In a short chapter with the strange title Capitalist Trucks, Friedman answers the question of how a state differs from a condominium, and also advises potential truck buyers on whether to buy a Kamaz.

On the one hand, Friedman’s arguments could encourage supporters of contractual jurisdictions. On the other hand, he also points out their limitations: such communities will inevitably be compact and small in number because the negative effect of scale is very pronounced in democracies. So enthusiasts of charter cities have something to think about. For example, whether their cities need a single system of law, or whether the development of most norms should be left to condominiums and other local organizations.

I published Chapter 59, regarding the problem of deriving the ought from the is in Ayn Rand, about a year ago. In it, Friedman examined the arguments for objectivist ethics in John Galt’s speech, found many logical holes, and stated that they cannot be closed by mere rhetoric.

In Chapter 60, The Economics of Vice and Virtue, the author analyzes moral qualities and actions from the perspective of economic analysis and game theory, thereby proposing his own approach to objectivism—that is, deriving the ought from the is. I have previously stated many times in discussions and answers to readers’ questions that a market society is more affluent and benevolent, and therefore less inclined toward the dominating desire to succeed at the expense of others than a society with strong state intervention. Friedman provided a more rigorous foundation for this empirical observation, for which he deserves thanks.

Chapter 58, Welfare and Immigration: The Second Part of the Argument, concludes the fifth part, The Mechanics of Freedom. While in Chapter 14, Friedman argued that labor immigration benefits both the migrants and the citizens, he now focuses on the fact that migrants may pursue the simple goal of living on welfare. He asserts that free migration is precisely what gives the government an incentive to reduce benefits, whereas high immigration barriers allow the level of redistribution to remain high. Thus, for proponents of a small state, it is entirely justified to either start by reducing benefits and then open the gates, or start by easing migration, and then the demand for reducing benefits will inevitably emerge.

It seems to me that Friedman relies too heavily on economics here, failing to consider the factor of populism in democratic countries.

And so, having finished the fifth part, I dove straight into the sixth, and first translated the poetic introduction, so the poems in this book are now seemingly dealt with.

The new chapter of The Machinery of Freedom, Default Rules, Economies of Scale, and the Stability Problem, is a more in-depth analysis of the possibility of a stateless society’s collapse compared to the first edition of the book. Forty years ago, the author’s mood was more overconfident, but later serious objections were raised against the proposed model, and he had to make a number of clarifications.

The key clarification was the idea that regardless of whether a state exists or not, the social contract is simply a peaceful agreement on which distribution of rights will not provoke people’s desire to violently change the status quo. This echoes, in some ways, my formulation that rights are claims that are tolerated. Then, Friedman adds the apparatus of Schelling points used in several previous chapters and shows that a stateless society is indeed susceptible to the danger of collapse during its formative stage, but if the rules become more or less settled, the resulting inertia will then provide the necessary stability.

I present the translation of another chapter of The Machinery of Freedom, Anarchy and Effective Law. Here, Friedman recalls his description of the legal system in a free market and applies a standard economic efficiency analysis to it. The conclusion is that in the market for law, the benefit of law providers and its enforcers is not always precisely linked to the benefit of the clients of the respective agencies. In other words, ancap does not lead to one hundred percent justice for all, and the field of private law is also subject to market failures (which Friedman analyzes in detail in the previous chapter). Nevertheless, attempts to establish legal norms through political mechanisms are subject to similar failures to a much greater extent, so overall, the market still decides.