For the attention of connoisseurs of David Friedman

As I promised, I am moving over the two chapters of David Friedman’s new book, Legal Systems Very Different from Our Own, which have already been translated under the editorship of Vladimir Zolotorev. At the same time, I am gradually typesetting the English original by chapters; I will complete this meditative process in a while.

The section on my site where the translation will be posted

Already translated chapters:

https://ancapchan.info/friedman2019/russian/f2019-7/
https://ancapchan.info/friedman2019/russian/f2019-8/

Practical Anarchy, Chapter 5

I was recently encouraged by a small donation for the translation of Stephan Molneux, so I continued the editing, and now I am posting the final version of the fifth chapter, The Apocalypse Argument.

First, to get things started, the author analyzes the Apocalypse argument itself, which does not require much intellectual effort, but then the interesting part begins. If in the previous chapter the anarcho-capitalist skillfully explained why roads are not that important, now he sets a new bar and just as skillfully explains why anarchy is not that important. Truly, among none of the critics of ancap have I previously encountered a critique of ancap as convincing as that of the person who consistently preaches that very ancap, and this, if you think about it, is quite logical.

How Molneux will answer this critique himself, I do not yet know: the end of the chapter caught Scheherazade, and she ceased her permitted speeches. So send your donations for the translation of the next piece of text. There is no rough translation there, so I will be working from the source, but I have become quite adept, and this will not particularly slow me down now, so I will put your donations directly into my own pocket. Nothing can be done, coronacrisis, there is less money.

Mechanics of Freedom, Chapter 52

In Chapter 52, A Positive Conception of Rights, David Friedman, using the conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter, develops the idea of Schelling points and claiming strategies from a model microsociety of two people to a society of arbitrary complexity.

In fact, Friedman introduces more extensively and with more justification the very definition of rights that I regularly use in my texts: rights are claims that are tolerated. It is not surprising that we found such a parallelism in thinking: if it hadn’t existed, I would hardly have undertaken to translate his book after reading literally a couple of chapters.

Are libertarians selfish?

We continue our series of sloppy translations of English-language articles on libertarianism from popular websites, simply to keep you up to date with the discourse.

Original publication: David S. d’Amato. Translation: André [remarks in square brackets throughout the text are his]

Libertarianism is, first and foremost, a philosophy of the Other, a philosophy emphasizing our obligation to refrain from dominating other people, and from imposing our vision of a good life on others.

Media Name: are_libertarians_selfish.png

In critiques of libertarianism, a common motif is the claim that libertarianism is nothing more than a celebration of selfishness and greed. According to this view, the libertarian ideal is a heartless miser on a golden toilet, gazing dispassionately down upon the poor. This view is most common among left-wing critics and is not least driven by Ayn Rand’s 1964 collection of essays, The Virtue of Selfishness, in which Rand advocated [regardless of what you think] selfishness. To begin with, it should be noted that Rand’s definition of “selfishness,” as she noted herself, “differs from the common usage.” Her argument is built on a very peculiar and counterintuitive definition of selfishness, differing from both everyday use and dictionaries; she was well aware of how controversial and provocative such a step was, which is precisely why she justifies selfishness. Despite this remark, placed in the very first lines of the preface, Rand still insists that she is simply applying the dictionary definition of selfishness: “concern for one’s own interests.” But Rand overlooks a very important component of the dictionary definition of “selfishness”—disregard and lack of respect for others. This point, as it turns out, is very important both in everyday life and in our discussion of the link between libertarianism and selfishness.

Libertarianism implies a fundamental modesty: we should not be so blinded by our ideals as to forcibly compel [hello GULAG and prison sentences for hate speech] others to follow them. Thus, it is important to understand that in some sense, the libertarian idea embodies a rejection of selfishness. One of the main concerns of libertarianism is that some people will use others as a means to achieve their own goals [when the forest is cut, chips fly], which entails selfishness of the most loathsome kind. Libertarians view everyone and every single person—including that guy on the left—as an important individual deserving of autonomy and dignity, possessing rights that must be protected from violent encroachments. Historically, libertarianism was a reaction to the blatant, irresponsible selfishness of the strong and the powerful. It is a fundamentally egalitarian viewpoint, according to which all people are equal in the sense that, completely regardless of our abilities, skin pigmentation, sex and gender [the same as sex, but if you say so, the Transformers will beat you up], language, and ethnicity, we all have the right to be free and pursue our own notions of a better life. This is simultaneously a radical idea and common sense, but it is not an idea that can be equated with “selfishness.” Put simply: “no one is free until we are all free.”

Selfishness is the arrogant belief that I know best and have the right to force everyone to live as I wish [church, ideologies, SJWs, the state]. Oscar Wilde perhaps expressed this better than anyone: “Selfishness is not living as one wishes to live, it is asking others to live as one wishes to live. Unselfishness is letting people live as they wish to live.” [trans. Oksana Kirichenko] The arrogance and complacency of the belief that I know better than others how they should live is a serious problem in itself, but added to it is the dangerous belief that I have the right, or even the duty, to use force to bring this belief to life. Obviously, this is wrong, but in politics, it is the norm. Libertarians are perceived as childishly minded egoists when they criticize, with undeniably logical ethical arguments, the unacceptability of such a state of affairs. We teach children that hitting and threatening others to get what one wants is unacceptable, but when it comes to the construction of all public institutions, this becomes not only acceptable behavior, but is presented as the best way of organizing society. Libertarians simply ask politely: “on what grounds, exactly, did you decide that among your rights there is a right to violate the rights of others?” Libertarians base their view on the conviction that we should treat others as free and equal, not as tools for achieving a desired end [whether it be ice cream or social justice]. This is sometimes called the law of equal liberty: people deserve—simply because they are human—to be free and do whatever they wish, as long as they do not violate the same liberty of others. People who support the idea that the state should create armed detachments to impose their understanding of the world and morality on people demonstrate an amazing overconfidence, believing their convictions to be the only correct ones. This overconfidence makes such people dangerous, prone to exceeding their authority and abusing power to achieve their ideals. And we are all prone to believing in the truth of our own ideals. As John Stuart Mill notes: “Very few people think it necessary to take any precaution against the possibility of their own views being mistaken, or admit the possibility that any opinion with which they are satisfied may be a case of error, which is itself a logical error.” Libertarians note the diversity of opinions and lifestyles; this position provides protection against the dominance of One Ideal, curbing its destructive potential.

The assumption that libertarians are selfish is an example of bad faith and self-deception, intellectual laziness, and an unfair way for a person to avoid the obligation to consider views on their merits. But while the critique of libertarianism as a philosophy grown out of selfishness is based on an unfair and inaccurate reading of libertarianism and its motives, we are not obliged to pay back in the same coin. Progressives, social democrats, socialists, and other pro-state creatures from the left side of the spectrum likely do not support the state solely to dominate and control those around them, even if this is an inevitable result of the expanding role of the state in our lives. Rather, they tend to mistakenly perceive the state as a virtuous social force aimed at protecting and supporting the most vulnerable and deprived. It would be one thing if they were fundamentally wrong only about what such a state is, how it behaves, and so on—but even the means to which this part of the left appeals do not yield the desired and expected empirical [visible, literally, physically tangible] results. On the contrary, they generate poverty and destitution, while libertarian principles of individual rights, genuine market competition, and private property ensure widespread prosperity and encourage generosity and social trust.

Libertarianism, in essence, is the clearest, most direct, and best path to those goals of the left that are worthwhile: ensuring that as many people as possible around the world have access to basic necessities, and opening the way to economic opportunities and security for the poorest strata of society. From a technical standpoint, those whose stated goals of government policy include the growth of the state, the restriction of free trade (both domestically and internationally), and the increase of the tax and regulatory burden are the primary enemies of the poor and oppressed; they actively hinder the mechanisms that create and distribute material values. Thus, as Jason Brennan notes in “Libertarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know,” when libertarians criticize, for example, the welfare state, it is not because of their “heartless indifference to the plight of the poor,” but “because they are convinced that the welfare state does more harm than good to the poor.” Political dialogue often (in fact, almost always) misses or confuses goals and means, assuming that political and social institutions designed to help the poor work as they should by design, rather than as they actually do.

It must be acknowledged that libertarianism mainly speaks (or, at least, should speak) about means, placing violations of the legitimate sphere of individual autonomy outside the bounds of acceptable behavior—completely regardless of the goals the individual pursues [one cannot drive people into paradise with a stick]. “I have often said,” writes Gandhi, “that if we attend to the means, the end will take care of itself.” Gandhi said this while arguing that non-violence is a practical path to national independence, but libertarians are guided by a broader and more principled interpretation of this idea. Following Gandhi, libertarians recognize that “we do not know our goal,” that the goal must be limited by the use of correct means and therefore “is defined not by our definitions, but by our actions.” Libertarians strive to treat other people appropriately—respectfully and decently—and we think that this constitutes a far better political program than the various forms of authoritarianism that have left so many scars in human history. Those who see in libertarianism only a reflection or rationalization of selfishness do not understand either its history or the philosophical positions that characterize it. Libertarians argue that there is nothing wrong with caring for oneself and pursuing one’s interests, but that our actions are limited by social reciprocity, the recognition of Others, and their inherent human value.

Stéphane Molinier, Practical Anarchy. Chapter 4.

I edited the fourth chapter of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molneux. The text is an impressive exercise in rhetoric. The author continues to motivate us to abandon the state in favor of anarchy using the following logical construct: the state is absolutely horrific, therefore, the absence of a state could be cool; if it turns out that coordination in a society without a state is possible in principle, then we should go for it. If this creates minor inconveniences, they can be tolerated, but the whole point is that no, it won’t, but on the contrary, it will only be better, and then it turns out that you endured the evil, ugly state just so that life would also be inconvenient—aren’t you idiots?

Mechanics of Freedom, Chapter 51

I continue to publish the translation of The Machinery of Freedom by David Friedman.

In the chapter Bargaining in Anarchy, the author analyzes how, in a Hobbesian state of nature where there are no means to compel each other to abide by agreements, these very agreements can arise and be observed at all. In other words, how people exit the state of war of all against all without any state. To explain this, a rather curious concept from game theory is introduced: Schelling points. I don’t know about you, but for me, the material was completely new, so I sincerely enjoyed the process of editing the text.

Eric Mack. Libertarianism. Chapter on Hume.

Today on our program is the promised chapter from Eric Mack’s book “Libertarianism,” dedicated to the views of David Hume as another of the precursors of this ideology. Despite the fact that Hume, opposing Locke (who was discussed in the previous chapter), denied both the social contract and natural rights, he quite sensibly supplemented Locke’s views on social organization with his description of the morality that arises in humans as social animals. Hume also formulates the resulting principles of justice, which lead to mutually beneficial social cooperation.

Mechanics of Freedom, chapters 49-50

I am starting to post the translation of the fifth part, The Machinery of Freedom.

As usual, everything begins with a poetic epigraph. In it, Friedman ironizes Hobbes’ idea of a mythical state of nature, in which a war of all against all occurs, and only the state is capable of protecting little people from this primitive horror. As for me, I had to recall how sonnets are structured.

Chapter 49, The First Legal System. Friedman announces his new book about legal systems that differ greatly from ours. At the time, it was still being written; now it is finished, but I haven’t tackled its translation yet. He asserts that literally all (or almost all) current legal systems originate from the fairly simple-to-understand tradition of blood feud, and then demonstrates this with several examples.

Chapter 50, Anarcho-Capitalism: The Kindergarten Version. Here, Friedman points out how this original legal system, through some simple tweaking, turns into the basic model of law and order under ancap—which has about as much relation to real modern models of stateless law enforcement as Robinson Crusoe’s economy has to a real economy.


Next, I will briefly switch to the translation of Eric Mack. Very little has been collected for it so far, but I hope you will encourage me with your donations. Details are on the translation page.

And a small curiosity illustrating the popular opinion that ancaps are usually not strong in mathematics. As the work neared completion, I clearly saw that my statistics for translated chapters weren’t adding up; I recounted them, and it turned out there are slightly more chapters in total, and slightly fewer have been translated, than I had previously shown in the images. Everything flows…

Practical Anarchy, Stephan Molynieux. Chapters 1-3.

I have edited the first three previously posted chapters of Practical Anarchy by Stephan Molinari. However, these are only formally three chapters; in terms of meaning, it is first a foreword, then an introduction, and finally some boundary conditions. I suspect that Molinari must be a very skilled lover, given such an approach to foreplay.

The style of the book is very lively and emotional, but somewhat overloaded. I tried to make it readable enough, and I hope I succeeded.

In the foreword, the author apologizes to the reader for daring to publish the book in open access, and for having the audacity to assume that the reader, having paid zero money, will devote more than zero time to reading it.

From the introduction to the first part, dedicated to methodology, the reader finds out that they are actually dealing with the second book of a trilogy, and also receives a new portion of authorial apologies—this time for the fact that the book will most likely cause some “butthurt.”

In the chapter on limitations, the author explains that he does not intend to describe in detail what color robes judges will wear under ancap, and generally would prefer the book to be perceived as a textbook rather than a handbook. Let us immediately apply this knowledge to the previously published chapters on dispute resolution organizations and stateless prisons.

There is still work to do on the previously translated chapters, but the completion of the draft translation is still far off, and your financial support could encourage the process. All details are before the table of contents.

Mechanics of Freedom, Chapter 48

I have finished the last chapter of the second edition of The Mechanics of Freedom, from 1989. Only the relatively fresh chapters of the third edition, published in 2015, remain. The chapter is strange and looks like a bit of an off-topic addition to this book, because instead of the mechanics of freedom, it tells about a little-known author of detective stories from the beginning of the 20th century – G.K. Chesterton. The ending of the first edition seemed somewhat more logical, in my opinion, and as it stands, this chapter looks like a kind of expanded appendix to the book.

The review describes what a great man Chesterton was, a true old-school liberal who successfully combined this with Catholicism and a certain indifference toward Jews. This is probably interesting to connoisseurs of Chesterton, and I generally like the stories about Father Brown — but, in my view, this chapter is redundant in The Mechanics of Freedom.

Next, I will give you a break from Friedman for a while and switch to Molinism.