Hooray, we did it! The most anticipated video of this summer has been released on the Libertarian Band channel, where I tried to explain panarchy in the simplest terms possible.
Panarchy for Grandmothers
In my opinion, this is the most successful of my scripts so far, and all the other project participants did a great job.
A bit of behind-the-scenes
In the spring, the team from this channel, with whom I had previously had sporadic experience collaborating, approached me with a request to write a script for a video so they could hold auditions for a new host. I decided that since all sorts of people would be auditioning, the text should be as simple as possible and aimed at the widest audience—an introduction to libertarianism. That’s how the script for “Libertarianism for Grandmothers” came about. During the auditions, they went through about five people, and as a result, the channel got a wonderful new face—Anton. Of course, it’s a bit a pity that the girl didn’t pass the casting; it would have been easier for me to prepare scripts for her, but I really like how it turned out.
Libertarianism for Grandmothers
The video spread quite well across various public pages and has received over 1,700 views to date, which already exceeds the audience of my own Telegram channel.
Then Bitarch approached me and suggested creating something equally accessible, but about panarchy. I had to disappoint him and reply that I wanted to create a cycle linked by the internal logic of the narrative, and the next one would be a description of minarchism. The video was released relatively recently, but for a reason I don’t understand, it wasn’t received as favorably by the audience. This is a bit strange because, on one hand, the entire agenda of the Libertarian Party in our country today is based on a minarchist platform, and on the other hand, the LP has never once explained its platform in video format, so the video on minarchism is almost the first of its kind. Please share it if you find it useful.
Minarchism for Grandmothers
Now the long-awaited panarchy is out. Following panarchy, there should be a “for grandmothers” description of such an interesting strategy as agorism. The text is already ready; all that’s left is to film and edit. There are many other interesting things planned, so please subscribe to Libertarian Band and recommend the channel to your friends.
Yesterday I published an article by Bitarch “Minarchism is a Marginal Ideology”. In it, the author criticizes the minarchist approach, arguing that minarchists are unable to come to power through democratic means if they run openly on a minarchist platform.
Indeed, this thesis does not contradict history. The USA was formed as a result of a revolution, Georgian reforms happened after a revolution, Chilean reforms after a coup; in Singapore and New Zealand, minarchist reformers came to power through deception, broadcasting a social-democratic agenda before the elections. Only Margaret Thatcher was honestly elected under the banner of shrinking the state, and indeed honestly pursued it, but she failed to achieve stable success in this matter, and today statist reaction reigns supreme in Great Britain.
Bitarch concludes that minarchists, understanding their marginality, will gravitate toward violent methods of imposing their ideology, which gives him reason to state that from the perspective of the average person, minarchist politicians are liberal fascists. Naturally, such a loud thesis could not fail to provoke a sharp reaction.
Alex Kotov, host of the Crypto-Libertarian channel, published an article with objections today. Due to the somewhat disjointed nature of the article, it is difficult to comment on, so I will touch upon just a couple of theses.
Bitarch writes that a minarchist state assumes the unity of laws throughout the entire territory, meaning that conditional leftists will miss their leftist laws. Thus, they will simply vote against the minarchist party and keep their labor code, minimum wage, veteran benefits, and other achievements of the welfare state. Panarchy, however, assumes a peaceful separation, where each interest club has its own rules, including those regarding the organization of social security and the resolution of labor disputes.
Alex responds that the forced redistribution of income contradicts libertarianism, and therefore panarchy is not a variety of libertarianism, and accordingly, the article criticizes not only minarchism but libertarianism as a whole.
This is a slightly strange thesis, since within the framework of contractual relations, a subscription fee for an agreed package of services can be stipulated. Another matter is that any contract can be terminated at any moment; otherwise, it is already slavery. So it is not surprising that another of Alex’s theses — “minarchists leave only the function of ensuring the fulfillment of contracts to the state, regardless of the content of the contract” — will logically be perceived by any anarchist (and even a supporter of panarchy) as a very bad sign. It happens that people sign oppressive contracts because at that moment they see no other way to make ends meet. When circumstances change, they leave these oppressive relationships with a sense of deep satisfaction, and, of course, a court of a minarchist state that decides to demand compliance with the original terms of the contract at that moment will be perceived as a violation of justice. A well-known ancap like Mikhail Svetov speaks quite extensively and in detail about the importance of the fact that any contract can be refused.
Now, another argument against panarchy seemed quite interesting to me. Supporters of panarchy claim that free competition between contractual jurisdictions will lead to the victory of the most free in the competitive race, so that leftists will gradually dissipate on their own. However, in the real world, the opposite is observed. Free competition between states with different laws leads to the fact that freedoms are curtailed everywhere, and governments are happy to adopt each other’s experience specifically in curtailing freedoms. Thus, competition alone is not enough; a moral compass is needed. Therefore, natural law rules, and contractual law sucks.
Overall, this is a fairly strong argument, but I want to draw attention to a very important difference between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdictions. It is much easier for extraterritorial ones to expand. Take such a wonderful liberal territorial jurisdiction as Hong Kong. People are practically climbing over each other there, so great is the desire of residents of neighboring China to live under liberalism. If this jurisdiction were extraterritorial, there would be no need to go huddle on an island; you simply sign a contract and live under Hong Kong law, pay Hong Kong taxes, and receive Hong Kong social services. And if you want handouts in your old age, you enter into a contract with some leftist jurisdiction where you are entitled to a basic income. What will the competition between such jurisdictions lead to? Either leftist jurisdictions will begin to impose entry restrictions, admitting only the young and healthy, or they will break under the weight of the social burden.
So, progress in social mores occurs not by ethics alone, but also by the competition of economic systems.
In conclusion, I want to announce an article where I intend to bring ancap, minarchism, panarchy, and agorism into a more or less coherent picture. I hope to release it within a week and count on the fact that there will be fewer such disputes after that.
While reading Aleksei Shustov’s book “After the State”, I came across an interesting thought:
“Such ‘choices’ [the choice of ECU], obviously, provide a fundamentally different level of freedom and ensure real justice compared to choices in a majority democracy. The latter does not take into account individual differences and forces everyone to live by the rules of the majority. After all, if one person feels great in a system with broad independence and high responsibility, while another prefers social security and is ready for high taxes, then either one or the other will inevitably be oppressed in their self-realization.”
The author of this book cannot be called a libertarian in any way. Perhaps he had not even heard the word when he wrote his book. He arrived at the idea of panarchy purely from an understanding of the destructiveness of the “majority democracy” model, which has now become synonymous with the word “state.” Accordingly, he looks at the world impartially. Unlike many libertarian authors, Shustov takes into account the demands of broad layers of the population, whom some ideological libertarians contemptuously call “lefties.”
Be realistic — such people are the majority even in Switzerland, which is “ideal” for many libertarians. Active attempts to promote minarchist ideas did not yield tangible results even with full freedom of choice and huge funding. Let alone Russia, with its paternalistic mentality and impoverished population.
As can be seen from the quote from the book, a “lefty” will feel oppressed under minarchism and will offer the maximum possible resistance to the ruling party (most likely, simply not allowing the libertarian party to come to power). From the perspective of a conditional “average Joe,” minarchism is a certain form of “liberal fascism” — where liberal values are forcibly imposed on people who wish to live under paternalism (since under minarchism, courts hold a territorial monopoly, and laws are mandatory throughout the state’s territory).
It turns out that in the eyes of voters, minarchists will look exactly as “lefties” look in the eyes of libertarians. As a libertarian, would you vote for a “lefty” proposing to impose ideas of social justice on the whole society? I don’t think so. And will a “lefty,” seeing that you propose to impose the exact opposite on the whole society, vote for you? I don’t think so either. Given that the majority of society supports at least some form of social support, the electoral chances of minarchists tend toward zero. Many of them do not want to acknowledge this fact and begin to hint at the usefulness of applying physical violence against their opponents (“Pinochet’s helicopter tours”), showing that in their methods of struggling for power, they will not be inferior even to their extreme ideological opponents — the Stalinists.
To achieve electoral success, any libertarian party must either become a kind of “people’s party,” attracting people from as wide a spectrum of views as possible, or form a bloc with a left-wing party based on a shared agenda, which is somewhat harder to imagine. Perhaps the LPR should discard the idea of imposing liberal values and change its program from minarchist to panarchist? As history shows, the chances of success for such a program are very high (with it, Abraham Kuyper won the elections in the Netherlands — read the article on pillarization).
NAP is not a non-aggression pact, as the well-known video blogger Mikhail Svetov likes to point out. It is not a norm handed down from above, like a single commandment from a libertarian deity. It is a purely analytically derived principle. If the principle “no one has the right to initiate violence with impunity” is generally observed in a given society, it means that there is—as engineers would put it—negative feedback operating there, which dampens manifestations of violence. Society becomes free from institutionalized coercion, which always leads to an explosive growth in prosperity.
Since the non-aggression principle is not established from above, naturally, no one imposes specific boundaries on everyone—for instance, claiming that a dirty look does not violate the NAP, but stepping on a foot already does. Such specifics are derived from practice, and this boundary can certainly change as customs evolve. The only thing clearly defined in the non-aggression principle is the absence of certain privileged groups who, for some reason, have the right to initiate violence with impunity.
The feedback loop works because the use of violence against an aggressor, whoever they may be, is precisely legitimate. In general, anyone can apply such retaliatory violence; the limitations here are purely technical: first, there must be the physical capability to do so, and second, reliable information about who applied what violence to whom.
The idea of limited government is to delegate the identification of aggressors and the application of counter-violence against them to one specific organization. This relieves the majority of society from such a burdensome duty. However, first, we have no right to forbid people from exercising counter-violence directly, without delegating it to anyone. And second, we have no right to forbid people from delegating rights to counter-violence to any other organization besides the one called the government. The attempt to forbid this is itself a violation of the NAP, which should entail counter-violence against whoever attempted to impose such a ban on people using force.
Thus, the only way for a limited government not to violate the NAP is to be a market monopoly—that is, to serve its clients based on voluntary contracts, and to do so so cheaply and qualitatively that it is simply unprofitable for competitors to enter this market, and the vast majority of people prefer to entrust counter-violence to the government rather than practice it themselves. Robert Nozick advocates approximately this point of view in his book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia”.
Adeptes of minarchism often cite Switzerland as an example of a successfully functioning minimal state that we should all strive for. They consider the confederal structure to be a guarantee against the expansion of government powers. In reality, however, there is a creeping growth of the state with signs of acceleration in recent decades. For example, a law prohibiting the criticism of homosexuality was recently passed, de facto destroying freedom of speech—the foundation of a free society. This puts a final end to the belief in the possibility of the sustainable existence of a minimal state.
A territorial monopoly will always strive for growth, and no measures are capable of restraining it. Only competition for people can reverse this trend. Even if you consider anarcho-capitalism a utopia at the moment, proposing minarchism as a transitional model is even more utopian! Do not waste your time; instead, pay attention to the model of extra-territorial contractual jurisdictions (ETC, panarchy).
Liberalism and libertarianism are two terms with very similar, yet mirrored, fates. In the middle of the 20th century, statists snatched the term “liberalism” away from the proponents of economic freedom. And around the same time, the term “libertarianism” was snatched by proponents of economic freedom from the socialists. Mind you, I have not heard of libertarian socialists calling themselves classical libertarians after that.
Classical liberalism in the 20th century is primarily Mises and Hayek. Both are convinced supporters of the free market, both are convinced opponents of collectivism, but both consider the existence of the state entirely acceptable and see some benefit in it, namely the protection of private property. For this purpose, the state is granted a monopoly on violence, and to ensure it does not use it against citizens, citizens must have the right to bear arms and to self-organize, up to the point of armed resistance to the government.
Libertarianism is, in effect, classical liberalism in economics plus the application of those same principles to all other spheres of life, primarily in ethics and law. Rothbard argued that a monopoly on violence contradicts the principles of a free market and must therefore be rejected along with the state; subsequently, Nozick clarified that if a state were to emerge again on a free market as part of a voluntary process, then libertarians should, in theory, have no complaints about it.
As a result, in addition to classical liberals, who simply say that the state must be limited and that political activity should be pursued for this purpose, we also have anarcho-capitalists, who claim that all services, including the protection of private property, are perfectly provided on the free market, and “we are not buying the state, take it away”—and minarchists, who do not mind the state remaining, but only on the condition that it behaves itself, does not extort taxes, but politely asks for donations.
This is how the differences between classlib and libertarianism appear to me
In Western Europe, especially in German-speaking countries, minarchist (classical-liberal) parties have existed for many years. The ideology of the LPR and, in particular, Mikhail Svetov, is very similar to the ideas of the Swiss FDP.Die Liberalen, which is not surprising, as he praises Switzerland in almost every lecture as the country closest to libertarianism.
In reality, he only provides facts taken out of context, omitting the prevalence of ever-increasing regulation and taxes that are not symbolic at all. This is not surprising—the influence of FDP.Die Liberalen on Swiss politics is not that great, and in recent years it has garnered only slightly more than 15% of the votes in parliament. Compared to other countries, in many of which minarchist parties are not represented in parliament at all, this is a decent result. But to build a libertarian society through election victories, this is completely insufficient. A similar picture exists in Germany—the results of the local FDP are even slightly more modest than the Swiss ones, remaining at around 10% for many decades.
Evaluating the prospects of the LPR in Russia, it is worth noting that in our society, the ideas of minarchism are even more marginal than in Europe. This party is unlikely to even enter the State Duma, let alone have any significant influence on state policy. Minarchists in Europe failed to achieve this over decades of active political struggle, and it is completely foolish to hope that it will be different in the RF.
To promote libertarianism, the path of party struggle clearly cannot be the only one. Hoping for a gradual transition to a free society through minarchism is also meaningless. In my opinion, a more realistic approach is to educate people with the ideas of a free society and the model of extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions (ECJ) as a transitional model to a free society with a full NAP.
People often ask how a libertarian society can be built by coming to power through elections. I will not dwell in detail on whether a libertarian party can come to power through elections at all, because this is the weakest point of the entire idea.
What options for building a libertarian society can the LPR choose? Mikhail Svetov often mentions them in his lectures, so I will try to explain them in plain language and provide my own comments.
1) Federalization. Mikhail constantly praises the USA and Switzerland for their model of national organization, reminding us that the RF is also de jure a federation (but not de facto—due to the violation of the constitution by the state’s first person). In this case, it will be possible to test various models of libertarianism in different regions and transfer best practices from one to another. The advantage of this approach is that in the event of an error, the consequences will be limited to one region rather than spreading across the entire country.
2) Homesteads. The idea is borrowed from the history of the settlement of the USA, when settlers from Europe occupied vacant lands, and later the government recognized their property rights to these plots. Svetov proposes to distribute the uninhabited territories of Siberia and the Far East in this way, granting settlers the right to autonomy, as if they were colonizing Mars (and accordingly, the opportunity to experiment with various libertarian models). Successful practices from these regions could then be gradually transferred to the main part of the country. Although, judging by the comments on this idea, people are not very eager to move to regions with such a harsh climate and a total lack of infrastructure.
3) Minarchism. A gradual transition to ancap is carried out through the gradual reduction of state functions across the entire country at once (as if the RF were a unitary state, which it is de facto now). Svetov means exactly this path when he calls himself a “forced minarchist.” This immediately raises the question of the stability of minarchism as such, which is further amplified by the centralization of power. A single unsuccessful reform could easily incite the people’s rage and end the LPR’s time in power, which would then create a negative image for the entire libertarian idea in the eyes of the general public for a long time.
Personally, I would propose another option—federalization of the country (simply follow the current constitution of the RF, it’s already in there) and the creation of competing extraterritorial contractual jurisdictions within regions that have approved the experiment by referendum. As the model is refined and “pitfalls” are eliminated, the geography can be expanded, gradually making all of Russia libertarian.
To the last paragraph, I would like to add that an extraterritorial jurisdiction is extraterritorial precisely so as not to be limited by some narrow list of regions. Today, there is one extraterritorial jurisdiction in the world—the jurisdiction of the United States of America. This state does not care whose territory its citizen is on; they continue to exercise their jurisdiction over them. But it is, of course, not contractual.
History shows that over a long period of time, the “size of the state” (the volume of resources it controls and the degree of influence over the lives of its subjects) constantly grows. This applies to all forms of government—liberal democracies, republics with census-based democracy, ideocracies, theocracies, and even monarchies. Some states were initially created on the idea of minarchism (“limited government”), such as the USA, where the founding fathers understood the possibility of the state’s growth and tried to prescribe mechanisms to restrain this process in the constitution. In all cases, this did not work, and even the “smallest” governments grew to gigantic proportions.
So why does this always happen? There are many versions, but the most plausible seems to be the idea expressed by Pavel Usanov in his recent lecture “Spontaneous Orders as an Alternative to the State”. Growth occurs because every official is interested in redistributing rent (resources taken from the population through taxes) in their own favor. If they do not do it themselves, one of their colleagues will. A constant temptation arises to engage in populism and invent new functions for state intervention in areas related to the interest group that put this specific official in power. For example, officials from a state social insurance agency are interested in INCREASING the number of unemployed and poor people, as they can then “secure” more funding for themselves and, accordingly, increase their salaries, hire their friends, or award themselves bonuses.
Now, as you probably know, the majority of the pension budget consists of transfers from the federal budget, where the working generation supports pensioners through taxes. The PFR (Pension Fund of Russia) exists purely on paper; without transfer payments from the budget, it would be exhausted instantly; accordingly, its privatization would achieve nothing. In a stable libertarian society, it is clear how the pension system will work (private insurance, assistance from children, charity, capital income, etc.), but what should be done during the transition period before this has been created?
The state, by forcibly seizing money from people, does so under the pretext that it assumes certain obligations in return. In the case of pension contributions, this is the obligation of a lifelong annuity, starting from an age determined by the state. After the liquidation of the state, the fate of its obligations may vary depending on exactly how the state was liquidated.
Minarchism
In the event of a minarchist government coming to power, everything is relatively simple and predictable (and for me personally, this is almost the only argument in favor of minarchism as a transition period to ancap). For example, the transition period is described in the LPR (Libertarian Party of Russia) program, and the proposed mechanism generally satisfies me completely:
At the initial stage of reforms, all obligations of the state to pensioners and persons who have begun to pay pension insurance contributions will be fulfilled through the creation of a special State Pension Restitution Fund, to which current profits from the privatization of state enterprises and corporations will be directed. All those who made mandatory pension insurance contributions will have them returned as funds from the sale of state property (including the property of the Pension Fund of Russia itself) enter the State Pension Restitution Fund.
Upon completion of the restitution, the LPR program envisions the liquidation of the fund and the transfer of the remnants to charity, which is an unfair and corruption-prone measure; therefore, it would be much simpler and more logical upon the liquidation of the fund to distribute the remainder equally to all citizens as a one-time payment.
Anarcho-capitalism
But no minarchism may happen at all. The moral and financial bankruptcy of the state may lead to its liquidation occurring not from the top, with payment on state obligations, but from below, from the side — yes, from everywhere people can reach, without the formation of any successor structures. In other words, state property will be partially bought up by private individuals and partially stolen by state employees at the pre-bankruptcy stage, and the least liquid assets will be scavenged by anyone and everyone once the state is actually liquidated.
How much will pensioners be able to grab for themselves at the pre-bankruptcy stage? Perhaps some land, since as difficulties with paying pensions grow, the demand for land for personal farming will increase, and the distribution of land to pensioners and “persons of pre-retirement age” during this period is quite likely.
How much will pensioners be able to grab at the stage of scavenging the remains? Working budget employees will scavenge the most because they are closer. Some of these working budget employees will be pensioners; they will get something. Non-working people will get something if they hustle, using old connections and similar tools.
Bleak? I’m sorry, I have no other ancap for you in Russia. But there is also good news. If, as the state gradually goes bankrupt, people manage to prevent a collapse into socialism, then by the time of the final liquidation of this parasite, society will already be ready: it will have developed most of the necessary institutions for ancap, primarily mechanisms for private protection and the establishment of property rights, and then the transition period will pass relatively painlessly.
Now, if the state is socialist at the moment of liquidation, then, I’m sorry, instead of ancap, you get Somalia. This is exactly the process we are seeing now in Venezuela.
