Bitarch’s Column
Holon Synergetic has published an article criticizing the deterrence doctrine, which we write about periodically. Let’s clarify some points.
1) One should not confuse the deterrence doctrine with terrorism. DD is a strategy for increasing the costs of initiating aggression. Methods for increasing costs may not involve the use of physical violence at all. Perhaps Holon has not read all of our articles on DD and missed this one. If DD is non-violent, it is harder for the state to slap a terrorist label on libertarians.
2) No wunderwaffen (robo-bees, genetically modified viruses, and especially doomsday weapons) are required for DD. Relying on wunderwaffen is by no means a libertarian strategy, as they are extremely complex, expensive, and will be available to few (meaning these people will be able to coerce others, ultimately recreating the status quo). For a stable free society according to Hirschleifer, a balance of violence potential (BVP) is needed; that is, weapons and deterrence strategies must be extremely simple and accessible to the maximum number of people.
3) For deterrence weapons, unlike weapons for classical wars, the “shell and armor” competition is practically inapplicable. Unacceptable damage can be inflicted in a million different ways, and new ones are constantly appearing. It is not for nothing that after the appearance of nuclear weapons, people began to talk about nuclear deterrence, rather than the development of a nuclear bomb neutralizer.
To protect against each type of deterrence weapon, separate “armor” is needed. For example, if the deterring party has ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and micro-drones, to intercept a retaliatory strike, one must have air defense/missile defense for each type, and with a large margin. So many ways to cause pain can be devised that even the nearly boundless US military budget would not be enough for defense.
4) An excursion into the history of medieval proto-panarchies shows that the demand for such institutions has existed for a long time, and now the theory is better developed and the technological level is higher. Furthermore, it is not necessary to involve the entire society in DD. Even a few will create a positive externality for others, as the example of the Femgericht perfectly demonstrates.
5) Regarding universal transparency, a standalone deterrence strategy can also be created on its basis. A libertarian jurisdiction might have no weapons for a retaliatory strike against state facilities at all, only many cameras and streaming to the network (to a server that is not subject to censorship and via a channel that cannot be suppressed—for example, Elon Musk’s Starlink, which uses a narrow beam). If a stationary bandit attempts to attack this jurisdiction, the broadcast of the attack to the network with all its juicy moments will deal a blow to the legitimacy of the government (tolerance for violence is currently extremely low, and various human rights activists will begin to undermine the careers of those who ordered the attack). Residents of such a libertarian jurisdiction would not need weapons more complex than household items—only to make the picture more colorful, otherwise the brief “they flew in and rounded them up” show will not gain a critical mass of views.
A similar strategy was successfully used by American black civil rights activists in the 1950s. Black activists sat in seats for whites on buses, refused to give them up at the request of the conductor, and the police arrested them. Public organizations often paid their fines to multiply the number of participants in such actions. Such cases were actively covered in the media, and irritation toward officials supporting segregation began to grow in society. Eventually, the supporters of segregation had to give in.

