the transaction complete. Unfortunately, blockchain is not the Internet of Things, as Ivan Ivanitsky aptly formulated in his article on Habr. Information in a registry, whether centralized or distributed, may differ from the conditions of the transaction. To protect against most such fraudulent transactions, a temporary freeze of the funds paid for the acquired object is sufficient. During this time, the problem of multiple claimants to one title of ownership will have time to surface, but the seller will not have had time to secure the money, and it can be returned to the unsuccessful buyers. Such a payment delay can be implemented either through a trusted intermediary or, possibly, through smart contracts (although I am not an expert in this area).

Money, a continuation of the discussion

I am grateful to Grigory Bazhenov for continuing the discussion about the future of money. Cross-posting on Telegram is a somewhat autistic format for conducting a conversation, but what can you do—it’s a quirk of the platform.

Consumer inflation in the USA.

Here is my quote from our discussion in the YouTube comments:

If people are sitting at home in quarantine, then the production of consumer goods and services will decrease one way or another. Meanwhile, governments are proposed to subsidize people’s lost wages, meaning they will have money to go to the store, but goods will appear there in smaller quantities. In other words, either the government regulates prices, as already announced in Russia, and gets a shortage, or it doesn’t regulate, and gets price increases.

After some time, I read in a post by the authoritative Americanist Dudakov:

The forecasts of economists, who predicted that after the epidemic the USA and other Western countries would experience a jump in consumer inflation for the first time in 40 years, are coming true.

The spike in meat prices served as an illustration there, but the problem is much broader. I had not read the economists’ forecasts mentioned by Malek, and I made my own forecast based on the simplest logic. To be fair, I thought governments faced a dilemma—regulate prices or accept their growth. It turned out that Trump resorted to a third option—direct directive management of production.

However, the assumed rapid recovery of developed economies will most likely lead to the fact that prices for temporarily underproduced consumer goods will return to values close to pre-crisis levels. So, on this relatively unimportant issue, I see little sense in debating for long.

The role of Bitcoin

My original question to Grigory was formulated as follows:

How will an economy behave in which money created in a fractional reserve banking system and money that does not provide for fractional reserve circulate in parallel on comparable scales?

I am not an economist, and I was interested to know the opinion of professionals about how the behavior of a system with the proposed parameters would look. Alas, instead of an answer, I received assurances that Bitcoin’s capitalization today is too small, its volatility is too high, it cannot be used as money, it is poor as a hedge asset, and so on. In short, I was told about today’s Bitcoin, not about a hypothetical situation in which its capitalization has already reached values comparable to the money supply of global reserve currencies, or at least gold.

Well, for now—yes, I fully agree that Bitcoin is more volatile than gold, that it is a poor hedge asset, and that its liquidity is lower than that of the dollar (although on the global market, Bitcoin’s liquidity is much higher than that of the Russian ruble). Today, the role of Bitcoin is less an instrument for short-term speculation and more an instrument for long-term investment. For someone who bought Bitcoin five years ago, it doesn’t matter much how much today’s rate jumps, because they have been firmly in the green for a long time. Similarly, for today’s buyer, it doesn’t matter much at what price they buy if they intend to hold Bitcoin for at least five years. They will be in the green anyway. If Grigory disagrees with this statement, it would be interesting to read his arguments.

However, even in that unlikely situation where the long-term trend of the BTC/USD currency pair turns from growing to horizontal or even falling, Bitcoin retains its significance as digital peer-to-peer cash—that is, value that can be passed from hand to hand via communication channels without using unreliable intermediaries such as state-regulated banks or transfer systems. However, my question to Grigory concerns only that hypothetical situation where the capitalization of BTC and the volumes of trade in it have already grown significantly—not the current picture, which we already know.

Unsecured obligations and fractional reserve

Separately, there is a post by Artem Seversky stating that money is an anti-commodity, and that issuing loans from own savings is inefficient, and it is much more sensible to issue loans with money created out of thin air. I see no reason to forbid anyone from giving others unsecured obligations; it is quite enough for me that secured and unsecured obligations cannot be confused, and beyond that, let market mechanisms work.

For example, I can use Bitcoins in settlements, and if I receive a Bitcoin loan, it is only because the lender actually had those Bitcoins on hand before kindly lending to me. Or I can issue my own ancap-tokens, tie their price to a single commissioned article—and sell tokenized obligations for creating texts to anyone willing in exchange for consumer goods. This would be an unsecured obligation, but what does fractional reserve have to do with it? Fractional reserve is if someone buys a hundred of my tokens and issues a thousand of their own, with an obligation to exchange them for mine upon first demand.

Franklin looks at the gypsy physical Bitcoin as an unsecured obligation

Morality. A new video from Libertarian Band.

In the new video, the Libertarian Band team and I examined morality from the same perspective we previously used to examine law, namely as a spontaneous order, so it is better to watch both videos one after the other. I don’t recall anyone describing morality in this way before, but I hope we managed to provide a sufficiently coherent, consistent, and practically applicable vision of the topic.

And next will be a video on a topic that many libertarian theorists have clashed over — about children. So don’t forget to subscribe to the channel.