Тег: Libertarianism

Watched Milov’s video, letting my inner libertarian out for a walk

Yesterday, I put on a video by Milov to listen to before sleep, but I fell asleep before reaching the scandalous phrase about the inner libertarian. I had to start it over in the morning.

In short, Vladimir’s thesis boils down to the idea that it is not always appropriate to take the side of big business when it is in conflict with a state defending certain political interests, especially when big business is lobbying for its own interests. And if your inner libertarian only knows how to say “everything private is good, everything state-owned is bad,” then kill it and grow another, more adequate one. Because values are subjective, and nothing is “good” or “bad” in a vacuum; these terms are always attached to a specific interested party—specifically, who exactly benefits and who exactly suffers.

Is it good for the German gas consumer that their country will receive cheap fuel supplies with massive excess transport capacity? Obviously, it’s good, and from Montenegro, I can only be happy for them. Is it good for a Pomeranian worker that a new employer comes to their land and creates many high-paying jobs? Yes, it’s wonderful for them! Is it good for a Ukrainian worker that their local job maintaining the pipeline is under threat of abolition or at least salary cuts? Nothing good about that. But is it good for them that they can travel to Germany without a visa to maintain the pipeline being built there, already earning a German salary? You bet! True, they will have to compete with Germans, and here, if the German tries to use state protectionism, the Ukrainian will suffer.

Is it good that gas is extracted in Russia and a transport network is built allowing its delivery to various corners of the world? This is an incorrect question. The question does not specify the subject for whom we are making assumptions—whether it is good or bad for them. For Putin, it’s good—the geopolitical club is long, heavy, and shiny. For the rotational workers laying the pipes—it’s great. For Gazprom shareholders—it’s questionable, because the commercial profit from the project is unclear; it’s less about money and more about geopolitics. For Russian citizens counting on some taxes from this Gazprom—don’t count on other people’s money and you’ll sleep sounder; and what are you even doing in Russia? Get out of there, following me and Vladimir Milov. The inner libertarian sticks its head out and gives the budget workers the finger.

In short, a huge thank you to Vladimir Milov for promoting libertarianism. Navalny is in prison and can no longer, as before, send us to forced labor, so Milov has to take the heat. It’s okay, he’ll manage.

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Nozick’s views on property rights.

I have started on the fourth section of Eric Mackay’s book Libertarianism, dedicated to economic justice and property rights. Like the third, it consists of a short introduction and two chapters showing the views of Nozick and Hayek on the subject—apparently, for Mackay, there are no other libertarians worthy of attention on this issue (though this is likely because Mackay is writing a book on philosophy, not on history, economics, or law, which explains the selection of authors).

The chapter on Nozick examines how he tore into supporters of distributive justice, showing that to achieve some ideal end-state, they would have to launch a mechanism of permanent revolution, and to apply some single distributive model, they would have to reduce everyone to partial slavery. Nozick opposes this redistributive ecstasy with the libertarian approach well known to us, according to which the justice of a particular property right depends on the procedures by which it was acquired, rather than on the size of the property or, for example, the degree of the beneficiary’s loyalty to the party line.

I express my deep gratitude to everyone who sent in donations for the translation of this chapter; now we can start collecting for the next one. And while the money for Mackay (or for Molynneux, you love Molynneux, don’t you?) is being collected, I will return to Friedman; a chapter on the laws of the Chinese Empire awaits us.

Exit from Sausage Libertarianism

A certain Belarusian libertarian, known in narrow circles and who changes nicknames frequently enough that there is no point in remembering them, recently posted a solid article on the subject on Telegraph.

A brief list of the article’s key takes from the author himself (what a clever boy, he took care of everything):

1) There are ethical libertarians and “sausage” libertarians

2) Sausage libertarians are useless or harmful to libertarianism and are prone to drifting toward other political views

3) The opposite of a sausage libertarian is an ethical libertarian

4) An ethical libertarian differs from a sausage one by possessing a libertarian mindset and a libertarian framework

5) Most libertarian activity in attracting new members is focused on attracting sausage libertarians and building a libertarian framework, as well as transferring it to ethical libertarians

6) A libertarian mindset is determined at a young age, and to increase the number of ethical libertarians, one should create it in other people’s children through specific practices.

7) Our enemies deal with the mindsets of other people’s children, while libertarians do not

8) And they should

In other words, the author suggests that we stop denying the insinuations that libertarians supposedly love children and, moreover, have a huge interest specifically in other people’s children—and instead, start confirming these insinuations, but in their own libertarian way. Like: everyone thought that “teaching” was a euphemism for “fucking,” but he actually makes children libertarians.

If, after reading the article, you share its conclusions, I await an influx of libertarians into children’s sports sections and creative studios (well, not state schools, for heaven’s sake), the organization of children’s libertarian hiking trips, the hiring of children for part-time jobs, and other useful practices.

Consumer Serfdom

Currently, many companies, such as Apple, Tesla, and John Deere, design their products so that in the event of a breakdown, the user cannot repair them, even if they know how. For example, a farmer could buy a certain part for a John Deere tractor for $100 and would have no trouble replacing it. However, the software installed on the tractor will prevent such a procedure, and the farmer will either have to pay $5,000 for the manufacturer’s service or install pirated software. In essence, the farmer does not own the tractor but merely takes it on an indefinite lease.
How does libertarianism view such a policy?

themouse1_ from Bulbaland

The examples provided are particular cases of the platform economy. Similarly, an app developer is forced to adapt to the requirements of the company producing the operating system for which the app is developed. Likewise, a hired worker on a plantation in Brazil a century ago was obliged to buy groceries only from the shop run by the plantation owner, and in Soviet Russia, a collective farmer could only redeem his work-days, again, at a specific village store.

In short, these are not entirely market cases. Can such quasi-monopolistic situations arise in a completely free economy? Yes, but they are unstable. The emergence of a profit source significantly higher than the market average leads to others wanting to imitate such success, and soon competition levels the margin: platform owners, competing for the customer, begin to spend more on maintaining their loyalty.

Libertarianism proposes removing politics from the economy. Will this make John Deere more reasonable? Not immediately. Simply put, they will no longer have the ability to sue the farmer for installing pirated software. Therefore, wanting their authorized service to not go completely under, they will lower repair prices. Moreover, some Japanese or Belarusian tractors will start being imported duty-free, so the consumer will have a real choice and will be able to acquire the solution that maximizes their profit from operating the tractor.

Similarly, without the ability to force a worker to eat expensive slop in the factory canteen, without the ability to forbid installing apps from outside the app store on a smartphone, without the ability to punish a kiosk owner for moving under the protection of another security firm—the owners of all these platforms will find that racketeering practices work worse and worse, and they must get used to acting within the framework of fair competition. It’s fine, they’ll get used to it.

A good tractor, what else

Tyan, but what about the physical restriction of liberty for dangerous criminals under ancap?

If, for example, we take ancap according to Molynieu, is it really possible that a few rich kids who caused a car accident while drunk or high, even without fatalities, or raped a girl, will be able to pay compensation, even tenfold, and continue to roam free? Money is money, but the danger to society hasn’t disappeared. Would you yourself, God forbid, if the above happened to you, turn to a state or private court, assuming we have minarchism with ancap tendencies and a choice between them? Yes, a state court would shake out a tiny compensation, as usually happens, but would isolate rapists in a colony for 5-10 years, with a small chance that they won’t return, or will return as broken and sick people. A private court, however, would shake out compensation exceeding the damage dozens of times over, but would release the rapists, as we know that the goal of punishment under ancap is not correction or retribution, but restitution for damages. What do you say to that?

Pushistik (question accompanied by a donation of 0.00009809btc)

Fortunately, I have already managed to write the first chapters of a book on libertarianism, so I can immediately send you to read about libertarian law. The task of the court is not to punish the criminal or to squeeze the maximum amount of money out of them. The task of the court is to resolve the conflict. Even if I couldn’t reach an agreement with the rapists regarding which court should consider our conflict, and the court turns out to be imposed on the defendants, this does not cancel the main task of the court. The outcome must be a situation where the conflict between me and the rapists is considered exhausted.

For me, it is extremely important to understand that I will never see these people again in my life. This will allow me not to flinch upon seeing an indistinct figure in my peripheral vision (at least, I hope). So I would insist that they receive an order to live in some specific city known to me, even if it is quite large. Accordingly, I will never set foot in that city, and they must stay out of mine. Of course, monitoring their compliance with this point will cost money—there’s no way around it, let them cough it up, it’s important to me.

I have a very strong psyche, but when I heard in an interview with Shulman that she suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome for a year after an attack on her husband, I am forced to admit the possibility of some psychological traumas needing treatment for myself. So my second requirement, of course, would be the payment for my rehabilitation.

Also, naturally, I would like to receive significant monetary compensation, however, I placed this point third because my priorities fully correspond to safety regulations: first, the dangerous factor is eliminated, and only then is aid provided and compensation paid.

As a fourth point, I would like the rapists to also receive psychological treatment, but if they have no money left for this after the payments for the previous points, I will not insist.

If the rapists were too poor to immediately pay the compensation assigned to me and fund other measures—well, they will have to take out a loan. They’ll pay it back someday; that’s no longer my business, but theirs and the bank’s.

It seems to me that my requests are modest enough: I do not insist on castration or execution, I do not demand that they necessarily languish in a cramped cell and be subjected to rapes by cellmates. I don’t need them to lose their health, nor do I want those who deprive them of health to lose their human form. So I hope the court will grant my claims. And if a victim of violence insists on all the crap described in this paragraph, I hope the court manages to convince her to abandon such requests. If the court appoints some severe punishment in this vein, for me, it will be a clear red flag: the court is not libertarian, I will never voluntarily deal with it, and I will try to dissuade others.

Here is a sufficient physical restriction

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Hayek and his spontaneous orders.

The donation for the translation of this chapter was quite decent, 6000 rubles, but the volume of text in it is also quite outstanding, so I had to toil away in the intervals between voluntary libertarian hard labor at the logging camp.

In this chapter, Eric Mack explains how Mises’s calculation argument regarding the unviability of a total planned economy influenced Hayek, describes the alternative approach developed by Hayek to describe society through the idea of spontaneous orders, and also analyzes in detail (in my opinion, even excessively meticulously) the idea that freedom is when everyone observes a certain single set of abstract rules, proudly called the rules of just conduct, and they observe them not for reasons of profit, but elevate them to the rank of a transcendent value. In short, if God is dead, it doesn’t mean that everything is permitted.

I hope that the next donation will be for the translation of Stephan Molynieux; his style is simpler, and the chapters are not of such monstrous size, so the interval between the donation and the product can be kept relatively short.

Boris Yurovsky. How to get away from the state

I want to recommend a pretty good video from the “Unknown Economics” channel, run by Ukrainian economist Boris Yurovsky. His channel features many detailed theoretical reviews of economic theory—I didn’t even notice how I gradually switched to him from Pavel Usanov’s channel, who is more of an economic historian. But not long ago, Boris Savvich started a series of videos on the topic of libertarianism, which is outside his primary field, and in my opinion, he handled it quite достойно.

The video I’m recommending is the final one in this series and is dedicated to the transition from etatism to libertarianism. As usual, it is a review of other authors’ ideas, quite clear and benevolent. If you like it, check out the other videos in the libertarianism series, and from there, you might reach the economic theory reviews; it happens as unobtrusively as becoming addicted to male approval.

Eric Mack, Libertarianism. Fundamentals. Nozick.

I am continuing to translate Eric Mack’s “Libertarianism.” Last time, having finished Part 2 on philosophical premises, I am now tackling Part 3 on the foundations of libertarianism, and today I present for your attention a short introduction to the third part and a rather long chapter on how Nozick explained self-ownership and the resulting moral constraints. Nozick’s approach is compared with Rawls’ more famous concept—about the veil of ignorance and all that—after which Eric Mack shows in which places Nozick seems more convincing to him.

I tried to translate in a way that makes it as clear as possible what is being discussed, but I cannot guarantee that I haven’t missed some set expressions from the unfamiliar jargon of moral philosophers, so I would be glad if some conditional Artem Seversky could briefly scan the translation and suggest corrections where he deems necessary.

The translation of this chapter was stimulated by a donation of one thousand rubles—which is quite a lot for a single donation, but very modest considering the volume of work. So I would be glad if you chip in more.

The next chapter will also be quite large, and it will be about what the author learned from Friedrich Hayek regarding the foundations of libertarianism.

I also slightly corrected the layout of the previously posted chapters, translated the notes for them, and improved the navigation between chapters. I’m doing great)))

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Translation of the chapter on Spencer.

After a long break, during which I was busy finalizing the edition of Mechanics of Freedom, I am returning to two other projects translating libertarian literature that have been pending. Since there are currently no donations coming in for the translation of Stephan Mol liqueur, but two donations of 500 rubles each arrived for Eric Mack, I am posting a chapter from Mack. Don’t forget to encourage the translation process.

With a story about the views of Herbert Spencer, Eric Mack concludes the first part of his book dedicated to the precursors of libertarianism; moving forward, he is expected to approach the main theme of his work.

The focus is on an early and not very well-known work by Spencer, which was moreover partially revised by him in a later edition toward greater moderation and acceptance of the status quo. In it, he introduces as the primary principle of justice the Law of Equal Liberty, which is still actively used by libertarians — the idea that everyone is free to do as they wish, provided they do not violate the similar liberty of other people.

What personally seemed worthy of attention was Spencer’s direct indication that the right of property is determined by the society’s consent to satisfy the corresponding claim. This is almost identical to the phrasing I use when defining any right as a claim that is tolerated.

Also, importantly, Spencer approaches the adoption of the principle of methodological subjectivism when he notes that to move within the principle of the greatest happiness, there is no need to compare whose concept of happiness is superior; it is sufficient that everyone has the opportunity to actively pursue their own.

How much nonsense is there in Netesov’s cycle on the mistakes of libertarianism, and how should one respond to it?

Danila

This is about the following cycle of three articles: Libertarians have shrugged their shoulders, Soviet society is not 1984, and Corporate Wastefulness in the 21st Century.

Shoulders

§1. The concept of Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial function and Hayek’s dispersed knowledge is described, as well as the problems that arise in a planned economy lacking access to this knowledge, since it is embedded in market prices. Everything is quite correct, with various amusing examples from life in the USSR.

§2. Mises’s calculation argument is described, according to which in the absence of market prices, a planning agency has to assign them arbitrarily, leading to suboptimal resource allocation, making the planned economy wasteful and inferior to the market economy. As a partial answer to how the USSR managed to survive for 70 years, it is pointed out that it was able to peek at some market prices from its capitalist neighbors. There are no complaints about this paragraph either.

§3. Here, the author, on one hand, shows that the lion’s share of innovations appears in small startups, but on the other hand, says that the world has long been ruled not by shopkeepers, but by corporations, and therefore classical liberalism is a libertarian’s dream. Essentially, “pipe down and return to the real world from your beloved 18th century.” Generally, the facts presented are quite correct, but the author’s pathos is unclear: the fact that the current economy is not fully market-based does not mean that its state is optimal or even inevitable. It’s just the way it is now.

1984

§4. Here the author points out that both Mises’s calculation argument and Hayek’s argument about dispersed knowledge neglect empirics. Since a global planned economy has never been built, it cannot be verified that it is incapable of economic calculation. Since the Soviet economy contained some rudimentary elements of a market rather than being fully planned, it again cannot be verified that a planned economy is unable to account for this dispersed knowledge. In short, the unverifiability of the arguments regarding the impossibility of building a planned economy is confirmed by the fact that no one has ever been able to build a pure planned economy. I would say that the absurdity (okay, let’s say more gently—the paradox) of such argumentation is quite obvious.

On the other hand, it is pointed out that both Hayek in The Road to Serfdom and Orwell in 1984 clearly overdid the pessimism of their forecasts, because the inefficiency of a totalitarian society quickly begins to require a minimum of market lubrication, and only with its presence is this planned machine somehow able to move forward. Again, the criticism seems strange. Hayek says: if you are consistent in your madness, this is what will happen. Then Netesov claims: look, Soviet society was not consistent enough in its madness, therefore Hayek was wrong. Well, sort of…

§5. Here it is said that Hayek claimed: under a system of centralized planning, all plans are handed down from above by one leader. But this is not the case: huge, cumbersome structures were built to create plans, which worked terribly, and these plans were not properly fulfilled. It is clear that empirical data should differ somewhat from theoretical ones: the Soviet Union was not an ideal system of centralized planning because such an ideal system is simply unattainable, just as absolute zero is unattainable.

But essentially, the author is right: The Road to Serfdom is not a detailed description of a specific USSR, nor even of socialism as a system. It is simply a political pamphlet, a warning to British society not to flirt too much with the Labour Party. For studying socialism, Hayek’s book is too superficial; if anyone is interested, there are many established Sovietologists, and the author suggests getting acquainted with them.

Greedy Escort

§6. Here, the author first suggests that libertarians get rid of praxeology. Then he begins to reason that a corporation is not some single and indivisible entrepreneur, but a multitude of people, each acting in their own personal interests, which do not necessarily coincide with some conceptual interests of the corporation as a whole or even its management. The question arises: why should we discard praxeology if it is precisely concerned with the consideration of individual human interests, which are much broader than economics?

It is also pointed out that Mises’s calculation argument regarding the impossibility of economic calculation in a planned economy applies to corporations in the same way. That is, the more internal transfer pricing within a corporation is detached from the market, the worse resources are distributed within it. Next, positive and negative economies of scale are mentioned, which Mises touched upon only slightly. Well, Mises wasn’t the only one; Ronald Coase did a lot of work in the field of firm theory, and supporters of the Austrian School of Economics can perfectly well use his constructions; they fit into the general economic theory and do not violate the principles of praxeology.

Further in this very long paragraph, there are reflections that the efficiency of a corporation becomes even lower when it reaches the state trough, and Mises is accused of ignoring this circumstance. Here, one can only be surprised, because the entire sixth part of Human Action is devoted to various distortions that the government can introduce into economic activity.

§7. Here, referencing Hernando de Soto, explanations are given as to why supercomputers are unable to save a planned economy, and then a question is left hanging about what prevents these same arguments from being applied to TNCs. Nothing prevents it. Centralization has its costs, and decentralization has its own.

§8. Here the author repeats a number of theses from previous paragraphs and mentions that Joseph Salerno proved: market prices convey a reliable signal to entrepreneurs only under proximal equilibrium. He uses this as an argument that Hayek is outdated, and along with him, the entire Austrian School. But Salerno is also a representative of the Austrian School, so we are seeing an evolving school rather than a dead dogma, so what’s the problem?

§9. In conclusion, Netesov lists the reasons why, in his view, the rapid expansion of the influence of the Russian-speaking libertarian movement has slowed down significantly recently. The selection looks like a set of random facts that caught the author’s eye and serves as a warning to me personally not to do the same, because it looks very funny from the side. There, literally, as reasons for the end of the golden age of libertarianism in Russia, he lists the publication of a feuilleton with 13 thousand reads (I first learned about it from Netesov’s article), Usanov’s weak performance in debates with Vatoadmin, and the failure of Zelensky’s reforms. Where is my pre-New Year depression? I also influenced the fading interest in libertarianism in Russia!

In my view, the problem is more that almost all the low-hanging fruit have been picked, and further, if one wants to continue spreading their ideology at the previous pace, new approaches must be found. The second problem is, undoubtedly, the COVID restrictions, which completely cut off the sphere of offline agitation. The third is the recent split of the libertarian community. However, the latter circumstance, on the contrary, may provide new growth points due to increased competition for fresh minds.