Тег: Law

There is a rule in libertarianism that if there is no victim, there is no court. It turns out that it would be profitable for a bandit to destroy the entire family so that no victims remain. Something about this is wrong…

anonymous question

So, I live in my own house, and one of my neighbors killed another neighbor and his entire family. What happens to the price of my house because a dangerous psycho lives next door? It drops rapidly. Who am I after that? A victim.

In a situation where law is decentralized, your moral judgment can always become the basis for your actions. There is no one to forbid you from doing something, but the responsibility will be entirely yours.

If I have enough evidence of how my neighbor killed an entire family, and I kill him afterwards, then to whoever accuses me of this murder, I will show this evidence and explain that I had sufficient grounds to fear for my own life, as the deceased was far too unpredictable. And I’ll bring up the argument about the house price, just as a cherry on top.

And then we’ll see if I can make peace with the relatives and acquaintances of the deceased.

In the modern world, which is largely individualistic, moral evaluations of actions usually play a more significant role than kinship ties—after all, we no longer live in a clan society where the kin effectively acted as a single legal entity.

reconciliation of blood feud parties

You wrote that in the event that a child is subjected to domestic violence, a third party can only explain the child’s rights to them. But isn’t such treatment of children aggression? Why, in this case, are the actions of the parent/guardian not a violation of the NAP?

anonymous question

I wrote that an outsider can use the rich arsenal of peaceful resolution techniques with impunity, but applying violence or the threat of violence is at their own risk. If you see a fight, it would be appropriate to inquire whether it is a private fight before intervening. Similarly, upon seeing violence against a child, it is appropriate to ask the child if they need help. If there is no opportunity or desire to clarify this important point, the consequences may be unpredictable.

Yes, the guardian is using violence against the child and thereby violating the principle of non-aggression toward them. However, by manifesting aggression against the child’s guardian without the child’s sanction, you also violate the principle of non-aggression toward the child. And it is the child who will be the first one asked after this incident who exactly caused them harm. And you could very well turn out to be the one who caused that harm.

Your evidence regarding the extent of the violence against the child must be damn convincing for an arbitrator, whose jurisdiction both you and the child’s guardian recognize, to rule that guardianship rights should indeed transfer from the current guardian to another party wishing to obtain them, in a situation where the child does not demonstrate a desire to change guardians.

How, under ancap, will the protection of children from parental violence, and specifically from psychological violence, be implemented?

anonymous question

The principle of self-ownership means that every person belongs to themselves. A child, however, is a person who, due to the finite speed of development of the human organism, is not yet perceived by other people as fully legal-capable. Therefore, while they do own themselves, they do not actually exercise full disposal of themselves—the right to dispose of the child is partially usurped by one adult or another (a fully legal-capable person), with the consent of other adults.

And then a situation arises where the way this adult exercises this usurped right ceases to satisfy the child. It does not matter whether it is a case of direct physical violence, psychological violence (regardless of what adult behavior is called such), or simply a clash of tastes. What matters is that at any moment, the child can both declare their full legal capacity and delegate the right of partial disposal of themselves to any other adult—that is, offer them to assume the rights of a guardian—provided, of course, they can come to an agreement with the candidate for guardianship. In this case, it is simple. The adult who, in the child’s opinion, performed their guardianship duties in bad faith, is deprived of the corresponding rights, and now nothing protects them in the event of violence against the child.

But what if the child does not insist on stripping the adult of their guardianship rights (being too young, too intimidated, or, most likely, generally satisfied with the situation), yet from the point of view of an outside adult, the guardianship duties are being performed unsatisfactorily? All that an outsider can do without penalty is to express their judgment on the matter, share this judgment with other adults, try to explain the child’s rights to them—in short, apply all the rich tools accumulated by humanity for the peaceful resolution of misunderstandings.

If for some reason they consider such measures insufficient, they may, of course, decide to use violence, thereby turning the conflict into a war, but as a fully legal-capable person, they must realize that they are fully responsible for the consequences of this decision, and that these consequences may not be what they expected.

I would like to know how things would stand with zoophilia and other perversions (excluding people) under libertarianism?

Anonymous question

If you are interested for the purpose of figuring out whether you should buy shares in a company that produces accessories for zoophiles in advance, or conversely, whether you should dump these shares, then I have no good news for you: it is impossible to make quantitative forecasts here.

From the position of libertarianism, animals are objects, not subjects of law (the exception, as you correctly noted, is an animal such as a human, simply by virtue of the fact that he invented this very law). Therefore, any actions of an owner with his animal on his own territory, which do not cause direct damage to other people who are not co-owners of the animal or the territory, cannot be subjects of legal proceedings at all. It is another matter that such actions can be given a moral evaluation, and one can attempt, through shaming, to drive someone who treated an animal “wrongly” to the point of suicide, if one has enough talent and persistence.

But an interesting legal case occurred to me, which I would not venture to resolve unequivocally.

A cat owner lives in a certain condominium. According to the charter, the chairman of the condominium is elected in general elections by the members of the condominium, and to be elected, it is not strictly necessary to be a member of the condominium oneself. The cat was included in the ballot, won the election, and is now the chairman of the condominium. Then, the owner of the cat performs a sexual act with it without the latter’s consent and publishes a video. The question is: in this case, should the cat be considered the sole property of its owner, or an official who has been harmed?

Stubbs the cat, mayor of Talkeetna, Alaska

Anglo-Saxon or Roman law?

Anonymous question

Oh. Usually, however, continental law is contrasted with Anglo-Saxon law.

In the first case, the judge determines the decision for each specific issue; he may base it on precedents as well as various codes, but he is also entitled to establish his own precedent. The only thing a judge is strongly advised not to neglect is general legal principles, many of which were discovered precisely within the framework of Roman law.
As for the second case, the judge’s role is reduced to determining which article of a particular code describes the situation under consideration, and then making a decision according to that article.

Effectively, the ideal judge in continental law is a computer expert system. Only in cases where legislative uncertainty is found does the judge have to turn to precedents (so-called law enforcement practice) or even establish a precedent himself.

It is easy to see that continental law is permeated with a spirit of distrust toward the judge and his sense of justice, provoking cynicism and the thoughtless stamping out of decisions. Of course, all other things being equal, I would prefer precedent law, especially in complex matters.

However, one of the most important features of Ancapistan is the complete decentralization of law. If the parties recognize the jurisdiction of the court over them, it is completely irrelevant whether the court judges by codes, precedents, Sharia, or a table of random numbers—the decisions of such a court must be obeyed. If even one party does not recognize the jurisdiction of the court over them, then it is no longer a court, but some legally null procedure.