Тег: Navalny

What to do if you do not want to repeat Navalny’s fate

Voluntarist, Bitarch

In connection with what has happened, I would like to express my own opinion. Of course, many are grieving and expressing their condolences. However, now would be the time to talk about what this story can teach us. The point is that opposing the established system—moreover, in many countries of the world—absolutely openly, playing by its own rules and resorting to standard and well-known practices, as the tragically deceased Alexei did, can be very dangerous and ultimately unproductive. But in the modern world, it is possible and necessary to resort to alternative approaches that, in principle, do not involve direct confrontation.

As a good example, I would point to how a certain anonymous individual (or group of anonymous individuals) under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto destroyed the “sacred” monopoly of stationary bandits (states) over money by creating Bitcoin. He was never reliably deanonymized, and his tool was designed so that even in the event of full deanonymization, or even the physical liquidation of the creator, it would not cease to exist and function, as it is decentralized. Meanwhile, the anonymous and state-uncontrollable payment methods and electronic currencies that existed before Bitcoin, such as E-gold and Liberty Reserve, were destroyed by the US government due to their centralized structure and the presence of specific, non-anonymous creators and managers, who ultimately received very long prison sentences.

Ideally, stationary bandits should not even be aware that someone is opposing them, and should not have the ability to track down those who are doing so. The methods of opposition should be extremely unconventional and non-traditional, most likely relying on modern technologies. Here, one could also mention current wars—with the popularization of modern drones, states have lost the ability to effectively destroy the production of high-tech weaponry when attacking someone. No matter how well-protected or hidden a large centralized military plant producing traditional weapons by traditional methods is, sooner or later it will be bombed. But with hundreds of small private enterprises producing thousands of drones a day and not united by any single management structure, absolutely nothing can be done. Such a modern, non-traditional approach to the production of high-tech weaponry is capable of providing protection even to those facing an enemy vastly superior in strength.

Exactly which methods can be proposed is for those who possess the necessary competence in a given field to decide. But we, within the framework of our project, can put forward one approach relying on science and modern technology. Understanding that the ability to commit intentional, planned, and targeted acts of violence without experiencing any internal repulsion or resistance is the result of an individual having a disorder—a dysfunction of the violence inhibition mechanism—makes clinical therapy of violent behavior possible using means that enhance the function of this mechanism. And in the event of a threat of violence from certain private individuals or representatives of some organized structure, it would be worth considering the creation of a combat version of such a biological solution. You can always find more details about the violence inhibitor concept in our materials.

I do not love and do not know how to write epitaphs

There is one negative aspect to Navalny’s death: a good man has died. But there could never have been a happy ending in his fairy tale.

Otherwise, alas, things have rather improved.

The Russian regime has lost the potential opportunity to use a well-known political prisoner as bargaining material or a tool for blackmail.

The Russian opposition has an additional reason to abandon the idea of peaceful protest. Some of its representatives, acting by inertia, will go out into the streets of Russian cities to publicly express their grief, face persecution, and leave the RF.

I have an additional reason to increase my efforts in writing a book on the theory of war.

Other political regimes may throw a bit more fuel onto the fire of war with the RF (it would be good if without new mindless sanctions against those Russians who are easier to reach, but here life rather forces one to be a pessimist).

Navalny in every home (on the coming mass repressions)

In response to the start of the procedure to declare them an extremist organization, Navalny’s team is calling for a final and decisive “Chinese warning” to the regime. Namely, let’s go to a rally in a huge crowd, like the Belarusians, and then defeat them in elections, like the Belarusians. “If they shot at us with rifles,” the FBK leadership states, “and we bravely pushed forward, then now, when they are unpacking the machine gun, we need to close our ranks even tighter; they can’t shoot everyone.” The main thing is not to become like them and not to unpack the guns ourselves.

Indeed, the judicial system in the RF has a certain terminal velocity for turning free people into colony inhabitants, and in the event that any political activity not coordinated with the regime is officially declared a criminal offense, this very system will have to work for quite some time at maximum capacity — which, however, is easily optimized (google troikas).

Now let’s look at a simple chart. This is the dynamics of the change in the number of prisoners over three Putin terms and one Medvedev term. As you can see, at least 360,000 vacant spots have opened up in Russian prisons and colonies during this time. 440,000 people have already signed up for Navalny’s rally, and an unauthorized mass action is planned for when 500,000 sign up. What is there to say? Indeed, it will be difficult to imprison everyone. Perhaps you will be among those 140,000 lucky ones who won’t fit in the prisons and will therefore receive a suspended sentence. Navalny also started with a suspended sentence.

Unfortunately, I cannot offer any more reasonable alternative than to get out of the country right now. Just imagine that you live, for example, in the USSR, and it is, for example, 1968. And by some incredibly lucky chance, you have the opportunity to physically be outside the country. You can leave, you can stay, but the regime will only collapse in 1991. That is roughly the picture we have today.

Free Navalny Project

Leonid Volkov, Navalny’s deputy for political technology, has announced something unprecedented that he is preparing to save his boss many times, and now, he has published it. In effect, he has invented a Free State Project. There, a roll call of those wishing to join the project was conducted first, and only after twenty thousand people wishing to move to the promised land were gathered did the relocation begin. It is the same in our case. Everyone who intends to join the prayer ritual for Navalny’s release from captivity is suggested to first sign up on the website, and only when half a million such people are gathered will the date of the ritual and other details be set.

They say the site crashed almost immediately from the influx of interested people, but by the time I reached it, the only thing indicating the high load was a non-functioning counter. So, the order of magnitude could only be estimated by the circles on the map (however, a report arrived—the 200,000 application mark has been passed). To register, you need to specify your address (you can simply click a point on the map) and a valid email. After the email is verified, the voice of the applicant is counted—at least, the number next to my house on the map increased by one.

There are no options to withdraw a vote, so if the date for taking to the streets turns out to be later than the date of my departure to Montenegro, I will not be able to inform the organizers that I cannot attend.

What can I say about the prospects of the campaign? If the goal were specifically the release of Navalny, one would have to take some Katerina Tikhonova hostage and demand Alexei’s immediate release, threatening this woman with death. As for the chosen toolkit, it is primarily suitable for rocking the boat. Well, okay, let’s rock it, even though it’s already become tiring. This will not help Navalny in any way, but he is a grown boy and knew what he was getting into.

Claims against Navalny

Supporters of political stability have many grievances against Alexei Navalny. If you ignore the anecdotal stuff, like “State Department agent” and “he would have stolen even more in their place,” and start asking in more detail, something curious emerges. If Navalny had overthrown Putin back in 2012, simply by preventing him from taking a third term, kicked both him and Medvedev out of the Kremlin, sat on the throne himself, befriended Europe, refrained from lending to Yanukovych, refrained from seizing Crimea, stopped inflating spending on the security forces and directed it toward social welfare instead—then in 2018, they would have voted for his second term and been champions of stability, asking “who, if not Navalny?” And they would have grumbled about gay parades in hushed tones, because there would be no reason to rock the boat.

In short, the main grievance “vatniks” have with Navalny is that he is weak and indecisive, and therefore unworthy of sitting on the tsarist throne. Instead of allowing himself to be beaten in the squares, he should have smashed the Kremlin with tanks; then he would be a respected man, not some lowlife. It is easy to see that this position is very close to the position of the well-known liberal extremist Arkady Babchenko, who still reminisces about the warm December of 2011 and expresses readiness to return to Russia only in an Abrams tank as part of a NATO peacekeeping contingent.

Alexei Navalny returned to Russia not at the head of a loyal guard, but on a shitty low-cost carrier; he was immediately punished for this stupidity, and rightly so. And if our leader is so dear to us, why the hell haven’t we freed him yet, and instead boast that on January 23rd the police seized a record number of people? Are we masochists? Is this why we went out? What do we actually plan to do to free Alexei? Where is the storming of Matrosskaya Tishina? Or do we think that they, the supporters of political stability, will defend Putin? No way! If Akela cannot protect himself, he has no business leading the pack.

That is the kind of interesting conversation I had recently, and I was unable to give my interlocutor satisfactory answers. Not only because I am not great at oral debates, but because essentially I have nothing to object with. Navalny and his team behave as if they haven’t even considered overthrowing the regime; Navalny seems perfectly content to spend another ten years playing Mandela and wait until Putin either dies on his own or becomes completely decrepit, hands over the throne, and his successor engages in national reconciliation by releasing Navalny and allowing him to run in the elections. Because even if they are looking at the Belarusian scenario, there was no need to return to Russia for that—hang out with Tikhanovskaya, meet with world leaders, push for sanctions, push for the freezing of the accounts of Putin’s cronies, rather than sitting in a cell. The cell is for Putin, not for you.

When Navalny and his associates try to explain why the hell Alexei rushed back to Russia, they bleat about moral duty. It is roughly like riding out on a white horse into machine-gun fire just to wave a papakha hat and send the army into a psychological attack because “the truth is on our side,” meaning we’ll overwhelm them by throwing hats at them.

So, I’ve suddenly found this touching unity with the supporters of the “strong hand.” As for tomorrow, I will try to post my thoughts on what I would like to see at the upcoming Sunday action.

Us. Here. Power!
Putin. Resign!
Give us. A Constituent. Assembly!

I wanted to make an extremist post, but something didn’t work out

In 2017, Navalny released a film about Medvedev that unexpectedly took off and brought a huge number of new faces onto the streets. Back then, many expected that the most important film—about Putin—was about to be released. We had to wait almost four years, but now we have a double blow: one about Putin’s palace, which is very effective and capable of igniting a new audience, and one about the FSB poisoners, which had a serious effect even on long-time observers.

On January 23, like most of my Russian readers, I will go out into the street to demonstrate my disagreement with Navalny being held in prison. This is a simple warning that the boundary between the extremely undesirable and the completely unacceptable today lies somewhere around “imprisoning a public politician of international standing through lawlessness on a live broadcast.” The use of violence against people in uniform or state property is not endorsed. But there is also an emphasis on the unwillingness to coordinate the protest itself in any form with representatives of the regime.

For its part, the regime is predictably demonstrating that it does not recognize our right to such a demonstration and will most likely not listen. This manifests in preemptive arrests of everyone who is presumed not only to intend to go out but is also capable of participating in the coordination of protest actions. Those who are administratively dependent are being assigned various chores for Saturday on a mass scale, students are warned of expulsion, loyalists invent horror stories about police shooting to kill, and Roskomnadzor-chan is scrubbing communities from VKontakte and videos from TikTok—in general, the direction of work is more or less clear.

Effectively, we are now at a fork between the Ukrainian and Belarusian scenarios. And I would, of course, prefer the Ukrainian one, but the Belarusian one seems more likely to me. I don’t know what other cards Navalny’s team has in their hand, but I suspect that the strongest ones have already been played, and the Ukrainian scenario requires the ability to raise the stakes significantly. In short, I am going tomorrow with a heavy heart and without much hope, not even for victory, but for at least some improvement in the situation. If no unpleasant surprises occur, tomorrow I will try to reflect in another post on what it felt like. And so, a channel about theory turns into a chronicle of some petty squabbling…

Good news from Navalny

I listened to the latest Navalny today, and I am very glad. By all appearances, he does intend to remain abroad, because it is much more convenient for him to throw a wrench in the regime’s works from there. Here he has the GDR archives, or wherever he is digging through the excavations of Putin’s German past. Here he has a Bulgarian colleague from Bellingcat. Here he has quick access to the EU establishment. As for the fieldwork in Russia, there are people to handle that. So, Alexei will live on.

For those who, for some reason, are still not aware of what this is about: Navalny pulled off a cool prank. Almost immediately after publishing his video investigation into the poisoning, he started calling the subjects of the investigation, introducing himself as an advisor to the Secretary of the Security Council and shaking them down for materials for a briefing note addressed to the first person. Only one operative fell for the trick, but what was heard perfectly complements the investigation materials, and now Navalny’s evidence is becoming absolutely ironclad.

Now we should expect obvious movement at the international level. If it is possible to file a lawsuit in one international court or another—good. If we have to settle for some situationally issued sanctions against Putin—well, that will also do. But it is far more interesting to watch the reaction in Russia.

To be more specific, I am talking about dormant institutions. During the transformation of hybrid regimes, they have a tendency to wake up and suddenly start working; there is a chance that this will happen in our case as well. We have already seen an appeal from several Tomsk municipal deputies demanding the opening of a criminal case regarding the poisoning. They were joined by colleagues from several other regions. But our state has too many nannies, which is why it’s always running around like a blind foal. So, besides a deputy’s appeal to the Investigative Committee, one could imagine the possibility of raising the issue of a parliamentary investigation at the State Duma level, some movements from the prosecutor’s office, or finally, an impeachment attempt. Of course, this will not get the support of the majority, but the news hook is loud, and there will surely be public politicians who find it possible to use this for PR.

It seems to me that a flash mob involving writing letters to one’s deputies, as well as to the heads of Duma factions, could work well right now. Something along the lines of: “I have received information from open sources regarding the illegal activities of the FSB. The explanations given by the president during the press conference are clearly insufficient. Could you initiate a parliamentary investigation into this matter, which has already gained significant international resonance and therefore should not be hushed up in the State Duma.”

I won’t provide precise wording; I am not very competent in that. I hope Ekaterina Mikhailovna will formulate a plan of action more clearly in her program tomorrow, with a specific link on where to search and where to write. Something in the final days of 2020 has triggered such a flurry of activity that I’ve completely rebranded myself as a political scientist—ugh, I shouldn’t do that, that’s not why you read me. But it’s also impossible not to share this funny prank, please bear with me)

Navalny. Prospects.

I read with great interest Navalny’s publication about the investigation into his poisoning conducted by Bellingcat. It is also available in video format; it’s roughly the same as the text, just slightly more detailed and interspersed with memes. It’s better to open it directly on YouTube rather than in the embedded player, so you can leave a like.

It seems to me that Navalny is mistaken in thinking there will be hysteria across all channels now. Rather, the opposite: they will ignore him, like some Hunter Biden. But, of course, a purely Russian quirk will be added—the reverse cargo cult glorified by Ekaterina Schulmann. The cult servants will snicker sardonically and wonder why we think all other planes in the world aren’t made of twigs and actually know how to fly. Naturally, all intelligence agencies of all countries in the world that have any ambitions at all poison or otherwise deal with those they dislike; everything is under control everywhere. And the fact that the dealings of specifically Russian intelligence agencies are so well-known is not because they are so reckless, but only because an info-war is being waged against them.

And, for the most part, these guys are right. Indeed, any state is a systemic aggressor. Indeed, any state, if its hand is not slapped, quickly senses impunity and begins to create total chaos. And those who try to slap its hand and expose it face various absurd misfortunes all over the world, like some Assange.

What will happen next? Next, Navalny will return to Russia, and then he will finally be killed, only this time bluntly and without artistry. The man just doesn’t get the hints, mocks in every way, makes them look ridiculous, and what then—will the old man give up and decide to leave him alone? What is there to be shy about? Will people really take to the streets? Well, let them come out once a year, on the anniversary of his death, like they did for Nemtsov. Let them leave flowers and light candles; that’s a problem for the municipal workers. Or is someone counting on a Maidan? And who will call people to the barricades? Kira Yarmysh or Yulia Navalnaya? Perhaps Leonid Volkov or Vladimir Milov? Alas, we can count on the Belarusian scenario at most, with peaceful unauthorized strolls that will be either ignored or brutally dispersed, with endless fines slapped on the participants.

At the current stage, the best thing Navalny is capable of doing, he is already doing. He is gaining publicity from the assassination attempt and trying to squeeze the harshest possible personal sanctions against Putin and his inner circle from other states. So he should stay in Europe for now, especially since there are two excellent, very compelling reasons. First, the rehabilitation period after poisoning can be extended indefinitely—there is no clinical practice, no one will check. Second, he can focus on searching for the foreign assets of Putin’s circle and striving for their seizure. Let them go to the Yukos shareholders; that’s still better than paying 57 billion from our taxes.

Who even cares where a popular blogger is physically located if he regularly produces quality content? But Navalny will go to Russia because he believes that is where he belongs. This will end tragically; I am very sorry.

Navalny and Leviathan

When I read about Navalny’s poisoning, I felt completely hopeless. This year, ruling regimes all over the world have finally gone off the rails and have already managed to cause an unimaginable amount of damage to people. And it’s only August! And there is no reason to believe that 2020 is just an anomaly and that things will settle down later. In short, I wanted to fully retreat into internal emigration. To a place where there are no political news, where you have no idea what new orders the disposers of other people’s lives are giving, where there is only a market around—peaceful, cozy, and benevolent. To the place where all decent people actually belong.

I beg you: please, do not feed yourselves to the Leviathan. Stop with these pickets of yours, for which you will be fined—one; jailed for a day—two; given a criminal case—three. Stop the performances with Putin dolls and other risky nonsense. This will not shame the bandits in power. This does not help the victims of the bandits. It simply forces the security forces to turn their extremely unfriendly attention toward you, with a predictable result. You cannot be proud of being a victim of the regime. You should be proud of causing damage to the regime with impunity. But be proud in silence, otherwise, the impunity will turn into a failure.

One should act openly only when backed by power. Until then, we are partisans in this war declared upon us by the state. We must not be visible. Only grotesque rumors should be known about us—that we are everywhere, that 90% of the country’s economy is in the shadows, that no one follows the regime’s orders except for completely naive weirdos, that only suckers keep their money in fiat while the right people keep it exclusively in crypto, that official employment for a normal person is just a smokescreen for shadow earnings, that a normal person has contacts for every occasion, and it is thanks to them, not the state, that he peacefully prospers.

Of course, it is not like that now. But such rumors and beliefs have the power of a self-fulfilling prophecy, which is why it is useful for us to broadcast them. This is a far more effective struggle against the regime than rallies or, Lord forgive me, anti-corruption investigations. Against any regime, not necessarily Putin’s. Against the phenomenon of political power as such.

The Fate of a Hero

Juneman. The one who defeated Navalny

Vladislav Zdolnikov and Mikhail Pozharsky posted explanations as to why Navalny was categorically wrong in his support for Zhukovsky and his refusal to support Yuneman…

So, who are all these people, and why am I writing about this here?

Navalny is the Sole Unalternative Leader of the Opposition, who confirmed this title on September 8 during the single voting day by defeating United Russia (I don’t know about you, but the word “united” makes my eyes spin).

Zdolnikov is a former IT consultant for the FBK, who has just resigned from this important post due to ethical disagreements with Navalny.

Pozharsky is a classic liberal, a former national-democrat, and recently a vlogger and lecturer.

Yuneman is an independent candidate in the Moscow City Duma elections, whom Navalny did not recommend as part of the smart voting strategy, but who nonetheless took first place in his district in the offline voting. Quite a few libertarians worked in his headquarters.

Zhukovsky is a candidate from the CPRF in Yuneman’s district, recommended by Navalny as part of smart voting, and is the only Navalny candidate who took a shameful third place (the others took first and second places).

Right now Yuneman, who as I already said won the offline voting, is trying to overturn the online voting results, which clearly appear rigged. It is also known that electronic voting glitched for three hours on the election day itself, does not provide the ability to monitor the authenticity of results, and the decision to implement it was made in violation of the election law. Moreover, electronic voting has an irremediable flaw: it is either open, which allows for administrative pressure on the voter, or secret, which makes it impossible to prevent and prove ballot stuffing.

So, Yuneman defeated Navalny, and now he intends to defeat another extremely harmful innovation: electronic voting. Quite a feat, isn’t it? Navalny should now literally move heaven and earth to defend Yuneman’s victory, in order to make up for his fault toward him and regain the trust of many respected people. As for our task, it is to not forget to remind Navalny of this, which is why this story must remain at the top for a sufficiently long time.

It is not enough to repost this whole story right now. We must continue to be interested in it, spread news about it, and if necessary, take part in protest actions. This is a long-term theme, like the fascinating voyage of the Yakut shaman, leaving rallies behind him and sowing panic among the higher-ups.

Navalny is 43, is starting to lose his grip and lose out to youth like this