Тег: Judgments

When the forest is cut, chips fly

Why is it that in many ancient narratives, ostracism/exile was mentioned as the only punishment, even for the most terrible criminals—murderers and rapists?

A truly interesting observation, for which even I could not find an answer for a long time. After all, no one was running a campaign for the humanization of punishments back then. Nor were there opportunities for a criminal to threaten significant damage to the entire society in the event of their arrest (the first mention of such a deterrence model was described by John von Neumann as “M.A.D.” after World War II, and even then it was realistic only for large group subjects—states, but not for individual actors).

So, the most plausible version is the extremely high value of human life in the described societies. For if people tried to arrest a criminal who was not initiating violence at that moment, he would likely be able to kill several people who came for him. In those societies, such a risk was considered unacceptable, so people simply motivated the villain to leave the community, ceasing all interaction with him. In mathematical terms, this solution was optimal in the game-theory matrix.

A different matter is strictly hierarchical etatist societies, where the phrase “The death of one person is a tragedy, the death of millions is statistics” is a norm of life. There, sacrificing even a hundred security officers to arrest one person is a good way to demonstrate the power of the stationary bandit (the state), so that others fear to contradict it. As for the fact that the mothers of the fallen security officers will cry at their graves, that is nothing terrible; “when the forest is cut, chips fly.” You can provide a survivor’s benefit in the amount of two minimum wages, and they will even kiss the portrait of the “radiant leader.”

What conclusion can be drawn from this? If you support physical punishments, including the use of violence for the confiscation of property, and justify this by a “court decision,” then you are not a libertarian! You are a vile authoritarian bastard like Hitler and Pol Pot, for whom “the death of one person is a tragedy, the death of millions is statistics.”

Bitarch

How will courts work under ancap?

анонимный вопрос

Since anarcho-capitalism does not emerge through social engineering, it is obviously pointless to make promises in the vein of “once ancap is established, all courts will operate according to these rules we have set.” We can show how courts operated in historical stateless societies, how they operate now in the non-state sphere, and how they could be organized if the state were consciously outgrown.

The issue of historical non-state legal systems is studied in detail in the book by David Friedman and Peter Leeson Legal systems very different from ours. Someday I will work on its translation, but for now, one can see from the table of contents alone just how many different legal systems existed that did not require state intervention in their operation.

What functions should a legal system perform?

  1. A system of landmarks. With a legal system in place, people can plan their actions, knowing what the procedure should be in the event of a conflict.
  2. Conflict freezing mechanisms. If a conflict occurs, it can always be attempted to be solved by direct force. The presence of a legal system, however, allows for the start of a conflict resolution procedure instead of an immediate fight. For example, summoning the opponent to court, to a duel, or giving them the business card of one’s insurance agent. The faster a lawsuit is initiated, the less damage will be caused, and the cheaper the process will be.
  3. Mechanisms for determining parties in court. A legal system can determine whether a person must defend their interests in court personally, whether they can be replaced by a representative, organize a class action, and so on.
  4. Restrictions on investigative methods. A legal system determines which evidence is considered valid (for example, a blockchain record) and which the court must ignore (for example, testimony given under torture).
  5. Procedure for choosing a judge. A legal system may require that both parties explicitly agree on the figure of the judge (arbitration), or it may prescribe a specific rigid procedure for applying to a pre-known court (for example, at the place where the conflict arose).
  6. Limitation of judicial powers. A judge may have the right to conduct an investigation, or may be required only to consider the evidence provided by the parties. He may have the right to summon witnesses under threat of sanctions, or may be limited to voluntary cooperation.
  7. Limitation of sentencing variability. The more predictable the outcomes of the proceedings, the lower the costs society members bear from uncertainty. Therefore, a legal system usually includes a certain schedule of penalties rather than leaving such things entirely to the discretion of the judge.
  8. Sentence enforcement system. A legal system may assume that both parties deposit funds in advance to secure possible compensation for a claim, may assume that the plaintiff collects the court-awarded amount independently, or may, for example, provide a system of coercion to execute sentences (for ancap, i.e., a society with an even distribution of the balance of violence potential, such coercion can only be non-violent).

Under ancap, various market agents can provide either a full range of legal services or individual specialized services. For example, a detective agency may provide only the search for evidence for court, a collection service only ensure recovery, a law firm represent the client’s interests in court, and the court itself organize the proceedings and issue decisions according to a pre-agreed legal system.

The development of legal systems is an evolutionary process, and it is impossible to predict in advance which solutions will be in demand in the market and which will not. Whether legal systems will be created by individual authoritative lawyers, consortia of legal service providers, or borrowed directly from existing systems is also impossible to predict.

More detailed information on the mechanisms of interaction between different elements of the legal system under ancap can be read in David Friedman’s book The Machinery of Freedom, chapter Police, Courts, and Laws in a Free Market.

On tangled court cases

Let’s imagine the following situation arising in an imaginary ancap society. In my opinion, someone has caused damage to my property, but in the opinion of that someone, he caused me no damage. And the circumstances of this case are such that it is very, very controversial; it is difficult for an objective party to determine who is right. As a result, this leads to a situation where, across a large sample of different courts, half of them side with me, and the other half side with the party I am accusing. To my suggestions to pay at least a portion of the compensation demanded by me (and by the courts that sided with me), the opponent categorically brushes them off, because, in his opinion, he did not cause damage to my property, and therefore does not owe me a single penny.

Under the conditions of a state, such a problem is reliably solved by a hierarchy of courts. Yes, someone will remain dissatisfied, but that is the whole essence of the institution of the court. In the conditions of ancap, however, we arrive at a complex conflict where my bailiffs and my opponent’s security must, in effect, start fighting each other, since both conflicting parties are equally right. What solution does ancap offer for such situations? And how should I personally behave in such a situation?

SK (the question is accompanied by a donation in the amount of 0.00088285btc)

The function of a court is to help the parties resolve their conflict. The only way to do this is for both parties to the conflict to recognize the jurisdiction of a particular court in a specific case. If the case is complex and convoluted, we cannot know in advance the position of any specific pre-designated court until it completes the proceedings. Therefore, all the parties to the conflict need to do is find a court that has a good enough reputation, is acceptable in price, and is willing to take on the case. Then, both parties enter into an agreement with the court that they are ready to execute its verdict in this case, and only after that does the court even begin to delve into the subject.

Since the case is so murky, the final court decision will likely be quite a compromise, such as one party receiving partial satisfaction of their claims while paying some compensation to the other party. But, however, we cannot know this in advance.

Naturally, each party to the conflict will be interested in the impartiality of the court; therefore, they will probably consider it important to include a clause in the contract stating that they reserve the right to withdraw from the process before the end of the proceedings if they can demonstrate the court’s interest in a particular outcome.

If one of the parties refuses in advance to recognize any verdict other than one that completely relieves them of obligations, they are thereby refusing the court as such, which means they intend to continue an open conflict with the second party. In this case, the party that agrees to the court can wave this readiness around, saying, “I am not the one starting a war here, I am merely defending myself,” and thereby gain new allies while gradually stifling the aggressor with sanctions, forcing them into peaceful negotiations.

By the way, peaceful negotiations, without any external arbitrator, are also a way of resolving a conflict, so a court is not a mandatory procedure for this at all.

As has been noted repeatedly by many, the state of affairs in international politics very much resembles ancap

How will accidents be resolved in ancap? For example, while defending myself from a bandit, I accidentally hit my neighbor and killed him with my automatic rifle.

анонимный вопрос

In such murky situations, it always makes sense to start by identifying the circle of interested parties: representatives of the deceased neighbor, representatives of the deceased bandits, surviving gang members, and perhaps other persons whose property was also at risk in this shootout. Then, the picture of what happened is reconstructed, making it clear whether you acted in collusion with the bandits, the extent of each gang member’s involvement, how the neighbor happened to end up in the line of fire, how you happened to hit him, and who ultimately suffered what property damage.

Next, the claims of the various parties in the proceedings against each other are outlined, the court issues verdicts on the validity of these claims, and then bargaining ensues until it is fixed who owes whom and how much. The court essentially becomes the moderator of this complex dispute, which, although it has the deciding vote, is interested in ensuring that, upon the conclusion of the dispute, no mutual claims remain if possible.

It is clear that in most such cases, the person who accidentally shot an innocent bystander will incur significant costs. It is clear that these costs can be partially offset by the attacker’s assets. It is clear that in a situation where the killed neighbor turned out to be of absolutely no interest to anyone, everyone will simply be very upset by such a fuck-up, and the matter may be reduced to ritual sacrifices like “lighting a candle for the repose of the soul every week and paying for commemorative prayers for ten years.” Feeling guilt for a misfortune that one inadvertently caused is normal for a human, and the market will certainly provide ways to make amends, as long as there is an obvious demand for such things.

A strange way for atheists to recover costs, even in the case where the subject to whom they are being paid is already gone.