Тег: Judgments

Let’s imagine a situation: a young man threatens a woman with a toy gun (a replica of a real one).

A woman entered self-defense mode and killed a man. Is the woman right in this situation? Is it permissible to kill a person if they point a replica pistol at you?

Alexey Deripaska

You know, a recent episode immediately came to mind, similar to the premise of the comedy “S Legkim Parom” (Enjoy Your Bath), but in the modern USA. A policewoman, thinking she was going to her own home, accidentally enters someone else’s house. There she sees a strange man and immediately kills him, mistaking him for a burglar.

It is quite obvious that in this tragic misunderstanding, the full responsibility lies with the woman, because the object of the attack did absolutely nothing to provoke it. The behavior of the woman, convinced that she had discovered a burglar, is completely logical and commendable: only such a lightning-fast reaction guarantees that the burglar will not have time to draw and use a gun first. But a mistake does not exempt one from responsibility, and a legal proceeding between the woman and the plaintiff, who filed a claim for damages resulting from the killing, will most likely lead to the woman having to pay the costs in full.

But now we add the provocative behavior of the deceased to the problem. It turns out that the emergence of a situation in which the woman defended herself from a presumed attack was caused not just by a tragic mistake, but is a direct consequence of the deceased’s reckless actions. Her behavior is also completely logical and commendable, as in the first case, but the party whose actions directly provoked the accident is different.

Therefore, a potential court proceeding here will most likely conclude that the man who threatened the woman with a dummy gun bears full responsibility. Wanted to play a prank? Well, congratulations, you played a fucking great prank!

… that’s because it says “replica” on the side of your gun…

Is vigilantism possible under ancap?

анонимный вопрос

This is also a fairly popular question; early answers can be found under the tag “court”, so it will be difficult to provide something new, but I will try.

Right here, I defined a court as a legal institution within which a conflict between parties is resolved by a third party, with the clarification that under ancap, a court can resolve conflicts only within the scope of the authority delegated to it by the parties to the conflict. I have also previously referred to the legal principle that no one can be a judge in their own cause.

Thus, formally, vigilantism is not a legal procedure, and the question could be closed on that basis, but the real world introduces its own corrections.

First, a person is fully entitled to exercise vigilantism upon themselves. They repented for some of their old actions and settled their accounts with life. Or decided to give ten bitcoins to charity. Or rewarded themselves with a couple of cocktails for meeting a deadline. This is vigilantism: the person evaluated their own actions, appointed the measure of retribution, and carried out the sentence themselves.

Second, in a conflict situation, one party may surrender themselves to the judgment of the other party. For example, I messed up, I surrender myself to your judgment, decide fairly how I should compensate for the damage. This could be an act of trust that strengthens further relations, an act of recklessness that lays the foundation for a future deep grievance, or a subtle manipulation designed to touch the other party and force them to forgive—it all depends on a multitude of circumstances, but in any case, such a deal also remains voluntary, and therefore legal, and this can also be called vigilantism.

Third, one of the parties to the conflict may decide to inflict some damage on the second party and be satisfied with that. I was overcharged at a restaurant, they were rude in response to a remark, I calmly walk outside, smash the display window, and leave. This is also vigilantism: the restaurant was sentenced by me to the destruction of its window. Is this a legal procedure? No. Is it possible under ancap? Yes. Will the conflict be exhausted after the application of this procedure? Quite possibly, if the passive party to the conflict, upon rational reflection, decides that to hell with it, it’s cheaper than going to court.

The broken windows theory in all its glory

Why, under ancap, will courts follow libertarian principles of law?

анонимный вопрос

Answering this question is not just simple, but very simple. If people only apply to a court voluntarily, and the court has no means of coercing the execution of its decisions—which is precisely the kind of pathetic existence courts might lead under ancap—then courts have no options left but to follow libertarian principles of law.

Alice, based on the principle of self-ownership, voluntarily turned to a court to resolve a conflict with Bob. The court denies Alice self-ownership and issues a verdict stating that she has no right to own any property, so that Bob has the right of exclusive disposal over all disputed property, starting with Alice herself. Bob, in accordance with the court’s decision, appropriates all the property, including Alice, whom he keeps on a leash and beats for any disobedience.


Under ancap, there cannot be a sad girl on a leash!

What will stop Alice from sabotaging the court’s decision and actively resisting Bob, seeking any outside help? What will stop any outsider who, seeing a violation of the NAP, asks what is going on, is told it is the execution of a court decision, and responds that he doesn’t give a fuck?

Since the question itself postulates that it is ancap all around, it means the vast majority of relationships in this society are voluntary and market-based. This is precisely what everyone perceives as the norm, and any deviation from the norm must be hidden or very carefully justified.

One can ask “what would be the typical reaction under ancap to such-and-such a deviation from libertarian principles,” and in response, those typical reactions will be described, demonstrating the feedback mechanisms in an anarcho-capitalist society that make deviating from basic principles unprofitable. But it is pointless to frame the question as “how to fight mass deviations of courts from libertarian principles under ancap?” If they are mass deviations, it is no longer ancap, and one must look into why they are mass and which feedback mechanisms were lacking.

The question of whether a pure anarcho-capitalist society is stable has no theoretical solution today. Societies considered precursors to ancap in legal terms (Ireland, Iceland) were historically defeated by external forces, but this is not an argument for internal instability.

If someone accidentally bumped me with their shoulder or stepped on my foot, and I shot the “aggressor” in response—would I be right from the perspective of the NAP?

anonymous question

For reasons that are unclear to me, in Russian libertarianism, the main emphasis is too often placed on the NAP, and the non-aggression principle is given not so much a legal meaning, but rather an ethical, or even mystical, one. All sorts of bastardized constructions like “I didn’t sign a NAP with you” or “he exited the NAP” stem from this intellectual imbalance. The violation of the NAP becomes a magic trigger that transforms a person from a legal subject into an object of legitimate violence.

As a reminder, the correct formulation of the NAP is “no one has the right to the unpunished initiation of violence.” And this principle is a derivative of the far more fundamental principle of self-ownership, which asserts a person’s inalienable property right to their own body. Violence, therefore, is an infringement on property. This infringement entails legal consequences if the owner so wills it.

The NAP, by asserting the lack of a right to unpunished aggressive violence, says nothing about the measure of punishment. Simply put, you have a property claim against another person: he stepped on your foot. You present this claim to him. In response, he suggests you don’t put your feet wherever you please, meaning he asserts that you created an obstacle for him, preventing him from moving freely across a territory that, for example, belongs to neither of you. By stepping on your foot, he avoided a trip-up that would have caused him property damage. You, in turn, are flabbergasted and suggest he wash his eyes and look where he’s going, meaning you assert that his behavior poses a constant systemic threat to those around him. He responds by saying he fucked your mother and tells you to fuck off. Thus, if one does not take his statement literally, he is asserting that he is ready to use violence against you if you do not stop making claims against him. You respond by telling him he’s out of line, a faggot, and that you will now make him lick your boots with his tongue. In other words, you promise the enforcement of the satisfaction of your property claims, but leave him the opportunity to bargain over the amount of compensation. He responds by promising to shove your boots up your ass, meaning he categorically refuses to satisfy your property claim in any form and expresses readiness to escalate damage in response to your attempt at enforcement. You, in turn, shoot him dead, meaning you apply ultimate economic sanctions against him, rendering his property useless.

Of course, in this case, there might not have been an argument, and you might have applied these economic sanctions immediately, without waiting for the counterparty’s refusal to pay compensation for damages. But to a potential judge, the case looks exactly like this: relatively small damage was caused to you, and in response, you caused significantly greater damage. Consequently, should you be required to make some compensatory payments to someone, should you be expelled from the local community, or should you be thanked for taking out a dangerous asshole who loved to pick on people but was, fortunately, not as skilled with a weapon as you—exactly what decision the court will reach will depend on many circumstances that the court must consider. Your reputation, the reputation of the deceased, community traditions, the compensation requested by the deceased’s friends, the personal moral beliefs of the judge, and possibly a number of other factors will play a role.

And these legal frameworks concerning permissible sanctions for a given property damage are a spontaneous order that will form in a libertarian society, optimally adapting it to the needs of people such that people’s satisfaction in society is maximized and conflicts are minimized. Because that is precisely the function of law—to resolve conflicts. 

Hey, Ancap-chan. Can you explain step-by-step and in detail how the judicial system will work in the wonderful Ancapistan? And how will private prisons make a profit?

anonymous question

In addition to this post, I also recommend reading all posts tagged “court,” at least this one and this one.

To start, let me roll out a bunch of definitions related to your question. Often, providing clear definitions is enough, and the answer to the question becomes completely obvious.

  • Property  – the relationship of an object to a subject, within which the subject disposes of the object at their discretion, and other subjects refrain from similar actions without the owner’s sanction.
  • Ancap – a system of relations between people based on the principle of self-ownership, that is, ownership of oneself. In common parlance, we will also call an “ancap” a person who is ready to adhere to this system of relations.
  • Law – a complex of practices for resolving conflicts between people.
  • Court – a legal institution within which a conflict between parties is resolved by a third party. Under ancap, a court can resolve conflicts only within the scope of the authority delegated to it by the parties to the conflict.
  • Prison – a legal institution within which the party that caused damage is isolated from the party that suffered damage. Under ancap, isolation can occur only with the sanction of the isolated party and only on terms agreed upon with them.

Now let’s provide a few examples of how law works in Ancapistan.

  1. Two ancaps disagree with each other regarding which of them owns a certain object. They have stated their claims to each other, and after discussion, they agreed on who gets the disputed object, and who, for example, in exchange for waiving their claims, receives an agreed-upon compensation. The conflict is resolved.
  2. Two ancaps disagree with each other regarding which of them owns a certain object. They have stated their claims to each other but have not reached an agreement. Then they agree with a third party in one way or another and delegate to them the authority to resolve the conflict. The court examines the situation, issues a decision, and the parties to the conflict execute the decision. The conflict is resolved.
  3. Two ancaps disagree with each other regarding which of them owns a certain object. In an attempt to exercise their property rights over the disputed object, the parties begin to cause each other some damage. Not wanting the conflict to escalate, one of the parties finds a shelter where they are out of reach of the second party, and after this, the parties begin to negotiate about a court. The court examines the situation, issues a decision, and the parties to the conflict execute the decision. The conflict is resolved.

The shelter appearing in the third example is, in essence, a prison. For the service of providing security during the period of imprisonment, the prison owner may charge a fee from the client, that is, from the person who wishes to obtain shelter.

I do not think that under ancap, the service of imprisonment will be in such high demand that it would be profitable to build special, well-protected structures to provide it. Most likely, the service of providing shelter will be provided decentrally and will be more declarative in nature.

A guy is running down the street, all disheveled and bruised, and another guy is behind him, very agitated and wanting to bruise the first one even more. The first guy rushes to me and asks for help. I shield him from the second one and suggest that he move toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict. I have isolated one participant of the conflict from the other, and, in essence, this is no different from putting him in a pretrial detention center. The only thing that prevents the strong side in this conflict from continuing the crackdown on the weak side is the unwillingness to enter into a conflict with me as well. In the vast majority of situations, this is quite enough.

Will I take money for the service provided? I don’t know, it depends on the circumstances, depending on how much it distracts me from my own affairs.

In describing this example, I proceeded from the implicit assumption that ancap developed in a peaceful society through the gradual withering away of the state, which is why the described conflict, within which the need for shelter arose, looks quite “vegetarian.” Of course, if some Venezuela arrives at ancap through the complete and rapid bankruptcy of the state, then conflicts between people in the first stage will be significantly more numerous, and there may indeed arise a sufficiently stable, solvent demand for solid fortified shelters where the client would be provided with armed security services. But the probability of such a scenario seems very small to me.

Explain the difference between common law and civil law jurisdictions?

anonymous question

This is roughly like asking what the difference is between equality and a jury trial. The first is a principle. The second is an institution. Between them is a cause-and-effect relationship.

NAP is the non-aggression principle, stating that no one has the right to use aggressive violence with impunity. Contractual jurisdictions are an institution for conflict resolution based on adherence to the NAP.

The point of contractual jurisdictions is that one subject enters into an agreement with another subject stating that they are subject to their jurisdiction. The agreement also specifies what limitations this jurisdiction has.
The existence of a contract between the court and the subject is a mandatory condition that ensures compliance with the NAP, since under the contract, the subject agrees to execute the court’s decision or agrees that they will be forced to execute it. Without such prior consent, an attempt to force a convicted person to execute a court decision becomes a violation of the non-aggression principle.

The most elementary example of a contractual jurisdiction is an arbitration court. Two parties to a conflict enter into a contract with a court to resolve one specific conflict, pledging to execute the court’s decision regardless of what it may be. An arbitration court provides the highest possible degree of fairness in conflict resolution, but is poorly suited for cases of extreme bitterness between parties, as well as situations where the parties are barely acquainted and simply cannot find a single person whom both parties trust.

In cases where a pure arbitration court is difficult, intermediaries begin to step in. I entrust the settlement of my conflict to someone I have chosen as my representative, and after some effort, they provide me with a result: here the opponent is ready to make such-and-such a concession, here it makes sense for me to make a concession, I can also count on such-and-such compensation, but I must pay such-and-such for the mediation. I agree to this, and a settlement occurs. Or I disagree and negotiations continue.

The more stable a society is, the more likely it is that such mediation contracts will become more long-term and the results of their activity more predictable. People generally love to generalize and average things out to save effort and not worry about minor details.
Thus arises what is usually meant by the words “contractual jurisdictions,” although this is only a specific case of them: a system in which practically everyone is bound by a permanent contract with one jurisdiction or another, and it is that jurisdiction that handles all their conflicts, whether they bring claims against others or others bring claims against them. A contractual jurisdiction can be freely changed, but this will likely happen no more often than people change mobile operators today.

To a certain approximation, such a judicial system existed in Iceland during the Age of Sagas, that is, in the period of the absence of a state, when jurisdiction, along with priestly functions, was carried out by the so-called godi, and a landowner could enter one godord or another or move to a different one.

For the geeks, I can even provide a link with a description of this legal system.

Modern Icelandic godi are more like role-playing games, but imitation institutions sometimes wake up

According to economic research, sustainable economic growth correlates weakly with the democratic or authoritarian nature of a state and the volume of state intervention in the economy — institutions play the decisive role. So how do we move from modern Russia to a country with a normal court, for example?

anonymous question

As I have already noted in the article on ancap and minarchism, there are two paths for changes in society: the political and the countercultural. For example, the Corn Laws in Great Britain were repealed through political means, while Lincoln’s famous Homestead Act was simply a recognition of a state of affairs already established through countercultural means.

How to act politically is more or less clear: through political pressure. All unjust sentences are contested in higher courts, the judges who issued them are shamed, there are no plea bargains or simplified judicial procedures, and all conversations with the police take place only in the presence of a lawyer… Simultaneously, a project for judicial reform is popularized, and every politician claiming any public visibility must be pressed about their attitude toward this project; if they dare say a word against it, they must be completely denied support. In a similar way, Prohibition was introduced in the States—you can imagine how strong the resistance was. So, one should not underestimate the capabilities of influence groups.

The countercultural method is also more or less clear. A complete refusal to voluntarily apply to state courts, non-recognition of any state court sentences, but simultaneously—the strengthening of the institute of arbitration, private investigation, and contract enforcement. There are examples of the success of such an approach to reshaping institutions, and in recent history: when Great Britain began to recognize the decisions of Sharia courts, it was precisely a surrender to a state of affairs established through countercultural means.

Counterculture on the march

And while others discuss other things, I am talking about bitcoins. There is a political way to establish them as a means of payment: lobbying for their legalization. And there is a countercultural way: simply conduct all settlements in bitcoins whenever possible, and reject offers to pay in rubles whenever possible. The ability to send me a donation in bitcoins from a bank card is a kind of compromise; of course, it’s better to do it directly: 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8.

You wrote that in the event that a child is subjected to domestic violence, a third party can only explain the child’s rights to them. But isn’t such treatment of children aggression? Why, in this case, are the actions of the parent/guardian not a violation of the NAP?

anonymous question

I wrote that an outsider can use the rich arsenal of peaceful resolution techniques with impunity, but applying violence or the threat of violence is at their own risk. If you see a fight, it would be appropriate to inquire whether it is a private fight before intervening. Similarly, upon seeing violence against a child, it is appropriate to ask the child if they need help. If there is no opportunity or desire to clarify this important point, the consequences may be unpredictable.

Yes, the guardian is using violence against the child and thereby violating the principle of non-aggression toward them. However, by manifesting aggression against the child’s guardian without the child’s sanction, you also violate the principle of non-aggression toward the child. And it is the child who will be the first one asked after this incident who exactly caused them harm. And you could very well turn out to be the one who caused that harm.

Your evidence regarding the extent of the violence against the child must be damn convincing for an arbitrator, whose jurisdiction both you and the child’s guardian recognize, to rule that guardianship rights should indeed transfer from the current guardian to another party wishing to obtain them, in a situation where the child does not demonstrate a desire to change guardians.

So, I understand that under libertarianism, there is seemingly nothing complicated with judges and courts—they will continue as they were. But who will execute the sentence, and on what grounds should one trust a particular person to carry out a court judgment?

anonymous question

With judges and courts under ancap, not only will nothing be difficult—it will be much simpler than it is now.

Currently, one must perform a multitude of strange ritualistic gestures just so the monopolist condescends to review a request and decide something, and these processes drag on insanely long; very often, both litigating parties end up as victims in fact, while only all sorts of intermediaries benefit from the procedure.
The majority of disputes under ancap will resemble modern commercial arbitration: when establishing certain relations, the parties decide in advance whom they trust to resolve their conflicts, and then, having sought a court, voluntarily execute its decision.

In situations where the parties, while establishing relations, do not fully trust each other’s integrity, they can immediately deposit a sufficiently large sum each, granting the arbitrator the right to deduct a penalty from the deposit in favor of the party to whom that penalty is awarded after the conflict is resolved.

An indispensable condition of a court is the voluntary consent of the parties to execute any of its decisions in advance. Forcible summons to court, as well as the forcible execution of a court sentence, is simply ritualized retribution.

Will there be an institution of such retribution under ancap? Yes, it is quite likely there will be.

Imagine that Bob caused some damage to Alice and disappeared. Alice hires detectives and establishes who caused the damage, after which she seeks judgment from persons who are, in her opinion, sufficiently authoritative: what compensation she could forcibly seize from Bob. The court examines the evidence and becomes convinced that the damage was indeed caused by Bob, then decides what compensation would be appropriate, and Alice, with the court decision in hand, begins to seize Bob’s property. The more authoritative the court Alice turned to is for those guarding Bob’s property, the easier it will be for her to achieve the seizure. Sooner or later, Alice receives her compensation, rewards everyone who helped her, and with that, her claims against Bob are exhausted (though he may still have claims against her, since the conflict between Alice and Bob was not settled amicably).

Finally, it may happen that Alice demands Bob’s head as compensation rather than property. Then, if the court recognizes her demand as justified, she, with this decision in hand, begins to hire bounty hunters, setting a reward for Bob’s head. They will be all the more willing to sign up for this work the larger the reward and the more authoritative the judge is for them. And here it will be in Bob’s interest to find Alice and try to reconcile with her (killing Alice may not be enough, as it would not cancel the contract on his head).

Bob, you shouldn’t have disappeared…

Petya killed Vanya

Petya killed Vanya. Petya is on trial. During the trial, it is revealed that Vanya was a serial killer. By killing him, Petya eliminated a violator of the NAP and saved many lives. The problem is that Petya had no idea about his victim’s sins—Petya is simply a scumbag and a murderer.

Should we condemn Petya for murder or acquit him because Vanya violated the NAP?

In other words, at what point does a violator of the NAP exit the NAP—at the moment the crime is committed, or when a third party finds out about it?

In this problem, we are operating within the zone of libertarian law.

Evgeny Kvasov

Elevating the NAP to the rank of the primary principle of libertarianism leads to many disagreements and linguistic monstrosities, such as “violation of the moral NAP,” “I didn’t enter into a NAP with you,” or “exiting the NAP.” People perceive the non-aggression principle as something like a contract that can be entered into, terminated, and supplemented with additional conditions.

It is far more convenient to derive everything directly from the basic axiom of libertarianism—the axiom of self-ownership. Petya killed Vanya, thereby infringing upon Vanya’s private property—Vanya’s body. It does not matter whether Petya was a bounty hunter for the “Sonechko” insurance company hunting Vanya, a former contractor for the Moscow Kingdom, or a drunkard who killed a stranger for a sideways glance, or even if Petya was defending himself from Vanya’s attack. In any case, Petya damaged someone else’s property, and he must now be prepared to bear responsibility for it.

If someone is found who wants to, or is contractually obligated to, deal with Vanya’s killer, then Petya will have to either fight back or try to reach an agreement—either amicably or in court.

According to the conditions of the problem, Petya agreed to a trial. In the trial, in our case, it is revealed that Vanya in no way encroached upon Petya, and Petya was not acting on behalf of those to whom Vanya had previously caused harm. This means that there was a violation of the NAP on Petya’s part, and the plaintiff—for example, Vanya’s insurance company—can demand compensation. It also emerges in court that Vanya is a long-time violator of the NAP, and a reward has been placed on his head by another insurance company.

The most likely outcome of the case: Petya receives a reward for killing Vanya from one insurance company and pays compensation for killing Vanya to another insurance company. And that company, in turn, had already paid an insurance premium to Vanya’s heirs before any trial took place.

Obviously, the outcome of the case could be different: there might have been no reward for Vanya, and then Petya would find himself in more difficult financial circumstances.

By the way, speaking of difficult financial circumstances. I very much hope that everything is fine with your money, and you might even decide to thank this channel in monetary form. My wallet: 1A7Wu2enQNRETLXDNpQEufcbJybtM1VHZ8